Matthew Bull v Rmbl Bxng Bondi Pty Ltd
[2025] FWC 3069
•22 OCTOBER 2025
| [2025] FWC 3069 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections
Matthew Bull
v
Rmbl Bxng Bondi Pty Ltd
(C2025/7333)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT CROSS | SYDNEY, 22 OCTOBER 2025 |
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal
On 26 July 2025, Mr Matthew Bull (the Applicant) lodged an application (the Application) in the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) pursuant to s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act), against Rmbl Bxng Bondi Pty Ltd (the Respondent).
The Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection to the Application, being that the Applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of s.386 of the Act because the Applicant was not an employee.
Directions were issued to program the manner in which the Application was to proceed to hearing. In response to those Directions each party filed materials, and the materials relied upon by the parties at the Hearing were:
(a) The Applicant filed an Outline of Submissions and a Witness Statement of the Applicant with Annexures, dated 12 September 2025; and
(b) The Respondent filed Witness Statements of Ms Leanne Doan and Mr Zdenko Martin dated 22 September 2025, with multiple Annexures. Ms Doan and Mr Martin are the owners of the Respondent.
The Applicant did not file any materials in reply.
The Hearing of the Application occurred on 1 October 2025 (the Hearing). Each deponent of witness statements was cross-examined.
Background Facts
(a) The Independent Contractor Agreement
On 23 May 2023, an agreement titled “Independent Contractor Agreement” (the Agreement) was executed between the Applicant and the Respondent.
The Agreement contained a number of important provisions. Those provisions included the following:
(a) Clause 1 “Title” provided:
“This Agreement is made the 23 May 2023 between Rumble Bxing Bondi Pty Ltd ABN: of [Address] (“the Engager”) AND Matt Bull ABN: of [ADDRESS] (“the Independent Contractor”)
(b) Clause 2 “Appointment of Independent Contractor” provided:
2.1. The Engager appoints the Independent Contractor to provide the Services to the Engager for the Term, as set out in the Schedule to the Agreement.
2.2. The Independent Contractor agrees to provide the Services as outlined in the Schedule to the Agreement.
2.3. This Agreement may only be renewed or the Term extended if agreed by the parties.
(c) Clause 3 “Relationship of the Parties to the Agreement” provided:
3.1. Nothing contained in this Agreement will be deemed to create any partnership or joint venture or relationship of agent or employer and employee between the Engager or any Group Company and the Independent Contractor. It is the express intention of the parties that the Independent Contractor is in all respects an Independent Contractor and no other relationship or authority will be inferred or implied.
3.2. The Independent Contractor has no authority to incur any obligations on behalf of the Engager or any Group Company without the written authority of the Engager or Group Company.
(d) Clause 4 “Responsibilities” provided in part:
4.1. The Independent Contractor:
(a) must carry out the Services in a conscientious, professional, competent and
expeditious manner and in accordance with all appropriate standards applicable to
the industry in which the Engager operates;(b) will provide the Services in a manner reasonably required by the Engager;
(c) warrants that the Independent Contractor and any person employed or engaged by
the Independent Contractor to perform the Services has the necessary knowledge,
skill, experience and ability to provide the Services and will promptly advise the
Engager if this does not continue to be the case;
…(e) will at all times observe all of the Engager's policies and procedures which the
Engager requires the Independent Contractor to adhere to (as may be varied from
time to time), provided that these policies and procedures do not form any part of this
Agreement;
…
(e) Clause 5 “Reporting Requirements” provided:
5.1. The Independent Contractor must submit a report monthly.
5.2. The report must be submitted to an officer appointed by the Engager in a form and
containing information as required by the Engager.
(f) Clause 6 “Payment” provided:
The Independent Contractor must provide a valid tax invoice to the Engager on a weekly
basis. In consideration for the provision of the Services, the Engager agrees to pay the
Independent Contractor any Invoice Payment within 14 days of receipt of a valid tax invoice in accordance with the Schedule of Rates below.
(g) Clause 7 “GST” provided:
7.1. Where required by law, the Engager will pay GST in relation to the Services at the rate of tax applicable at the time of supply subject to the receipt of a valid tax invoice. The Independent Contractor is required to add the correct amount of GST to its invoice(s) in accordance with the Schedule.
7.2. The payment of GST to the Australian Taxation Office with respect to the Services will be the sole and absolute responsibility of the Independent Contractor.
