Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Richardson

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER v RICHARDSON

[2016] SASCFC 42

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Kelly, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

20 April 2016

PROCEDURE - INFERIOR COURTS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - OTHER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GENERALLY

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - EXTENSION OF TIME - GENERALLY

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - REVIEWABLE DECISIONS AND CONDUCT

Action seeking declarations.

On 30 April 2015, the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner laid in the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal a charge alleging unprofessional conduct by Mr Richardson. The charge contained three counts relating to conduct alleged to have occurred more than five years earlier and two counts alleging conduct some of which was alleged to have occurred more than five years earlier and some of which was to have occurred more than three years earlier.

On 1 July 2014, subsection 82(2a) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 had been amended to reduce the prima facie limitation for laying charges from five years to three years and to empower the Tribunal to allow an extension of time instead of the Attorney-General consenting to the laying of a charge outside the prima facie limitation period.

At a preliminary hearing of the charge before the Tribunal, the issue arose whether the Tribunal had power to allow an extension of time and whether the Commissioner had power to lay the charge. That issue turned on the question whether the amendment to subsection 82(2a) applied to conduct that occurred more than five years ago before 1 July 2014.

Held per Blue J (Kelly and Nicholson JJ agreeing):

1. On the proper construction of paragraph 14(1) of Schedule 2 to the Legal Practitioners (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013. The amended Act applied both to the commencement and prosecution of proceedings in the Tribunal (at [21]-[25]).

2. Paragraph 14(1) applies to proceedings commenced outside the old five year limitation period notwithstanding that they are commenced without the Attorney-General’s consent (at [21]–[25]).

3. The presumption than an amendment that increases or relaxes a limitation period is not intended to apply to a proceeding barred by the expiration of the limitation period in the absence of express provision or necessary intendment has no operation in light of the express provisions of paragraph 14(1) (at [25]).

4.       The Commissioner is entitled to declarations that the charge is not invalid to the extent that it relates to conduct that occurred more than five years before 1 July 2014 and that the Tribunal has power to allow an extension of time for the laying of the charge (at [26]–[28]).

Acts Interpretation Act 1915 SA s 16; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 14(1), s 14(2), s 71, s 72, s 74, s 82, s 82(2a), s 84, s 77J; Legal Practitioners (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013 (SA); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 48, referred to.
Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v…

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Details
Case
[2016] SASCFC 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered a dispute between the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner and Mr. Richardson. The matter concerned the validity of a charge laid by the Commissioner against Mr. Richardson, which related to conduct that occurred more than five years prior to the laying of the charge. The case was referred to the Full Court by consent of the parties.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the amended time limitation provisions under the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), as amended by the Legal Practitioners (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013 (SA), applied to conduct that occurred before the commencement of the amendments on 1 July 2014. Specifically, the court had to determine if a charge laid by the Commissioner, alleging misconduct that occurred more than five years before 1 July 2014, was invalid due to the time limitation provisions.

The court reasoned that the presumption that legislation operates prospectively did not apply in this instance. It noted that the amended legislation reduced the prima facie limitation period from five to three years but retained a discretionary power for the Tribunal to grant an extension of time. The court found that the transitional provisions, particularly clause 14(1) of Schedule 2 to the Amendment Act, evinced a clear intention that the amended Act, including its time limitation provisions, should apply to charges commenced and prosecuted in the Tribunal, regardless of when the conduct occurred. Therefore, the court concluded that the charge laid by the Commissioner was not invalid.

The court ordered that the charge laid by the Commissioner against Mr. Richardson was not invalid, even if it related to conduct that occurred more than five years before 1 July 2014. The court affirmed that the Tribunal had the power under section 82(2a) of the amended Act to allow an extension of time for the laying of the charge, and the merits of any such extension were a matter for the Tribunal to decide. The parties were to be heard on the precise form of the declarations to be made.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

