Exn20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 64
•10 February 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
EXN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 64
File number(s): PEG 350 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE LUCEV Date of judgment: 10 February 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review – Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision – Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa – citizen of Malaysia – whether jurisdictional error in Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision – where originating application dismissed by consent.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Interlocutory application – notice of discontinuance sought to be filed in respect of originating application – originating application dismissed by consent – application for reinstatement of originating application – whether to adjourn proceeding – where no previous directions hearing – where first respondent had limited notice of hearing – whether evidence of fraud – whether applicant has proper understanding of requirements for proof of fraud.
EVIDENCE – Fraud – evidentiary requirements for proof of fraud.
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 140
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), ss.9, 10
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), rr.13.01, 17.05
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.16.05
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 476Cases cited: Atta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 360
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] ALR 334; (1938) 12 ALJ 100
Commonwealth & Anor v Fernando [2012] FCAFC 18; (2012) 200 FCR 1; (2012) 287 ALR 267; (2012) 126 ALD 10
Jensen v Cultural Infusion (Int) Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 358
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2019] FCAFC 221; (2019) 273 FCR 213
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; (2020) 95 ALJR 54; (2020) 385 ALR 212
Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 67 ALJR 170; (1992) 110 ALR 449
Papakosmas v The Queen [1999] HCA 37; (1999) 196 CLR 297; (1999) 73 ALJR 1274; (1999) 164 ALR 548
Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama [2008] FCAFC 69; (2008) 167 FCR 537; (2008) 247 ALR 273; (2008) 101 ALD 459
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189; (2007) 81 ALJR 1401; (2007) 237 ALR 64; (2007) 96 ALD 510
SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445; (2013) 305 ALR 557; (2013) 138 ALD 46Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 21 Date of last submission/s: 2 February 2022 Date of hearing: 2 February 2022 Place: Perth For the Applicant: Appeared in person (via video link with the assistance of an interpreter) Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L. Groves Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor For the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
PEG 350 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: EXN20
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LUCEV
DATE OF ORDER:
2 FEBRUARY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The First Respondent have leave to file:
(a)The affidavit of Laura Jean Groves affirmed 1 February 2022; and
(b)The Outline of Submissions dated 1 February 2022;
and those documents be treated as having been filed in Court today.
2.By 1 March 2022 the Applicant file and serve any further affidavits in support of the Application in a Proceeding, including in particular any evidence of fraud for the purpose of rule 17.05(2)(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
3.By 1 April 2022 the First Respondent file and serve any further affidavits in opposition to the Application in a Proceeding.
4.By 22 April 2022 the Applicant file and serve a written Outline of Submissions in support of the Application in a Proceeding.
5.By 13 May 2022 the First Respondent file and serve a further written Outline of Submissions in opposition to the Application in a Proceeding.
6.The hearing of the matter be adjourned to 10.00 am AWST / 12.00 pm AEST on 27 May 2022 by video link.
7.Short written Reasons for Judgment be published from Chambers at a later date.
8.Costs of today be reserved.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LUCEV
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an Application in a Proceeding filed on 27 October 2021 by the applicant, EXN20, seeking orders that the originating application be reinstated (“Reinstatement Application”). The originating application is an application for judicial review filed by EXN20 on 24 November 2020 (“Judicial Review Application”) under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”). The Judicial Review Application concerns a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal Decision” and “Tribunal” respectively) handed down 28 October 2020. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (“Delegate’s Decision” and “Delegate” respectively) of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (“Minister”), to dismiss EXN20’s application for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (“Protection Visa”).
The relevant background is as follows:
(a)EXN20 is a citizen of Malaysia. She arrived in Australia in 2016 and applied for the Protection Visa on 22 November 2016: CB 56;
(b)the Delegate’s Decision to refuse the Protection Visa was made on 22 March 2017. The Delegate assessed the following claims made by EXN20:
•The applicant claims to have left Malaysia due to the country’s worsened political and economic situation.
•She fears that if she were to return to Malaysia now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, she would be not able to subsist or to provide for her family.