(h) Clause 9 “Facilities” provided:
9.1. The Independent Contractor shall be responsible for providing any Facilities that are necessary or required in the safe, accurate and timely performance of the Services at the cost of the Independent Contractor.
9.2. The Engager will not provide the Facilities to the Independent Contractor in the provision of the Services, unless otherwise agreed between the Parties.
9.3. Where the Engager agrees to provide Facilities to assist the Independent Contractor in the provision of the Services, this is done for convenience only and does not in any way affect the contracting relationship between the parties.
Clause 14 “Taxes and Levies” provided:
14.1. The Independent Contractor is responsible for all taxes and levies relating to, or in
connection with, the provision of the Services by the Independent Contractor to the
Engager, including but not limited to any income taxation payments, GST payments or
superannuation payments required under the relevant legislation.
(j) The Termination provision at Clause 19 provided in part:
19.1. This Agreement terminates on expiry of the Term, without the need for notice by either party.
19.2. This Agreement may be terminated during the Term;
(a) by either party immediately by giving writing in notice to the other party if at any time the other party fails to remedy any breach of this Agreement or default within 7 days;
(b) by either party at any time by giving 14 days notice in writing to the other party; or
(c) immediately, by the Engager providing no notice to the Independent Contractor
where:
…
(k) The Agreement also included terms;
(i)requiring the Applicant to pay all insurances including workers compensation, public liability insurance for not less than $20,000,000.00, and professional indemnity insurance for not less than $10,000,000.00;
(ii)imposing post employment restraints on the Applicant.
Importantly, the Schedule to the Agreement provided:
TERM: The Term of this Agreement shall be from 4 April 2023 (“Commencement Date")
until completion of the Services until 8 April 2024 (“the Expiry Date”).SERVICES The services the Independent Contractor is required to perform are:
Trainer
PAYMENT:
27.15. In consideration of the Services provided, the Engager agrees to pay the Independent Contractor the Payment specified in the Schedule of Rates table attached. (sic.)
(b) The Nature of the Engagement
The actual nature of the relationship between the Applicant and Respondent was disclosed in the evidence of the Applicant, Ms Doan and Mr Martin, and various documents, and was largely uncontested.
Notwithstanding the terms of the Agreement, the Applicant was never asked to submit a monthly report, and ceased submitting tax invoices after a few months of engagement. The Applicant did not obtain workers compensation, public liability insurance, or professional indemnity insurance, and was never asked by the Respondent to provide evidence of having obtained such insurance. Ms Doan stated regarding public liability insurance that the Respondent “didn’t enforce it.”[1]
Following the expiry of the Agreement on 8 April 2025, the Applicant was never asked to sign any similar document or extension of the term of the Agreement. It was agreed between the parties that the Agreement had expired,[2] although Ms Doan claimed “…the expectations carried on, so it still applies because the engagement continued”.[3]
On 28 January 2025, the Applicant received an email from Ms Tasha Lapidge who described herself as an HR Consultant. That email requested the Applicant sign the Respondent’s Employee Handbook. The Applicant signed that Handbook, which required the Applicant to adhere to the Respondent’s policies including a Code of Conduct that referred to performance management and set out the rules applying to the use of social media during or outside work hours.[4] Under the heading “Application”, the Employee Handbook provided:
This handbook applies to all employees of Rumble Boxing (“the Company”) including managers and supervisors; temporary and permanent employees (whether full-time, part-time or casual); student placements, apprentices, contractors, sub-contractors and volunteers, collectively referred to in this policy as ‘employees'.
The policies contained within this handbook are not limited to the workplace or work hours. These policies extend to all functions and places that are work related. For example, work conferences, work events and parties, work-related social media platforms and social media, and client functions.
This handbook does not form part of any contract of employment or contract for service with the Company.
The Employee Handbook contained provisions precluding the Applicant from promoting his personal business within the gym, and that he must positively represent the Respondent inside and outside their facility.[5] It also provided that the Applicant may be required to comply with a dress code.[6]
The Applicant worked in accordance with a roster which was prepared and finalised by Ms Doan, based on client needs and attendance. The Applicant typically worked 12 to 15 classes of 45 minute each per week in line with that roster and did not have the ability to set his own hours.
The Applicant was paid a fixed rate per class which was determined based on class participant numbers in each class. The ultimate decision as to the rates paid to the Applicant rested with Ms Doan.[7] Template rates had been given to the Respondent by “head office” which I infer was the Head Franchisor.[8] The Applicant’s only choice was whether he would accept the rates outlined by the Respondent.[9]
Except for the first few months of his engagement wherein the Applicant provided invoices to the Respondent, the Applicant’s remuneration was processed by the receipt of remittance advices from the Respondent.
