Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Thompson

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER v THOMPSON

[2018] SASCFC 102

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Kelly, The Honourable Justice Nicholson and The Honourable Justice Hinton)

4 October 2018

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT AND UNSATISFACTORY PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT - FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS AND TRANSACTIONS

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS

The Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (“Commissioner”) brought five charges against the practitioner in the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (“Tribunal”), alleging that the practitioner had engaged in unprofessional conduct. The conduct occurred between October 2010 and March 2011. All charges related to the practitioner’s client K. The charges included that the practitioner had misled Masters of the District Court, prepared and executed affidavits knowing them to contain false and misleading information and that he had fabricated the contents of K’s file.

At a hearing in the Tribunal, the practitioner admitted to engaging in the five separate instances of unprofessional conduct. The Tribunal found each of the charges proven and recommended that disciplinary proceedings be commenced in the Supreme Court.

The practitioner appeals the decision of the Tribunal that disciplinary proceedings be commenced in the Supreme Court on a number of grounds. By a separate originating application, the Commissioner applied to the Supreme Court for orders that the name of the practitioner be struck from the roll of practitioners.

Held per Kelly J (Nicholson and Hinton JJ agreeing) dismissing the appeal:

1)  The Tribunal made sufficient findings about the workplace environment in which the practitioner was working;

2)  The Tribunal did not misconstrue the nature and intent of the practitioner’s self-report letter;

3)  The Tribunal did not unfairly take into account the uncharged act of the practitioner that he permitted his client K to swear an affidavit without using a Bible;

4)  The Tribunal took into account the mitigating factors which the practitioner complains were not taken into account, gave adequate reasons and did not err in concluding after taking these factors into account that the appropriate course was to recommend disciplinary proceedings in the Supreme Court ;

5)  The Tribunal gave due weight to the medical evidence before the Tribunal;

6)  The Tribunal did not err in finding that the practitioner did not hold a genuine belief as to the assertion contained in the paragraph the subject of the disputed facts hearing in the Tribunal relevant to the fourth charge.  

Held per Kelly J (Nicholson J and Hinton J agreeing) adjourning the Commissioner’s application:

1)  On the material provided the Court cannot be satisfied that the practitioner is a fit and proper person to practise as a legal practitioner.

2)  The practitioner should be permitted an opportunity to address the deficiencies in his case and particularly to provide further satisfactory character references focussing on his present capacity to operate appropriately when under stress in the workplace and on his present reputation for honesty…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASCFC 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner appealed to the Supreme Court of South Australia against a decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. The appeal concerned the conduct of a legal practitioner, Mr Thompson, in relation to a motor vehicle claim brought against his client, K. The core of the dispute involved Mr Thompson's failure to file a defence on behalf of K by the court-ordered deadline, which led to default judgment being entered against K for approximately $800,000. Subsequently, Mr Thompson made representations to the court regarding the reason for the default judgment, which were found to be misleading.

The legal issues before the Supreme Court included whether the Tribunal had made sufficient findings regarding the practitioner's work environment and the impact of that environment on his conduct. The court also considered whether the Tribunal had misconstrued the significance of Mr Thompson's decision to self-report his conduct. Furthermore, the appeal addressed whether the Tribunal had given due weight to the medical evidence concerning Mr Thompson's depression and its potential impact on his capacity to perform his duties as a legal practitioner.