(c)the Delegate was not satisfied that EXN20 was a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act: CB 49-65;
(d)on 7 April 2017 EXN20 applied for review of the Delegate’s Decision by the Tribunal: CB 66-67;
(e)on 31 August 2020 the Tribunal scheduled a hearing for 24 September 2020: CB 86-89. At the Tribunal hearing on 24 September 2020: CB 92-94, EXN20 raised a new basis for her protection claims which related to her being a victim of domestic violence from her ex-husband. The Tribunal adjourned the Tribunal hearing and a new Tribunal hearing was scheduled and conducted on 28 October 2020: CB 106-108. At the second Tribunal hearing, the following documents were provided in support of EXN20’s new claim: CB 110-137:
(i)two sworn statements;
(ii)a family violence restraining order;
(iii)a conduct agreement order; and
(iv)26 photographs relating to EXN20’s claim of domestic violence in Australia;
(f)the Tribunal handed down an oral decision at the hearing on 28 October 2020 affirming the Delegate’s Decision to refuse to grant the Protection Visa: CB 139-153, and the Tribunal Decision was provided to EXN20 on 16 November 2020: CB 157-167;
(g)on 24 November 2020 EXN20 filed the Judicial Review Application in this Court;
(h)on 29 September 2021 EXN20 sought to file a Notice of Discontinuance (“Notice”) in this Court. As the Notice was sought to be filed seven days prior to final hearing, it was not accepted for filing because r 13.01(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“GFL Rules”) requires leave of the Court or a Registrar of the Court to file the Notice if sought to be filed within 14 days of the day fixed for final hearing of a matter;
(i)on 30 September 2021 a member of the Court’s National Migration Team sent an email to the Minister’s lawyers attaching the Notice;
(j)on 1 October 2021 the Minister’s lawyers sent an email to EXN20 advising that the Minister was willing to consent to the Judicial Review Application being dismissed on that basis that EXN20 agree to pay the Minister's costs fixed in the sum of $4,000;
(k)on 5 October 2021 the Chambers of the presiding Judge received a signed Minute of Proposed Consent Orders from the parties and on the same date the following orders were made, by consent (“Consent Orders”):
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $4,000.
REINSTATEMENT APPLICATION
In the Reinstatement Application EXN20 stated as follows (unaltered):
1.I filed an FCC application (PEG 350/2020) to appeal against my protection visa refusal outcome on 24/11/2010 with the help of a lawyer. The first hearing date was 28/01/2021 and my most recent hearing was scheduled on 06/l0/2021. As I want to move to Victoria, I ask the agent whether I can transfer my case to Melbourne He said yes and asked me for service fees. After I paid him the fees, he helped me with the withdrawal and on 05/10/2021, he sent me a court order, showing that my case was dismissed. Later, I submitted an application to Melbourne registry by myself and it was refused as it does not comply with the court rules. I am very confused the the results were different from the information given by the lawyer. Now, I just want to continue appealing my case. Hence, I hope the court can reopen the proceeding of PEG 350/2020.
The Court notes that:
(a)the affidavit of EXN20 sworn 23 October 2021 (“EXN20 Affidavit”) filed at the same time as the Reinstatement Application, is in exactly the same terms as the above-quoted statement in the Reinstatement Applicant; and
(b)although styled as a Reinstatement Application, because what is sought is the re-opening of the Judicial Review Application, it appears that what is actually being sought is the setting aside of the Consent Orders which would have the effect of reinstating the Judicial Review Application.
The Reinstatement Application was listed for hearing on 2 February 2022 by the National Migration Team but was not served on the Minister by EXN20 nor sent to the Minister by the National Migration Team. The Minister was therefore unaware of the Reinstatement Application until 27 January 2022 when the Chambers of the presiding Judge emailed a Confirmation of Listing Details to the Minister and EXN20. Consequently, there has been no directions hearing in relation to the Reinstatement Application.
On 1 February 2022, a day before the listed hearing of the Reinstatement Application, the Minister filed a written Outline of Submissions (“Minister’s Submissions”) and an accompanying affidavit of Laura Jean Groves affirmed on the same day (“Groves Affidavit”). As the matter was not listed for a directions hearing and no orders were made for the filing of submissions and affidavits, the Court makes an order granting leave for the Minister to file the Groves Affidavit and the Outline of Submissions, and that they be treated as having been filed in Court on 2 February 2022.
