Exn20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2)
[2022] FedCFamC2G 724
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
EXN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 724
File number: PEG 350 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS Date of judgment: 1 September 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application in a proceeding – application for reinstatement of application for judicial review filed under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where originating application was dismissed by consent order – whether consent order was obtained by fraud – no basis for setting aside consent order – application in a proceeding dismissed. Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 13.01, 17.05
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 476
Cases cited: Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 126
ESD18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 653
EXN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 64
Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235; [1956] HCA 27
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 (2019) 273 FCR 213; [2019] FCAFC 221
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 (2020) 385 ALR 212; [2020] HCA 46
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE (2006) 154 FCR 365; [2006] FCAFC 142
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189; [2007] HCA 35
SZMIC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCA 800
Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543; (1997) 47 ALD 1
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 38 Date of hearing: 16 August 2022 Place: Perth Applicant: In person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Papalia Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
PEG 350 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: EXN20
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:
1 September 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application in a proceeding filed by the applicant on 27 October 2021 is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LADHAMS:
Introduction
The application before the Court is an application in a proceeding filed by the applicant on 27 October 2021. Essentially, the applicant asks the Court to set aside an Order of Judge Lucev made by consent on 5 October 2021 (Consent Order) dismissing her application for judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal).
The application in a proceeding first came before the Court on 2 February 2022. On that occasion, Judge Lucev adjourned the hearing and made orders to give the parties an opportunity to file further evidence and submissions, including in relation to any allegation of fraud by the applicant. His Honour subsequently published written reasons to explain the orders made: EXN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 64 (EXN20).
The application in a proceeding came before me for hearing on 16 August 2022. I am not satisfied that the applicant has established that the Consent Order should be set aside and I dismiss the application in a proceeding.
Background
The factual background to this matter is set out in Judge Lucev’s judgment in EXN20 and need not be repeated here.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the applicant’s application under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision was listed for hearing before Judge Lucev on 6 October 2021. Shortly before that hearing, on 29 September 2021, the applicant attempted to file a notice of discontinuance, but this document was not accepted for filing because the applicant did not file the notice at least 14 days before the date fixed for hearing, and the Court or a Registrar had not granted leave to the applicant to file the notice less than 14 days before the final hearing: see r 13.01(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (GFL Rules).
On 5 October 2021 Judge Lucev made the Consent Order in the following terms:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $4,000.
Application in a proceeding
The application in a proceeding was filed on 27 October 2021. In her application, the applicant seeks the following order, reproduced below without alteration:
I filed an FCC application (PEG 350/2020) to appeal against my protection visa refusal outcome on 24/11/2010 with the help of a lawyer. The first hearing date was 28/01/2021 and my most recent hearing was scheduled on 06/10/2021. As I want to move to Victoria, I ask the agent whether I can transfer my case to Melbourne. He said yes and asked me for service fees. After I paid him the fees, he helped me with the withdrawal and on 05/10/2021, he sent me a court order, showing that my case was dismissed. Later, I submitted an application to Melbourne registry by myself and it was refused as it does not comply with the court rules. I am very confused the the results were different from the information given by the lawyer. Now, I just want to continue appealing my case. Hence, I hope the court can reopen the proceeding of PEG 350/2020.
The applicant filed an affidavit in support of her application in a proceeding, which simply restated the relief claimed, but did not ultimately rely on that affidavit at the hearing before me.
Judge Lucev recognised that the relief that the applicant seeks appears to be the setting aside of the Consent Order, which would have the effect of reinstating the judicial review application: EXN20 at [4].
The circumstances in which the Court may set aside or vary an order after it has been entered are set out in r 17.05(2) of the GFL Rules, which provides:
(2)The Court or a Registrar may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:
(a) it was made in the absence of a party; or
(b) it was obtained by fraud; or
(c) it is interlocutory; or
(d) it is an injunction or for the appointment of a receiver; or
(e) it does not reflect the intention of the Court; or
(f) the party in whose favour it was made consents; or
(g) there is a clerical mistake in the judgment or order; or
(h)there is an error arising in the judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission.
When the matter came before him, Judge Lucev recognised that it may be that the only apparent path open to the applicant in her application in a proceeding is to seek that the Consent Order be set aside on the basis that it was ‘obtained by fraud’: EXN20 at [11].
