Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
Giltrap v Czeschka [2022] FedCFamC2G 715
ORDERS
ADG 121 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: STEPHEN CRAIG GILTRAP
Applicant
AND: JOSEF CZESCHKA
First Respondent
SIMON BRENNAN
Second Respondent
L2S ENGINEERING PTY LTD
Third Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE LUCEV
DATE OF ORDER:
31 august 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The matter be adjourned to a directions hearing at11.00am ACST/9:30am AWST on…
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- AGLC
- Giltrap v Czeschka [2022] FedCFamC2G 715
- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 715
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning in resolving these issues is based on the current state of the law in Australia, which holds that the rescission of a termination of employment can only be effected by consent of the parties to the contract of employment. The court found that Mr Giltrap consented to the rescission of the 20 December 2019 termination of employment. Therefore, the court concluded that the termination of Mr Giltrap's employment by L2SE on 20 December 2019 was rescinded, and the question of whether L2SE was a small business employer must be answered as at 9 January 2020 only. The court has concluded that as at 9 January 2020 L2SE employed 14 employees for the purposes of s 23 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The matter will be adjourned to a directions hearing at which time the parties can make submissions as to whether any declarations or orders are necessary as a consequence of these Reasons for Judgment, and as to what, if any, further directions are required to be made.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In re-examination Mr Brennan said that the re-employed employees were treated by L2SE as if their employment was continuous (that is that the termination on 20 December 2019 had not occurred) and their entitlements were fully maintained: Transcript, page 39.ConsiderationWhether rescission of 20 December 2019 termination of employmentLaw concerning rescission of termination of employment In Riordan v War Office [1959] 3 All ER 552; [1959] 1 WLR 1046 at 1054 per Diplock J (affirmed on appeal in Riordan v War Office [1961] 1 WLR 210 ) it was said that:… the giving of a notice terminating the employment, whether by employee or employer, is the exercise of the right under the contract of employment to bring the contract to an end, either immediately or in the future. It is a unilateral act, requiring no acceptance by the other party, and, like a notice to quit a tenancy, once given it cannot in my view be withdrawn save by mutual consent. In Birrell v Australian National Airlines Commission (1984) 5 FCR 447; (1984) 9 IR 101 (“Birrell”), FCR at 458 per Gray J the Federal Court observed that:The purpose of providing in a contract for a period of notice of termination is to enable the party receiving the notice to make other arrangements. An employee given notice by his or her employer has a period of time in which to seek another job; an employer who receives notice has time to arrange for a substitute employee. It would be harsh if arrangements so made during the running of the notice could be disrupted, and parties could be held to their contracts by unilateral withdrawal of the notice at the last minute. Such withdrawal, if possible, could lead to an employee being bound by contracts of employment with two employers, or an employer being bound by contracts of employment with two employees, each being required to give notice to one or the other in order to be extricated from this position, or possibly to suffer the requirement to forfeit or pay wages for a period of time. In my view, I should lean against the adoption of any principle which could lead to such unfortunate consequences, and I should follow the authorities which tend to establish that withdrawal of a notice of termination of a contract of employment can only be effected by consent of both parties. Birrell reflects the current state of the law in Australia: see New South Wales v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235; (2002) 60 NSWLR 371; [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-676; (2002) 115 IR 283; (2002) 52 AILR 5-410 at [277] per Spigelman CJ; Frederick v South Australia [2006] SASC 165; (2006) 94 SASR 545; (2006) 152 IR 182 at [73]-[75] per White J; Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2012] VSC 94; (2012) 264 FLR 1; (2012) 64 AILR 250-033 at [422]-[428] per Vickery J. It follows from the law as set out above that the rescission of a termination of employment can only be effected by consent of the parties to the contract of employment, in this case, Mr Giltrap and L2SE. Although several questions are raised by the issues posited at [6] above, the key to the resolution of those issues is firstly to determine if there was consent to the rescission of the undoubted, because it is not in dispute, termination by L2SE of the contract of employment on 20 December 2019. If that question is answered in the affirmative, that is, that there was consent, then the question of whether L2SE was a small business employer as at 20 December 2019 falls away, and it is only necessary to ask and answer the question of whether L2SE was a small business employer as at 9 January 2020. If that question is answered in the negative, that is, that there was no consent, then the question of whether L2SE was a small business employer must be answered as at both 20 December 2019 and 9 January 2020, as if there was no rescission of the termination of employment on 20 December 2019 then there were two contracts of employment between Mr Giltrap and L2SE which were terminated: the first terminating on 20 December 2019, and the second commencing on 6 January 2020 and terminating on 9 January 2020.