Esso Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union [2016] FCAFC 72

Appeal from:

Application for leave to appeal and appeal: Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union (Federal Court of Australia, VID 115 of 2015, Orders dated 13 August 2015)

Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union (2015) 253 IR 304; [2015] FCA 758

File number(s): VID 435 of 2015
VID 470 of 2015
Judge(s): SIOPIS, BUCHANAN AND BROMBERG JJ
Date of judgment: 25 May 2016
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – construction of s 418 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – powers of the Fair Work Commission under s 418 – such orders are limited to the scope of identified industrial action – primary judge held that orders of the FWC lacking in specificity were invalid – no error in the approach of the primary judge

INDUSTRIAL LAW – Fair Work Commission ordered that “de-isolation of equipment”  was protected industrial action – dispute between parties as to the practical meaning of “de-isolation of equipment” – primary judge found that the construction to be given to what is protected industrial action is that which a reasonable person in the position of the employer would understand it to mean – no error in conclusion by the primary judge  

INDUSTRIAL LAW – whether the union was in breach of coercion provisions under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth); ss 343, 346 and 348 – two elements to be satisfied to find coercion (Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (2001) 109 FCR 378) – not necessary to establish the person intended to act unlawfully – not a defence that a person believed their action to be lawful – intent to coerce requires showing negation of choice

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 13, 14, 14(1), 19, 186, 186(5), 272, 272(2), 340, 341, 341(1)(b), 341(2)(e), 343, 343(2), 346, 347, 347(b)(iv), 348, 360, 361, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 413, 413(4), 413(5), 414, 414(6), 415, 417, 417(1), 417(2), 418, 418(1), 418(3), 419, 421, 421(2), 556, 570, 675

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), ss 4, 127, 127(1), 170NC, 170NC(2), 420, 496, 496(1), 496(9)

Cases cited:

Anthony Hordern and Sons Limited v The Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1

Australian Mines and Metals Association Inc v The Maritime Union of Australia [2015] FCA 677; (2015) 251 IR 75

Australian Mines and Metals Association Inc v The Maritime Union of Australia [2016] FCAFC 71

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 21; (2015) 89 ALJR 622; 320 ALR 448

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Endeavour Coal Pty Ltd (2015) 231 FCR 150

Fair Work Ombudsman v National Jet Systems Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 243; (2012) 218 IR 436

Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2000) 106 FCR 16

Johns v Australian…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 72
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Esso Australia Pty Ltd appealed against a decision of the Fair Work Commission (FWC) and the Australian Workers' Union (AWU) cross-appealed. The dispute centred on the interpretation of section 418 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the nature of protected industrial action. Esso argued that the FWC's orders lacked specificity and the AWU's actions constituted coercion contrary to the Act. The primary judge ruled that the FWC's orders were invalid due to their lack of specificity and that the AWU had not coerced Esso. Both parties appealed to the Full Court.

The court needed to determine whether the FWC's orders were sufficiently specific under section 418(3) of the Act, if the AWU's actions were protected industrial action, and whether the AWU had coerced Esso as alleged. The court also considered if the AWU had breached the coercion provisions under sections 343, 346, and 348 of the Act. The key issue was the interpretation of "de-isolation of equipment" as protected industrial action and the threshold for coercion under the Act.

The court found that the FWC's orders, while not perfectly specific, were within the scope of the jurisdiction granted by section 418(1) of the Act. The court upheld the primary judge's interpretation that "de-isolation of equipment" could be understood by a reasonable employer. Regarding coercion, the court held that the intent to coerce required a negation of choice, but it was not necessary to establish that the person intended to act unlawfully. The court allowed the AWU's appeal and dismissed Esso's appeal, setting aside certain declarations and orders made by the primary judge.

The court granted leave to appeal and set aside the declaration that the AWU contravened section 421(1) of the Fair Work Act by failing to prepare a written notice. The appeal was otherwise dismissed. The court ordered that Esso's Second Further Amended Originating Application be dismissed and gave the parties an opportunity to make submissions on a different order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal be granted.

