Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, KEANE, GORDON, EDELMAN, STEWARD AND GLEESON JJ

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MARITIME,
MINING AND ENERGY UNION & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

PERSONNEL CONTRACTING PTY LTD  RESPONDENT

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd

[2022] HCA 1

Date of Hearing: 31 August 2021
Date of Judgment: 9 February 2022

P5/2021

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 17 July 2020 and, in its place, order that:

(a)the appeal be allowed;

(b)the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 November 2019 be set aside;

(c)it be declared and ordered that, between 27 July 2016 and 6 November 2016 and 14 March 2017 and 30 June 2017, the second appellant was employed by the respondent; and

(d)the matter be remitted to the primary judge for determination according to law.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

B W Walker QC with M A Irving QC and T J Dixon for the appellants (instructed by Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union)

J B Blackburn SC with M L Felman for the respondent (instructed by Hotchkin Hanly Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ, KEANE AND EDELMAN JJ.   The respondent (trading as "Construct") is a labour-hire company based in Perth, which engages workers to supply their labour to building clients. Construct's major client was Hanssen Pty Ltd ("Hanssen"), a builder of high‑rise residential apartments and offices[1].

  2. In 2016, Mr McCourt was a 22‑year‑old British backpacker who had travelled to Australia on a working holiday visa. Seeking a source of income, and with limited prior work experience as a part‑time brick‑layer and in hospitality, Mr McCourt obtained a "white card", which enabled him to work on construction sites. He contacted Construct and attended an interview on 25 July 2016. At the interview, Mr McCourt indicated that he was prepared to do any construction work, and was available to start work immediately. He confirmed to the Construct representative that he owned a hard hat, steel‑capped boots and hi‑vis clothing, having purchased them for less than $100 in the hope of finding construction work. He was offered a role and presented with paperwork to sign. Among the documents he signed was an Administrative Services Agreement ("ASA"), which described Mr McCourt as a "self‑employed contractor"[2].

  3. The day after Mr McCourt's interview, Construct contacted him to offer him work at Hanssen's Concerto project site beginning the following day. When he arrived on site, Mr McCourt was given the Hanssen Site Safety Induction Form and Hanssen…

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Details
Case
[2022] HCA 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the nature of the employment relationship between the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (CFMMEU) and Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd (Personnel), specifically concerning a backpacker engaged by Personnel, a labour-hire business. The dispute centred on whether the backpacker, Mr. McCourt, was an employee of Personnel or an independent contractor, as described in their written agreement.

The central legal issue before the High Court was to determine whether Mr. McCourt was an employee of Personnel, notwithstanding the written contract that labelled him a "self-employed contractor." This required the Court to assess the true nature of the relationship established by the rights and obligations created by the agreement, rather than relying solely on the parties' characterisation of their arrangement. The Court also considered arguments regarding policy considerations underpinning vicarious liability in the context of labour-hire arrangements.

The High Court reasoned that the label used by the parties to describe their relationship was not determinative. Instead, the Court applied a multifactorial approach, examining the totality of the relationship and the legal rights and obligations created by the contract. It found that the agreement, despite its wording, effectively required Mr. McCourt to serve Personnel in its business. The Court rejected the argument that the absence of practical ability or legal authority to influence the actual performance of work on site by Personnel negated an employment relationship, and similarly dismissed arguments based on policy considerations for vicarious liability. The Court also clarified that the ability of a casual employee to reject work offers and work for others does not preclude an employment relationship, particularly when such rejection rights are understood within the context of the overall engagement.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court. It declared and ordered that Mr. McCourt was employed by Personnel during specific periods and remitted the matter to the primary judge for further determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 17 July 2020 and, in its place, order that:

(a) the appeal be allowed;

(b) the order of the Federal Court of Australia made on 6 November 2019 be set aside;

(c) it be declared and ordered that, between 27 July 2016 and 6 November 2016 and 14 March 2017 and 30 June 2017, the second appellant was employed by the respondent; and