The Supreme Court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the practitioner's work environment, including the additional workload and the stressful nature of his position, and that these factors did not necessitate more specific findings. Regarding the self-reporting letter, the court determined that the Tribunal had not unfairly diminished its significance, acknowledging that the practitioner's conduct would likely have come to light regardless of his self-report. The court also addressed the medical evidence, noting that while the Tribunal had summarised the reports, it had made selective findings. However, the court ultimately concluded that the Tribunal's findings and reasoning were sound, and that the practitioner had engaged in unprofessional conduct.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's finding that Mr Thompson had engaged in unprofessional conduct. The Tribunal had recommended that disciplinary proceedings be commenced against the practitioner in the Supreme Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to discuss the grounds of appeal it is necessary to set out some of the procedural and factual history of this matter. Factual background The practitioner was admitted to practise in December 2007 having completed legal studies in 2006. In January 2007 he began a placement with a law firm, Lawson Smith, where he worked as a paralegal and subsequent to his admission as a lawyer. He resigned in November 2008 as he and his wife intended to travel. When those plans fell through, he successfully applied for a position as a junior lawyer at Westside Community Lawyers (“WCL”). He commenced there in July 2009 on a two-year contract. WCL is a State and Federally funded community legal practice. His supervising lawyer at the practice was the managing lawyer, Mr Bullock. In November 2009 K went to WCL seeking advice in relation to a motor vehicle claim against him commenced by the Motor Accident Commission (“MAC”). The file was assigned to the practitioner. All of the charges against the practitioner arise out of his conduct in relation to the K matter. After a period of negotiations in early 2010, a Master in the District Court eventually made an order on 30 June 2010 that the defendant, K, file and serve a defence by 21 July 2010. The practitioner did not file a defence on behalf of K by that date. On 22 July 2010 and again on 4 August 2010 Minter Ellison, solicitors for MAC, wrote to the practitioner and requested that the practitioner file and serve a defence within seven days. In their second letter, MAC advised that they would seek their client’s instructions to apply for default judgment if a defence was not filed and served by the close of business on 11 August 2010. On 16 August 2010, MAC obtained default judgment against K in the sum of approximately $800,000 plus costs by reason of the defendant’s failure to file a defence. The solicitors for MAC served the order for default judgment on the practitioner in a letter dated 17 August 2010 which was emailed to the practitioner. On 26 August 2010 Minter Ellison issued a summons for examination of K and he was personally served with the examination summons on 8 September 2010. The date for the hearing of the examination summons was scheduled for 14 October 2010 before a Master of the District Court. On 12 October 2010 K telephoned the practitioner during which the practitioner explained that the examination summons had been issued because of a default judgment. K was shocked to learn that a default judgment had been entered against him and instructed the practitioner to apply to set aside the default judgment. On 14 October 2010 the practitioner appeared before the Master and applied for permission to bring an application to set aside the default judgment. On that occasion, the practitioner proffered to the Master as a basis for permitting an application to be made, that K had not received correspondence from himself, when the practitioner knew that he had not sent any correspondence to K after 30 June 2010. The practitioner failed to tell the Court on that date that it was his fault and not K’s fault that the default judgment had been obtained in the proceedings. That was the basis for count 1 in the charge laid before the LPDT.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For these reasons I consider the second aspect of the complaint made under Ground 4 to be misconceived. The Tribunal undertook an exhaustive consideration of the facts and made clear findings in respect of disputed matters. The Tribunal analysed in detail the medical evidence and took into account that the practitioner’s conduct was complicated because of the fact of his depression. The Tribunal specifically referred to the practitioner’s youth and inexperience, the stressful work environment, lack of support and the fact that he had been out of the profession for over six years. Nevertheless, all of the factors complained of in Ground 4 are matters which properly go to the question now as to whether the practitioner is unfit to remain a member of the legal profession. Ground 5 – Failure to accord the medical evidence due weight This is a complaint that the Tribunal failed to accord the weight due to the uncontested medical evidence of Drs Maxwell and Clarke. In particular, counsel for the practitioner complained that the Tribunal failed to accord any proper significance to the unique advantage which Dr Maxwell had as his treating general practitioner. In addition, there was a complaint that the Tribunal misconstrued the reports of both those doctors in that although the Tribunal summarised the evidence given by them, it made only selective findings on the basis of that evidence. At the Tribunal hearing, six medical reports were tendered by consent, three from Dr Maxwell, a general medical practitioner who has a