MAGISTRATES - MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS IN RELATION TO MAGISTRATES
PUBLIC SERVICE - APPOINTMENT UNDER PUBLIC SERVICE AND SIMILAR ACTS - WHO ARE AND WHO MAY BE SO EMPLOYED - STATES OR TERRITORIES
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES
EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - UNDUE INFLUENCE AND DURESS - PRESUMPTION FROM RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIES
Plaintiff seeking declarations that his resignation as a magistrate is a nullity and that he continues to hold office as a magistrate - plaintiff convicted by a jury of criminal offences - convictions quashed on appeal and a nolle prosequi entered - immediately after jury verdicts plaintiff gave written notice of intention to resign with effect from a nominated date - whether there is a distinction between a notice of intention to resign and a notice of resignation - whether Magistrates Act 1983 requires more than a notice of intention to resign in order that a resignation may be effected - whether Magistrates Act permits a notice of resignation to be withdrawn unilaterally or by agreement - whether Chief Magistrate procured letter of resignation by undue influence or unconscionable conduct - whether resignation coerced - whether Chief Magistrate an agent of Attorney-General - whether plaintiff an employee of the Crown working under a contract of employment - whether resignation constituted a constructive dismissal of the plaintiff's employment.
Held: the notice of intention to resign had the same effect as a notice of resignation - discussion of use of provisions in other statutes in construction of provision in Magistrates Act - unilateral withdrawal of a notice of resignation by a magistrate not permitted - discussion of inferences to be drawn from defendant's failure to call a relevant witness - letter of resignation not procured by undue influence or unconscionable conduct - resignation an independent and voluntary act by plaintiff - Chief Magistrate not acting as agent of Attorney-General - no unconscionable conduct by Attorney-General - letter of resignation not a nullity - plaintiff not denied procedural fairness - magistrate not an employee of the Crown - no constructive dismissal - plaintiff's claim dismissed.
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Frederick v State of South Australia involved a claim by the plaintiff, a former magistrate, seeking declarations that his resignation was not effective and that he had continued to hold office since 10 September 2004. The plaintiff's claim was based on several alternative grounds, including whether his resignation was validly executed and whether it was influenced by undue pressure from the Chief Magistrate. The court was required to interpret the provisions of the Magistrates Act 1983, determine whether a notice of intention to resign had the same effect as a notice of resignation, and examine whether the resignation was procured by undue influence or unconscionable conduct. The court also needed to decide whether the Chief Magistrate acted as an agent of the Attorney-General and whether the plaintiff's resignation constituted a constructive dismissal.
The court found that a notice of intention to resign had the same effect as a notice of resignation under the Magistrates Act 1983. It held that the unilateral withdrawal of a notice of resignation by a magistrate was not permitted. The court further determined that the letter of resignation was not procured by undue influence or unconscionable conduct, and that the resignation was an independent and voluntary act by the plaintiff. The Chief Magistrate was not acting as an agent of the Attorney-General, and there was no unconscionable conduct by the Attorney-General. The resignation was not a nullity, and the plaintiff was not denied procedural fairness. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not an employee of the Crown and that there was no constructive dismissal. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.
