Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v McDermott (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v McDermott (No 2) [2017] FCA 797

File number: SAD 58 of 2015
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 17 July 2017
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – conduct of state of mind of union officials attributable to registered organisation – whether registered organisation can be directly liable for a contravention of s 500 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether a registered organisation can be vicariously liable for a contravention of s 500 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether registered organisation involved in the contraventions of it officials within the meaning of s 550 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – proof of participation and knowledge — registered organisation taken to have contravened s 500 by reason of its knowing involvement – registered organisation not otherwise liable

INDUSTRIAL LAW – contraventions of s 500 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by union officials – whether officials had implied licence to enter construction site to — whether officials acted in an improper manner by entering site without providing an entry notice as required by s 487 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 13

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 6, 12, 480, 484, 487, 490, 492, 500, 508, 510, 512, 539, 545, 546, 550, 793

Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth), s 27

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 52, 75B, 84

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), ss 170NC, 349

Cases cited:

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Harris [2017] FCA 733

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148

Australian Workers’ Union v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2013) 209 FCR 191

Commissioners of Police v Cartman [1896] 1 QB 655

Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2016] HCA 41, (2016) 338 ALR 360

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2017] FCAFC 77

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke [2007] FCAFC 87, (2007) 164 IR 299

Darlaston v Parker (2010) 189 FCR 1

Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36

Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) v WJI (2004) 219 CLR 43

Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCA 1287

Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2015] FCA 199

Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v McDermott [2016] FCA 1147

Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Robinson (2016) 241 FCR 338

Ellis v Guerin (1925) SASR 282

Fair Work Ombudsman v Offshore Marine Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 943

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89

Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473

Hanley v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 797
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v McDermott (No 2), the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (ABCC) sought to hold the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) liable for contraventions of section 500 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The dispute involved whether the CFMEU could be directly or vicariously liable for the actions of its officials, as well as whether it was "involved in the contraventions" of its officials within the meaning of section 550 of the Act. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining these issues.

The primary legal issues addressed by the court were whether the CFMEU could be held directly liable for the contraventions of section 500 committed by its officials, whether it could be vicariously liable, and if it was "involved in the contraventions" for the purposes of section 550. The court examined these issues in light of section 793 of the Act, which attributes the conduct and state of mind of officials to the registered organisation. The court also considered the implications of the decision in Harris v Trade Practices Commission, which had previously addressed similar issues under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).

The court found that while the CFMEU could be vicariously liable for the actions of its officials under the principles of common law vicarious liability, it could not be directly liable for the contraventions of section 500. This conclusion was based on the specific language of section 500, which sanctions the conduct of a permit holder, and the broader context of the Act, which does not impose direct liability on registered organisations for the actions of their officials. The court also held that the CFMEU was not "involved in the contraventions" for the purposes of section 550 unless it had knowledge of the contraventions and had participated in them. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to establish the CFMEU's knowledge or participation.

The court's reasoning led to the conclusion that the CFMEU could not be directly liable for the contraventions of section 500 by its officials, but it could potentially be held vicariously liable. However, the evidence presented did not support a finding that the CFMEU had the requisite knowledge or participation to be deemed "involved in the contraventions." As a result, the court dismissed the application for declaratory relief against the CFMEU in all but one respect.

The final orders of the court included allowing the application for declaratory relief to the extent that the CFMEU was not directly liable for the contraventions of section 500, dismissing it in all other respects, and setting a deadline for any further applications to vary the relief granted. The matter was also listed for further directions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for declaratory relief against the fourth respondent is allowed to the extent of the relief granted in paragraph 7 of the declarations made today.

2. The application for declaratory relief against the fourth respondent is otherwise dismissed.

3. Any application for orders varying paragraph 7 of the declaratory relief granted today is to be filed on or before 24 July 2017.

