Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND
ENERGY UNION  APPELLANT

AND

BORAL RESOURCES (VIC) PTY LTD & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd

[2015] HCA 21

17 June 2015

M18/2015

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria

Representation

P J Morrissey SC with R B Shann and J D Watson for the appellant (instructed by Slater and Gordon)

S J Wood QC with J L Snaden and D Ternovski for the first to sixth respondents (instructed by Fisher Cartwright Berriman)

J B Davis with B W Jellis for the seventh respondent (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Practice and procedure – Contempt of court – Discovery – Where proceeding brought under r 75.06(2) of Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) ("Rules") to punish appellant for contempt of court – Where appellant is a corporation – Whether a corporation may be ordered to make discovery under r 29.07(2) of Rules in a contempt proceeding – Whether a contempt proceeding is a criminal proceeding or a civil proceeding.

Words and phrases – "accusatorial proceeding", "civil proceeding", "companion principle", "criminal proceeding".

Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), s 3, Pt 4.3.
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 187.
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic), r 29.07(2), O 75.

  1. FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ. At issue in this appeal is whether the appellant, a corporation, is amenable to an order under r 29.07(2) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) ("the Rules") to make discovery of particular documents in proceedings brought to punish it for contempt of court.

  2. Rule 29.07(2) expressly authorises the making of an order for discovery.  If the appellant were a natural person, production of documents pursuant to such an order might be resisted as offending the privilege against self‑incrimination (which would not be displaced by the general language of the rule) with the result that an order for discovery would be refused[1].  But because the appellant is a corporation, it is unable at common law to invoke this privilege[2] or the privilege against self‑exposure to a penalty[3], and so compliance with an order under r 29.07(2) cannot be excused on these grounds. The position at common law is now reinforced by s 187 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), which provides:

    "(1)This section applies if, under a law of the State or in a proceeding, a body corporate is required to—

    (a)      answer a question or give information; or

    (b)      produce a document or any other thing; or

    (c)      do any other act whatever.

    (2)The body corporate is not entitled to refuse or fail to comply with the requirement on the ground that answering the question, giving the information, producing the document or other thing or doing…

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Details
Case
[2015] HCA 21
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union ("CFMEU") against Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd. The dispute concerned whether the CFMEU, a corporation, could be ordered to make particular discovery of documents in a proceeding brought to punish it for contempt of court. The CFMEU argued that the accusatorial nature of contempt proceedings, which requires the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, meant it should not be compelled to assist in that proof through discovery.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether a corporation could be ordered to make particular discovery under rule 29.07(2) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) in a proceeding for contempt of court, and whether such a proceeding was to be characterised as criminal or civil for the purposes of discovery. The CFMEU contended that the fundamental principle of criminal justice, that the onus of proof rests on the prosecution and an accused cannot be compelled to assist in proving the case, should limit the court's power to order discovery, even though corporations no longer hold privileges against self-incrimination or self-exposure to penalty.