The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the Magistrates Act 1983 and the evidence presented in the case. The court found that the plaintiff's resignation was validly executed and that he had no continuing claim to hold office as a magistrate. The plaintiff's claim was dismissed, and the court's decision stands as a definitive interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Magistrates Act 1983.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
By these proceedings, the plaintiff seeks declarations to the effect that his resignation was not effective and that he has continued to hold office as a magistrate under the Magistrates Act 1983 since 10 September 2004. Background The plaintiff puts his claim on a number of alternative bases. Before identifying those bases, it is appropriate to set out some matters of background. The matters which I now identify as background constitute preliminary findings of fact. For the most part these matters were common ground. The plaintiff was appointed as a magistrate on 10 December 1987. That appointment was made pursuant to the Magistrates Act 1983. The plaintiff held office as a magistrate until the events of August and September 2004 which give rise to these proceedings. On 1 September 2003, the plaintiff was charged with four counts of unlawful sexual intercourse contrary to s 49(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (“CLCA”) and one count of indecent assault contrary to s 56 of the CLCA. The offences were alleged to have been committed in the period between January and October 1983. The trial of these charges took place in the District Court before a judge and jury in August 2004. At the trial, the plaintiff was represented by Ms B J Powell QC and Mr S C Ey. The jury verdicts were delivered on 10 August 2004. The plaintiff was acquitted on three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse, but found guilty of one offence of unlawful sexual intercourse and of the offence of indecent assault. During 2003 and 2004 Mr Kelvyn Prescott held the office of Chief Magistrate. Mr Prescott had been present in and about the District Court for much of the plaintiff’s trial and was present when the verdicts were given. Shortly after the verdicts Mr Prescott asked to have a meeting with the plaintiff and his wife. That meeting took place in a conference room on the fifth floor of the Sir Samuel Way Building about 20 minutes after the jury verdicts. Those present were the plaintiff, his wife, Mr Prescott and Mr Anderson, the Senior Media Liaison Officer of the Courts Administration Authority. Neither Ms Powell QC nor Mr Ey was present. Each had had to leave the court shortly after the verdicts in order to attend to other matters. I accept the evidence of Ms Powell and Mr Ey that they had not been informed of the matters to be discussed at the meeting. The content of the discussion which took place in the conference room will have to be the subject of more detailed findings later in these reasons. But, in general terms, it is plain that Mr Prescott, after stating that he was speaking as the Chief Magistrate, raised, in light of the jury verdicts, the question of the plaintiff continuing to hold office as a magistrate, the prospect of his being suspended from that office and the prospect of action being taken to remove him from office. During the course of the discussion, Mr Prescott showed to the plaintiff a copy of ss 10 and 11 of the Magistrates Act, the subject matter of which is the suspension and removal of a magistrate from office. Mr Prescott produced a letter of resignation which had been prepared in the plaintiff’s name. After some further discussion the plaintiff signed the letter of resignation and returned it to Mr Prescott. The substantive part of the letter was as follows:Dear Attorney-GeneralOn 10 August 2004 I was found guilty of an indictable offence. Although I intend to appeal against the finding of guilt I realise that my position as a magistrate is now untenable regardless and I therefore give notice of my intention to resign, effective on 10 September 2004 (s 9(2) Magistrates Act 1983).Yours faithfullyM E FREDERICK SM
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The Act also provides for circumstances in which a magistrate may be removed from office. Section 11(1) provides:The Attorney-General may, of his own motion, and shall, at the request of the Chief Justice made after consultation with the Chief Magistrate, conduct an investigation in order to determine whether proper cause exists for removing a magistrate from office.The following provisions in s 11 provide for a judicial inquiry to be carried out by a single judge of the Supreme Court to determine whether “proper cause” exists for the removal of the magistrate. A conviction for an indictable offence constitutes proper cause for the removal of a magistrate from office (s 11(8)(b)). Subsections (5) and (6) provide:(5) Where-- (a) a magistrate is convicted of an indictable offence; or (b) it appears from the findings made upon a judicial inquiry under this section that proper cause exists for removing a magistrate from office, the Attorney-General shall apply to the Full Court for a determination of whether the magistrate should be removed from office. (6) Where the Full Court determines, upon an application under subsection (5), that a magistrate should be removed from office, the Governor may remove him from office.Section 12 provides:Except as provided in this