Jensen v Cultural Infusion (Int) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jensen v Cultural Infusion (Int) Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 358

Appeals from:

Jensen v Cultural Infusion (Int) Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 2137; 337 FLR 191

Palframan v Cultural Infusion (Int) Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 2225

Goodwin v Cultural Infusion (Int) Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 2224

File numbers: VID 1130 of 2018
VID 1136 of 2018
VID 1137 of 2018
Judge: WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 19 March 2020
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – appeals from the Federal Circuit Court – appeals by way of rehearing – whether actors engaged for the performance of a travelling theatrical show were independent contractors or employees – multi-factorial test of the totality of the parties’ relationship – indicia for distinguishing between independent contractors and employees – relevance of alleged casual employment on particular indicia – appellants were independent contractors – appeals dismissed.

EVIDENCE – application of Briginshaw or s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to the civil standard of proof – whether the preliminary issue of determining the independent contractor-employee distinction itself involves allegations of gravity – s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) not applied in determining that preliminary issue.

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 45, 323, 340, 357, 536, 546 and 548

Federal Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 24(1)(d)

Cases cited:

ACE Insurance Ltd v Trifunovski and Others (2013) 209 FCR 146

AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v SPI Networks (Gas) Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 173

Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd (2018) 261 FCR 301

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 2003 CLR 172

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2017) 269 IR 28

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2018) 261 FCR 347

Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin (1978) 18 ALR 385

Boensch v Pascoe (2019) 94 ALJR 112

Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Building Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia v Odco Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 104

Climaze Holdings Pty Ltd v Dyson (1995) 13 WAR 487

Cohen & Co v Ockerby & Co Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 288

Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers and Citizen Co-operative Assurance Company of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1806

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 230 FCR 298

Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472

Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd (2017) 261 CLR 544

Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553

Fair Work Ombudsman v Ecosway Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 296

Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 346

Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 137

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Barrett (1973) 129 CLR 395

Federal Commissioner of…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 358
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Jensen v Cultural Infusion (Int) Pty Ltd concerns appeals by professional actors against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court that they were independent contractors rather than employees of the respondent, a theatre company. The appeals were dismissed by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue in the case was whether the appellants were independent contractors or employees of the respondent, a determination that has significant implications for their entitlements under the Fair Work Act. The appellants argued that they were employees and sought various remedies based on this premise. The respondent maintained that the appellants were independent contractors.

The court considered several factors in determining the nature of the appellants' relationship with the respondent, including the control exercised over the appellants, the method of remuneration, and the extent of personal financial risk taken by the appellants. The court found that while the primary judge had made some errors in applying the multi-factorial test, the overall conclusion that the appellants were independent contractors was correct. The court emphasised that the appellants incurred no personal expenses, took on no personal financial risk, and were not under the absolute control of the respondent. Additionally, the method of remuneration, where the appellants were paid for days worked rather than for each week that they provided services, was indicative of an independent contracting relationship.

In addressing the standard of proof required to determine the independent contractor-employee distinction, the court noted that section 140 of the Evidence Act applies to civil proceedings, requiring the court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities. However, the court held that the preliminary issue of determining the independent contractor-employee distinction itself does not involve allegations of gravity, and therefore section 140(2) of the Evidence Act was not applied in making that determination.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeals, affirming the primary judge’s conclusion that the appellants were independent contractors. The court ordered that if any party sought costs, they had to file and serve written submissions in relation to costs by specified dates, with no order for costs if no submissions were filed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. If any order for costs is sought by a party, that party shall file and serve written submissions in relation to costs not exceeding three pages by 4.00pm on Thursday, 26 March 2020, with any responding submissions to be filed by 4.00pm on Thursday 2 April 2020.