By consent of the parties, the action was referred to the Full Court pursuant to section 48 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA).Background Before 1 July 2014, it was the function of the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board under section 74 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (the Act), amongst others, to investigate suspected misconduct by legal practitioners, impose sanctions in relation to minor misconduct, lay charges in the Tribunal alleging misconduct, and commence disciplinary proceedings in the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Tribunal. Before 1 July 2014, section 82 empowered the Board, the Attorney-General, the Law Society or any person aggrieved to lay a charge in the Tribunal alleging misconduct. Subsection 82(2a) provided that a charge laid in the Tribunal must be laid within five years of the relevant conduct unless laid by the Attorney-General or the Attorney-General gave written consent to the laying of the charge. On 1 July 2014, under amendments to the Act effected by the Legal Practitioners (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013 (SA) (the Amendment Act), the office of Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner was created. Gregory Mornington May was appointed as Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner) pursuant to section 71 of the amended Act. The functions of the Commissioner under section 72 of the amended Act encompassed and became more extensive than the functions of the Board under the unamended Act. Clause 13 of Schedule 2 to the Amendment Act (Schedule 2) provided for the transfer of functions from the Board to the Commissioner. It provided for the assumption on 1 July 2014 by the Commissioner of the conduct of a complaint, investigation, charge in the Tribunal or disciplinary proceeding in the Supreme Court formerly conducted by the Board. Clause 14(1) of Schedule 2 contained transitional provisions relating to complaints, investigations and disciplinary proceedings which it is necessary to analyse in some detail. On and from 1 July 2014, under the Amendment Act the concepts of “unsatisfactory conduct” and “unprofessional conduct” previously the subject of investigations by the Board and proceedings by the Board in the Tribunal and the Supreme Court were replaced by new concepts of “unsatisfactory professional conduct” and “professional misconduct”. The new concepts were defined in different terms to the old concepts and, speaking generally, were broader concepts. Clause 14(2) of Schedule 2 contained a transitional provision to the effect that the Amended Act applied in relation to conduct before 1 July 2014 but as if the new concepts were replaced with the old concepts as defined under the unamended Act. On and from 1 July 2014, subsection 82(2) empowered the Commissioner, the Attorney-General, the Law Society or any person aggrieved to lay a charge in the Tribunal alleging misconduct. Subsection 82(2a) provided that a charge laid in the Tribunal must be made within three years of the relevant conduct unless the charge is laid by the Attorney-General or the Tribunal allows an extension of time.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Richardson’s third contention must also be rejected. First, the presumption relied upon by Mr Richardson has reduced, if any, force when the time limitation is not absolute but is liable to be extended in the exercise of a discretion by a decision-maker.[2] The substitution of subsection 82(2a) effected by the amending Act reduced the prima facie limitation period from five to three years but continued to provide for a discretionary extension of the prima facie limitation period. In the latter respect, it changed the decision-maker from the Attorney-General to the Tribunal and changed the timing of the extension decision from being before laying of the charge to after laying of the charge. The legislature must have considered that it was preferable that the Tribunal make a judicial decision rather than the Attorney-General making an administrative decision on extension, and is likely to have considered that this change was in the interests of practitioners against whom charges might be laid. Given the nature of the change, the presumption on which Mr Richardson relies has no application to paragraph 14(1) of Schedule 2. Secondly, even when it applies, the presumption is subject to a contrary intention being manifested by transitional provisions expressly or by necessary intendment.[3] The provisions of paragraph 14(1) evince a clear intention that the amended Act, including its time limitation provisions, is to apply to the commencement and prosecution of charges in the Tribunal in respect of conduct whenever it occurred, including conduct occurring more than five years before 1 July 2014.[2] Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471 at 476 per Dixon CJ, 483-484 per Taylor J and 489-490 per Windeyer J; Rodgers v Revenue SA, Department of Treasury and Finance [2014] SASCFC 2, (2014) 240 IR 202 at [84] per Blue J (with whom Vanstone J agreed).[3] G F Heublein and Bro Incorporated v Continental Liqueurs Proprietary Limited (1962) 109 CLR 153 at 161-162 per Dixon CJ, Taylor and Windeyer J; Karounos v Flavel (1984) 75 FLR 46 at 55 per Zelling J (with whom Wells and Bollen JJ relevantly agreed); Jennings Constructions v Workers Rehabilitation & Compensation Corporation (1998) 71 SASR 465 at 472 per Doyle CJ (with whom Prior and Nyland JJ agreed).Conclusion The charge laid by the Commissioner against Mr Richardson on 30 April 2015 is not invalid because, or to the extent that, it relates to conduct that occurred more than five years before 1 July 2014. The Tribunal has power under section 82(2a) of the amended Act to allow an extension of time for the laying of the charge. Whether the Tribunal exercises its discretion to allow such an amendment on the merits is a matter for the Tribunal. I would hear the parties as to the precise form of the declarations to be made in light of the above conclusions.NICHOLSON J: I agree with Blue J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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