FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v McDermott (No 2) [2017] FCA 797
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 797
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues addressed by the court were whether the CFMEU could be held directly liable for the contraventions of section 500 committed by its officials, whether it could be vicariously liable, and if it was "involved in the contraventions" for the purposes of section 550. The court examined these issues in light of section 793 of the Act, which attributes the conduct and state of mind of officials to the registered organisation. The court also considered the implications of the decision in Harris v Trade Practices Commission, which had previously addressed similar issues under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
The court found that while the CFMEU could be vicariously liable for the actions of its officials under the principles of common law vicarious liability, it could not be directly liable for the contraventions of section 500. This conclusion was based on the specific language of section 500, which sanctions the conduct of a permit holder, and the broader context of the Act, which does not impose direct liability on registered organisations for the actions of their officials. The court also held that the CFMEU was not "involved in the contraventions" for the purposes of section 550 unless it had knowledge of the contraventions and had participated in them. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to establish the CFMEU's knowledge or participation.
The court's reasoning led to the conclusion that the CFMEU could not be directly liable for the contraventions of section 500 by its officials, but it could potentially be held vicariously liable. However, the evidence presented did not support a finding that the CFMEU had the requisite knowledge or participation to be deemed "involved in the contraventions." As a result, the court dismissed the application for declaratory relief against the CFMEU in all but one respect.
The final orders of the court included allowing the application for declaratory relief to the extent that the CFMEU was not directly liable for the contraventions of section 500, dismissing it in all other respects, and setting a deadline for any further applications to vary the relief granted. The matter was also listed for further directions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for declaratory relief against the fourth respondent is allowed to the extent of the relief granted in paragraph 7 of the declarations made today.
2. The application for declaratory relief against the fourth respondent is otherwise dismissed.
3. Any application for orders varying paragraph 7 of the declaratory relief granted today is to be filed on or before 24 July 2017.
4. The matter is listed for directions at 9:30am on 14 August 2017.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Judgment in Harris was delivered after judgment in this matter was reserved. Submissions were reopened for the purpose of allowing ABCC to submit that the decision in Harris is plainly wrong and should not be followed: see Re York Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 162 FCR 358 at [22] – [23] (Finkelstein J); Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [135]. ABCC confirmed its reliance on the same submissions originally made in closing submissions concerning the meaning and operation of s 793 of the Act. For the reasons that follow, the arguments advanced by ABCC do not establish that the decision in Harris is plainly wrong. I would, with respect, arrive at the same conclusion as that arrived at by Siopis J.Consideration Section 793 of the Act provides:793 Liability of bodies corporateConduct of a body corporate(1) Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate:(a)by an officer, employee or agent (an official) of the body within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority; or(b)by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether express or implied) of an official of the body, if the giving of the direction, consent or agreement is within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the official;is taken, for the purposes of this Act and the procedural rules, to have been engaged in also by the body.State of mind of a body corporate(2)If, for the purposes of this Act or the procedural rules, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of a body corporate in relation to particular conduct, it is enough to show:(a)that the conduct was engaged in by a person referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b); and(b)that the person had that state of mind.Meaning of state of mind(3) The state of mind of a person includes:(a)the knowledge, intention, opinion, belief or purpose of the person; and(b)the person’s reasons for the intention, opinion, belief or purpose.Disapplication of Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code(4)Part 2.5 of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code does not apply to an offence against this Act.Note: Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code deals with corporate criminal responsibility.(5) In this section, employee has its ordinary meaning. The word “conduct” is defined non-exhaustively in s 12 of the Act to include an omission. Section 793 is a provision of general application. It operates on its own force whenever it is necessary, for the purposes of the Act, to ascertain whether a body corporate has engaged in particular conduct and whenever it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the body corporate in relation to that particular conduct. It is to be construed in accordance with its text, context and purpose: Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (NSW) v Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1 at [57] – [62]. In respect of CFMEU’s liability for a contravention of s 500, ABCC contends that s 793 supplies proof of all of the elements of the contravention, including the essential element that the person said to have contravened the provision have the status of a permit holder. ABCC advanced three interrelated arguments in support of its contention that the provision operates in that way.