(d) the matter be remitted to the primary judge for determination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, KEANE AND EDELMAN JJ STEWARD J
For the sake of completeness, it should also be said that the primary judge erred in concluding that the circumstances that Mr McCourt was free to accept or reject any offer of work[136], and that he was not precluded from working for others[137], were factors which contraindicated a characterisation of his relationship with Construct as one of employment. It is commonplace that casual employees do not work exclusively for one employer. In addition, Mr McCourt's right pursuant to cl 5(b) of the ASA to accept or reject any offer of work from a builder must be understood subject to his promise to Construct in cl 4(c) of the ASA to "supply labour ... for the duration required by [Hanssen]". His right to reject an offer of work was exercisable at the level of an overall engagement with Hanssen, rather than on the basis of a new engagement each day.[136]Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1806 at [143].[137]Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1806 at [146].Earlier decisions involving triangular labour‑hire arrangements Construct argued that Personnel (No 1)[138], when viewed alongside the decisions in Building Workers Industrial Union of Australia v Odco Pty Ltd[139] and Young v Tasmanian Contracting Services Pty Ltd[140], established a body of authority in which "Odco‑style" triangular labour‑hire arrangements have been held not to create relationships of employment. It was submitted that this Court should not overturn this long‑standing position. Many persons, it was said, will have relied on these decisions in arranging their affairs.[138](2004) 141 IR 31.[139](1991) 29 FCR 104.[140][2012] TASFC 1. In this regard, Personnel (No 1) was wrongly decided, the critical error of the reasoning of the majority being the attribution of decisive significance[141] to the parties' description of their relationship in a manner so as to "remove [the] ambiguity"[142] generated by other factors in the analysis pointing in opposite directions. The same error infected the decision in Odco[143]. That error involves a departure from principle which should not be perpetuated.[141](2004) 141 IR 31 at 40‑41 [38]‑[42], 61‑63 [139]‑[150].[142](2004) 141 IR 31 at 62 [145]. See also 40‑41 [40].[143]Odco Pty Ltd v Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 24 August 1989) at 126; Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia v Odco Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 104 at 126‑127. Construct also placed reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bunce v Postworth Ltd[144]. In that case, it was held that a labour‑hire agency was not in a relationship of employment with its worker because it lacked the requisite power of control, which instead was found to reside in the client to whom the worker was assigned. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the client's day‑to‑day control originated in the contract between the labour‑hire agency and the worker. Keene LJ (with whom Gage LJ and Sir Martin Nourse agreed) said that[145]:"[t]he law has always been concerned with who in reality has the power to control what the worker does and how he does it." (emphasis in original) [144][2005] IRLR 557.[145][2005] IRLR 557 at 561 [29].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, KEANE AND EDELMAN JJ, STEWARD J

The ASA described Mr McCourt as "the Contractor". But the effect of the rights and duties created by the ASA was that Mr McCourt was engaged by Construct to serve Construct in its business. The rights and duties agreed between Construct and Mr McCourt leave no room for ambiguity as to the character of that relationship. For the reasons stated above, that the parties have described their relationship a certain way cannot change the character of the relationship established by their rights and obligations. Lee J was right to suggest that it was erroneous in point of principle to use the parties' description of their relationship to resolve uncertainty produced by application of the multifactorial test. There was no occasion to have recourse to the label chosen by the parties, whether as a "tie‑breaker" or otherwise.Policy considerations underpinning vicarious liability Pursuant to a notice of contention, Construct argued that the Full Court ought to have found that none of the policy concerns which underpin the vicarious liability of an employer for the actions of its employees favoured a characterisation of Mr McCourt's engagement as one of employment. In this regard, Construct argued that, as a result of its absence of practical ability or legal authority to influence the actual performance by Mr McCourt of work on site, the imposition of vicarious liability on Construct would have no useful deterrent effect on its willingness to court risks to workplace health and safety. Secondly, Construct submitted that it was Hanssen, as builder, which created any enterprise risk, and therefore Construct should not bear vicarious liability for Mr McCourt's actions in furtherance of Hanssen's enterprise. Thirdly, Construct submitted that because Mr McCourt was not integrated into Construct's business – for example, by the wearing of a uniform or by acting publicly as Construct's representative – it could not be said that Mr McCourt was a public manifestation of Construct's business for whom Construct should be held responsible. The simple answer to these submissions is that these broad appeals to considerations of policy cannot alter the effect of the ASA, any more than Mr McCourt's invocation of the disparity in bargaining power can alter its effect in his favour. In any event, it is important to recognise that Construct was able, by the deployment of its right of control over Mr McCourt, to determine the industrial environment in which he would work; and so there is nothing counter‑intuitive about recognising both Construct's non‑delegable duty to him and its vicarious liability for his acts or omissions. However, given the confusion that arises from the conflation of questions of vicarious liability of an employer with questions of characterisation of a putative employment relationship, it is necessary to explain the difference. There are two conceptions of vicarious liability of an employer[132]: the traditional "agency" conception, where an employer has a primary liability for the actions of an employee or other agent[133]; and the policy‑based conception, where an employer has a secondary liability for the liability of the employee[134]. On either conception, the relationship of employment is only the first step in ascertaining whether vicarious liability exists. There is a necessary second step which requires consideration of the subsequent conduct of the employee, the event for which the employer is to be held primarily or secondarily liable, and its association with the employment relationship.[132]Pioneer Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Columbus Capital Pty Ltd (2016) 250 FCR 136 at 147‑149 [48]‑[58].[133]Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 at 60.[134]Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 at 57.