Pt Krakatau Steel v Felix Resources

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

PT KRAKATAU STEEL v FELIX RESOURCES & ORS

[2010] SASC 170

Judgment of The Honourable Justice White

9 June 2010

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS - OTHER MATTERS

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS - IMPLIED TERMS - GENERALLY

ESTOPPEL - ESTOPPEL IN PAIS - EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL - PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

TRADE AND COMMERCE - TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) AND RELATED LEGISLATION - CONSUMER PROTECTION - MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT OR FALSE REPRESENTATIONS - MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT GENERALLY

CORPORATIONS - MEMBERSHIP, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES - MEMBERS' REMEDIES AND INTERNAL DISPUTES - OPPRESSIVE OR UNFAIR CONDUCT - WHAT CONSTITUTES - GENERALLY

Plaintiff and the first and second defendants are shareholders in the third defendant - an attempt by the third defendant to establish the viability of pig iron production using a particular technology was unsuccessful and was abandoned - plaintiff seeks to recover the amount of its investment in the project - the relationship of the parties was governed by two agreements:  the "State Agreement" and the "Shareholders Agreement" - the plaintiff claimed that cl 11.2.5 of the Shareholders Agreement required the defendants to grant it access to mineral deposits from which it could recover iron ore or coal of equivalent value to the amount of its investment, thereby rendering its investment cash neutral.

Whether the defendants breached cl 11.2.5 - whether the first defendant breached express terms of the Shareholders Agreement by divesting its interest in a subsidiary and by relinquishing exploration licences - whether the first defendant breached an implied term of the Shareholders Agreement to do what was reasonably necessary to allow the plaintiff to have the benefit of cl 11.2.5 - whether the first defendant breached an implied term of the Shareholders Agreement requiring it, upon request, to transfer title to coal deposits to the third defendant - whether the second defendant breached the Shareholders Agreement by its disposal of the technology used in the project.

Whether the first and second defendants are estopped from denying a construction of cl 11.2.5 which would give the plaintiff the right to obtain iron ore or coal to the value of its contribution to the project, or the same rights which were conferred under a previous agreement - whether an estoppel arose on the basis of representations made by representatives of the first and second defendants or upon a conventional basis.

Whether, in the event that cl 11.2.5 of the Shareholder's Agreement did not entitle the plaintiff to obtain iron ore or coal to recoup the amount of its contribution in addition to the extraction and transportation costs, the clause should be rectified to give it that effect.

Whether representations made by the first and second defendants amounted to misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).

Whether the parties owed fiduciary duties to each other - whether the defendants breached those obligations.

Whether the…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 170
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Pt Krakatau Steel, the plaintiff, initiated legal proceedings against Felix Resources, the first defendant, and Ausmelt Limited, the second defendant, over alleged breaches of contractual obligations and other claims related to an investment in a pig iron production project. The dispute revolves around the interpretation and enforcement of two key agreements: the State Agreement and the Shareholders Agreement. The plaintiff sought to recover its investment in the project by claiming that the defendants failed to fulfil certain contractual obligations, including granting access to mineral deposits and ensuring the project's viability.

The primary legal issues the court needed to address were whether the defendants breached specific clauses of the Shareholders Agreement, including Clause 11.2.5, which the plaintiff argued required the defendants to facilitate a cash-neutral investment. The court also had to determine if the first defendant breached other express terms of the Shareholders Agreement and whether there were any implied terms that the defendants failed to honour. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the second defendant's actions in disposing of project technology constituted a breach of the Shareholders Agreement.

The court's reasoning focused on the objective interpretation of the agreements, applying the principle that the parties' subjective intentions are not determinative. Instead, the court considered what a reasonable person would have understood the contractual terms to mean, taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the purpose of the transaction. The court rejected the plaintiff's reliance on subjective evidence of prior negotiations, emphasizing that only objective evidence relevant to the agreements' interpretation was admissible. The court found that despite the plaintiff's claims, the defendants did not breach the Shareholders Agreement, and the plaintiff's investment did not become cash neutral as alleged.

The court's final orders dismissed the plaintiff's claims against the defendants, finding no breaches of the Shareholders Agreement and rejecting the plaintiff's claims for rectification, estoppel, and misleading or deceptive conduct. The defendants were found not liable for the plaintiff's investment losses.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

