Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal (No 2) - [2022] NSWCA 131

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal (No 2) [2022] NSWCA 131
Hearing dates: 5 May 2022
Date of orders: 22 July 2022
Decision date: 22 July 2022
Before: Kirk JA
Decision:
(1) Prayers 4-10 of the applicant’s motion filed on 9 March 2022 are dismissed.
(2) The contempt application against the Attorney-General of New South Wales (raised by paragraphs 12 and 14 of the applicant’s motion filed on 9 March 2022 and the accompanying Statement of Charge) is dismissed with costs.
(3) The following allegations in the statement of charge filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022 are dismissed:
(a) as against Mr McHugh, at [15], and at [13], [14] and [16] (insofar as those three paragraphs are based on the particulars at [13](b) and (l)-(q));
(b) as against Mr Moore, at [23]-[25];
(c) as against Messrs McHugh, Griffin and Cameron and the 4th and 7th-11th respondents, at [29];
(d) as against Messrs McHugh, Griffin and Moore and the 4th and 7th-11th respondents, at [30].
(4) The following matters are struck out:
(a) the following paragraphs or particulars in the statement of charge filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022, to the extent that they are not summarily dismissed: [13], [14], [16], the particulars at (f)-(h) of [17], [20]-[22] and [26]-[28];
(b) in the further amended notice of motion filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022: all names from paragraph 1A, other than that of Patrick Griffin.
(5) The applicant is to pay 50% of the costs of the 2nd to 11th respondents to the further amended notice of motion filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022 with respect to costs incurred to the date of this order.
(6) Pursuant to s 13(1) of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), this matter be listed for further hearing before Kirk JA for review of the suppression order made by this Court on 1 December 2015 (and all subsequent orders varying that order), on a date to be set by the Registrar and in accordance with timetabling directions to be made by him.

Catchwords:
CONTEMPT — alleged breaches of order made under Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) — summary dismissal applications — where contempt application made against barrister who disclosed information potentially in breach of order in course of other proceedings — whether suppression order should be read down to exempt disclosures made in furtherance of the administration of justice — operation of s 15 of Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) — whether defence to contempt charges where breach of court order committed in furtherance of the administration of justice — where Attorney-General was a party to the proceedings in which the suppression order was made — where contempt application also brought against Attorney-General — whether Attorney-General has a duty to enforce suppression order
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Registrars — Review of Registrar’s decision — Court of Appeal — where Registrar granted leave to amend notice of motion on condition that various paragraphs be omitted

Legislation Cited:
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 13, 64
Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW)
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 46, 48, 49 and 121(3)
Supreme Court Rules, Pt 55
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, rr 4.15, 6.4, 13.4, 49.19(1) and 51.59

Cases Cited:
Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41
Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38; [2013] HCA 7
Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station (1986) 161 CLR 98; [1986] HCA 46
Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2013] VSC 572
CFMEU v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375; [2015] HCA 21
Collier v Country Women’s Association of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 36
Commonwealth v Kupang Resources Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 77
Dae Boong International Co Pty Ltd v Gray [2009] NSWCA 11
Davy v Garrett (1877) 7 Ch D 473
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1987) 7 NSWLR 588
Doyle v Commonwealth (1985) 156 CLR 510; [1985] HCA 46
European Asian Bank AG v Wentworth (1986) 5 NSWLR 445
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69
GR v Family and Community Services [2021] NSWSC 39
Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36
Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Timania Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 823; [2005] FCAFC 155
Killen v Lane [1983] 1 NSWLR 171
Kizon v Palmer (1997) 72 FCR 409
Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd (2018) 98 NSWLR 1002; [2018] NSWCA 306
Liristis v Corrective Services NSW (No 4) [2020] NSWSC 147
Magaming v The Queen (2013) 252 CLR 38; [2013] HCA 40
Markisic v Commonwealth of Australia [2006] NSWCA 150
Matthews v ASIC [2009] NSWCA 155
McDonnell v Novello [2006] NSWSC 1186
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v JS and SD [2022] NSWSC 774
New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; [2013] HCA 26
Osborne v R [2014] NSWCCA 17
Penson v Titan National Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 404
Porter v Dyer [2022] FCAFC 116
Singh v State of NSW [2021] NSWCA 260
Skouvakis v Skouvakis [1976] 2 NSWLR 29
Tomko v Palasty (No 2) (2008) 71 NSWLR 61; [2007] NSWCA 369
Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149; [2018] HCA 25
Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; [1995] HCA 3
Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWCA 373
Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 1425
Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 1943