Recognising that the applicant is a self-represented litigant who requires the assistance of an interpreter, Judge Lucev adjourned the hearing as a matter of procedural fairness to afford the applicant an opportunity to adduce relevant evidence. After setting out the relevant principles relating to fraud, Judge Lucev said in EXN20 at [18] and [19]:
18.Given the nature of the evidence required to prove fraud, the Court is concerned that to proceed with the matter without EXN20 having an opportunity to marshal such evidence of fraud as she is able, may constitute a breach of procedural fairness akin to that found in SZRUR [v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 216 FCR 445; [2013] FCAFC 146]. It is important that EXN20 understand what is required for the Reinstatement Application to succeed so that she has a proper opportunity to produce evidence and argue her case. So that EXN20 might be afforded that opportunity, the Court did not consider it in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing of the Reinstatement Application on 2 February 2022. To that end, these Reasons for Judgment effectively put EXN20 on notice of what might be required to prove any relevant fraud. At the hearing on 2 February 2022, whilst EXN20 had the benefit of a Mandarin interpreter, the Court indicated to EXN20 that it would be advisable to have these Reasons for Judgment translated once they were available, so that she might have a better understanding of the nature of the required evidence prior to any resumed hearing of the Reinstatement Application.
19.The Court notes that there is no evidence filed on behalf of EXN20 or the Minister from any migration agent who has advised EXN20, or any lawyer who has acted on behalf of EXN20, in, or in relation to, these proceedings.
Despite being ordered to file affidavit evidence (including evidence of fraud for the purposes of r 17.05(2)(b) of the GFL Rules) and submissions, the applicant had not filed any further evidence or submissions when the application in a proceeding first came before me on 21 July 2022.
When the application came before me on 21 July 2022, the Minister’s lawyer attended the Court in person, and the applicant wished to attend the hearing by Microsoft Teams. She told the Court that she did not wish to attend in person as she had symptoms associated with COVID-19. Unfortunately, due to technical issues on the day of the hearing, the Court was unable to establish a Microsoft Teams link. The applicant was able to appear by telephone, but in circumstances where I anticipated that the applicant would need to be given an opportunity to provide oral evidence in relation to her assertion of fraud, I adjourned the hearing to 3 August 2022 so that the applicant could appear in person or by video. At the hearing on 21 July 2022, I again explained to the applicant the need to provide evidence to establish any claim of fraud, and identified to her the relevant paragraphs in EXN20 where Judge Lucev had explained the circumstances in which an order could be set aside or varied, the nature of fraud, and the need to provide evidence. I also made orders to give the applicant a further opportunity to file affidavit evidence and submissions.
The applicant filed a further affidavit on 27 July 2022.
The hearing listed on 3 August 2022 was rescheduled to 10 August 2022 because the applicant told the Court on 27 July 2022 that she had tested positive to COVID-19. The hearing listed on 10 August 2022 was further rescheduled to 16 August 2022, as the applicant told the Court on 9 August 2022 that she continued to test positive to COVID-19. On the afternoon of 15 August 2022 the applicant requested a further adjournment of the hearing indicating that she continued to test positive for COVID-19. On that occasion the Court declined to grant the adjournment, but agreed to allow the applicant to appear by video if she returned a further positive test for COVID-19 on the day of the hearing. The applicant was also advised that if she was unable to participate in the hearing due to health reasons, she would need to provide medical evidence. No medical evidence was provided.
The hearing proceeded on 16 August 2022, with the applicant appearing by video link and the Minister’s lawyer appearing in person. Although the applicant did appear to be affected by illness, I was satisfied that she was able to effectively participate in the hearing. The Court briefly adjourned the hearing twice to allow the applicant to take breaks, and the applicant was advised that she could tell the Court if she needed further breaks. The applicant confirmed at the conclusion of the hearing that she had told the Court everything she wished to say.
Evidence before the Court
The evidence before the Court for the purposes of the application in a proceeding comprises:
(a)the affidavit filed by the applicant on 27 July 2022;
(b)the applicant’s oral evidence at the hearing;
(c)an affidavit affirmed by Laura Jean Groves on 1 February 2022, and filed on behalf of the Minister, annexing email correspondence between the Court, the applicant and the Minister’s lawyers in relation to the notice of discontinuance and the Consent Order; and
(d)the court book.
