Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long

Link copied
Case Copied 71 min read
97 CLR 36

DARLING ISLAND STEVEDORING AND

LIGHTERAGE COMPANY LIMITED DEFENDANT, LONG

RESPONDENT. PLAINTIFF,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Action-Statute-Power to make regulations-Regulation imposing duty-What

persons subject to duty-Breach of regulation-Person thereby injured-Right of action-Against whom action lies-Validity of regulation creating right- 1956,

-Master and servant-Vicarious liability-Liability for acts or for torts- SYDNEY,

Navigation Act 1912-1953 (Cth.), S. 425 (c) (h)-Navigation (Loading and Nov. 9, 12,

Unloading) Regulations, regs. 4, 31. 13;

Regulation 4 of the Navigation (Loading and Unloading) Regulations made pursuant to S. 425 of the Navigation Act 1912-1953 (Cth.) provides (inter SYDNEY,

alia): "person-in-charge", in relation to the loading or unloading of any May 3.

ship, means any person directly or indirectly in control of the persons actually engaged in the process of loading or unloading that ship. Regulation 31 of such regulations provides :- (1). Before any loading or unloading work is begun at a hatch on any vessel to which these Regulations apply, all hatch beams shall be removed unless the hatch is of such size as to permit of the work being carried out without any danger to the workers in the hold from a load striking against any beam left in place. (2). If the cargo is to be loaded or unloaded through more than one hatch and it is necessary to remove the hatch beams, the beams from the topmost hatch shall be removed first, and the beams from upper hatches shall be removed before those from lower hatches. (3). Where any hatch beam is left in place it shall, before loading or unloading work begins, be securely fastened at each end by means of stout bolts, with nuts attached, or other suitable fastenings provided for the purpose of preventing, and in such manner as to prevent, its accidental displacement. Penalty, on the person in charge: One hundred pounds".

Held, (1) by the whole Court, that reg. 31 is authorised by pars. (c) and (h) of S. 425 of the Navigation Act 1912-1953.

97 CLR 37

(2) by Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ., Kitto and Taylor JJ. expressing no opinion, that a private right correlative with the duties imposed by reg. 31 exists in the persons for whose protection such regulation was made.

(3) by the whole Court, that the obligations created by reg. 31 are, regard being had to the definition of person-in-charge in reg. 4, cast upon the person actually exercising control on the spot where the operations are being carried out and not upon the employer of such person.

(4) by Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ., that the obligations being SO cast, an action at law for damages based upon breach of such statutory obligations brought against the employer as such of the person actually in control by reason of the latter's failure to perform such obligations will not lie, the employer not being liable for breaches by his employee of statutory obligations cast solely upon that employee and not upon the employer.

(5) by Kitto and…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1957] HCA 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff, a wharf labourer, sued his employer, the stevedoring company, for damages for personal injuries sustained when a hatch beam became displaced and fell into the hold of a ship. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant company had breached Regulation 31 of the Navigation (Loading and Unloading) Regulations, which required hatch beams left in place to be securely fastened before loading or unloading operations commenced.

The central legal issues before the High Court were: (1) whether Regulation 31 of the Navigation (Loading and Unloading) Regulations was validly made under the Navigation Act 1912-1953 (Cth.); (2) whether a private right of action for damages for breach of Regulation 31 existed for the protection of persons engaged in loading and unloading ships; (3) whether the duty imposed by Regulation 31 was cast upon the employer (the stevedoring company) or solely upon the "person-in-charge" as defined in Regulation 4; and (4) if the duty was solely upon the "person-in-charge," whether the employer could still be held vicariously liable for the employee's breach of that statutory duty.

The High Court, by majority, held that Regulation 31 was authorised by the Navigation Act and that a private right of action for damages correlative to the duties imposed by Regulation 31 did exist for the protection of workers. However, the Court unanimously determined that the obligations created by Regulation 31, having regard to the definition of "person-in-charge," were imposed upon the individual directly or indirectly in control of the loading or unloading operations on the spot, and not upon the employer company. Consequently, the Court held that an action at law for damages based upon a breach of these statutory obligations could not be brought against the employer as such, as the employer was not liable for breaches by its employee of statutory obligations cast solely upon that employee. The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was reversed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Alfred Harold Long, a wharf labourer, commenced an action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Company Limited, claiming damages for personal injuries sustained during loading and unloading operations on a ship in the port of Sydney. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant company, as the employer, failed to securely fasten a hatch beam before loading or unloading work began, resulting in the beam becoming displaced and causing the plaintiff to be thrown into the ship's hold, leading to injuries. The defendant company filed a plea arguing that the plaintiff's declaration disclosed no cause of action against them. The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the declaration was good in substance, and the demurrer was set down for hearing. The Full Court of the Supreme Court ordered judgment on the demurrer be entered for the plaintiff. The defendant company appealed to the High Court, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision was in error. The High Court considered whether the Navigation Act 1912 conferred a power on the Governor-General to create by regulation statutory duties giving rise to civil rights of action and whether a breach of such duties could give rise to a private right in the injured party to maintain a civil action for damages. The Court also examined whether an employer could be held liable for breaches of statutory duties imposed on their employees, even if the employer was not directly subject to such duties.

