Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Clisby

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Application)

LEGAL PRACTITIONERS CONDUCT BOARD v CLISBY

[2012] SASCFC 43

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Anderson and The Honourable Justice Stanley)

1 May 2012

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - PRACTISING CERTIFICATES - CANCELLATION AND SUSPENSION

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - DUTIES AND LIABILITIES - DUTIES TO COURT - OTHER MATTERS

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS

Application by the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board for an order that the name of the legal practitioner be struck off the roll of legal practitioners - where the defendant had been found by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal to be guilty of unprofessional conduct - the findings of unprofessional conduct related to the defendant's conduct in relation to 12 clients concerning migration law - conduct took place in 2003/2004 - whether the name of the legal practitioner be struck off the roll having regard to his continuation in practice since that time - whether the practitioner should have conditions imposed on his practising certificate - whether any other sanction appropriate.

Held:  Application to strike the legal practitioner's name from the roll of legal practitioners is dismissed - suspension for 2 years appropriate sanction in the circumstances.

Legal Practitioners Act (1981) (SA) s 82(6)(a)(v), s 82(6)(v), s 89(2)(c), s 89(2)(d) and s 89A; Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474, referred to.
Wentworth v NSW Bar Association (1982) 176 CLR 239; Law Society of South Australia v Murphy (1999) 201 LSJS 456; NSW Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 117 CLR 177; Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Lind (2011) 110 SASR 531; A Solicitor v Law Society (NSW) (2004) 216 CLR 253; Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Patterson (2011) 110 SASR 500; Law Society (SA) v Rodda (2002) 83 SASR 541; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476; R, In re (a practitioner of the Supreme Court) [1927] SASR 58; Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Phillips (2002) 83 SASR 467; A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (2004) 216 CLR 253; Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Boylen (2003) 229 LSJS 32; Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279; A Practitioner, Re (1984) 36 SASR 590; Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630; Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Hay (2001) 83 SASR 454, considered.

LEGAL PRACTITIONERS CONDUCT BOARD v CLISBY
[2012] SASCFC 43

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Anderson and Stanley JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ and STANLEY J:            The nature and circumstances of the conduct of the practitioner which has led the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board to seek an order that his name be struck off the Roll of Practitioners is set out in the reasons for judgment of Anderson J.  We do not repeat them.

  2. As Anderson…

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Details
Case
[2012] SASCFC 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Legal Practitioners Conduct Board applied to the Supreme Court of South Australia for an order striking the name of the legal practitioner, Mr. Clisby, from the roll of legal practitioners. This application followed findings by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal that Mr. Clisby had engaged in unprofessional conduct in relation to 12 clients concerning migration law between 2003 and 2004. The Board sought this order despite Mr. Clisby's continued practice since the time of the conduct.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether Mr. Clisby's name should be struck off the roll of legal practitioners, or alternatively, whether conditions should be imposed on his practising certificate, or if any other sanction was appropriate, given the findings of unprofessional conduct and his subsequent continuation in practice. The Court was required to consider the seriousness of the conduct, the public interest, and the object of disciplinary proceedings, which is the protection of the public rather than the punishment of the practitioner.

The Court acknowledged that Mr. Clisby's conduct in 2003-2004 was indeed unprofessional and could have warranted striking him off the roll at that time. However, the Court also noted the significant delays in the matter reaching this stage and that Mr. Clisby had continued to practice competently and professionally for approximately seven to eight years since the conduct occurred. While one judge expressed an inclination to allow him to continue practice under strict supervision, the majority considered that a period of suspension was necessary to properly recognise the seriousness of his conduct and to uphold public confidence in the legal profession.

Consequently, the Court ordered that Mr. Clisby be suspended from practice for a limited period.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

As can be seen, there have been a series of delays in the progress of this matter to this stage. I will discuss the significance of those delays in due course insofar as they might be relevant to any order that the name of the legal practitioner be struck off the roll.Background The practitioner commenced legal practice in 1987. He commenced practising in the area of migration law in 1989. He received referrals from other solicitors and from migration agents to represent various migrants in their reviews of immigration decisions. In 2001, legislation was passed amending the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) which limited the scope of the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals in reviewing decisions. The practitioner challenged the validity of the legislation by commencing many judicial review proceedings in the High Court of Australia. The proceedings were in the names of the respective clients claiming judicial review. The proposed legislative change had been announced by the Federal Government in 1997. The practitioner before the amendment had kept a close watch on all reports and debates which took place over the next four years. He says in his affidavit that before the legislation was passed he formed the view that the proposal to introduce a privative clause into the Migration Act was possibly unconstitutional. The Migration Act was amended. Part 8 was repealed and replaced with a new section 474, which reads:Part 8—Judicial reviewDivision 1—Privative clause474 Decisions under Act are final(1) A privative clause decision:(a)is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2) In this section:“privative clause decision” means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) … The practitioner then took the view, after the legislation was passed, that the only way to avoid the effect of the privative clause was by invoking the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The amending legislation had pre-empted the possibility of applications to the High Court and placed a time limit of 35 days in which to appeal against a decision from the Migration Tribunal to the High Court. The practitioner says he considered that the privative clause was invalid. He then set about drafting a pro forma application for judicial review which could be issued in the High Court on behalf of all of his clients who were appellants. He received numerous referrals from migration agents and other solicitors. The number of these referrals grew rapidly, resulting in approximately 365 applications in the High Court. The practitioner believed that one of these matters would most likely be used as a test case before the High Court. However, the court decided to proceed with the hearing of another matter, plaintiffS157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 who was not one of the practitioner’s clients. At the conclusion of that hearing the High Court remitted all matters to the Federal Court. The Federal Court then set down strict timetables to progress the many applications remitted to it.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ ANDERSON J
The Board did not take any interim measures to protect the public by applying to have the practitioner’s practising certificate suspended. Seven or eight years have now passed since the practitioner’s unprofessional conduct and he has remained active and productive in the profession during that time.Conclusion In this matter it is not a question of deciding whether the conduct of the practitioner is unprofessional. He has admitted that it is. The question is whether that unprofessional conduct is of such a character as to require the practitioner’s name to be struck from the roll. This is not an easy question to answer on the facts of this case. That is because at this point in time there is nothing to show that the practitioner is acting other than in a competent and professional manner. He has now been conducting practice in this way for some seven or eight years. As I have said, the public interest demands that his conduct in 2003-2004 be scrutinised critically. It was certainly conduct for which he could have been struck off the roll. The object of the Act is not to punish the practitioner but to protect the public. My inclination is that marginally the practitioner should be allowed to continue in practice. Since preparing these reasons I have had the advantage of reading in draft the joint reasons of Doyle CJ and Stanley J. I agree generally with their comments concerning the maintenance of public confidence in the profession. It is an important consideration. I am aware that the Chief Justice and Stanley J consider that the practitioner should be suspended from practice for a limited period. Whereas I would have allowed him to continue in practice, albeit under strict conditions of supervision, I can see the merit in imposing a period of suspension to properly recognise the seriousness of his conduct and the need to uphold public confidence in the standards of the profession. I would therefore join in the order proposed by the other members of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ, ANDERSON J

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