Texts Cited:
Anne Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales (Federation Press, 2004)

Category: Procedural rulings
Parties:
Z (applicant in contempt applications)

Attorney-General for NSW (applicant in summary dismissal application of 30 March 2022)
Michael McHugh, Patrick Griffin, Stewart Cameron, Christopher Moore, Roderick Cameron, David Fischl, Paul Hendriks, Cameron Leaver, Najeh Marhaba, and Quincy Wong (applicants in summary dismissal application of 25 March 2022)
Representation:
Counsel:
Z (in person)
R J Pietriche (Attorney-General for NSW)
K Morgan SC and A Poukchanski (applicants in summary dismissal application of 25 March 2022)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Attorney-General for NSW)
Hicksons Lawyers (applicants in summary dismissal application of 25 March 2022)

File Number(s): 2015/00291241
Publication restriction: Note the suppression order identified at [1] of this judgment.

Judgment

In 2015 a person identified here by the pseudonym “Z” (the applicant) succeeded in an appeal to this Court: Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWCA 373 (2015 CA). One of the orders the Court made in the course of the appeal was as follows (the Suppression Order):

“Pursuant to the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010, prohibit the disclosure of information tending to reveal the identity of the applicant, including by disclosure of information which might indirectly lead others to identify the applicant.”

In the light of events which have occurred since that order was made, the applicant has sought to charge the Attorney-General of New South Wales with contempt of this Court based upon the Suppression Order. She has similarly sought to charge Michael McHugh SC, Patrick Griffin SC, and various current and former partners of the firm Hicksons Lawyers, with contempt (the Bar Association respondents; when referred to together with the Attorney-General, the respondents). Various other forms of relief are also sought by the applicant.
The procedural history is complicated, as I set out below.
There are three issues which fall to be determined by me:

whether – as the applicant seeks by motion filed on 9 March 2022 – the Court should set aside the order of the Registrar of this Court, Registrar Riznyczok, of 14 February 2022 granting leave to amend the motion filed against the Bar Association respondents on the condition that various paragraphs be omitted from the motion;

whether the contempt charges against the Attorney-General should be summarily dismissed or struck out, as the Attorney seeks by motion filed 30 March 2022; and

whether the proceedings against the Bar Association respondents should be summarily dismissed or struck out, as they seek by motion filed 25 March 2022.

Various affidavits were read and exhibits tendered by the parties. I indicated to the parties that I would treat any evidence put before me as potentially relevant to all motions. There was no cross-examination. No issues of credit arise.
For the reasons set out below, the application to review the decision of the Registrar should be dismissed; the contempt charges against the Attorney-General should be summarily dismissed; and the contempt charges against the Bar Association respondents should be either summarily dismissed or struck out, except as regards Mr Patrick Griffin SC. I note that my conclusion that the charges against Mr Griffin should not be dismissed says nothing as to the likelihood of those charges succeeding, let alone leading to any penalty even if they did succeed.
In what follows, I first set out the factual context in which these issues arise; then deal with the first issue; then set out relevant legal principles which arise with respect to the second and third issues; then I deal with those issues in turn.

Relevant background facts

The 2015 proceedings

Basten JA explained the context of the 2015 proceedings at [1] of 2015 CA:

“The applicant, Z, has been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia (a diagnosis Z does not accept). The applicant has, in the recent past, been detained in hospitals as an involuntary patient, pursuant to the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW). On 3 June 2015 the Mental Health Review Tribunal made a community treatment order, requiring Z to attend at a community health centre, in part for medication administered by depot injection on a monthly basis.”

The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court with respect to the community treatment order, without success: Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 1425. Her appeal from that decision to this Court met with success in 2015 CA based upon the nature of the review that the Supreme Court had undertaken. The Court remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further consideration. By the time the matter was again before the Supreme Court the community treatment order had expired and the issues were held by Stevenson J to be moot: Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 1943.