Where the Applicant was unable to attend a rostered class, he was unable to delegate or subcontract his services without approval of the Respondent. Usually, the Respondent would arrange replacement Trainers where required. The Applicant was able to reject rostered classes.
The Applicant did not maintain or possess any training equipment used in his classes. His training classes were carried out at the Respondent’s Bondi Beach premises. The Respondent provided the workplace, all equipment, the booking system, the training music and provided clients for the classes. The Applicant’s responsibility was to conduct the fitness classes according to the Respondent’s business protocol.
The Applicant was promoted on social media as part of the Respondent’s “squad”.
On 6 July 2025, after the Applicant had queried why his pay rate was to be reduced, he was removed from the roster. The Respondent conceded that the Applicant did not receive 14 days’ notice and stated it was because he was a contractor.[10]
On 10 July 2025, at 12.32pm, the Respondent sent the Applicant an email as follows:
Hi Matt,
As of July 10, 2025 your employment at Rumble Boxing Bondi Beach as been terminated effective immediately
Your last day at Rumble was July 5 and your final pay was July 8th. If this is incorrect, please let us know
We want to thank you for the 2 years you've been at Rumble.
Your contribution has been invaluable and there is no denying thatPlease let us know if you would like to arrange a farewell with the Rumble community or team.
That's entirely up to youThanks
Leanne
The Respondent sent a further email to the “Rumble Crew” that included:
Good Morning Team, it is with a lot of sadness but not without a lot of careful consideration; we have terminated Matt Bull's employment with us at Rumble. We naturally want and hope for an amicable exit and hope to find a way to do that for Matt, the team and the community who have grown so fond of him.
His contributions and commitment over the years has been invaluable and cannot be disputed at all.
And while the decision was made, it wasn't done so lightly and we know the impact it may have on the business overall, and despite those strong factors, the decision was made based on the long term needs of us as business, how we operate and conduct ourselves and the success of the team and each individual that makes up this team.
…
In addition to working for the Respondent, the Applicant also worked at times for two other Gyms, one of which was from the same franchise as operated by the Respondent. The Applicant was also building his own fitness App.
Submissions
(a) Applicant’s Submission
The Applicant contended that the engagement was, in substance, an employment relationship disguised as an independent contracting arrangement.
Noting the provisions of Sections 335 and 15AA of the Act, the Applicant submitted that although the Agreement is styled as an "Independent Contractor Agreement", the terms of the contract and the operational realities aligned more closely with employment. Further, there is no doubt the Agreement has ceased and was no longer in effect, and as such its terms could not be relied upon to establish a contractor/principal relationship.
The Applicant submitted that after 8 April 2024, the Applicant has not been party to any written employment arrangement, however the employment relationship has continued to exist at common law. Where no comprehensive written contract is in place, the “multifactorial” test is appropriate in identifying the applicable legal rights and obligations.[11]
The Respondent cannot alter the true nature of the contractual relationship by placing a misleading label on it. The “label” which the Respondent may choose to describe the relationship as is not determinative of, or even relevant to, ascertaining the true relationship between the parties.
The Applicant submitted the Respondent exercised control over the Applicant in a manner indicative of an employer/employee relationship. In January 2025, the Applicant was even required to sign the Respondent’s Employee Handbook.
(b) Respondent’s Submission
The Respondent submitted that, on the true substance and practical reality of the relationship, the Applicant was an independent contractor, not an employee. The written Agreement, the arrangements regarding payment and taxation, the allocation of entrepreneurial risks, and the ongoing conduct of the parties all demonstrate a relationship consistent with independent contracting.
Pursuant to section 15AA of the Act, the assessment must consider the totality of the relationship, including contractual terms and practical operation. The evidence clearly showed that the Applicant had authority to negotiate rates and hours, refuse engagements, and operated independently across multiple clients, including St Leonards and One Playground, confirming the capacity for discretion and control characteristic of a contractor.
Additionally, the contractual allocation of risk, including obligations for insurance, GST, invoicing, and ABN registration, further supports that the Applicant bore entrepreneurial responsibility and was operating as a business. The absence of employee entitlements such as paid leave, PAYG withholding, or superannuation contributions reinforced this conclusion.
The Respondent submitted that the relationship was that of an independent contractor, and the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim based on the Applicant’s employment status.