The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal by special leave from a decision of the Full Supreme Court of New South Wales. Alfred Harold Long, a wharf labourer, sued Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Company Limited for damages following an injury sustained during loading operations at a ship in the port of Sydney. Long claimed the stevedoring company breached the Navigation (Loading and Unloading) Regulations, which required securing hatch beams before loading or unloading operations. The Supreme Court initially found for Long, but Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Company Limited appealed to the High Court, challenging the validity of the regulation, the existence of a private right of action, and the employer's vicarious liability for the employee's statutory negligence. The High Court heard arguments from both parties and delivered its judgment, reversing the decision of the Supreme Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Navigation Act 1912 confers power on the Governor-General to create by regulation a right of action for damages for breach of a regulation thereunder.
2. Whether Regulation 31 of the Navigation (Loading and Unloading) Regulations creates a right of action for damages based on a breach of statutory duty.
3. Whether the obligations created by Regulation 31 are cast upon the employer of the person actually in control of the loading or unloading operations, or solely upon the person actually exercising control on the spot.
4. Whether the employer is liable for breaches by its employee of statutory obligations cast solely upon that employee and not upon the employer.

Held
1. The court held that Regulation 31 of the Navigation (Loading and Unloading) Regulations is authorized by sections (c) and (h) of Section 425 of the Navigation Act 1912.
2. The court held that a private right correlative with the duties imposed by Regulation 31 exists in the persons for whose protection the regulation was made.
3. The court held that the obligations created by Regulation 31 are cast upon the person actually exercising control on the spot where the operations are being carried out and not upon the employer of such person.
4. The court held that an employer is not liable for breaches by its employee of statutory obligations cast solely upon that employee and not upon the employer.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court's decision in Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long addressed several critical issues related to statutory interpretation and employer liability for breaches of safety regulations. The case revolved around whether Regulation 31 of the Navigation (Loading and Unloading) Regulations created a right of action for damages for breaches of statutory duties, and if so, who could be held liable for such breaches.

The court first considered whether the Navigation Act 1912 conferred power on the Governor-General to create by regulation a right of action for damages for breach of a regulation. The High Court held that the act did confer such power, consistent with the principle that regulations made under an act can create a civil right correlative to the duty for breach of which the person on whom the duty is imposed is liable to punishment. This was grounded on the precedent that where a statute requires specific precautions for the protection of employees, it creates an individual civil right of action for those injured by the breach of such a duty.

Secondly, the court examined whether Regulation 31 of the Navigation (Loading and Unloading) Regulations created a right of action for damages based on a breach of statutory duty. The court concluded that it did, as the regulation was of the kind likely to give rise to such a correlative civil right. However, the court found that this right was correlative with the criminal liability and punishment for breach of the duty imposed on the person-in-charge, not the employer.

Thirdly, the court addressed whether the obligations created by Regulation 31 were cast upon the employer of the person actually in control of the loading or unloading operations, or solely upon the person actually exercising control on the spot. The court found that the obligations were cast solely upon the person actually in control of the operations, i.e., the person-in-charge, and not upon the employer.

Finally, the court deliberated on whether the employer is liable for breaches by its employee of statutory obligations cast solely upon that employee and not upon the employer. The majority of the court held that an employer is not liable for statutory wrongs committed by its employee in the course of employment unless the statute or regulation specifically imposes a personal duty on the employer. The court reasoned that to hold an employer liable for statutory breaches committed by an employee simply because the employee is in the employer's service would give the regulation an operation not justified by its provisions.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an employer is not vicariously liable for breaches of statutory duties cast solely upon employees, unless the statute or regulation specifically imposes a personal duty on the employer. The court's decision also clarifies that a regulation can create a civil right of action for damages for breach of statutory duty, but such a right is correlative with the criminal liability imposed by the regulation. The court's reasoning distinguished between the acts of an employee and the employee's liabilities, emphasizing that vicarious liability pertains to the acts of the employee, not their liabilities.