The applicant’s affidavit filed on 27 July 2022 was signed but not witnessed. Although the applicant indicated at the hearing that someone had assisted her with the translation of her affidavit, she could not confirm whether that person was a qualified interpreter or translator. At the hearing, I had the interpreter translate the content of the affidavit to the applicant and then gave the applicant an opportunity to make any necessary corrections and otherwise confirm that the content of her affidavit was true and correct. The applicant was also given an opportunity to provide further evidence-in-chief orally. The applicant’s evidence-in-chief can be summarised as follows:
(a)The applicant was assisted by a lawyer to file her application for judicial review and she fully trusted the lawyer. The lawyer asked her to sign the document, she did so and then the lawyer told her that the application was lodged and she just needed to wait.
(b)The applicant did not notice until September 2021 that the contents of her affidavit were incorrect. The lawyer did not make comprehensive arguments for her according to her actual situation. She asked her boss for help to write a new affidavit. She planned to relocate to Victoria, so she told the lawyer who helped her previously to transfer her application to Melbourne. The lawyer said yes and asked her for service fees. After she paid him the fee he helped her with the withdrawal and on 5 October 2021 he sent her a Court Order showing that her review case was dismissed.
(c)The applicant was completely confused by the dismissal order. She tried to submit an application for review to the Melbourne registry of the Court but the application was refused and she was told that the application did not comply with the Court rules and she could only try to reopen her case in Perth. She was confused because this was different to the information given by the lawyer. She therefore applied to reopen her case in Perth.
(d)When she filed her judicial review application she was completely ignorant of being cheated by her bad lawyer and did something that she did not understand. Later, with the help of her boss, she submitted the correct affidavit to express her meaning.
(e)The applicant agreed to sign the Consent Order to dismiss her application to the Court because she was going to move to Melbourne and because she realised that some of the information in the affidavit was incorrect.
Under cross-examination, the applicant gave the following relevant evidence:
(a)The applicant confirmed the email addresses that she uses. She confirmed that one of her email addresses was the email address she had used on the day of the hearing to communicate with the Court, which was the same email address that she had used in communications with the Minister’s lawyer when agreeing to the Consent Order. The applicant confirmed that, at present, nobody else has access to that email address, but previously her agent was able to use it.
(b)The applicant indicated that she was not sure of the name of the agent or lawyer who assisted her and only used a mobile phone application to communicate with him. She only knew him as ‘Lawyer Gao’. She used a Chinese website to find this lawyer but does not remember the name of the website.
(c)The applicant said that her agent drafted her application for judicial review. When asked what was wrong with the application, she said that the affidavit accompanying the application was wrong because it did not set out the risk she would be facing if she returned to her home country. It was put to the applicant that her claimed risk of harm was based on economic grounds and domestic violence grounds, which were the grounds addressed by the Tribunal, and the applicant said that it was more than that. She said that she also had some debt and was threatened
(d)The applicant confirmed that she signed the notice to discontinue the application for judicial review and provided that notice to the Court by email. She also confirmed that it was her signature on the Consent Order. She was directed to an email sent from her email address to the Minister’s lawyer on 5 October 2021 which read:
I am [applicant’s name]. I agree to withdraw my case and pay the fees for other respondents. Please continue processing my discontinuance application. Please find the attached signed consent order. Thank you
The applicant gave evidence that her lawyer or agent drafted the email for her.
(e)It was put to the applicant that she never had an agent and had made up the existence of this person. The applicant denied this assertion.
The applicant in her evidence had at times referred to an agent and at other times referred to a lawyer. In response to a question from the Court, the applicant indicated that the person was both a migration agent and a lawyer.
The affidavit of Ms Groves, filed on behalf of the Minister, annexes:
(a)an email from the Court to the parties dated 30 September 2021 attaching a notice of discontinuance lodged by the applicant on 29 September 2021, and advising that the notice would remain pending until the date of the hearing and may be addressed at the hearing, but could not be accepted for filing;
(b)an email from the Minister’s lawyer to the applicant dated 1 October 2021 advising that the Minister was willing to consent to the matter being dismissed on the basis that the applicant agree to pay costs in the sum of $4,000 and attaching a proposed consent order to give effect to this;
(c)an email dated 5 October 2021 from the applicant to the Minister’s lawyer attaching a copy of the proposed consent order signed by the applicant and containing the text extracted at [20(d)] above;
(d)an email dated 5 October 2021 from the Minister’s lawyer to the Court attaching a copy of the proposed consent order signed by or on behalf of both parties; and
(e)an email from Judge Lucev’s associate to the parties sent on 5 October 2021 confirming that the Consent Order had been made and that the hearing listed for 6 October 2021 had been vacated.