Legislative framework
Section 365 of the Act provides:
Application for the FWC to deal with a dismissal dispute
If:
(a) a person has been dismissed; and
(b) the person, or an industrial association that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the person, alleges that the person was dismissed in contravention of this Part; the person, or the industrial association, may apply to the FWC for the FWC to deal with the dispute.
In order for the Commission to be able to deal with the dispute under s.368 of the Act it must determine that the Applicant has been dismissed within the meaning of s.365.[12] The Commission must conclude that the relevant dismissal has actually occurred as a matter of jurisdictional fact. It is not sufficient that the Applicant merely alleges that they were dismissed. If there is a contest as to whether the alleged dismissal the subject of the application has occurred, this is an antecedent question which has to be determined before the powers to deal with the dispute conferred by s.368 can be exercised.
Section 386 of the Act sets out the circumstances in which an employee can be said to have been ‘dismissed’ for the purposes of s.365. That section provides:
Meaning of dismissed
(1) A person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer‘s initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.
In order to be dismissed under s.386(1)(a), a person’s ‘employment’ has to be terminated and terminated on the employer’s initiative. For employment to be terminated it has to have commenced in the first place. The Act does not define “employment.” Section 335 provides that in the relevant Part of the Act, Part 3-1 – General Protections, “employee” and “employer” have their ordinary meanings.
Employment contracts and employment relationships are related but distinct concepts. In Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd(Personnel Contracting),[13] the High Court observed:[14]
In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker, French CJ, Bell and Keane JJ said:
“The employment relationship, in Australia, operates within a legal framework defined by statute and by common law principles, informing the construction and content of the contract of employment.”
An employment relationship will not always be defined exclusively by a contract between the parties. Historically, the employment relationship was recognised and regulated by the law before the law of contract came to govern the relationship. An employment relationship, though principally based in contract, may be affected by statutory provisions and by awards made under statutes.
Section 357 prohibits an employer from representing that an employment relationship is one of independent contract, a prohibition colloquially referred to as “sham contracting”.
Section 15AA, inserted by the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes) Act 2024, directs courts and tribunals to determine whether a person is an employee by reference to the “real substance, practical reality and true nature” of the relationship having regard to the totality of the work arrangements. Section 15AA of the Fair Work Act, which took effect from 26 August 2024, is entitled “Determining the ordinary meanings of employee and employer.” Section 15AA relevantly provides:
15AA Determining the ordinary meanings of employee and employer
(1) For the purposes of this Act, whether an individual is an employee of a person within
the ordinary meaning of that expression, or whether a person is an employer of an
individual within the ordinary meaning of that expression, is to be determined by
ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship
between the individual and the person.(2) For the purposes of ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature
of the relationship between the individual and the person:(a) the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person must be
considered; and(b) in considering the totality of the relationship between the individual and the
person, regard must be had not only to the terms of the contract governing the
relationship, but also to other factors relating to the totality of the relationship
including, but not limited to, how the contract is performed in practice.Note: This section was enacted as a response to the decisions of the High Court of
Australia in CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1 and ZG
Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2.…
The note in s. 15AA refers to High Court decisions in Personnel Contracting and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek (Jamsek),[15] where the High Court applied the principles of contract interpretation, which it described as the long-standing approach in determining the nature of the relationship between parties. The Court criticised the multi-factorial approach that had been adopted following the decisions in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (Stevens v Brodribb),[16] and Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (Hollis)[17] and went on to explain that Stevens v Brodribb and Hollis had not departed from the long-standing approach to contract interpretation that predated those decisions. In particular, reference was made to the earlier cases of Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Narich),[18] approving the earlier decision in Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin (Chaplin).[19]
Narich and Chaplin stood for the proposition that where there is a written contract between the parties a court is confined, in determining the nature of that relationship, to a consideration of the terms, express or implied, of the contract in the light of the circumstances surrounding the making of it, and it is not entitled to consider the manner in which the parties subsequently acted in pursuance of such contract. In Personnel Contracting, the Court said that Stevens v Brodribb and Hollis did not alter the orthodox principle that courts are not concerned with what has actually occurred in a relationship but rather were concerned with the obligations by which the parties were bound.
By contrast, as noted above, section 15AA sets a statutory test for ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the parties by considering the totality of the relationship having regard to not only to the terms of the contract governing the relationship, but also to other factors relating to the totality of the relationship including, but not limited to, how the contract is performed in practice.