The High Court reasoned that while the "companion principle" (that an accused cannot be required to assist in proving the offence) is a fundamental aspect of a criminal trial, no criminal trial was in prospect in this contempt proceeding. The Court affirmed that the common law does not afford corporations a privilege against self-incrimination or self-exposure to penalty. Furthermore, section 187 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) explicitly states that a body corporate cannot refuse to comply with a requirement to produce a document or do any other act on the ground that it might incriminate it or make it liable to a penalty. The Court concluded that there was nothing in principle or otherwise about the integrity of the criminal justice system that warranted a corporate defendant in a civil contempt proceeding being spared from an order compelling discovery. The rules of civil procedure, including rule 29.07(2), operate accordingly.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the purposes of what is in issue in this matter, it is sufficient to say that Caltex shows that it is not a fundamental aspect of the accusatorial criminal justice system that a corporation should be entitled to resist a requirement for compulsory production of documents. That is why the common law does not afford corporations a privilege against self-incrimination or against self-exposure to penalty. It follows that, in the case of a corporate defendant, there is no need for any specific statutory abrogation of the fundamental principle or companion rule in order to render the corporate defendant susceptible to an order compelling the production of documents. In particular, there is nothing in principle or otherwise about the integrity of the criminal justice system which warrants that a corporate defendant to a civil proceeding for contempt, whether civil or criminal, should not be ordered to make particular discovery of documents or to produce them. The rules of civil procedure in relation to contempt proceedings brought under O 75, including r 29.07(2), operate accordingly.Section 187 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria argued that s 187 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) lends support to that conclusion. That submission should be accepted. Section 187 provides inter alia that, where in a proceeding a body corporate is required to produce a document or any other thing or to do any other act whatever, it is not entitled to refuse or fail to comply with the requirement on the ground that producing the document or other thing or doing the other act might tend to incriminate it or make it liable to a penalty. CFMEU has been ordered to make particular discovery. Hence, it has been ordered to do an act in a proceeding within the meaning of the section. For the reasons already stated, CFMEU has no privilege against self-incrimination or self-exposure to penalty which would enable it to resist an order for discovery and neither the fundamental principle of the criminal justice system nor the companion rule requires that CFMEU be spared from an order requiring it to give particular discovery. The words of the section are clear. The effect of the section is that CFMEU may not refuse to make the discovery ordered on the ground that it might incriminate it or expose it to a penalty or because of the fundamental principle or the companion rule. Order 75 is not self-contained At an earlier stage of the proceeding, CFMEU contended that O 75 was a self-contained code which excluded other parts of the Rules, including O 29. In the course of argument, that contention was abandoned. Counsel for CFMEU conceded that O 75 operates as part of the Rules and thus incorporates other parts of the Rules according to its and their terms. The concession was properly made. Order 75 is plainly not an exclusive code. It provides for a procedure which necessarily imports processes provided for in several other parts of the Rules; subject, in the case of a natural person, to the privilege against self-incrimination and the privilege against self-exposure to penalty and, in the case of a corporation, to other qualifications which are not here in issue. Substantial injustice

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ NETTLE J
In summary then, it may be accepted that the companion principle is a fundamental aspect of a criminal trial, which is not to be "whittled down" by an expansive interpretation of legislation that is not clear in its intention. But no criminal trial is in prospect here, and so there is no reason why the language of r 29.07(2) should not be applied according to its tenor in the contempt proceeding.Conclusion and orders The appeal should be dismissed with costs. The issue for determination in this appeal is whether, in a civil proceeding for punishment of a corporation for criminal contempt, it is competent for a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria to order that the corporation make particular discovery. For the reasons which follow, it is.CFMEU's contentions The factual background and applicable provisions of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) ("the Rules") are set out in the joint judgment. In brief substance, the appellant ("CFMEU") contends that, despite the decision of this Court in Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd[37] that the privilege against self-incrimination is not available to a corporation, and the view later taken in the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd[38] and by members of this Court in Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission[39] that the privilege against self-exposure to penalty is similarly not available to a corporation, the court below was wrong to order particular discovery in view of the accusatorial nature of a contempt proceeding. [37](1993) 178 CLR 477; [1993] HCA 74.[38](1994) 52 FCR 96.[39](2002) 213 CLR 543; [2002] HCA 49. The gist of the argument is that, because the proceeding to punish CFMEU for contempt is an accusatorial proceeding in which it is incumbent upon the first to sixth respondents ("Boral") to prove the alleged contempt beyond reasonable doubt, it would be inconsistent with the accusatorial nature of the proceeding to require CFMEU to assist in proof of the alleged contempt by discovery of particular documents. CFMEU relies in particular on the fundamental principle of the criminal justice system that the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt rests on the Crown, and the companion rule that an accused cannot be required to assist in proof of the offence charged. It bases its resistance to the order for particular discovery on the limits on compulsory production which it says are imposed by the companion rule. It contends that, although the privileges against self-incrimination and self-exposure to penalty may no longer be available to corporations, the fundamental principle and the companion rule continue to limit the way in which a prosecutor is permitted to prove the prosecution case against an accused and thus to limit the powers of courts to compel production of documents in aid of the prosecution.The privileges against self-incrimination and self-exposure to penalty

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ, NETTLE J

Full text does not contain this section.