NEW SOUTH WALES. Gift-Fiduciary relationship-Undue influencePresumption-Rebuttal.
Wherever the relation between donor and donee is such that the latter is in a position to exercise dominion over the former by reason of the trust and confidence reposed in the latter, the presumption of undue influence is raised. To rebut the presumption it must be affirmatively shown by the donee that the gift was the pure, voluntary, well-understood act of the mind of the donor. April 8, 16;
A man sixty-seven years of age, who was wholly illiterate, of low intelligence and quite devoid of any capacity for, or experience in, business affairs, was habitually dependent on others for advice and assistance. After the death of his wife he transferred to a relative of his wife a piece of land on which his home was erected and which was substantially his only asset. The transfer was executed in the office of the donee's solicitor, and was expressed to be for natural love and affection. The donor did not have any independent advice concerning the transfer, but it was shown that he was appreciative of kindnesses shown from time to time by the donee to his wife and to himself. At the suit of the donor's son the transfer was set aside as having been made under the undue influence of the donee.
Held that an appeal from this decision must be dismissed :- By Latham C.J., Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ., because a special relation- ship of influence was shown by the circumstances to have arisen between the donee and the donor and the presumption of undue influence which arose from the relationship had not been rebutted.
By Starke J., because the evidence justified the finding of the primary judge that the transfer was the result, not of the full and deliberate judgment of the donor, but of unfair and undue pressure on the part of the donee.
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Nicholas J.) affirmed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
A suit was brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in its equitable jurisdiction by John Spencer Raymond Buttress, as administrator cum testamento annexo of the will of his deceased father, John Spencer Buttress, and as the assignee of one Agnes Emily Hart, the sole executrix and sole beneficiary under the will, against Mary Eliza Johnson. The plaintiff sought to set aside a document signed by the deceased on 24th April 1931, whereby he transferred or purported to transfer to the defendant a piece of land at Maroubra near Sydney, on which was erected a cottage in which the deceased had lived for many years. The plaintiff claimed that the document should be set aside because it was executed under the undue influence of the defendant, and he based this claim on the circumstances surrounding and immediately preceding the transfer, on the mental condition of the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Johnson v Buttress [1936] HCA 41
Case
[1936] HCA 41
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Johnson v Buttress* involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff, John Spencer Raymond Buttress, as administrator of his deceased father's estate, sought to set aside a transfer of land made by his father, John Spencer Buttress, to the defendant, Mary Eliza Johnson. The plaintiff contended that the transfer was procured by the undue influence of the defendant.
The High Court was required to determine whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales had erred in setting aside the transfer of land. Specifically, the court had to consider whether a presumption of undue influence arose from the relationship between the donor and the donee, and if so, whether that presumption had been rebutted by the donee. The court also considered whether, even in the absence of a presumption, the evidence supported a finding of actual undue influence or pressure exerted by the donee.
A majority of the High Court, comprising Latham C.J., Dixon, Evatt, and McTiernan JJ., dismissed the appeal. They found that the circumstances surrounding the transaction established a special relationship of influence between the donee and the donor, giving rise to a presumption of undue influence. This presumption, they held, had not been rebutted by the donee. Starke J. dismissed the appeal on the basis that the evidence justified the primary judge's finding that the transfer was not the result of the donor's full and deliberate judgment but rather of unfair and undue pressure from the donee. The court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.