Consequently, for the purpose of the Act, in determining the issue of whether a person
is an employee or independent contractor, the Commission is required to ascertain the real
substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the parties. This adopts
the approach described in Hollis:[20]
It should be added that the relationship between the parties, for the purposes of this litigation, is to be found not merely from these contractual terms. The system which was operated thereunder and the work practices imposed by Vabu go to establishing “the totality of the relationship” between the parties; it is this which is to be considered.
The approach to be taken under s. 15AA adopts the multi-factorial test that was eschewed in Personnel Contracting.
The multifactorial test was summarised by a Full Bench of the Commission in Jiang Shen Cai trading as French Accent v Do Rozario[21] (Jiang Shen), wherein the Full Bench described the focus of the enquiry in Hollis as whether the person carries on a trade or business of his or her own or is working in the business of another, the nature of the work performed and the manner of its performance, and the terms of the contract between the parties. Various indicia may be considered. They include the actual exercise, or the right to exercise, control over the putative employee, whether the worker performs work for others, whether they provide tools and equipment, whether the work can be delegated, whether the worker is remunerated by periodic wages or salary or by reference to completion of tasks, and whether the worker is presented to the world at large as an emanation of the putative employer’s business.
Consideration
While the Agreement states in clauses 2 and 3 that “The Engager appoints the Independent Contractor” and that “Nothing contained in this Agreement will be deemed to create any partnership or joint venture or relationship of agent or employer and employee between the Engager or any Group Company and the Independent Contractor”, Section 15AA requires that the true relationship between the parties be determined by reference to the totality of the relationship between the parties. Regard must be had not only to the terms of any contract governing the relationship, but also to other factors including, and not limited to, how the contract is performed in practice.
The Agreement had clearly ceased to apply to the Applicant and the Respondent after 8 April 2024, however even before that date, the Agreement did not reflect the reality of the relationship between the parties. In particular:
(a) The Applicant did not submit a monthly report (Clause 5.1);
(b) But for the first few months of the engagement, the Applicant did not submit a tax invoice on a weekly basis (Clause 6); and
(c) The Applicant did not arrange insurance with respect to workers compensation, public liability insurance or professional indemnity insurance (Clauses 11.1, 12.1 and 13.1).
A factor against a finding of employment was the tax arrangements of the Applicant whereby no tax was deducted from remittances to the Applicant.[22]
As to the Respondent’s submission that the Agreement somehow continued past 8 April 2024, I reject that submission. Clause 2.3 clearly outlined that the Agreement could only be renewed or the Term extended if agreed by the parties, and there was no such agreement. Further, the Agreement did not express the terms of any agreement between the parties as it did not reflect in any material way the employment relationship that has continued to exist at common law.
The totality of the relationship between the parties, however, disclosed significant levels of control by the Respondent over the Applicant. In particular:
(a) The Applicant was required to sign the Respondent’s Employee Handbook that stated all employees must adhere to the Code that included provisions to manage performance, conduct and, amongst other things, the use of social media during or outside work hours;
(b) The Applicant worked in accordance with a roster which was prepared and finalised by the Respondent. The Applicant was not able to set his own times for classes;
(c) The Applicant was paid a fixed per class rate for each class he conducted. The Applicant did not set his own rates or terms of engagement;
(d) Should the Applicant be unable to attend a class, he was not able to provide a replacement of his choosing, without approval from the Respondent;
(e) Ultimate authority over the Applicant in his performance of work resided with the Respondent; and
(f) The Respondent provided the workplace, equipment, booking system music and clients, the Applicant solely provided his labour.
I accept that the Applicant was presented to clients as a representative of the Respondent and promoted on social media as part of its “squad”.
The Applicant did not advertise his services outside the Respondent’s business and did not have his own workplace and did not have his own business.
I accept that the relationship between the parties is that the Respondent is the business that took the risk of profit or loss and unlike an independent contractor, the Applicant did not operate a business and bore no business risk. On this issue the Respondent submitted that the Applicant took entrepreneurial risk. Mr Martin described entrepreneurial risk as:[23]
You've got in your statement that Mr Bull bore an entrepreneurial responsibility. Can you tell the tribunal what that is? --- As all independent contractors have their own businesses, that bears its inherent risks. You are choosing to not work at a place at a 9 to 5 where you're getting minimum wage. You take on the risk of needing to find work. That is risk. If you are going to be your own business, that is entrepreneurial risk, and every independent contractor at our studio has made that decision.
