Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Cleland

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER v CLELAND

[2021] SASCA 10

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Kelly, the Honourable Justice Livesey and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

17 March 2021

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AND UNSATISFACTORY PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT - GENERALLY

The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) found that the practitioner was guilty of professional misconduct in accepting the retainer to prepare two wills and a codicil for his aunt (the testator), despite knowing that he was a major beneficiary under those wills. Following the Tribunal’s decision, the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner) applied to this Court for orders pursuant to ss 89(1) and 88A of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (the Act) that disciplinary proceedings be commenced and that “appropriate disciplinary action” be taken pursuant to s 89(2) of the Act.

Held, per Livesey JA (Kelly P and Bleby JA agreeing):

1.      Given the number and seriousness of the adverse findings made against the practitioner, this is an appropriate case for the exercise of this Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction and powers.

2.      The purpose of exercising the Court’s disciplinary powers is to protect the public from legal practitioners who are ignorant of the basic rules of proper professional practice or who are indifferent to rudimentary professional requirements. The object of protecting the public includes deterring practitioners from wrongdoing and giving notice to all other practitioners that professional misconduct is not acceptable and will not be tolerated.

3.      The Court’s power to strike off, suspend or impose conditions upon an admitted practitioner is not necessarily dependent on the existence of a current practising certificate.

4.      Though the practitioner’s inexcusable ignorance of his fiduciary and ethical obligations is serious, it is not as a serious as a case where a solicitor is fully aware of the relevant rules but deliberately and flagrantly breaches them.

5.      The practitioner’s failure to keep appropriate contemporaneous records of his dealings with the testator and his disregard of the need to assess the testator’s testamentary capacity were not merely “cavalier” but, together with his misconduct generally, a serious dereliction of the duty to ensure that his client’s testamentary intentions were reflected in instruments that were protected from obvious risks and challenge. Observations made about the standard expected of solicitors in these circumstances.

6. This is not a case in which is it necessary to strike the practitioner’s name from the roll of practitioners pursuant to the inherent power of this court and s 89(2)(d) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA). In this case it is both necessary and appropriate to reprimand the practitioner, impose a substantial fine, impose an agreed prohibition on practice in wills and impose a 6 month period of suspension.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) ss 89(1), 89(2), 88A; Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules, referred to.

In Re a Solicitor [1975] QB 475; Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449, discussed.

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Details
Case
[2021] SASCA 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Livesey JA, Kelly P, and Bleby JA, considered disciplinary proceedings brought by the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner against a legal practitioner. The dispute concerned allegations of professional misconduct arising from the practitioner's dealings with a client, Ms. Cleland, particularly in relation to her will and his own potential benefit under it.

The Court was required to determine whether the practitioner's conduct constituted professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct, and if so, what disciplinary action was appropriate. Specifically, the Court had to consider the seriousness of the practitioner's ignorance of his fiduciary and ethical obligations, his failure to keep adequate records, and his disregard for assessing the testator's testamentary capacity. The Court also had to decide whether striking the practitioner's name from the roll of legal practitioners was necessary and in the public interest, or if other disciplinary measures would suffice.

The Court reasoned that the purpose of its disciplinary jurisdiction is to protect the public by deterring wrongdoing and signalling that professional misconduct will not be tolerated. While acknowledging the seriousness of the practitioner's inexcusable ignorance and his failure to ensure his client's testamentary intentions were properly reflected and protected, the Court distinguished this case from those involving deliberate and flagrant breaches of known rules. The Court found that the practitioner's wrongdoing was ignorant, cavalier, and incompetent, rather than dishonest or deliberate. Considering the practitioner's otherwise unblemished 20-year career, the limited scope and duration of the misconduct, his assistance in the proceedings, and his consent to a prohibition on practicing in wills, the Court concluded that striking off was not necessary.

Consequently, the Court ordered that the practitioner be reprimanded, pay a substantial fine, be prohibited from practicing in wills, and serve a six-month suspension from practice. The Court held that these measures were both necessary and appropriate to uphold professional standards and protect the public, without resorting to the most severe sanction of striking the practitioner's name from the roll.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held, per Livesey JA (Kelly P and Bleby JA agreeing):

1. Given the number and seriousness of the adverse findings made against the practitioner, this is an appropriate case for the exercise of this Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction and powers.

