SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil)
FITTOCK v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER
[2017] SASC 113
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone
31 July 2017
PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AND MATTERS
Appeal against decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal extending time within which the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner might lay a charge against the appellant.
Where application for an extension of time was made after substantial amendments to the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) came into force. Where the proposed charge were filed simultaneously with the extension application and endorsed as ‘laid subject to an order being made pursuant to s 82(2a)’. Where, by consent, extension application heard by the Tribunal constituted of one member.
Whether the Tribunal was properly constituted to hear the application and if so, whether the order extending time was a valid and effective exercise of jurisdiction. Further, whether the exercise of discretion proceeded on a correct basis, having regard to its nature.
Held: Appeal allowed. Because jurisdiction to proceed on that charge could only be conferred if the extension were granted, it was not a ‘procedural or interlocutory matter’ within the meaning of s 80(1b): [18]. An assessment of such an application requires an assessment of the merits of the prospects of the prosecution succeeding: [26]. Order granting extension of time set aside.
Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 77J, s 77K, s 80, s 82, referred to.
Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Richardson (2016) 125 SASR 152; Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; Ulowski v Miller [1968] SASR 277; Keung v Abbott [2017] SASCFC 58; Finemores (No 3) v Evans [1998] SASC 6820; Hardell v Burrell (2009) 103 SASR 408; Richardson v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2017] SASC 30, considered.
FITTOCK v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER
[2017] SASC 113Miscellaneous Appeal
VANSTONE J: Laurence John Fittock appeals against the decision of Ms M Pyke QC, the presiding member of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal to extend the time within which the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner might lay a charge against him. The main argument presented is that the Tribunal, consisting only of one member, was not properly constituted and so the order extending time was neither a valid nor effective exercise of jurisdiction. It is further argued that the exercise of discretion to extend time proceeded on an incorrect basis, that is, as if the issue were merely a procedural one.
For the reasons which follow the appeal succeeds. The application will be remitted to the Tribunal for rehearing.
Background
The application for an extension of time was made on 15 September 2014 pursuant to s 82(2a) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (‘the Act’) which both sets a time limit within which the charges may be laid (three years) and empowers the…
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- Case
- [2017] SASC 113
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included the proper composition of the Tribunal when considering an extension of time for laying a charge, the Tribunal's capacity to make retrospective orders, and whether the Tribunal's discretion to extend time was exercised correctly. The court had to determine whether the Tribunal, constituted by a single member, had the authority to grant the extension and if the decision was made in accordance with the statutory requirements and principles of natural justice.
The court found that the Tribunal should have consisted of three members, not a single member, to hear the application for an extension of time. The nature of the application did not qualify as a "procedural or interlocutory matter" under section 80(1b) of the Act, which would have allowed for a single-member Tribunal. The court also noted that the presiding member did not have sufficient material to assess the merits of the charge. Consequently, the appeal succeeded, and the order granting the extension was set aside. The case was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration, with the direction that it should be heard by a properly constituted panel of three members.
The final orders of the court included setting aside the order granting the extension of time and remitting the application to the Tribunal for fresh consideration by a properly constituted panel. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements for the composition of the Tribunal and ensuring that all relevant material is considered before making any decision on an extension of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the exercise of discretion of the presiding member, Mr Cole relies on the decision of Stanley J, sitting as a single Judge, in Richardson v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2017] SASC 30, applying the Ulowski v Miller calculus. He submits that the presiding member proceeded in a manner consistent with Stanley J’s decision. He argues that the merits had been considered and there was evidence of that consideration in the reasons of the presiding member, when she said:It was submitted that the case involves dishonesty in dealing with a third party. The public expects such conduct to be dealt with in a manner which properly reflects the seriousness of the charge. The public interest supports the charge being laid. At the very least, Mr Cole submits the Tribunal had material before it, upon which it could consider the merits.Consideration The laying of a charge ‘under this section’ (s 82) gives rise to the Tribunal’s obligation to enquire under s 82(4). It is a jurisdictional fact. Here, it is acknowledged that the charge was not ‘laid under this section’. As the endorsement on it indicated, it was subject to an order being made pursuant to s 82(2a)(b). The laying of a charge in that form together with the application for an extension of time was sufficient, in my view, to give the Tribunal jurisdiction first, to consider whether the charge was laid ‘under this section’ and second, to hear the application for an extension. Because jurisdiction to proceed on that charge could only be conferred if an extension of time were granted, this was not ‘a procedural or interlocutory matter’ within the meaning of s 80(1b) and a tribunal consisting of three members should have been constituted to hear it. That the parties acquiesced in the presiding member sitting alone to hear it is not to the point. This is a sufficient basis on which to allow the appeal. However, I shall go on to express an opinion about some further parts of Mr Wells’ argument. I am not persuaded that the Commissioner was required to seek an extension of time before filing the charge, or that having obtained one he would need to file the charge again. There is no machinery in the Act to facilitate such an application, or to give the Tribunal power to entertain it in the absence of a charge being filed. Whether the Tribunal has been given power to make an order enlarging time nunc pro tunc is a matter of interpretation of the provisions of the Act. It may be accepted that a tribunal does not inherently possess such a power, but the Parliament might have chosen to give it that power. My earlier conclusion that the Act does not provide for a stand alone extension of time application is a basis for implying a power to make an order that any extension of time given is to operate on the charge as filed. In addition, the text of the provisions does not clearly imply that an extension of time application must be made before any charge is filed. Without a charge being filed there may be a question whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear an application for an extension of time.