The Minister’s Submissions outline his opposition to the Reinstatement Application on the basis that the only ground available to EXN20 might be an application to set aside the Consent Orders under r 17.05(2)(b) of the GFL Rules, but says that the circumstances set out in the Reinstatement Application and EXN20’s Affidavit do not give rise to the level of fraud required by the GFL Rules and that there is insufficient evidence to make out such a claim of fraud justifying the setting aside of the Consent Orders.
RELEVANT LAW
Rule 17.05(2) of the GFL Rules, provides that:
(2)The Court or a Registrar may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:
(a) it was made in the absence of a party; or
(b) it was obtained by fraud; or
(c) it is interlocutory; or
(d) it is an injunction or for the appointment of a receiver; or
(e) it does not reflect the intention of the Court; or
(f) the party in whose favour it was made consents; or
(g) there is a clerical mistake in the judgment or order; or
(h)there is an error arising in the judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission.
Atta v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 360 at [20]-[23] per Judge Baird dealt with relevant principles when applying r 16.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (the predecessor to r 17.05 of the GFL Rules, which, save for numbering, is in identical terms to r 17.05 of the GFL Rules) in circumstances where an applicant had signed consent orders dismissing an application for extension of time, and later sought to have that application for extension of time reinstated:
[20]Sections 14, 15, and 16 to 18 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), (the FCC Act), provide this Court with authority to resolve the whole of the controversy between the parties within its jurisdiction. As Judge Cameron held in SZVGM v Minister for Immigration (2016) FCCA 1602, the Court also has an implied power to correct abuse of its process. Thus, whilst there is no express power in the FCC Act, or the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), to set aside a notice of discontinuance, an absence of express power will not prevent a statutory court such as this Court from preventing an abuse of process.
[21]His Honour noted that s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is relevantly identical to s 15 of the FCC Act. At [7] of his Honour’s judgment in SZVGM, his Honour helpfully identifies comments made by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Chin v Monash University (2016) FCAFC 66 in the context of a discontinuance, albeit at the appellate level, and at [6], his Honour referred to Hunter v Lee (1999) FCA 1075; (1999) 91 FCR 214.
[22]The scope of the power to vary or set aside an order or judgment after entry in this Court is much more circumscribed than that provided by the Federal Court Rules, and by r 16.05(1) of the Rules of this Court before an order has been entered. This is clear from the circumstances identified in r 16.05(2).
[23]In Moussa v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) FCA 1280, Judge Perram summarised four relevant principles to consider in assessing whether to set aside a discontinuance at [13]:
(a)A notice of discontinuance may be set aside where it is shown that its filing constituted an abuse of process.
(b)It may also be set aside where its filing was procured by fraud or duress.
(c)There is no jurisdiction to set such a notice aside to avoid substantial injustice.
(d)None of these jurisdictions is engaged where a party knowingly and voluntarily files a notice of discontinuance.
The Court notes that the question of any inherent jurisdiction, or of implied power to deal with abuse of process, inuring in this Court, which is seemingly not a superior court: compare ss 9(1) and 10(1), Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (“FCFCOA Act”), but is a court of record and a court of law and equity: FCFCOA Act, s 10(1), probably does not arise, and therefore need not presently be addressed further, because:
(a)the Notice has never been treated as filed, and therefore need not be set aside; and
(b)of the express power to set aside orders in r 17.05 of the GFL Rules which might be applied to the Consent Orders.
CONSIDERATION
Having regard to the relevant law and principles set out above, it may be, on the materials presently before the Court, that the only apparent path open to EXN20 to pursue the Reinstatement Application is under r 17.05(2)(b) of the GFL Rules, that is, to seek that the Consent Orders be set aside on the basis that they were “obtained by fraud”.
In SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189; (2007) 81 ALJR 1401; (2007) 237 ALR 64; (2007) 96 ALD 510 (“SZFDE”) the High Court dealt with the question of fraud in relation to a fraud “on” the Tribunal. The notion of “fraud” in a public law context in SZFDE was summarised by the dissenting Justice in the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2019] FCAFC 221; (2019) 273 FCR 213 (“DUA16 - FCAFC”) at [42]-[47] per Griffiths J as follows:
[42]First, emphasis was placed upon differences concerning the place of fraud in public law, as opposed to equity or common law. As stated at [13], principles of public law concerning impropriety and exercise of statutory powers have not had what the Court described as the “red blooded” species of fraud which engages the common law. In contrast with fraud in private law concerning the creation and protection of personal and proprietary rights in inter partes litigation, the concern in a public law case such as SZFDE was the “due administration of the provisions of the Act respecting protection visas and procedures for review by the Tribunal of decisions on visa applications”. That concern with the due administration of the laws of the Commonwealth was identified as having an “important constitutional underpinning” (at [11] and referring, inter alia, to Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476 at [103]- [104]).
[43]Secondly, the Court emphasised that the vitiating effect of fraud is not universal throughout the law and that the notion of “fraud unravelling all” needed some modification in a public law context. The Court stated at [22] that in a public law case, such as that appeal, the only remedy of any real utility was an order which provided the review applicants with the opportunity to press their claims to a protection visa in a fair hearing conducted according to law.
[44]Thirdly, and significantly, the Court emphasised at [28] that it was unnecessary for the purpose of resolving the appeal there “to determine at large and in generally applicable terms the scope for judicial review for ‘third party fraud’ of an earlier administrative decision...”. Presumably, this was because the factual and statutory contexts in which the issue could arise are so diverse. As already emphasised, each case necessarily has to be considered and determined by reference to the particular facts and the particular statutory context in which the issue arises.
[45]Fourthly, and related to the previous point, at [8], the Court agreed with Lord Macnaghten’s view in Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 199 at 221 that “fraud is infinite in variety” and that it is impossible to define the concept exhaustively in advance. As will shortly emerge, however, the Court viewed the “dishonest acts and omissions” or “misconduct” of the kind engaged in by the rogue there as constituting fraud, which subverted or stultified the relevant statutory review process.
[46]Fifthly, a finding of fraud should specify what conduct was fraudulent, how it was fraudulent, and how it was acted upon (at [41]). Such precision is necessary not only to determine whether particular conduct is in fact fraudulent in the relevant sense, but also to determine if, and how, it has subverted or disabled an imperative statutory function.
[47]Sixthly, while the Court expressed agreement with the dissenting view expressed below in the Full Court by French J that there were sound policy reasons why mere bad or negligent conduct or some other mishap by an agent should not vitiate a review proceeding, the Court proceeded on the basis that the conduct of the agent in that case stood apart from such considerations (at [53]). Conduct which involved “dishonest acts and omissions” (at [14]) or involved “misconduct” of the kind demonstrated by the rogue in that case (at [36]), could amount to conduct which had the effect of subverting the relevant review process. The Court said at [51] (emphasis added):
No doubt Mr Hussain was fraudulent in his dealings with the appellants. But the concomitant was the stultification of the operation of the critically important natural justice provisions made by Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act. In short, while the Tribunal undoubtedly acted on an assumption of regularity, in truth, by reason of the fraud of Mr Hussain, it was disabled from the due discharge of its imperative statutory functions with respect to the conduct of the review. That state of affairs merits the description of the practice of fraud “on” the Tribunal.
In Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; (2020) 95 ALJR 54; (2020) 385 ALR 212 (“DUA16 – HCA”) at [35] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ, the High Court allowed an appeal against DUA16 – FCAFC, but in so doing expressly endorsed the dissenting approach as “correct”: DUA16 – HCA at [22] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ. The High Court also observed that as a ground of judicial review, fraud must affect a particular duty, function or power of the administrative decision maker, and it was not sufficient to assert that fraud might be said to affect the process of decision-making in some abstract sense: DUA16 – HCA at [18] and [22] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ. Whether similar observations apply to the exercise of this Court’s powers to make the Consent Orders and the circumstances in which the Consent Orders were made, may be a matter for consideration upon the hearing of the Reinstatement Application.
Ordinarily, in order to constitute fraud, the relevant conduct must be proven to the requisite standard outlined in s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“Evidence Act”), which is as follows:
140 Civil proceedings: standard of proof
(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.