Act, a magistrate shall not be removed or suspended from office.The Evidence at the Trial The plaintiff gave evidence himself and also led evidence from his wife, from Ms Powell QC and from Mr Ey. In addition, a number of documentary exhibits were tendered. The exhibits included an aide-mémoire prepared by Mr Prescott on 19 August 2004 regarding the meeting in the conference room on 10 August 2004, an aide-mémoire prepared by Mr Anderson at about the same time, and a letter from Mr Prescott to the Acting Crown Solicitor dated 24 August 2004 in which Mr Prescott gave a detailed account of his involvement with the plaintiff in relation to the charges, the resignation letter, and subsequent events. The defendant adduced evidence from Mr Anderson. The Solicitor-General, who appeared with Mr Ikonomopoulos, indicated in opening that Mr Prescott would also be called. However, the Solicitor-General later said that Mr Prescott would not be called. No explanation was proffered. I infer that Mr Prescott was available to be called.Jones v Dunkel Relying on Jones v Dunkel[1] Mr Heywood-Smith QC submitted first that the Court should drawn the inference that had Mr Prescott been called, his evidence on topics in dispute would not have assisted the defence. Secondly, he drew attention to a number of matters upon which he had been unable to cross-examine Mr Prescott (or, as Mr Heywood-Smith QC put it, on which cross-examination had been denied). His submission seemed to be that cross-examination of Mr Prescott on those topics would have revealed matters unfavourable to the defence case, and that the Court ought to view the evidence in that light.[1] (1959) 101 CLR 298. The inferences which might be drawn in a civil trial from the failure of one party to give or call relevant evidence were stated by the majority in RPS v The Queen[2] as follows:[2] (2000) 199 CLR 620 at 632 [26].In a civil trial there will very often be a reasonable expectation that a party would give or call relevant evidence. It will, therefore, be open in such a case to conclude that the failure of a party (or someone in that party’s camp) to give evidence leads rationally to an inference that the evidence of that party or witness would not help the party’s case and that: “Where an inference is open from facts proved by direct evidence and the question is whether it should be drawn, the circumstance that the defendant disputing it might have proved the contrary had he chosen to give evidence is properly to be taken into account as a circumstance in favour of drawing the inference”. [Citations omitted]In O’Donnell v Reichard[3], Norris and Newton JJ said:It is sufficient to say that in our opinion for the purposes of the present case the law may be stated to be that where a party without explanation fails to call as a witness a person whom he might reasonably be expected to call, if that person’s evidence would be favourable to him, then, although the jury may not treat as evidence what they may as a matter of speculation think that that person would have said if he had been called as a witness, nevertheless it is open to the jury to infer that that person’s evidence would not have helped that party’s case; if the jury draw that inference, then they may properly take it into account against the party in question for two purposes, namely:(a)in deciding whether to accept any particular evidence, which has in fact been given, either for or against that party, and which relates to a matter with respect to which the person not called as a witness could have spoken; and(b)in deciding whether to draw inferences of fact, which are open to them upon evidence which has been given, again in relation to matters with respect to which the person not called as a witness could have spoken.This statement of principle was approved in the majority judgment in Brandi v Mingot:[4]The third comment we would make is that, in our view, the learned trial judge’s direction to the jury, in the terms summarised above was, in any event, correct and is to be preferred to the somewhat different statement of the position by the Full Court. In the authority relied upon by the Full Court, O’Donnell v Reichard, the joint judgment of Newton and Norris JJ does, we think, correctly state the law when it says that a jury may infer that the evidence of the absent witness “would not have helped that party’s case”. This is just what the jury were told in the present case. With this may be contrasted the view expressed in the judgment now under appeal, that the proper inference is that the absent witness’s evidence would have exposed facts unfavourable to the case of the party failing to call that witness. This latter approach reflects the views of Wigmore, as Street J observed in Dilosa v Latec Finance Pty Ltd. Like Street J, we too regard a narrower view, as expressed in the joint judgment in O’Donnell v Reichard as that which has come to be accepted in Australia …”. (Citations omitted)[3] [1975] VR 916 at 929.[4] (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 559.
Decision
Reasons for decision
It is not necessary to consider whether, had a finding of constructive dismissal been made, the effect would have been that the contract was still on foot so that a declaration of the kind sought by the plaintiff could have been made in any event.Conclusion For the reasons given above, none of the alternate bases upon which the plaintiff put his claim is made out. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.