The applicant’s admission as a legal practitioner and the 2019 proceedings

In February 2017 the applicant was admitted as a lawyer in this State. In the course of applying to be admitted the applicant made appropriate and frank disclosures about various matters to the Legal Profession Admission Board (LPAB), in a statutory declaration dated 14 November 2016. Those disclosures included that she had been subject to a community treatment order. She also indicated that she had challenged that order in the 2015 proceedings, and identified the two judgments of the Supreme Court and the judgment of this Court which resulted. She also quoted the Suppression Order.
The applicant then applied for and obtained a practising certificate from the Law Society of NSW as a solicitor. Subsequently, in April 2018, she drew the attention of the Law Society to 2015 CA, and annexed a copy of this Court’s decision, when seeking to have a condition on her practising certificate lifted.
In 2019 the applicant successfully completed the bar practice course run by the Bar Association. On 1 August 2019 she applied for a barrister’s practising certificate. The application form asks, amongst other things, whether the applicant has “ever disclosed any matters to any admission authority or body responsible for issuing practising certificates in any Australian jurisdiction”. The applicant, appropriately, answered “yes” to that question. She attached to her application a copy of the 14 November 2016 statutory declaration (along with another past statutory declaration), thus disclosing to the Bar Association her involvement in the 2015 proceedings. She also attached documents recording her interactions with the Law Society, including the 2018 correspondence referring to and annexing 2015 CA.
On a literal reading of the Suppression Order, it might be thought that the applicant’s appropriate disclosures to the LPAB, the Law Society and the Bar Association breached the order, as she identified herself as the litigant “Z” in the 2015 proceedings. I will return to that point below, although it is not necessary here to determine if that surprising possible consequence is so.
The Council of the New South Wales Bar Association (the Bar Council) required the applicant to be medically examined before it would consider the grant of a practising certificate. The applicant underwent an examination, after which the Council informed the applicant that her application remained under consideration.
The applicant then brought proceedings against the Bar Council in the Supreme Court, seeking urgent interim relief that she be granted a barrister’s practising certificate, and final relief in the form of a declaration that she was a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate (2019 proceedings).
The matter came before a judge of the Supreme Court on 8 October 2019. So as to avoid indirectly identifying the applicant by identifying the proceedings the subject of her complaints, I will refer to that judge as “Judge 1”, and other judges in like manner. The applicant was self-represented. On the first mention Mr Roderick Cameron, of Hicksons Lawyers, appeared for the Bar Council. The matter was stood down to 12.30pm. At that mention, Mr Patrick Griffin SC appeared for the Bar Council, having apparently just been briefed. The matter was stood down again to 2.30pm.
It seems from the transcript that the Bar Council had informed the applicant before the matter resumed of its intention to tender her application for a practising certificate, which included the materials disclosing her connection to this proceeding. The applicant raised a concern about that immediately upon the resumption. She informed Judge 1 of the existence of a suppression order made by this Court. Shortly thereafter, in consequence, his Honour went into a closed court session. Subsequently Mr Griffin sought to tender the application for a practising certificate. The applicant objected on the basis of “relevance and also it is prejudicial” (Tcpt, 8 October 2019, p 25). After some interaction with the bench, the applicant asked that that material be “suppressed”; Judge 1 said that “This is a closed court and it will follow that I will make a suppression order”; the applicant responded “For the evidence filed?”; his Honour said “Yes. Mr Griffin won’t oppose that, I am sure”, to which Mr Griffin responded “No, your Honour” (ibid, p 27). The application was then admitted as Exhibit 2.
Mr Griffin made some submissions, then the matter was stood over to the following day, 9 October 2019. On that day further submissions were made by either side and evidence was tendered. His Honour reserved judgment.
On 10 October 2019 an order was made by Judge 1 under the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) (Court Suppression Act) preventing disclosure “of the proceedings” and of the Court file other than to the parties and their legal representatives.
The matter was returned to court on 11 October 2019 in light of some further issues having arisen. Further submissions were made. The non-disclosure order was varied to enable disclosure of material on the court file to any consultant that the parties wished to engage in relation to the subject matter of the proceedings.
