Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

JEAN BALHARRY GARCIA  APPELLANT

AND

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED  RESPONDENT

Garcia v National Australia Bank Limited (S18/1997) [1998] HCA 48
6 August 1998

ORDER

  1. Appeal allowed with costs.

  1. Set aside paragraphs 1 to 8 of the orders made on 3 July 1996 by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales and in lieu thereof dismiss the appeal to that Court with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation:

D F Jackson QC with L J W Aitken for the appellant (instructed by
Minter Ellison)

B C Oslington QC with D L Williams for the respondent (instructed by Dibbs Crowther & Osborne)

Amicus Curiae:

D M J Bennett QC with J Stoljar amicus curiae on behalf of the Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Incorporated (instructed by J Hutchinson, Principal Solicitor, Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW) Inc.)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Garcia v National Australia Bank Limited

Equity – Wife guaranteed debts of husband's company as a volunteer – Wife did not fully understand effect of guarantees – Whether guarantees liable to be set aside – Bank did not explain document to wife – Bank not on notice of unconscionable dealing between husband and wife – Principle in Yerkey v Jones explained.

Precedent – Binding effect of previous decisions of High Court – Ascertainment of binding rule.

Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, explained and followed.

Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, not followed.

  1. GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ.   In August 1979, the appellant and her then husband, Fabio Garcia, executed a mortgage over their home in favour of the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd (a bank with which the respondent later merged and to the rights of which the respondent succeeded).  The mortgage secured all moneys which the mortgagors might owe the mortgagee, including moneys owing under future guarantees given by either of them to the mortgagee.  It was given to secure a loan of $5,000 made to the husband for use in his business and was later used as security for a personal loan made to the appellant and her husband.

  2. The appellant's husband conducted a number of businesses of which we need to refer only to one ‑ a business of buying and selling gold conducted through a company called Citizens Gold Bullion Exchange Pty Ltd ("Citizens Gold").

  3. Between 1985 and 1987 the appellant signed four guarantees in favour of the respondent.  Three of the guarantees guaranteed repayment to the bank of debts owed by Citizens Gold; the fourth guaranteed debts owed by another company but the details of that transaction do not now matter.  Of the three guarantees which related to debts of Citizens Gold, one dated 25 November 1987 was limited to $270,000 plus interest, costs and charges.  It is convenient to…

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Details
Case
[1998] HCA 48
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mrs Jean Garcia against the National Australia Bank Ltd. Mrs Garcia had provided guarantees for debts of her husband's company, but argued that she did not fully understand the effect of these guarantees. The primary judge had found that Mrs Garcia had not established actual undue influence by her husband, nor that the Bank had notice of any unconscionable dealing between her and her husband. The Court of Appeal had upheld these findings.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the equitable principle established in *Yerkey v Jones* applied to a wife who guarantees her husband's debts and enters the transaction without adequate understanding, and whether this principle, if it existed, was still relevant or had been subsumed by later equitable doctrines such as those in *Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio*. The Court also considered whether a broader equitable principle, potentially influenced by overseas jurisprudence like *Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien*, was required to address the vulnerability of such sureties.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the principle in *Yerkey v Jones* did indeed represent a binding rule of equity applicable to the circumstances. This rule provides that a guarantee given by a wife for her husband's debts will be set aside if the wife did not understand the transaction and the creditor failed to take reasonable steps to ensure she did, unless the creditor can show that the wife was not unduly influenced or misled by her husband. The Court held that the Bank had not discharged this onus.

The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs, and that paragraphs 1 to 8 of the Court of Appeal's orders be set aside. In lieu of those orders, the appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeal allowed with costs.

2.

Set aside paragraphs 1 to 8 of the orders made on 3 July 1996 by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales and in lieu thereof dismiss the appeal to that Court with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issues arising are therefore:1.Does the principle stated by Dixon J in Yerkey express a special rule of equity applicable to a case where a wife gives a guarantee of a debt for the benefit of her husband (or entities controlled by him) and where the wife's agreement to give the guarantee was obtained by undue influence, pressure or misrepresentation on the part of the husband or without an adequate understanding of the nature and effect of the transaction? Does that principle represent the holding of this Court or simply an opinion of Dixon J, never specifically endorsed by the Court as a binding rule? (The Yerkey v Jones point).2.Whatever the status of the opinion of Dixon J in Yerkey, should any rule which Yerkey may have stated in 1939 now be regarded as obsolete and subsumed in the principles expressed in later decisions such as Amadio? Should this be done having regard to changes in society affecting married women, their legal status, the expansion of the availability of financial credit to them and the desirability of avoiding reliance upon discriminatory criteria for the provision of equitable relief and the development of equitable doctrine?(The Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio point).3.If the equitable principle expressed by Dixon J in Yerkey is revealed as his individual opinion, is overruled as obsolete or now treated as absorbed in the broader doctrines of equity, does the exposition of such doctrine in Amadio sufficiently meet the particular problem of sureties who are emotionally vulnerable or dependent on the debtor? Or is a broader statement of equitable principle required than that expressed in Amadio?In particular, should this Court follow the decision of the House of Lords in Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien[53] or some modified version of the principles there stated? (The Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien point).[53][1994] 1 AC 180.The facts The facts of this case, and the history of the litigation, are set out in the reasons of the other members of this Court. I will not repeat what is said. Let me state the features of the evidence which appear to me to be most telling when considering the invocation of equitable doctrine to protect the interests of Mrs Jean Garcia (the appellant) ("the wife"). I start this review with three holdings of the primary judge, which were not disturbed by the Court of Appeal, and which were adverse to the wife's various claims for relief:1.That she had failed to establish that she executed the relevant guarantee as a result of the exercise of actual undue influence on the part of Mr Fabio Garcia ("the husband").2.That if the suggested principle in Yerkey had been absorbed in, or subsumed by, the principles stated in Amadio[54], the latter would not entitle the wife to relief because, unless it arose from her then relationship of marriage to her husband, there was no other basis upon which it could be established that National Australia Bank Limited (the respondent) ("the Bank") knew of the unconscionability of the husband's conduct. Specifically, there was no evidence that the Bank had knowledge of his deceptive conduct, or had wilfully shut its eyes to what a reasonable lender in its position would have perceived as fraud.3.That there was no basis upon which the wife was entitled to relief under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).[54](1983) 151 CLR 447 at 474-475.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ KIRBY J (dissent) CALLINAN J (dissent)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HUGH, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ,