Richardson v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

RICHARDSON v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER

[2017] SASC 30

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

15 March 2017

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AND MATTERS

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - LIMITATION OF PARTICULAR ACTIONS - PENALTIES AND FORFEITURE

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT - IMPROPER DEALINGS

Appeal from a decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal extending time for the respondent to lay five charges against the appellant on 30 April 2015. 

A Supreme Court judgment was obtained against Mr Frost, whom the appellant subsequently commenced acting for in November 1997.  In July 1998, a freezing order was made against Mr Frost and at the same time, Mr Frost appealed the Supreme Court judgment.  The appeal having been dismissed, Mr Frost applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court, which was refused in August 2000.  The appellant was acting for Mr Frost in all of those subsequent proceedings.

In January 1999 and February 2000, the appellant took two mortgages over property of which Mr Frost and his wife were registered proprietors, and in August 2000, Mr Frost granted a bill of sale and an assignment of a chose in action.  These purportedly secured Mr Frost’s legal fees which the appellant had not charged.  The appellant advised Mr Frost this was not in breach of the freezing order.

The appellant was declared bankrupt in September 2000, and Mr Sheahan was appointed trustee.  In June 2005, Mr Sheahan lodged a complaint with the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board as to the appellant’s conduct in relation to the mortgages, and in November 2009, Mr Sheahan sought declarations in the Federal Court that the mortgages were void.  Following judgment in favour of Mr Sheahan in June 2011, the appellant and Mr Frost unsuccessfully appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, and were refused special leave to appeal to the High Court in December 2012.

In 2007, the appellant requested the Board delay its investigation pending the outcome of related litigation.  The appellant notified the Board that the litigation had concluded in January 2013.  The Board laid charges against the appellant on 30 April 2015.

The appellant argued that the Tribunal should not have granted the Board an extension of time pursuant to section 82(2a) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) to lay charges against him.

Held: Appeal dismissed. An appeal from the grant or refusal of an application to extend time pursuant to s 82(2a) is to be determined in accordance with the approach of House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. The Tribunal is allowed considerable latitude in exercising its discretion under s 82(2a), constrained only by the statutory subject matter and object of the Act. In this case, the appellant did not make out any relevant error (at [52]).

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 82; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 233; Limitation of…

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Details
Case
[2017] SASC 30
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Richardson, appealed against a decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal to extend time for the respondent to lay five charges against him for professional misconduct. The charges stemmed from Richardson's actions in representing Allen Gordon Frost, including taking two mortgages over Frost's property. The respondent, Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner, argued that the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (SA) to extend the time limit for laying charges. Richardson argued that the Tribunal had erred in its decision, particularly in not recognising the onus of proof was on the respondent to demonstrate a fair trial was possible, and in finding an acceptable explanation for the delay in laying charges.

The court had to determine whether the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion to extend the limitation period for laying charges, and whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the factors relevant to the exercise of that discretion. The court considered whether the Tribunal had correctly identified and balanced the relevant factors, including the length and explanation for the delay, the harm to the public interest if the extension was not granted, the prejudice to Richardson if the extension was granted, and Richardson's conduct relevant to the delay.

The court found that the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion. The Tribunal had considered the principles in Ulowski v Miller and had addressed the evidence relevant to the delay and its explanation, as well as the hardship, prejudice, and conduct of Richardson in relation to the delay. The court noted that while it is desirable for charges to be laid promptly, it is not always possible to do so within the prescribed limitation period. The Tribunal had appropriately balanced the relevant factors, including the public interest in the disposition of charges of serious professional misconduct and the need to maintain public confidence in the regulation of the legal profession against the legitimate need to protect a practitioner from stale complaints.