particular specialty in providing mental health counselling service to lawyers in South Australia since 2011, one from a psychiatrist, Dr Michael Clarke, one from a psychologist, Megan Jones, and one from the practitioner’s general practitioner, Dr Rammal. None of the practitioners were called to give oral evidence and their reports were tendered by consent. The Tribunal dealt at length with each of the reports tendered and accurately summarised the salient features of each of the reports, in particular those of Dr Maxwell and Dr Clarke. The salient features of Dr Maxwell’s report, which the Tribunal accepted, were that in March/April of 2011 the practitioner was suffering from severe clinical depression consistent with having been present for some time and likely to have reduced his capacity to undertake work. In her first report of 15 December 2015, Dr Maxwell opined:5.Nathan told me that he had suffered depression whilst studying law at university and also when he first began working as a lawyer (my notes record that he graduated in 2007). I am not aware of any other relevant past conditions.6.I would anticipate that Nathan’s depression will only surface under very stressful conditions. With minimal stress I would think he would be unlikely to need ongoing medication. I make this assumption based only on my consultations with him in 2011 and 2012 and realise that his situation may have changed since then. In her second report dated 14 September 2016, Dr Maxwell reviewed that position to some extent. She said:Nathan has depression requiring lifelong medication. He is currently well-controlled and does not require any medication changes or any psychological intervention. He has very good insight into his depression, is aware of the signs of increasing depression and knows when and how to seek help. I consider his current state of mental health to be excellent and in my opinion there is nothing that would prevent him from discharging his duties as a legal practitioner. …In my opinion he needs to continue medication probably for life. If he has significant life stressors, he may benefit from some counselling. However, as he has developed very good coping strategies and has responded extremely well to medication, I would expect him to manage any stressors with minimal outside help.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Although the disputed facts hearing was about one factual issue only, the evidence was at large. The practitioner maintained in his oral evidence that he did hold such a belief at the time he prepared the affidavit and identified a number of factors which he said caused him to now realise that his belief was mistaken. He identified those factors as being discussions with senior counsel and with his solicitor and reading an affidavit filed later by K on 29 March 2011 in which he deposed to certain aspects of the earlier affidavit prepared on 15 February 2011 which were not true.The Tribunal’s decision and reasons On 12 October 2017 the Tribunal delivered its decision formally finding the charge of unprofessional conduct proven. The Tribunal gave extensive reasons for its decision and finally concluded by recommending that disciplinary proceedings be commenced against the practitioner in the Supreme Court in accordance with s 82(6)(v) of the Act. Further aspects of the Tribunal’s reasons will be discussed in the context of discussing each ground of appeal.Ground 1 – Complaint about sufficiency of findings as to practitioner’s work environment I turn now to the first ground of appeal, which is a complaint that the Tribunal failed to make any or any sufficient findings about the uncontested evidence as to the nature and extent of the workplace environment at WCL, where the practitioner was practising at the time of the offending, including the additional workload and the pressures and effect of that environment upon him. This complaint can be dealt with quite briefly. In my view, it is misconceived. The Tribunal specifically referred to all of the relevant features of the workplace environment. These features include the fact that the practitioner was asked to take on the role of finance officer as an incentive to obtain permanent employment as opposed to contract employment only and that he found his supervisor blunt and intimidating to such an extent that he preferred not to trouble him. The Tribunal also specifically referred to the stressful environment in which the practitioner was required to work without adequate support from senior colleagues. None of the facts concerning the practitioner’s employment were in dispute and in the circumstances I do not consider it was necessary for the Tribunal to have made any more specific findings than it did about them. The salient features of the practitioner’s employment were clearly accepted by the Tribunal.Ground 2 – The Tribunal misconstrued the nature and intent of the self-reporting letter The practitioner’s counsel submitted that the Tribunal unfairly diminished the significance of the practitioner’s decision to self-report. He complains that the Tribunal discounted its significance because the practitioner would inevitably have been reported, even if he had not self-reported. It was unfair as well for the Tribunal to criticise the practitioner for failing to report conduct which became the subject of the first four counts when that conduct was already out in the open and the purpose of the self-report was to disclose matters not already known, to which only the practitioner was privy. Those matters included the state of mind of the practitioner at the time, which led him to being unable to take the necessary and proper steps on the file, and to bury his head in the sand around the looming crisis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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