3. If no submissions seeking costs are filed by 4.00pm on Thursday, 26 March 2020, there be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeals arise out of a largely common set of facts and raise a common issue. The appellants and the respondent agree that the same conclusion should be reached in each of the appeals. For the following reasons, I have determined that the primary judge erred in some respects in applying the multi-factorial approach in evaluating whether the appellants were independent contractors or employees. However, in reviewing the evidence, I have come to the same conclusion as that of the primary judge, namely that at all material times, the appellants and the respondent were in a relationship of independent contractor and principal. Therefore, the appeals will be dismissed.Background The following summary is drawn from the primary judge’s findings of primary fact in respect of which there was no challenge on appeal. The appellants are professional actors. The respondent is a theatre company that is in the business of providing educational and school performances. The respondent engaged the appellants to participate in a series of performances titled the ANZAC Centenary Roadshow: Victoria’s Journey of Remembrance. The ANZAC Roadshow was underwritten by the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet, and performed throughout Victoria at venues such as Returned and Services League clubs, and at schools. At the start of their engagement in July 2014, the appellants conducted rehearsals of the ANZAC Roadshow over a two-week period at premises occupied by the respondent. Those rehearsals were overseen by Mr Montgomery, the production manager and director, and Ms Suris, the script writer, both of whom were employees of the respondent. Approximately mid-way through their two-week rehearsal schedule, each of the appellants entered into a written contract with the respondent. Their contracts were in substantially the same terms, and the parties agreed that the minor differences in the manner of formation and terms of those contracts were not material to these appeals. The primary judge at [39] described the contracts as “drafted in a somewhat rudimentary form”. That was putting it kindly. The contracts appear to have been haphazardly drafted and contain a number of anomalies and inconsistencies. The primary judge stated at [39], and the parties have not challenged, that the “contracts should be construed against the matrix of mutually known facts which underpinned the production of the ANZAC Roadshow and as two honest businessmen would understand their terms: Cohen & Co v Ockerby & Co Ltd (1917) 24 CLR 288 at 300 (Isaacs J); AGL Victoria Pty Ltd v SPI Networks (Gas) Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 173 at [80] (Nettle JA, Maxwell P and Bongiorno AJA agreeing).” That approach is consistent with more recent High Court authority, including Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 12; 261 CLR 544 at [16]-[19] (Kiefel, Bell and Gordon JJ) and [45] (Gageler J), and I have adopted that approach in my construction of the terms of the contracts.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As set out above, the primary judge proposed, and the parties agreed, to conduct a combined hearing of all three applications in relation to the preliminary issue whether the actors were engaged as independent contractors or employees of the respondent. The primary judge at [10] explained that since the independent contractor-employee distinction was a common issue to the alleged contraventions of the Live Performance Award 2010 and the alleged sham contracting, the appellants’ applications would be most efficiently addressed by first determining the independent contractor-employee distinction as a preliminary issue. The primary judge did not refer to the fact that the appellants by their written submissions, but not by their originating applications or small claims forms, sought pecuniary penalties for the respondent’s alleged contraventions of the civil remedy provisions in s 45 (breaching the Live Performance Award 2010), s 357 (sham contracting) and s 536 (failing to provide pay slips) of the Fair Work Act, all of which claims were dependent on a finding that the appellants were employees of the respondent. Nor did the primary judge refer to the appellants’ bare submission for a declaration that the respondent took unlawful adverse action against them in contravention of s 340 of the Act.Section 140 of the Evidence Act As referred to above, the primary judge at [214] referred briefly to a sham contracting claim and to s 140(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) as follows –By the applications, the actors seek that Cultural Infusion will be held liable for contraventions of s 357 for alleged misrepresentation in relation to sham contracting arrangements. In evaluating the evidence, I do not overlook the gravity of those allegations: s 140(2)(c) Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). This reference by the primary judge to s 140(2)(c) of the Evidence Act raises the question of the applicable principles relating to the standard of proof to be applied in determining the preliminary issue of the independent contractor-employee distinction, by the primary judge at first instance in the Federal Circuit Court and also on appeal by way of rehearing to this Court. Section 140 of the Evidence Act provides –140 Civil proceedings: standard of proof(1)In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.