Notwithstanding the caution expressed against treating any provision of the Evidence Act (as part of the uniform evidence legislation) as a codification of common law principles of evidence: Papakosmas v The Queen [1999] HCA 37; (1999) 196 CLR 297; (1999) 73 ALJR 1274; (1999) 164 ALR 548 at [10] per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J, s 140 of the Evidence Act has been said (in Commonwealth & Anor v Fernando [2012] FCAFC 18; (2012) 200 FCR 1; (2012) 287 ALR 267; (2012) 126 ALD 10 at [128] per Gray, Rares and Tracey JJ and Jensen v Cultural Infusion (Int) Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 358 at [28] per Wheelahan J) to be a partial codification or re-statement of what was said in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] ALR 334; (1938) 12 ALJ 100; CLR at 362 per Dixon J, where it was also observed that it is often said that fraud must be proved "clearly", "unequivocally", "strictly" or "with certainty". It has also been observed that the gravity of the matter: Evidence Act, s 140(2)(c), is a circumstance which the Court must take into account when determining whether or not the burden of proof has been discharged, and the more serious the issue in which proof is required, the more cogent and clear the evidence is needed to establish it: Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; (1992) 67 ALJR 170; (1992) 110 ALR 449; ALJR at 170-171 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ; Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama [2008] FCAFC 69; (2008) 167 FCR 537; (2008) 247 ALR 273; (2008) 101 ALD 459 at [128]-[129] and [137]-[139] per Branson J.
In SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445; (2013) 305 ALR 557; (2013) 138 ALD 46 (“SZRUR”), the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed an appeal against a judgment of this Court, with the Full Court of the Federal Court holding that an unrepresented asylum seeker with no English language ability and no knowledge of the legal system had been denied procedural fairness because of the failure of the Court to explain the need for sworn evidence or explain the kinds of issues that arise and needed to be addressed to make out an allegation of fraud.
In this case, the evidence is minimal: EXN20’s Affidavit is but a few lines of very general factual explanation of the circumstances in which the Consent Orders were made, and a plea for the Court to reopen the Judicial Review Application. EXN20 is a self-represented Malaysian national who requires the assistance of an interpreter for these proceedings. Due to the manner in which the Reinstatement Application came to be listed for hearing without a prior directions hearing, there was no opportunity prior to the hearing listed on 2 February 2022 for the Court to explain to EXN20 the nature of the evidence which might be required to prove fraud on an application to set aside the Consent Orders.
Given the nature of the evidence required to prove fraud, the Court is concerned that to proceed with the matter without EXN20 having an opportunity to marshal such evidence of fraud as she is able, may constitute a breach of procedural fairness akin to that found in SZRUR. It is important that EXN20 understand what is required for the Reinstatement Application to succeed so that she has a proper opportunity to produce evidence and argue her case. So that EXN20 might be afforded that opportunity, the Court did not consider it in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing of the Reinstatement Application on 2 February 2022. To that end, these Reasons for Judgment effectively put EXN20 on notice of what might be required to prove any relevant fraud. At the hearing on 2 February 2022, whilst EXN20 had the benefit of a Mandarin interpreter, the Court indicated to EXN20 that it would be advisable to have these Reasons for Judgment translated once they were available, so that she might have a better understanding of the nature of the required evidence prior to any resumed hearing of the Reinstatement Application.
The Court notes that there is no evidence filed on behalf of EXN20 or the Minister from any migration agent who has advised EXN20, or any lawyer who has acted on behalf of EXN20, in, or in relation to, these proceedings.
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
For the reasons set out at [11]-[19] above, on 2 February 2022 the Court determined that it is in the interests of justice that the hearing of the Reinstatement Application be adjourned to a date in May 2022, and made an order accordingly, plus further orders:
(a)for the filing of further affidavits and submissions by EXN20 and the Minister, particularly addressing any evidence of fraud for the purpose of r 17.05(2)(b) of the GFL Rules;
(b)that the costs of the day be reserved; and
(c)that short written Reasons for Judgment be published from Chambers at a later date. These are those Reasons for Judgment, which are not as short as originally intended.
Finally, the Court notes that at hearing the Minister did not object to the orders made, and in the circumstances quite properly so for a model litigant, but for which the Court is nevertheless grateful.
I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Lucev. Associate:
Dated: 10 February 2022
1
19
5