The Respondent’s submission regarding entrepreneurial risk was that it was somewhat like being a casual and not having the guarantees of permanent employment. That is not correct, and I note nonetheless that the Applicant was looking for more hours to work. In On Call Interpreters and Translators Agency Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (No 3)[24], Bromberg J stated:
“Simply expressed, the question of whether a person is an independent contractor in relation to the performance of particular work may be posed and answered as follows:
Viewed as a “practical matter”:
(i) is the person performing the work as an entrepreneur who owns and operates a
business; and
(ii) in performing the work, is the person working in and for that person’s business
as a representative of that business and not of the business receiving the work.”
Bromberg J, then went on to state in the same paragraph that if the answer is “no”, then the person is likely to be an employee. In this matter, the Applicant was working in and for the Respondent’s business.
The Applicant did not create any goodwill in carrying out his role as a fitness trainer, however he did create goodwill and value for the Respondent.
While the Respondent placed considerable weight on the Applicant performing work at other Gyms while also working for the Respondent, that fact does not on its own point to a contractor relationship. That a person has a number of casual employment relationships simultaneously, as it appeared the Applicant did, does not render them otherwise as a contractor.
Conclusion
The indicia that pointed to the Applicant being a Contractor rather than an Employee arose from the formal structure imposed by the Agreement rather than how the relationship was
performed in practice. Those indicia included that the Applicant was responsible for his own taxes and insurances. In the overall balance, however, those indicia can be accorded little weight in determining the totality of the relationship.
Section 15AA requires the Commission to decide the “true nature” of the relationship. Taking into account the level of control, integration, branding and restraints imposed on the Applicant, I find that the relationship was one of employment notwithstanding the Agreement and the description of the relationship therein. The Applicant was for all intents and purposes working in the business of the Respondent.
In conclusion, I wish to indicate that I consider Ms Doan and Mr Martin used their best endeavours to properly engage the Applicant. Ms Doan’s evidence, which I accept, was:
You never had a discussion on 9 April 24 with Mr Bull to say, 'Your independent contract has expired, but it will continue on.' You never did that, did you? --- No, and look, I hear you, and there are a lot of things that we didn't enforce, and this is a small business, the first small business that my husband and I are running, and there are a lot of things that come with running a small business, learnings, and we lean heavily on our master franchisor to guide us to ensure best practices, and I think this was evidenced in setting up payroll. We did our best and what we knew how to do it and then they showed us the best approach, and part of this, while it's not excusable, is that, you know, you do these contracts, make sure you renew it, make sure you follow up, make sure you have all the liability insurance and enforce it. No, it wasn't documented and a contract wasn't renewed, or a verbal agreement, or a meeting was in place. He continued to teach and I'm sure on 9 April, he taught, and also he never came to us and said, 'Hey, this contract has expired, am I still working here, is our agreement and our arrangement the same?' Neither party came and had this conversation.
Ultimately, however, Section 15AA of the Act requires the Commission to decide the “true nature” of the relationship, and in this matter the indicia found point overwhelmingly to the relationship being one of employment.
Accordingly, the jurisdictional objection fails.
Disposition
For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent’s objections to the Application are dismissed.
The matter will be relisted for a conference pursuant to s.368 of the Act on a date to be fixed.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
Mr G Bull, on behalf of the Applicant.
Ms L Doan, on behalf of the Respondent.
Hearing details:
Microsoft Teams.
10AM.
1 October 2025.
[1] Transcript PN 284.
[2] Transcript PN 296 and 297.
[3] Transcript PN 299.
[4] Transcript PN 350, 358 and 359.
[5] Transcript PN 336, 346 and 347.
[6] Transcript PN 335 and 345.
[7] Transcript PN 239.
[8] Transcript PN 408.
[9] Transcript PN 247 to 253.
[10] Transcript PN 329.
[11] Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting (2022) 275 CLR 165 per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ at [33]-[34], [47], [61], per Gordon J at [174], [186]-[189].
[12] Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v. Milford (2020) 279 FCR 591 and see Lipa Pharmaceuticals v Jarouche[2023] FWCFB 101.
[13] (2022) 275 CLR 165.
[14] At [40] and [41] per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ, footnotes omitted.
[15] (2022) 275 CLR 254.
[16] (1986) 160 CLR 16.
[17] (2001) 207 CLR 21.
[18] [1983] 2 NSWLR 597.
[19] (1978) 52 ALJR 407.
[20] Hollis at [24].
[21] [2011] FWAFB 8307.
[22] Transcript PN 150.
[23] Transcript PN 467, see also Ms Doan at PN 278.
[24] (2011) 214 FCR 82, at [208].
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