Consideration of whether a ground for setting aside the Consent Order has been established
Rule 17.05(2) of the GFL Rules, extracted at [10] above, sets out eight circumstances in which an order made by the Court can be varied or set aside. The only circumstance which might, on the applicant’s case, be applicable in the present matter is that the order was obtained by fraud: r 17.05(2)(b).
The principles relating to fraud in a public law context, considered in cases such as SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189; [2007] HCA 35 (SZFDE), Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 (2019) 273 FCR 213; [2019] FCAFC 221 and Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 (2020) 385 ALR 212; [2020] HCA 46, were summarised by Judge Lucev in EXN20 at [12]-[13] and are not repeated here.
After considering the evidence before the Court, I am not satisfied that the applicant has established that the Consent Order was obtained by fraud.
I have some concerns about the credibility of some aspects of the applicant’s evidence. In particular, I have serious doubts about whether the applicant ever consulted an agent or lawyer. The applicant’s evidence was very vague and she has been unable to provide any meaningful detail about the name of the lawyer or agent and the website she used to find them. She has simply indicated that she communicated with them using an application on her mobile phone but has not given any detail or evidence about that application. The applicant indicated that she paid her lawyer a fee but she has not provided any documentary evidence, such as a receipt or other evidence of payment, which might support this assertion. There is no indication on any of the Court documents that they have been prepared by a lawyer and there has never been a lawyer on the Court record for the applicant in this matter.
However, even if I were to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt and accept all evidence provided by her, the evidence does not establish that the Consent Order was obtained by fraud.
Any finding of fraud would need to specify what conduct was fraudulent, how it was fraudulent, and how it was acted upon: SZFDE at [41]. It is difficult to pinpoint in this matter the precise conduct that the applicant says is fraudulent. The applicant appears to imply that she was given poor advice by her lawyer, who has never been on the Court record. The applicant gave evidence that she was dissatisfied with the originating application and affidavit in support because it did not include an additional claim that she wished to raise. The applicant’s concerns in relation to the originating application for judicial review are irrelevant to the question of whether the Consent Order was obtained by fraud.
The evidence surrounding the circumstances in which the Consent Order was obtained does not identify any fraudulent conduct. Even if I accepted that the applicant did seek assistance from a lawyer, I would not find that that lawyer or any other person engaged in fraud. My reasons for this are as follows:
(a)The applicant gave evidence that she approached a lawyer to transfer her judicial review application to the Melbourne registry and that lawyer assisted her to prepare a notice of discontinuance. No evidence is given as to why the applicant ultimately decided to discontinue her application, rather than to seek a transfer as she initially intended, and no evidence is given as to what advice she received from her lawyer.
(b)The applicant personally signed the notice of discontinuance and the proposed consent order to dismiss the application. There is no evidence as to any specific conduct by a third person that induced her to sign those documents, and there is no evidence to suggest that the applicant did not understand that the effect of those documents, if accepted by the Court, would be that her judicial review application would end. To the contrary, the applicant’s oral evidence to the Court was that she signed the proposed consent order because she wanted to move to Melbourne and there were mistakes in her application for judicial review that she wanted to correct by filing a fresh application.
(c)Although the applicant gave evidence at the hearing that her lawyer drafted the email to the Minister’s solicitor attaching the signed proposed consent order and confirming that the applicant wished to discontinue her case, there is no evidence before the Court as to who actually sent the email and there is no suggestion that the email was sent without the applicant’s knowledge or consent.
(d)The applicant’s evidence that she was ‘completely confused’ by the Consent Order upon receiving a sealed copy does not establish that she was given any incorrect or misleading information by any person. It certainly does not establish that any person has engaged in any sort of dishonest conduct which might amount to fraud.
(e)As mentioned above, the applicant did not give evidence as to what advice was provided to her by her lawyer. In these circumstances, I am unwilling to draw any inference that the applicant has been given incorrect advice. In any event, if the applicant had acted upon advice which was merely incorrect or negligent, I would be unwilling to find that this amounted to fraud: see, for example, the comments of French J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE (2006) 154 FCR 365; [2006] FCAFC 142 at [129], referred to by the High Court in SZFDE at [53].
The applicant has not established that the Consent Order was obtained by fraud or that there is any other basis under r 17.05(2) for setting aside the Consent Order.
