FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Huddy (No 2) [2017] FCA 1088
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1088
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that, absent statutory authority, the application of the totality principle did not permit the imposition of a single global sentence for multiple offences, including civil penalties under the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth). The court reasoned that penalties should be imposed on individual respondents based on their respective culpability and circumstances. However, in this case, neither counsel argued for distinguishing between the employee respondents, and no evidence or submissions were made regarding the individual financial and other circumstances of the represented respondents. The Commissioner argued, and the Represented Respondents accepted, that penalties in the same amounts could be imposed on all the employee respondents.
The court noted that section 348 of the Fair Work Act was designed to prohibit activities that would detract from the orderly conduct of industrial affairs. The employees had contravened this section by engaging in unlawful industrial action to coerce their employer to change the finishing time. The court emphasised the seriousness of the employees' conduct, given that they were aware of the unlawful nature of their actions. The court concluded that the penalties should reflect the gravity of the contraventions, taking into account the employees' knowledge and intent to coerce the employer.
The court ordered various pecuniary penalties for the respondents, with different amounts assigned based on the specific contraventions and the individual respondents' roles. The penalties ranged from $400 to $2,500 per contravention, and the total penalties were to be paid to the Commonwealth of Australia. The specific orders included Mr Huddy paying a total penalty of $10,700, Mr Tait paying $8,000, the CFMEU paying $25,000, and other respondents paying $1,500 each, among other specific penalties.
Orders
Orders of the court
1st Respondent (Mr Huddy)
15. The 1st Respondent (Mr Huddy) pay a pecuniary penalty of $1,200 for each of the first five accessorial contraventions of s 348 (those of the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Respondents) which are the subject of Declaration 6.
16. The 1st Respondent (Mr Huddy) pay a pecuniary penalty of $1,000 for each of the next five accessorial contraventions of s 348 (those of the 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th and 13th Respondents) which are the subject of Declaration 6.
17. The 1st Respondent (Mr Huddy) pay a pecuniary penalty of $500 for each of the next five accessorial contraventions of s 348 (those of the 14th, 15th, 16th, 18th and 19th Respondents) which are the subject of Declaration 6.
18. The 1st Respondent (Mr Huddy) pay a pecuniary penalty of $2,500 for the contravention of s 500 which is the subject of the Declaration 9.
2nd Respondent (Mr Tait)
19. The 2nd Respondent (Mr Tait) pay a pecuniary penalty of $1,500 for the contravention of s 348 which is the subject of Declaration 3.
20. The 2nd Respondent (Mr Tait) pay a pecuniary penalty of $1,000 for each of the first five accessorial contraventions of s 348 (those of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Respondents) which are the subject of Declaration 12.
21. The 2nd Respondent (Mr Tait) pay a pecuniary penalty of $750 for each of the next five accessorial contraventions of s 348 (those of the 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th Respondents) which are the subject of the Declaration 12.
22. The 2nd Respondent (Mr Tait) pay a pecuniary penalty of $400 for each of the next five accessorial contraventions of s 348 (those of the 15th, 16th, 18th, 19th and 20th Respondents) which are the subject of Declaration 12.
3rd Respondent (the CFMEU)
23. The 3rd Respondent (the CFMEU) pay a pecuniary penalty of $25,000 for the accessorial contravention of s 500 which is the subject of the Declaration 14.
4th to 9th, 11th to 16th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 23rd to 58th and 60th to 68th Respondents
24. The 4th to 9th, 11th to 16th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 23rd to 58th and 60th to 68th Respondents each pay a pecuniary penalty of $1,500 for their contraventions of s 348 which are the subject of the Declaration 3.
10th Respondent (Mr Churchyard)
25. The 10th Respondent (Mr Churchyard) pay a pecuniary penalty of $1,200 for his contravention of s 417(1).
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:
26. Pursuant to s 546(3) of the FW Act, each of the pecuniary penalties is to be paid to the Commonwealth of Australia.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I also note that in Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCAFC 59; (2015) 229 FCR 331, the Full Court noted at [43] that, absent statutory authority to do so, the application of the totality principle does not authorise a sentencing court to impose a single global sentence for multiple offences and held that the same applied with respect to the imposition of civil penalties under the BCI Act. Relevant considerations Strictly speaking, penalties should be imposed on the individual respondents having regard to the Court’s assessment of their individual culpabilities and circumstances. However, neither counsel submitted that it was necessary in the circumstances of this case to distinguish between the employee respondents. Further, counsel for the Represented Respondents did not adduce evidence of, or make submissions concerning, the individual financial and other circumstances of the Represented Respondents. In short, counsel for the Commissioner contended, and counsel for the Represented Respondents accepted, that penalties in the same amounts could be imposed on all of the employee respondents. It is appropriate to commence by noting some general matters regarding the imposition of penalties for a contravention of s 348. Section 348 is contained in Div 4 of Pt 3‑1 of the FW Act. Looked at generally, the purpose of Div 4 is to prohibit activities which would detract from the orderly conduct of industrial affairs. Section 348 is an important element of that scheme. It proscribes actions taken with the intention of coercing another to engage in “industrial activity”. That term is defined very broadly. In the present case, the employees contravened s 348 by taking action (which was of itself unlawful) to cause LOR to comply with the “request” that it change the finishing time. In ABCC v CFMEU [2017] FCAFC 53 at [73], Dowsett and Rares JJ said of s 348:The legislative prohibition in s 348 is designed to proscribe the use of industrial action to coerce someone else into, among other things, complying with a request whether it is lawful or not. The purpose of s 348 is to make the act of coercion itself unlawful, regardless of its motivation. The lawfulness of a request, the fulfilment of which the person seeks to achieve by taking coercive action, is an element of a contravention of s 348 and cannot be treated as, in any way, mitigating the seriousness of that contravention. Counsel for the Commissioner emphasised that the employees knew at the time that they engaged in the industrial action that it was a form of unlawful activity. Mr Huddy had told them as much. Further, on my findings, most of the employees knew LOR’s reasons for maintaining that it was entitled to have its employees continue at its worksite until 5 pm see [354] in the principal judgment. The Commissioner emphasised that each of the individual employees (other than the 10th respondent) had taken the industrial action with a view to coercing LOR to provide a satisfactory response to their demands that it change its position on the time at which the buses departed from the LOR worksite. The element of coercion means that the respondents’ conduct must be regarded seriously.