(2)Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:(a)the nature of the cause of action or defence; and(b)the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and(c)the gravity of the matters alleged. That provision is related to the often-cited observations of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336 at 362 about the civil standard of proof –But reasonable satisfaction is not the state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherently unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants incurred no personal expenses and took on no personal financial risk in the engagement. When the ANZAC Roadshow toured regional areas, the respondent met the costs of the appellants’ accommodation. The appellants did not accrue or take any paid leave from their work for the respondent. If one of the appellants was unavailable to perform a scheduled show, the respondent engaged an understudy to perform the role. During the period of their engagement with the respondent, all of the appellants performed other work for other entities, variously as contractors or employees, and as actors or in other industries.The primary judge’s decision The appellants filed their applications in the Federal Circuit Court on 11 December 2017, and invoked the small claims procedure under s 548 of the Fair Work Act. The appellants alleged that they had been engaged as casual employees, rather than as independent contractors of the respondent, and consequently sought payment of wages alleged to be owing under the Live Performance Award 2010. Ms Goodwin claimed $18,466.44, Mr Jensen claimed $18,696.13 and Mr Palframan claimed $18,788.06. The appellants also raised other claims in written submissions filed in the Federal Circuit Court, which were dependent on a finding that the appellants were employees of the respondent. These additional claims were not included in the appellants’ originating applications or small claims forms, and on review of the Federal Circuit Court file, do not appear to have been perfected in any amended originating process. First, the appellants alleged that the respondent contravened the sham contracting provision in s 357 of the Fair Work Act, which prohibits an employer from misrepresenting to an employee that the employee performs work as an independent contractor: see, generally, Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 45; 256 CLR 137. Second, the appellants alleged that the respondent contravened s 536 of the Fair Work Act, which requires an employer to give a pay slip to each of its employees within one working day of paying wages to the employee. By their submissions but not their originating applications or small claims forms, the appellants sought pecuniary penalties under s 546(1) of the Fair Work Act for the respondent’s alleged contraventions of the civil remedy provisions in s 45 (breaching the Live Performance Award 2010), s 357 (sham contracting) and s 536 (failing to provide pay slips) of the Act. However, given that the appellants invoked the small claims procedure, it appears that such orders were not available: s 548(1)(a) of the Fair Work Act. I consider this issue in more detail below. In addition, in written submissions filed in the Federal Circuit Court, the appellants sought a declaration that the respondent contravened s 340 of the Fair Work Act by taking adverse action against them for exercising their workplace rights. On review of the Federal Circuit Court file, it does not appear that the appellants substantiated or pressed this claim any further, and the respondent did not respond to it. Given that it was not raised and is not the subject of these appeals, I have not considered it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Third and fourth, I do not consider that there was any specific error in the primary judge’s conclusions in relation to control. The primary judge’s conclusions that were the subject of alleged error go no further than stating that the appellants were not under the absolute control of the respondent. There was no error in that conclusion. I shall consider the indicium of control further in considering for myself the independent contractor-employee distinction, below.Ground 4: mode of remuneration The appellants submitted that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent’s mode of remunerating them was indicative of independent contracting, when it should properly have been found to be indicative of an employment relationship. The appellants pointed to three specific errors by the primary judge that they alleged. First, the finding by the primary judge at [166] that the appellants had “quite deliberately set up a system for issuing invoices to Cultural Infusion for the performances which they undertook”, which the appellants submitted was made without evidence and should not have been attributed “particular significance” in supporting a finding of an independent contracting relationship. Second, the primary judge’s attribution at [166] of “particular weight” to the fact that the appellants were paid for each day of performance in finding an independent contracting relationship. Third, the appellants claimed that the primary judge was in error at [190] in treating the fact that the appellants were paid for days worked, rather than for each week that they provided services, as indicative of an independent contracting relationship. Further, the appellants made three more specific submissions in relation to the indicium of mode of remuneration. First, the appellants conceded that payment on submission of an invoice was suggestive of an independent contracting relationship, but submitted that the method of payment should not be attributed any weight in circumstances where they rendered invoices only to comply with the detailed requirements in their contracts and to ensure that they were paid. Second, the appellants submitted that the fact that they were paid monthly for the days that they worked, rather than being paid irregularly for the completion of particular tasks, pointed to employment. To support this submission, the appellants noted that the manner in which they were paid complied with the requirement in s 323 of the Fair Work Act that employers pay their employees on at least a monthly frequency. Third, the appellants submitted that the fact that they took on no financial risk pointed to an employment relationship. To support this submission, the appellants argued that independent contractors operating their own business take on the prospect of making a profit and the risk of making a loss when performing work, whereas employees do not take on such risk. The respondent submitted that payment on invoice was indicative of independent contracting and otherwise generally supported the primary judge’s reasons.