Fittock v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil)

FITTOCK v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER

[2017] SASC 113

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone

31 July 2017

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AND MATTERS

Appeal against decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal extending time within which the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner might lay a charge against the appellant. 

Where application for an extension of time was made after substantial amendments to the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) came into force. Where the proposed charge were filed simultaneously with the extension application and endorsed as ‘laid subject to an order being made pursuant to s 82(2a)’. Where, by consent, extension application heard by the Tribunal constituted of one member.

Whether the Tribunal was properly constituted to hear the application and if so, whether the order extending time was a valid and effective exercise of jurisdiction.  Further, whether the exercise of discretion proceeded on a correct basis, having regard to its nature.

Held: Appeal allowed. Because jurisdiction to proceed on that charge could only be conferred if the extension were granted, it was not a ‘procedural or interlocutory matter’ within the meaning of s 80(1b): [18]. An assessment of such an application requires an assessment of the merits of the prospects of the prosecution succeeding: [26]. Order granting extension of time set aside.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 77J, s 77K, s 80, s 82, referred to.
Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Richardson (2016) 125 SASR 152; Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; Ulowski v Miller [1968] SASR 277; Keung v Abbott [2017] SASCFC 58; Finemores (No 3) v Evans [1998] SASC 6820; Hardell v Burrell (2009) 103 SASR 408; Richardson v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2017] SASC 30, considered.

FITTOCK v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER
[2017] SASC 113

Miscellaneous Appeal

  1. VANSTONE J:     Laurence John Fittock appeals against the decision of Ms M Pyke QC, the presiding member of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal to extend the time within which the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner might lay a charge against him.  The main argument presented is that the Tribunal, consisting only of one member, was not properly constituted and so the order extending time was neither a valid nor effective exercise of jurisdiction.  It is further argued that the exercise of discretion to extend time proceeded on an incorrect basis, that is, as if the issue were merely a procedural one. 

  2. For the reasons which follow the appeal succeeds.  The application will be remitted to the Tribunal for rehearing.

    Background

  3. The application for an extension of time was made on 15 September 2014 pursuant to s 82(2a) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (‘the Act’) which both sets a time limit within which the charges may be laid (three years) and empowers the…

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Details
Case
[2017] SASC 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Fittock v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner, the appellant challenged the validity of an order extending the time within which a charge could be laid against him under the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA). The appellant argued that the Tribunal, which granted the extension, was improperly constituted, lacked the power to make retrospective orders, and misapplied its discretion in granting the extension. The appeal centered on the interpretation and application of sections 80 and 82 of the Act, particularly in light of amendments that took effect on 1 July 2014.

The legal issues before the court included the proper composition of the Tribunal when considering an extension of time for laying a charge, the Tribunal's capacity to make retrospective orders, and whether the Tribunal's discretion to extend time was exercised correctly. The court had to determine whether the Tribunal, constituted by a single member, had the authority to grant the extension and if the decision was made in accordance with the statutory requirements and principles of natural justice.

The court found that the Tribunal should have consisted of three members, not a single member, to hear the application for an extension of time. The nature of the application did not qualify as a "procedural or interlocutory matter" under section 80(1b) of the Act, which would have allowed for a single-member Tribunal. The court also noted that the presiding member did not have sufficient material to assess the merits of the charge. Consequently, the appeal succeeded, and the order granting the extension was set aside. The case was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration, with the direction that it should be heard by a properly constituted panel of three members.