2. Declaration 3 made on 13 August 2015 be set aside.

3. The appeal be otherwise dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 418(3) recognises that in the proper exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by s 418(1), it will not always be possible to specify the industrial action with particularity. That is unlikely to be the case where the industrial action “is happening”, and is thus manifest, but is more likely where the industrial action is prospective and its intended form insufficiently apparent to permit it to be described with particularity. In the latter circumstance, the proper exercise of the FWC’s s 418 jurisdiction, including the requisite assessment to be made as to whether the industrial action is protected industrial action, will need to be made by reference to a general rather than a particular identification of “the” industrial action in prospect.CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, I would formalise by order the grants of leave to appeal and make such orders as were necessary concerning the filing of the draft notices of appeal. I would uphold grounds 1–4, 6, and 12 of the AWU’s notice of appeal. Grounds 5 and 7–11 do not arise because of the way in which I have decided the issues. I would allow the AWU’s appeal. Further, I would dismiss grounds 1–2 of Esso’s notice of appeal. Ground 3 does not arise, but if it did I would dismiss it. I would dismiss Esso’s appeal. I would set aside each of the declarations made by the primary judge on 13 August 2015. I would set aside Orders 16–22 of the Orders made by the primary judge on 13 August 2015, which deal with or are incidental to the conduct of a hearing on the issues of compensation or penalties. Order 14 dismissed so much of Esso’s application as was unsuccessful, and Order 15 discharged an earlier restraint, by Order dated 25 March 2015, on the taking of further industrial action by the AWU. I would let Order 15 stand, its appropriateness not being in dispute on the appeal. I would supplement Order 14 by making an order that Esso’s Second Further Amended Originating Application dated 14 May 2015 be dismissed. Esso’s written submissions in each appeal included a submission that there should be no order as to costs. The AWU made no submission in relation to costs. I am not aware of any circumstance that would warrant departure from the usual order, pursuant to s 570 of the FW Act, that there be no order as to costs. But, I would give the parties an opportunity to make submissions (supported by affidavit, if necessary), within 14 days, in support of a different order. I would order that, in the event any party makes such a submission, the other party have 7 days to respond (again supported by affidavit, if necessary). I would order that, if no submission is filed in support of a different costs order, there be no order as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Broadly speaking, the declarations made by the primary judge were that:(1)By reason of the primary industrial action, the AWU contravened s 421(1) of the FW Act by contravening the FWC’s s 418 order of 6 March 2015 (declarations 1 and 2);(2)By operation of s 413(5) of the FW Act, the primary industrial action and the other industrial action were unprotected industrial action (declaration 4);(3)By organising the primary industrial action with intent to coerce Esso, the AWU contravened ss 343 and 348 of the FW Act (declarations 5, 7, 8 and 10);(4)By organising the other industrial action with intent to coerce Esso, the AWU contravened ss 343 and 348 of the FW Act (declarations 6 and 9);(5)By organising the primary industrial action, the AWU contravened s 346(b) of the FW Act (declarations 11 and 13); and(6)By organising the other industrial action, the AWU contravened s 346(b) of the FW Act (declaration 12). Declaration 3 was that the AWU contravened s 421(1) of the FW Act by contravening cl 5.1(a) of the FWC’s s 418 order made on 6 March 2015, by its conduct in failing to prepare a written notice as soon as practicable following 6 pm on 6 March 2015. It is not in contest that if the AWU’s first ground of appeal succeeded, as I have determined it should, grounds two and three should also succeed. It would follow that declarations 1 and 2 referred to at (i) above should be set aside. With one reservation, it was accepted by Esso that if the AWU succeeded on appeal grounds 1–3, the AWU would avoid all liability under ss 343, 384 and 346(b). If Esso’s reservation was not sustained, it would follow that each of declarations 5, 7, 8 and 10 (referred to in (iii) above), 6 and 9 (referred to at (iv) above), 11 and 13 (referred to at (v) above), and 12 (referred to at (vi) above) should be set aside. It would also follow that declaration 4 (referred to at (ii) above) should be set aside. The only remaining declaration is declaration 3 and that declaration is the basis for Esso’s reservation. Esso contended that, unless the AWU succeeded in showing that it did not contravene cl 5.1(a) of the FWC’s order of 6 March 2015 (which required the preparation of a written notice), s 413(5) would operate to render all industrial action taken after 6 pm on 6 March 2015 unprotected industrial action and that, consequently, the organisation of that action by the AWU would be in contravention of ss 343, 348 and 346(b) of the FW Act. That analysis suggests that I should turn next to consider the AWU’s appeal grounds 4 and 5, which challenge the primary judge’s finding that the AWU contravened cl 5.1(a) by failing to prepare a written notice. Thereafter I will turn to consider the operation of s 413(5) and the challenge to the approach taken by the primary judge which is raised by Esso’s second ground of appeal. It will also be necessary to consider Esso’s first ground of appeal, which raises s 418 and challenges some of the primary judge’s findings as to the validity of parts of the s 418 orders made by the FWC.THE AWU’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE A WRITTEN NOTICE