The appeal was dismissed. The court held that the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion under the Act to extend the time limit for laying charges against Richardson. The Tribunal had appropriately considered the relevant factors, including the length and explanation for the delay, the harm to the public interest if the extension was not granted, the prejudice to Richardson if the extension was granted, and Richardson's conduct relevant to the delay. The court found that there was no basis to interfere with the Tribunal's conclusion that there had not been a loss of evidence which would tend against the prospects of a fair trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal extending time to 30 April 2015 for the respondent to lay five charges against the appellant. Factual background The charges arise from conduct of the appellant in acting for a client, Allen Gordon Frost (Mr Frost). The appellant commenced acting for Mr Frost in about November 1997. A judgment had been obtained against Mr Frost in an action in the Supreme Court. Mr Frost was represented by other solicitors in that action. Following the judgment, Mr Frost’s professional indemnity insurer declined to indemnify him in respect of the judgment. In July 1998 a freezing order was made against Mr Frost. At the same time he instituted an appeal against the Supreme Court judgment. That was dismissed by the Full Court in July 1999. Mr Frost made an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. Leave was refused in August 2000. The appellant was acting for Mr Frost in those proceedings subsequent to the judgment at trial. In January 1999 and February 2000 the appellant took two mortgages over property of which Mr Frost and his wife were the registered proprietors. In August 2000 Mr Frost granted a bill of sale and an assignment of a chose in action purporting to secure legal fees which the appellant had not charged. The appellant advised Mr Frost that the mortgages could be granted without breaching the freezing order made in July 1998. The appellant asserts he did so on the advice of counsel, Mr Cummins, he had retained to act for Mr Frost. In September 2000 Mr Frost was declared bankrupt. Mr John Sheahan was appointed as his trustee. In June 2005 Mr Sheahan made a complaint to the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board (the Board) about the appellant’s conduct in relation to the mortgages. In October 2005 Mrs Frost commenced proceedings in the Family Court for a property settlement. Mr Sheahan was joined as a party to the proceedings. The appellant intervened in the Family Court proceedings and opposed Mrs Frost’s application for orders discharging the two mortgages on the basis, inter alia, that the consideration for each was his legal fees. In October 2005 the appellant also gave evidence to the Federal Court in Mr Frost’s bankruptcy examination. In November 2009 Mr Sheahan commenced proceedings in the Federal Court seeking, inter alia, declarations that the two mortgages were void. The appellant gave evidence before Mansfield J. In June 2011 Mansfield J gave judgment in favour of Mr Sheahan. The appellant and Mr Frost unsuccessfully appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. Special leave to appeal was refused by the High Court in December 2012. Following receipt of Mr Sheahan’s complaint, the Board undertook an investigation. It engaged in extensive correspondence with the appellant. In 2007 the appellant demanded that the Board suspend its investigation pending the outcome of the litigation in which the appellant was embroiled in the Family Court relating to the mortgages. It appears the Board acquiesced in this demand. The appellant notified the Board in January 2013 that the litigation had concluded.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In this case, for the reasons I have explained, there was no reversal of the onus. Further, it has not been demonstrated that there is any basis to interfere with the conclusion of the Tribunal that there has not been a loss of evidence which will tend against the prospects of a fair trial. In any event, as I have explained, I consider that, given the particular nature of these proceedings, which are not concerned merely with the enforcement of private rights but with the protection of the public interest, there is a balancing exercise to be undertaken in determining whether there is an unacceptable risk that the appellant will not enjoy a fair trial. That requires an assessment of the strength or importance of the public interest considerations relevant to the nature of the proceedings. Those considerations are the public interest in the disposition of charges of serious professional misconduct, and the need to maintain public confidence in the regulation of the legal profession against the legitimate need to protect a practitioner from stale complaints. There is nothing in that balancing exercise which compels a different conclusion from that reached by the Tribunal.Conclusion For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Against that background, I consider it relevant that, in exercising the discretion conferred by s 82(2a), the Tribunal should have regard to the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, the harm to the public interest if the extension of time is not granted, the prejudice to the practitioner if it is and the conduct of the practitioner, if any, relevant to the delay in laying the charges. This is the Ulowski v Miller[21] calculus broadly adopted to the work to be performed by s 82(2a) in the statutory regime established by the Act. [21] [1968] SASR 277 at 283.Consideration The appellant’s grounds of appeal fall into three broad categories. First, that the Tribunal erred in failing to recognise that the onus of demonstrating that a fair trial was possible was on the respondent, as opposed to finding that the appellant should have taken steps to preserve evidence. Second, it erred by giving insufficient weight to the prejudice suffered by the appellant in the delay in laying the charges which brought about a loss of documentary evidence and witnesses. Third, it erred in finding that there was an acceptable explanation for the delay in laying charges between 2005 and 2007 and then from January 2013 to April 2015. In my view, the appellant has not made out these grounds. The Tribunal approached its exercise of the discretion in accordance with the principles in Ulowski v Miller.[22] At the time of the Tribunal’s decision, the High Court had not delivered judgment in Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC.[23] The Tribunal separately addressed the evidence relevant to the length of the delay and the explanation for the delay on the one hand and the hardship, prejudice and conduct of the practitioner in relation to the delay on the other hand. From that foundation, it turned to the exercise of its discretion. [22] [1968] SASR 277.[23] [2016] HCA 37, (2016) 335 ALR 1. It is convenient to address first the grounds of appeal relating to the third category, namely, the explanation for the delay. It is undoubtedly desirable for charges to be laid promptly and it is unsatisfactory if they are not. The greater the delay, the greater the risk that relevant documents will be lost or destroyed and memories will deteriorate. However, recognition of those factors plainly does not prevent charges being laid outside the prescribed limitation period. Plainly, Parliament intended that this should occur in certain circumstances. In my view, the explanation for the delay must be considered in this case in two distinct ways. First, there is the question of the explanation for the delay which focusses attention on the conduct of the Commissioner and the Board in failing to lay charges before 30 April 2015. For this purpose, the period of “delay” only commences to run once a complaint had been made to the Board concerning the appellant’s conduct. This did not occur until 22 June 2005. Second, there is the question of delay which occasions actual prejudice to the appellant in his defence of the charges. For that purpose, the period of “delay” is the period between the conduct the subject of the charges and 30 April 2015. That is a period variously between nearly 17 years and four years.