PTKS alleged that each of Felix and Ausmelt had breached cl 11.2.5 of the SHA by failing to procure SASE to take the steps contemplated by that clause by which its contribution of US$2.5m could have been rendered “approximately cash neutral”, and that each of Felix and Ausmelt had breached cl 15.3 of the SHA. It alleged, in the alternative, that SASE itself had breached cl 11.2.5. PTKS claimed that Felix by itself had breached cll 10.1, 10.2, 15.2.1 and 15.2.2 of the SHA, and that Ausmelt by itself had breached cl 15.1.5.The Admissible Evidence Because of its relevance to the rectification and misleading and deceptive conduct claims in particular, the parties adduced a considerable amount of evidence concerning their antecedent negotiations for the SHA. If PTKS’ claim had been confined to allegations of breach of the SHA, much of that evidence, in particular that concerning their subjective intentions, would not have been admissible.[18] The fact that the evidence was received in relation to the rectification and misleading and deceptive conduct claims does not mean that the evidence may be used in relation to the contractual claims.[18] Cf Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52 at [35]; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at 177-8. The principle of objectivity by which the rights and liabilities of contracting parties are to be determined was recently affirmed by the High Court in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd:It is not the subjective beliefs or understandings of the parties about their rights and liabilities that govern their contractual relations. What matters is what each party by words and conduct would have led a reasonable person in the position of the other party to believe. References to the common intention of the parties to a contract are to be understood as referring to what a reasonable person would understand by the language in which the parties have expressed their agreement. The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction.[19] [Footnote omitted][19] Ibid at [40]; 179. See also Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd [2009] NSWCA 407 at [4], [322]; (2010) 264 ALR 15 at 21, 89 and the authorities therein cited. The principles concerning the use of evidence of the parties’ negotiations in the construction of contracts were stated by Mason J in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales[20] in the following passages:The true rule is that evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it has a plain meaning. Generally speaking facts existing when the contract was made will not be receivable as part of the surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, unless they were known to both parties, although, as we have seen, if the facts are notorious knowledge of them will be presumed.It is here that a difficulty arises with respect to the evidence of prior negotiations. Obviously the prior negotiations will tend to establish objective background facts which were known to both parties and the subject matter of the contract. To the extent to which they have this tendency they are admissible. But in so far as they consist of statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations they are not receivable. The point is that such statements and actions reveal the terms of the contract which the parties intended or hoped to make. They are superseded by, and merged in, the contract itself. The object of the parol evidence rule is to exclude them, the prior oral agreement of the parties being inadmissible in aid of construction, though admissible in an action for rectification.Consequently when the issue is which of two or more possible meanings is to be given to a contractual provision we look, not to the actual intentions, aspirations or expectations of the parties before or at the time of the contract, except in so far as they are expressed in the contract, but to the objective framework of facts within which the contract came into existence, and to the parties’ presumed intention in this setting.[21]Later authorities have made it clear that it is not necessary for a court first to identify some ambiguity in the parties’ contract before it can have regard to evidence of surrounding circumstances.[22] Hence, in construing the SHA, the Court should have regard not only to its text but also to the surrounding circumstances known to the parties and to the purpose and object of the transaction.[23] It should determine what a reasonable person would have understood the words used to mean. The Court should not have regard to the parties’ statements of their subjective intentions.It is not necessary in these reasons to review more fully the principles appropriate to the construction of commercial contracts. I note the recent review by Allsop P and Campbell JA in Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd. [24][20] (1982) 149 CLR 337.[21] Ibid at 352.[22] Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 70 at [11]; (2001) 210 CLR 181; Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA 35 at [22]; (2004) 218 CLR 451 at 462; Zhu v Treasurer of the State of New South Wales [2004] HCA 56 at [32]; (2004) 218 CLR 530 at 559; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52 at [40]; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at 179; International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd [2008] HCA 3 at [8], [53]; (2008) 234 CLR 151 at 160, 174.[23] Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA 35 at [22]; (2004) 218 CLR 451 at 462.[24] [2009] NSWCA 15 at [19]-[23], [239]-[292].Features of the SHA