The final orders of the court included setting aside the order granting the extension of time and remitting the application to the Tribunal for fresh consideration by a properly constituted panel. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for the composition of the Tribunal and ensuring that all relevant material is considered before making any decision on an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow the appeal succeeds. The application will be remitted to the Tribunal for rehearing.Background The application for an extension of time was made on 15 September 2014 pursuant to s 82(2a) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (‘the Act’) which both sets a time limit within which the charges may be laid (three years) and empowers the Tribunal to allow an extension of time. Along with the application for an extension, the Commissioner filed the proposed charge against the appellant. The charge document was endorsed within the Registry as being ‘laid subject to an order being made pursuant to s 82(2a)’ of the Act. Under s 80 of the Act, but subject to exceptions, the Tribunal consists of a panel of three members. Under s 80(1b) it may consist of one member chosen by the presiding member if it is to deal with a ‘procedural or interlocutory matter’. It is plain that the Commissioner’s application was seen as being a procedural or interlocutory one, because, on 10 December 2014 the presiding member chose herself to constitute the Tribunal to hear the Commissioner’s application. The parties consented to that course. Following three directions hearings the application was argued before the Tribunal on 23 March 2015. On 9 January 2017 the presiding member delivered reasons for making an order extending the time within which the charges might be laid, to 15 September 2014. The appellant attacks that order on several bases. He argues that, notwithstanding his earlier acquiescence to the procedure followed, the Tribunal should have consisted of a panel of three and, as constituted, had no power to make the order. He submits that the Tribunal has no power to make retrospective orders. In any event, he puts that the exercise of discretion by the presiding member miscarried. It is convenient to set out parts of the sections of the Act upon which the appellant’s arguments rest. The relevant sections are 80 and 82 of the Act. These were altered by substantial amendments which came into force on 1 July 2014. In Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Richardson (2016) 125 SASR 152 the Full Court declared that the amended Act applies both to the commencement and prosecution of charges in the Tribunal whenever the conduct occurred: [25]. Sections 80 and 82 are found within Part 6, Division 3 of the Act. Section 80 is headed ‘Constitution and proceedings of Tribunal’. It relevantly provides:(1)Subject to subsection (1a), in relation to proceedings instituted before the Tribunal alleging professional misconduct by a legal practitioner, the Tribunal consists of a panel of three of its members chosen by the presiding member to constitute the Tribunal for the purposes of those proceedings (one of whom may be the presiding member).(1a)[applies to charges alleging conduct of a less serious nature, and need not be reproduced](1b)Despite subsections (1) and (1a), the Tribunal may, for the purposes of dealing with a procedural or interlocutory matter, consist of 1 of its members chosen by the presiding member to constitute the Tribunal or be otherwise constituted as determined by the presiding member.(1c)-(5)[not relevant]

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, in terms of the breadth of factors to be considered when assessing the application for an extension of time, a consideration of the merits was required. That view is consistent with the approach taken by the Full Court in Keung v Abbott. It appears from what I was told that the Tribunal member did not have before her sufficient material on which to assess whether the charge had reasonable prospects of succeeding. I do not mean to imply that such a test would be the appropriate one; merely that what was before the presiding member was not sufficient to make any assessment at all. Mr Wells sought to put further material before me in relation to that matter. That material should be placed before the Tribunal when it sits to reconsider the Commissioner’s application. There is force in Mr Wells’ argument that the Ulowski calculus has only limited relevance in weighing an application of this nature. However, it is unnecessary for me to deal with Mr Wells’ criticisms of the decision of Stanley J in Richardson. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons I consider that the appeal must succeed. The order granting an extension of time within which to lay a charge is set aside and the application is remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the exercise of discretion of the presiding member, Mr Cole relies on the decision of Stanley J, sitting as a single Judge, in Richardson v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2017] SASC 30, applying the Ulowski v Miller calculus. He submits that the presiding member proceeded in a manner consistent with Stanley J’s decision. He argues that the merits had been considered and there was evidence of that consideration in the reasons of the presiding member, when she said:It was submitted that the case involves dishonesty in dealing with a third party. The public expects such conduct to be dealt with in a manner which properly reflects the seriousness of the charge. The public interest supports the charge being laid. At the very least, Mr Cole submits the Tribunal had material before it, upon which it could consider the merits.Consideration The laying of a charge ‘under this section’ (s 82) gives rise to the Tribunal’s obligation to enquire under s 82(4). It is a jurisdictional fact. Here, it is acknowledged that the charge was not ‘laid under this section’. As the endorsement on it indicated, it was subject to an order being made pursuant to s 82(2a)(b). The laying of a charge in that form together with the application for an extension of time was sufficient, in my view, to give the Tribunal jurisdiction first, to consider whether the charge was laid ‘under this section’ and second, to hear the application for an extension. Because jurisdiction to proceed on that charge could only be conferred if an extension of time were granted, this was not ‘a procedural or interlocutory matter’ within the meaning of s 80(1b) and a tribunal consisting of three members should have been constituted to hear it. That the parties acquiesced in the presiding member sitting alone to hear it is not to the point. This is a sufficient basis on which to allow the appeal. However, I shall go on to express an opinion about some further parts of Mr Wells’ argument. I am not persuaded that the Commissioner was required to seek an extension of time before filing the charge, or that having obtained one he would need to file the charge again. There is no machinery in the Act to facilitate such an application, or to give the Tribunal power to entertain it in the absence of a charge being filed. Whether the Tribunal has been given power to make an order enlarging time nunc pro tunc is a matter of interpretation of the provisions of the Act. It may be accepted that a tribunal does not inherently possess such a power, but the Parliament might have chosen to give it that power. My earlier conclusion that the Act does not provide for a stand alone extension of time application is a basis for implying a power to make an order that any extension of time given is to operate on the charge as filed. In addition, the text of the provisions does not clearly imply that an extension of time application must be made before any charge is filed. Without a charge being filed there may be a question whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear an application for an extension of time.