The Larrakia People v Northern Territory

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

The Larrakia People v Northern Territory [2003] FCA 1175

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 135, 136
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)

Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 cited
BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 949 cited
Commonwealth of Australia v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 cited
Daniel v State of Western Australia [2001] FCA 233 cited
Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28; (2002) 76 ALJR 1098 cited
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002] HCA 58; (2002) 77 ALJR 356 cited
Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 289 cited
Dyson v Pharmacy Board of New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 981; (2000) 50 NSWLR 523 cited
Northern Land Council v Olney (1992) 34 FCR 470 cited
Odgers ‘Uniform Evidence Law’, 5ed, Lawbook Co. 2002 at 440

THE LARRAKIA PEOPLE AND THE QUALL APPLICANTS v NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA, DARWIN CITY COUNCIL & AMATEUR FISHERMEN’S ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

D 6033 of 2001

MANSFIELD J
17 SEPTEMBER 2003
DARWIN


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

D 6033 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

THE LARRAKIA PEOPLE
FIRST APPLICANTS

THE QUALL APPLICANTS
SECOND APPLICANTS

AND:

NORTHERN TERRITORY
FIRST RESPONDENT

DARWIN CITY COUNCIL
FIFTH RESPONDENT

AMATEUR FISHERMEN’S ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
SIXTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

17 SEPTEMBER 2003

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR RULING

  1. The issue upon which I am presently asked to rule is whether an order should be made under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act) refusing to admit evidence of Professor Howard Morphy in the terms contained in his report of September 2003, and alternatively whether I should admit that evidence but limit its use under s 136 of the Evidence Act. Both the first and the fifth respondents have submitted that I should refuse to receive that evidence in its entirety.

  2. I also note that in a formal sense the proposed evidence of Professor Morphy, including the proposed tender of his report, is in the first applicants’ case.  The first applicants’ evidence completed in the last tranche of evidence in July 2003.  At that time senior counsel for the first applicants reserved the prospect of calling an expert witness in the current tranche of evidence, which otherwise was proposed to complete the evidence of the first and fifth respondents.

  3. The context in which the application is made is as follows:

  4. In accordance with directions, the first applicants filed anthropologists’ reports from Professor Merlan and Mr Graham.  Professor Maddock’s report was filed in June 2002 as the first respondent’s response to that anthropological evidence.  Subject to supplementary reports, that was in effect the close of the anticipated expert anthropological evidence.  I subsequently made an order extending the time by which supplementary reports from the proposed expert anthropological witnesses might be filed to 23 May 2003.  In fact,…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 1175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of The Larrakia People v Northern Territory, the applicants sought to adduce expert evidence from Professor Morphy in response to the evidence of Professor Maddock, whose report was to be adduced by the respondents. The central issue before the court was whether the evidence of Professor Morphy should be admitted, considering the provisions of the Evidence Act that could potentially bar its admission. The respondents argued against the admission of the evidence, citing sections 135(a) and 135(c) of the Evidence Act, which allow the court to refuse evidence if it is unfairly prejudicial or if its admission would result in undue waste of time. Alternatively, the respondents suggested that if the evidence was admitted, its use should be limited to avoid prejudice.

The court considered the purpose of the proposed evidence, finding it relevant to address theoretical anthropological issues raised by Professor Maddock's report. The court acknowledged that the general content of Professor Morphy's report was admissible as opinion evidence. The potential for unfair prejudice was evaluated, with particular attention to the respondents' ability to cross-examine Professor Morphy. Given the timing of the report's submission and the respondents' lack of opportunity to prepare for cross-examination, the court concluded that there was a significant risk of unfair prejudice if the evidence was admitted without restriction.

Consequently, the court ruled that the evidence of Professor Morphy should not be admitted at that time, as its admission would substantially prejudice the respondents. The court found that the delay in submitting the report had deprived the respondents of the opportunity to adequately respond, thereby impacting their ability to effectively cross-examine Professor Morphy. This decision underscored the importance of timely disclosure of expert evidence to ensure a fair trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

At the time, that is on 23 July 2003, I pointed out to senior counsel for the first applicants that if a further report was proposed to be adduced in evidence, subject of course to any ruling that such evidence might not be admitted, the sooner the document were produced the less likely leave to call the evidence would be contentious on the ground of delay. It is plain that the timing of the filing of the report of Professor Morphy or of any further expert evidence would affect the capacity of the respondents to take instructions with respect to it, and to deal with it in the current tranche of evidence. I accept that, given its contents, the respondents are not in a position to cross-examine Professor Morphy on his report if it is received in evidence at the present time.CONSIDERATION The issue is that identified in [1] of these reasons. Senior counsel for the first and fifth respondents submitted that the proposed evidence should not be admitted by reason of s 135(a) and by reason of s 135(c) of the Evidence Act. Section 135 provides:‘The court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might:(a)be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or(b)be misleading or confusing; or(c)cause or result in undue waste of time.’Alternatively, as emerged in the course of submissions, it was contended that the proposed evidence should be received but the use to which it should be put be limited, so as to avoid the danger of unfair prejudice to the respondents. The power to make such an order appears in s 136 of the Evidence Act, which provides:‘The court may limit the use to be made of evidence if there is danger that a particular use of the evidence might:(a)be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or(b)be misleading or confusing.’ To rule upon the issue it is necessary to identify the purpose for which the evidence is adduced. As is apparent from the report of Professor Morphy, he was asked specifically to provide a response to theoretical anthropological issues raised by the anthropologist's report of Professor Maddock which is dated June 2002. The first respondent intends to adduce the evidence of Professor Maddock, removing from it significant portions for reasons to which I do not need to refer in detail. Professor Maddock is now deceased. In my view the purpose of the proposed evidence indicates that it is relevant. The content of the report of Professor Morphy is in a general sense admissible, that is, without referring to specific parts of the report which might attract specific contentions as to their admissibility, the way in which it is expressed is generally in an admissible form of opinion evidence in relation to some of the matters to which Professor Maddock refers: see ss 76(1) and 79 of the Evidence Act. I observe that the High Court in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 (per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at 308 with whom Gaudron and Kirby J agreed at 311 on the issue, and per McHugh J at 325-328) referred with approval to the consideration given to ss 135 and 136 of the Evidence Act by the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales in BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139. One aspect of unfair prejudice may be the lack of a proper opportunity to cross-examine the person whose evidence is sought to be admitted: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 949 per Nicholson J at [10]; Commonwealth of Australia v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389; Odgers ‘Uniform Evidence Law’, 5ed, Lawbook Co. 2002 at 440 and cases cited at fn 517. More generally, the way in which the trial has been conducted may be a factor relevant to determining whether there is a danger of unfair prejudice to a party by the admission of evidence: Daniel v State of Western Australia [2001] FCA 223 per Nicholson J at [18].