Decision

Reasons for decision

Despite some initial difficulties in the demonstration plant’s operation, it did produce pig iron and, in particular, did produce a test shipment of pig iron of a quality acceptable by a commercial steel producer, as required for the Third Milestone in the SHA (cl 7.3). By early 2002, SASE was planning for the final feasibility study contemplated for the completion of the Third Milestone. The Decision of Felix to Cease Funding the SASE Project Mr Parker commenced as the Chief Operating Officer of Felix with effect from 7 January 2002. At that time Felix had incurred or committed approximately $20.6m in the operation of the demonstration plant and had incurred or committed an additional amount of approximately $1.8m for a preliminary feasibility study of the development of commercial iron-making operations by SASE. With the exception of the amount of US$2.5m which had been contributed by PTKS and the R & D Start Grant, the financing of the SASE Project had been provided entirely by Felix. In addition, Felix had incurred costs of approximately $6m in 2001 in constructing a trial coal pit at Ingomar. Mr Parker’s evidence about these matters was not contested and I accept it. Mr Parker informed the Board of Directors of Felix on 29 January 2002 of his preliminary view that SASE was unlikely to achieve the development of a 2.5 million tonne per annum (mtpa) project in a single step, if at all. The Board then directed him to investigate, in addition, the feasibility of SASE developing a 0.5 mtpa smelter in conjunction with OneSteel Ltd (which also had operations at Whyalla) or, alternatively, of SASE developing a 0.5 mtpa stand-alone smelter. The Directors of Felix discussed the SASE Project again at a “SASE Immersion Day” on 11 March 2002 and at their scheduled meeting on 13 March 2002. Recognising that OneSteel may not wish to participate in a feasibility study, Mr Parker recommended at that time that Felix should develop “a concurrent exit strategy”. At the next Board meeting on 5 April 2002, Mr Parker confirmed his preliminary view that it was not commercially viable for SASE to develop a 2.5 mtpa smelter and recommended that Felix should focus solely on assessing the and commercial viability of SASE developing a 0.5 mtpa smelter. The Board noted that a joint business case analysis involving Ausmelt, OneSteel and Thiess (the contractor who had built the demonstration plant) was to begin on 15 April 2002 and was expected to take eight weeks. Mr Parker also reported on negotiations which had taken place with Ausmelt concerning possible future funding of the SASE Project. Following the Board meeting, Felix lodged with the Australian Stock Exchange (ASE) a report which summarised the results of Mr Parker’s strategic review. The report (signed by Mr Arthur) contained the following:As a result of the Strategic Review and given the current uncertainties in markets, the Company has decided that the most prudent project development strategy seeking to achieve the goal of a 2.5 mtpa pig iron business is to now focus on an initial 500,000 tpy commercial smelter module at Whyalla (the “SASE Project”) using commercially available third party coal and iron ore feeds.This focused new approach will reduce initial Project capital costs scale-up and other risks. The Company anticipates that once a 500,000 tpy commercial pig iron smelter module is in operation, lower pig iron production costs may be achieved by switching to [Felix’s] own coal.The first phase of this new focused approach, before deciding to commit further significant cash resources to the SASE project, is to develop, in cooperation with its strategic stakeholders, a thorough business case assessment that is targeted for completion by mid – 2002.…Upon the feasibility study confirming the viability of the SASE Project, [Felix] will then seek the necessary project funding with a view to the smelter being completed and commercial qualities of pig iron being produced in 2005 for domestic and overseas markets.[14][14] Exhibit P1 at p 4128.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Asian Financial Crisis, which occurred during 1997 affected the ability of Maritosa and PTKS to meet their respective obligations under the SASE JVA. In April 1997 the parties executed amending agreements extending the time within which Maritosa could make its contribution and within which PTKS could make its further contribution. However, Maritosa still did not comply with its obligations and, on 26 November 1997, all parties agreed that Maritosa should cease to be a participant in the SASE Joint Venture. It took no further part thereafter.Incorporation of the Joint Venture Shortly after entering into the SASE JVA on 14 November 1996, the Australian participants realised that an unincorporated joint venture had some shortcomings, particularly in the raising of finance. Further, the parties contemplated making an application to the Australian Government for a Research and Development Start Grant, and such grants could be made only to Australian resident companies. They sought advice on whether the SASE Joint Venture should be incorporated. In anticipation of that advice, SASE (originally known as Ausmelt-MML Pty Ltd) was incorporated on 16 September 1997.[12] In December 1997, Ernst & Young recommended that the SASE Joint Venture be incorporated and Gresham Partners recommended that the parties hold their respective interests in the SASE Project and in the demonstration plant through SASE.[13][12] Exhibit P2 at [26].[13] Exhibit P1 at p 994. On 10 December 1997, AusIndustry (a department of the Australian Government) approved a grant (the R & D Start Grant) to Felix, Ausmelt, the Minister and PTKS as joint venturers, and for the purpose of the SASE Joint Venture. The amount of the R & D Start Grant was 50 per cent of the eligible project expenditure for the SASE Project or $6,532,329, whichever was the lesser. This meant that the joint venture had to fund at least $6,532,329 from its own resources if it was to receive the maximum grant. The R & D Start Grant was subject to certain conditions. The negotiation of those conditions and the entry by SASE into an agreement with AusIndustry was delayed for a number of reasons, including the negotiation of the incorporation of the terms of the SASE JVA into the SHA and into the State Agreement. The agreement relating to the R & D Start Grant was not executed until 16 December 1999 and payment of instalments of the R & D Grant commenced shortly afterwards. The decision to incorporate the SASE Joint Venture and to use SASE as the vehicle was made at a meeting of the Management Committee of the SASE Joint Venture on 12 January 1998. This meeting was attended by Mr Arthur as a representative of Felix, by three representatives of Ausmelt (including Mr McCammon, its Managing Director, and Mr Fogarty), three representatives from PTKS including Mr Bujang, then the Director of Technology within PTKS, and Mr Satrio, and by three representatives from the Department of Primary Industry and Resources (PIRSA) in South Australia representing the Minister. This was an important meeting as Mr Bujang was given assurances relied upon by PTKS in these proceedings to the effect that the entitlements and benefits of PTKS under the existing SASE JVA would be preserved and protected within the proposed incorporated structure. It will be necessary to return to the representations made at the meeting on 12 January 1998 and to their effect.