His Honour refused the interim relief sought by the applicant in a judgment dated 15 October 2019 (I will not identify the judgment here, so as to avoid identifying the applicant in this proceeding). In refusing interim relief, his Honour ordered that “the publication of these reasons be suppressed in accordance with the orders made by the Court on 11 October 2019”.
On 24 October 2019 the matter was relisted before Judge 2, as duty judge in the Equity Division, at the request of the applicant. Various matters were discussed but no formal orders were made. The hearing occurred in closed court.
On 28 October 2019 the matter came before Judge 3 as duty judge. The matter was stood over to the Registrar’s list on 9 December 2019.
On 5 December 2019 the Bar Council determined that the applicant’s application for a barrister’s practising certificate should be refused, and issued a notice of its decision to the applicant under s 464 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (LPUL). The Bar Council gave lengthy reasons for its decision. Those reasons referred to the 2015 CA proceedings, noting that the applicant had disclosed those proceedings to the LPAB and the Law Society, and had then attached those disclosures to her application to the Bar Association.
On 9 December 2019 the Bar Council issued a further s 464 notice to the applicant, owing to an error in the first notice in describing the applicant’s appeal rights.
Also on 9 December 2019 the matter was listed before Judge 4 as duty judge, in closed court. The applicant sought to tender two pages of the Bar Council’s decision. Mr Griffin, appearing again for the Bar Council, submitted that it needed to be read as a whole. In the end the whole document was tendered together with the 5 December 2019 s 464 notice, seemingly by the Bar Council, but without objection from the applicant. The applicant then pointed out that the 5 December 2019 notice had been superseded. As a result, Mr Griffin then tendered the 9 December 2019 s 464 notice, again without objection (Tcpt, 9 December 2019, pp 8-11). In this hearing the applicant sought the same interim relief that had been refused by Judge 1. Judge 4 declined that application, directed that the applicant serve an amended summons, and stood the matter over.
It appears that the applicant’s proposed amended summons sought to join the Commonwealth and NSW Attorneys-General as parties.
On 16 December 2019 the matter came before Judge 5 as duty judge. Mr Griffin again appeared for the Bar Council. The two Attorneys were also represented. The transcript starts with the heading “case suppressed” but the matter was heard in an open court, as his Honour noted in his subsequent judgment (again, I will not identify that judgment). In the course of the hearing the applicant herself referred to this Court’s decision in 2015 CA, identifying herself as the appellant in the case. Senior counsel for the Bar Association respondents explained to me that “nothing [was] tendered formally in front of [Judge 5] because the material was already tendered to [Judge 4], and subject to a suppression order” (Tcpt, 5 May 2022, p 55).
There was discussion before Judge 5 of whether the suppression orders made by Judge 1 should be continued or varied. It was also suggested to the applicant in the course of argument that she might bring an appeal from the Council’s decision refusing her a practising certificate under s 100 of the LPUL. She declined this opportunity.
Judge 5 delivered an ex tempore judgment, in which his Honour refused the applicant leave to file her amended summons and dismissed her summons with costs. The main basis of his Honour’s decision was that the appropriate route under the statutory scheme for the applicant to obtain what she sought was an appeal to the Supreme Court under s 100 of the LPUL. His Honour noted that he had made informal arrangements for the matter to be referred directly to the expedition list judge for directions to be made for any such appeal to be progressed, but the applicant refused to adopt that course.
Judge 5 extended the suppression orders to include all hearings and judgments in the proceedings until 13 March 2020. He had noted in his judgment that in the circumstances of an urgent hearing in the Duty List, there had not been an opportunity fully to explore the basis on which the suppression orders ought to continue. He indicated he had doubts about continuing the orders, but said that in the circumstances he would continue the orders on a limited basis. His Honour made clear in his judgment that the three month period of the orders was to enable the applicant to take advice as to what her next steps should be, including consideration of bringing an appeal or other proceedings relating to the decision of the Bar Council. He stated that if she commenced such proceedings and wished for an extension it would be a matter for her to persuade the Court that the suppression orders should continue.