4. The matter is listed for directions at 9:30am on 14 August 2017.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

If an approach resonant with the “liability” theory stated by Fullagar J were to be adopted in the current statutory context, it would follow that CFMEU may be vicariously liable for a contravention of s 500 of the Act, notwithstanding that the provision sanctions the conduct by a natural person (namely a permit holder) and no other person.The decision in Hanley In Hanley v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (2000) 100 FCR 530, Ryan, Moore and Goldberg JJ considered alternative legal bases for the liability of a union for a contravention of s 170NC of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WR Act). Section 170NC(1) provided:(1) A person must not:(a)take or threaten to take any industrial action or other action; or(b)refrain or threaten to refrain from taking any action; with intent to coerce another person to agree, or not to agree, to:(c)making, varying or terminating, or extending the nominal expiry date of, an agreement under Division 2 or 3; or(d)approving any of the things mentioned in paragraph (c).… The union’s liability was alleged to be founded on the conduct of its organiser, Mr Dowling. A magistrate had found that Mr Dowling was liable for a contravention of s 170NC(1) but the union was not. The magistrate held that s 349 of the WR Act (a provision expressed in relevantly the same terms as s 793 of the Act as now in force) was the only basis upon which the union may be liable by reference to Mr Dowling’s conduct, but that provision had not been pleaded. The magistrate rejected a submission that the union may be found to be vicariously liable at common law. The Full Court held (at [59]) that the presence of s 349 in the WR Act did not exclude the operation of either “common law vicarious liability” or direct corporate liability under the principles in Tesco. Moreover, vicarious liability was not excluded merely because s 170NC could be characterised as a penalty provision (at [60] – [61]). The same must be concluded about s 500 and s 793 of the Act now under consideration: see also Fair Work Ombudsman v Offshore Marine Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 943 at [148] (Gilmour J). In the result, the union respondent in Hanley was not shown to be directly liable for a contravention of s 170NC(1) under the principles in Tesco because Mr Dowling had not been shown to be the “directing mind and will” of the union (at [64]). The union was, however, “vicariously liable, or liable by the operation of s 349, for Dowling’s breach of s 170NC(1)” (at [85]). In concluding that the common law principles of vicarious liability applied, the Full Court said (at [61]):In our view, common law vicarious liability is not excluded merely because s 170NC can be characterised as a penalty provision. It will be recalled that the passage from the speech of Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass, relied upon by his Worship, spoke of statutes creating civil liabilities only ‘exceptionally’ excluding vicarious liability. There is nothing to suggest that s 170NC falls into that exceptional category. Indeed, it may be doubted whether, even if s 170NC created an offence (which it does not: see s 170NF(1)), vicarious liability would necessarily be excluded (as seems to be the effect of his Worship’s reasoning). That question would probably have to be answered by the application of the following test suggested by Atkin J in Mousell Brothers Ltd v London and North-Western Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 836 at 845, 846 (applied by the High Court in R v Australasian Films Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 195 at 214-215 and by Franklyn J in Ducasse):‘I think that the authorities cited by my Lord make it plain that while prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a duty in such words as to make the prohibition or duty absolute; in which case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants. To ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not regard must be had to the object of the statute the words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person upon whom the penalty is imposed.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Judgment in Harris was delivered after judgment in this matter was reserved. Submissions were reopened for the purpose of allowing ABCC to submit that the decision in Harris is plainly wrong and should not be followed: see Re York Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 162 FCR 358 at [22] – [23] (Finkelstein J); Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [135]. ABCC confirmed its reliance on the same submissions originally made in closing submissions concerning the meaning and operation of s 793 of the Act. For the reasons that follow, the arguments advanced by ABCC do not establish that the decision in Harris is plainly wrong. I would, with respect, arrive at the same conclusion as that arrived at by Siopis J.Consideration Section 793 of the Act provides:793 Liability of bodies corporateConduct of a body corporate(1) Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate:(a)by an officer, employee or agent (an official) of the body within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority; or(b)by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement (whether express or implied) of an official of the body, if the giving of the direction, consent or agreement is within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of the official;is taken, for the purposes of this Act and the procedural rules, to have been engaged in also by the body.State of mind of a body corporate(2)If, for the purposes of this Act or the procedural rules, it is necessary to establish the state of mind of a body corporate in relation to particular conduct, it is enough to show:(a)that the conduct was engaged in by a person referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b); and(b)that the person had that state of mind.Meaning of state of mind(3) The state of mind of a person includes:(a)the knowledge, intention, opinion, belief or purpose of the person; and(b)the person’s reasons for the intention, opinion, belief or purpose.Disapplication of Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code(4)Part 2.5 of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code does not apply to an offence against this Act.Note: Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code deals with corporate criminal responsibility.(5) In this section, employee has its ordinary meaning. The word “conduct” is defined non-exhaustively in s 12 of the Act to include an omission. Section 793 is a provision of general application. It operates on its own force whenever it is necessary, for the purposes of the Act, to ascertain whether a body corporate has engaged in particular conduct and whenever it is necessary to establish the state of mind of the body corporate in relation to that particular conduct. It is to be construed in accordance with its text, context and purpose: Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (NSW) v Cunneen (2015) 256 CLR 1 at [57] – [62]. In respect of CFMEU’s liability for a contravention of s 500, ABCC contends that s 793 supplies proof of all of the elements of the contravention, including the essential element that the person said to have contravened the provision have the status of a permit holder. ABCC advanced three interrelated arguments in support of its contention that the provision operates in that way.