2. The purpose of exercising the Court’s disciplinary powers is to protect the public from legal practitioners who are ignorant of the basic rules of proper professional practice or who are indifferent to rudimentary professional requirements. The object of protecting the public includes deterring practitioners from wrongdoing and giving notice to all other practitioners that professional misconduct is not acceptable and will not be tolerated.

3. The Court’s power to strike off, suspend or impose conditions upon an admitted practitioner is not necessarily dependent on the existence of a current practising certificate.

4. Though the practitioner’s inexcusable ignorance of his fiduciary and ethical obligations is serious, it is not as a serious as a case where a solicitor is fully aware of the relevant rules but deliberately and flagrantly breaches them.

5. The practitioner’s failure to keep appropriate contemporaneous records of his dealings with the testator and his disregard of the need to assess the testator’s testamentary capacity were not merely “cavalier” but, together with his misconduct generally, a serious dereliction of the duty to ensure that his client’s testamentary intentions were reflected in instruments that were protected from obvious risks and challenge. Observations made about the standard expected of solicitors in these circumstances.

6. This is not a case in which is it necessary to strike the practitioner’s name from the roll of practitioners pursuant to the inherent power of this court and s 89(2)(d) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA). In this case it is both necessary and appropriate to reprimand the practitioner, impose a substantial fine, impose an agreed prohibition on practice in wills and impose a 6 month period of suspension.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, it is no answer to say that Ms Cleland intended to make the practitioner her major beneficiary and would have proceeded to benefit the practitioner even if he had observed his fiduciary and ethical duties. This is not a case concerning the recovery of loss suffered as the result of breach of fiduciary duty.[40] It is a case concerned with recognising and upholding proper legal and ethical standards in the legal profession. Whilst the intentions of Ms Cleland are not irrelevant, and certainly assist in understanding how the practitioner’s misconduct occurred, what Ms Cleland might have done had proper legal and ethical standards been observed cannot excuse or obviate the findings of serious professional misconduct made in this case.[40] And so does not raise the issue left by the High Court in Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449, 470-474, being whether the causation test applied in Brickenden v London Loan & Savings Co [1934] 3 DLR 465 is correct. Strike off and suspension: Conclusion I am nevertheless satisfied that this is not a case where it is necessary or in the public interest to remove the practitioner’s name from the roll of legal practitioners kept by this Court. His wrongdoing was neither deliberate nor dishonest.[41] It was ignorant, cavalier and incompetent. It was, moreover, confined to one client in a six-month period. It occurred in the context of a close family relationship, in an unfamiliar area of practice in an otherwise unblemished and creditable 20-year career as a legal practitioner.[41] Cf In re Practitioner of the Supreme Court [1941] SASR 48, 51 and In re a Practitioner (1982) 30 SASR 27, 32 (King CJ, with whom Mitchell and White JJ agreed) regarding deliberate misuse of trust account monies and a misleading and untrue explanation given to a Master. When one adds that the practitioner generally assisted in the disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal, that he belatedly accepted his failings in the course of these proceedings, and willingly consented to a condition prohibiting any legal work involving the drawing of wills, it may be concluded that there is little likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.[42] In addition, I agree that “the practitioner’s own moral character is such that the ignominy of the misconduct finding will operate as a deterrent”.[43] This is not a case where the practitioner so lacks the requisite qualities, character and trustworthiness expected of a legal practitioner in South Australia that strike off is necessary.[44][42] Demonstrating, it was said, “an appreciation of, and insight into, the wrong”: Legal Services Commissioner v Pierpont [2018] NSWCATOD 160; Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee and Wells [2014] WASAT 112; Legal Services Commissioner v Lim [2011] QCAT 291, [16].[43] Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v P [2003] NSWCA 320, [24]; The New South Wales Bar Association v Kalaf (New South Wales Court of Appeal, Kirby P, Samuels and Mahoney JJA, 11 October 1988).[44] Inre a Practitioner (1984) 36 SASR 590, 592-593 (King CJ, with whom Zelling and Jacobs JJ agreed).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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