Other matters raised at the hearing
At the hearing I heard submissions from the applicant about why she believes that her application for judicial review has reasonable prospects of success. I did this on the understanding that if I found that one of the grounds in r 17.05(2) to set aside the Consent Order was established, it would then be appropriate to take into account the merits of the proposed substantive application at a reasonably impressionistic level in deciding whether to actually set aside the Consent Order. Such an approach would be consistent with cases where it has been found that if a ground for setting aside an order has been established, it is then appropriate to consider whether the interests of justice call for the order to be set aside: see, for example, SZMIC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCA 800 at [24]; Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 126 at [21]. An assessment of the merits of the judicial review application can be relevant to determining the interests of justice.
However, at the hearing, the Minister’s lawyer indicated that if the Court found the Consent Order was obtained by fraud, the Minister would accept that the Consent Order should be set aside on the basis that it would be in the interests of justice that the application be determined following a final hearing, irrespective of any assessment of the merits at a reasonably impressionistic level.
The Minister submitted that the merits of the judicial review application may be relevant to any exercise of the Court’s discretion to set aside the Consent Order outside of those grounds set out in r 17.05(2) of the GFL Rules. A question then arose as to whether the Court had any power to set aside the Consent Order even if it was not satisfied that one of the grounds in r 17.05(2) was established. The Minister submitted that if such a power existed, it should be exercised with great care and caution, and the Court was referred to the principles discussed in Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543 at 550. The Minister further submitted that there is no arguable jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision in the present matter.
It is unnecessary to express any definitive view as to whether the Court has any incidental power to set aside a consent order once entered for a reason not referred to in r 17.05(2) of the GFL Rules, because even if such a power existed, I would not exercise it to set aside the Consent Order in the present matter.
The High Court considered circumstances where it may be appropriate to set aside a compromise in Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235; [1956] HCA 27 (Harvey), and said at 244:
The question whether the compromise is to be set aside depends upon the existence of a ground which would suffice to render a simple contract void or voidable or to entitle the party to equitable relief against it, grounds for example, such as illegality, misrepresentation, non-disclosure of a material fact where disclosure is required, duress, mistake, undue influence, abuse of confidence or the like.
The applicant has not established the existence in the present matter of any of the types of reasons discussed in Harvey that may make it appropriate to set aside a consent order.
Alleged merits of a substantive application are not on their own a proper basis to set aside a consent order: for example, see ESD18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 653 at [7]. In any event, the applicant has not established that her judicial review application would have any realistic prospects of success for the following reasons:
(a)The applicant submitted at the hearing to this Court that she wished to raise a further claim based on a debt that she owed in Malaysia and the threats that she had received as a result of that debt. This claim was not raised by the applicant before the Tribunal. The Court in a judicial review proceeding can only grant relief where a decision is affected by jurisdictional error, and the Court does not consider whether the applicant meets the criteria for a protection visa. There is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal not addressing a claim that was not raised before it, and there is no basis on which the Court can consider the applicant’s claim based on any debt owed in Malaysia.
(b)The first of the three grounds raised in the judicial review application asserts that the Tribunal made an unfair and unreasonable assumption about the risk of the applicant being harmed if she returned to her home country. This ground really appears to invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review, but I treat it as an assertion that the Tribunal made findings that were illogical and irrational. The Tribunal in this matter did not make any unreasonable or unfair assumptions and its findings were not illogical or irrational. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s evidence about allegations of past harm and her claim to fear harm in the future and made findings of fact that were open to it on the evidence. Based on its findings of fact and country information, the Tribunal formed a reasonable conclusion that the applicant did not face a risk of harm sufficient to engage Australia’s protection obligations.
(c)The applicant’s second ground of review asserts that the Tribunal did not properly assess the danger of her being abused by her former husband. The Tribunal carefully considered the applicant’s evidence in relation to her claimed risk of harm from her former husband. While the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s claims in relation to past domestic violence, it accepted that the applicant’s marriage had ended, and it was not satisfied that there was a real chance the applicant would face serious harm from her former husband. The Tribunal noted that the applicant’s claim was not for one of the reasons in s 5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act. The Tribunal also carefully and thoroughly considered country information about Malaysia’s laws against domestic violence and found that the applicant’s home country could offer effective state protection. No jurisdictional error is discernible from the Tribunal decision insofar as it addresses the risk of harm that the applicant will face from her former husband.
(d)The applicant’s third ground asserts that the Tribunal underestimated the possible risks and harm that she would face from political and economic suppression and from domestic violence, even if laws against domestic violence do exist in Malaysia. This is simply an assertion of disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision and does not include any allegation of jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
The applicant has not established that there is any reason to set aside the Consent Order and reinstate her application for judicial review. The application in a proceeding must therefore be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams. Associate:
Dated: 1 September 2022
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