The applicant was thus given clear warning that the suppression order made by Judge 1 would expire. She chose not to appeal from the decision of Judge 5, nor did she file other proceedings against the Bar Council. She also made no further application to extend the suppression orders. Those orders thus lapsed.
After the lapsing of those orders, the judgments of Judge 1 and Judge 5 in the 2019 proceedings were published online, seemingly on or about 10 August 2020.
Later in August 2020, The Australian newspaper published an article referring to the judgment of Judge 5, and mentioning other cases the applicant had brought in the past. The 2015 proceedings were not referenced. That is not surprising, as neither judgment in the 2019 proceedings refers to the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court in the 2015 proceedings. There is a passing reference to the Suppression Order in the second judgment, which quotes a long email from the applicant to the associate of an earlier judge asking, amongst other things, that the matter “be referred to the Court of Appeal to allow the relevant suppression order from 2015 to be altered to allow NCAT access to the information provided with my application for a reader certificate”.
The two judgments remain available online. The applicant’s name is identified in each of those decisions.

The applicant’s Federal Court proceedings

In November 2021 the applicant commenced proceedings in the Federal Court against the Bar Association under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). The applicant described these proceedings as follows, in terms which the Bar Association respondents accepted (Tcpt, 5 May 2019, p 42):

“those proceedings, file number [xxxxxxx] only seek a restraining order against the New South Wales Bar Association in relation to rejection of a notice issued in November 2021 under the Mutual Recognition Act. That is the relief sought in those proceedings does not in any way relate to the Bar Council's refusal from December 2019.”

The applicant’s allegations of contempt

The applicant’s complaints arise mainly, but not entirely, from the conduct of the 2019 proceedings, and the publication of the judgments in those proceedings once the suppression and non-publication orders in those proceedings lapsed. The relevant procedural history is as follows.
On 17 January 2022 the applicant filed a notice of motion in this appeal proceeding. She sought various forms of relief which are referred to below, but which included a “declaration that the Law Society of New South Wales be adjudged guilty of contempt”.
The notice was not accompanied by a statement of charge. A proposed statement of charge was subsequently sent by email to the Registrar of this Court. It purported to charge with contempt Michael McHugh SC (as President of the Bar Association), Patrick Griffin SC, and the firm of solicitors Hicksons Lawyers, which I understand is a partnership. Hicksons Lawyers acted for the Council in the 2019 proceedings.
On 14 February 2022 the Registrar declined leave to file the proposed statement of charge out of time, but directed the applicant to serve a further proposed statement of charge by 7 March 2022. The Registrar also granted leave to amend the motion, subject to the condition that the applicant omit most of the various forms of relief sought, save those which sought declarations of contempt. That is the decision which the applicant seeks to review (issue (1)).
On 3 March 2022 an amended notice of motion was filed. The named respondents to the motion were the Law Society of New South Wales, Michael McHugh SC, Patrick Griffin SC, Christopher Moore (a partner at Hicksons), Roderick Cameron (a former partner at Hicksons) and Hicksons Lawyers, which the applicant sought to sue as one respondent, although she specifically named six partners other than Mr Moore and Mr Cameron. In compliance with the order of the Registrar, most of the original paragraphs were omitted, so that the remaining two substantive orders sought were for declarations that the Law Society, Michael McHugh SC, Patrick Griffin SC and Hicksons Lawyers be held in contempt.
On 9 March 2022 the applicant filed another notice of motion, seeking various forms of relief, including orders that the Attorney-General for New South Wales and Nationwide News Pty Ltd (as publisher of The Australian) be adjudged in contempt. The notice of motion was accompanied by a statement of charge, charging the Attorney and Nationwide News Pty Ltd with contempt. By paragraph 4 of this motion the applicant seeks review of the decision of Registrar Riznyczok on 14 February 2022.
On 15 March 2022 the applicant filed a further amended notice of motion, being an amended version of the notice of motion of 3 March 2022 (the notice of motion seeking relief against the Bar Association respondents). The further amended notice was accompanied by another statement of charge. The Law Society was named as 1^st respondent. Messrs McHugh, Griffin, Moore and Cameron were still named as the 2^nd, 3^rd, 5^th and 6^th respondents respectively. Hicksons Lawyers was no longer named as one respondent, but the six individual partners partners who had previously been named were individually listed as the 4^th and 7^th-11^th respondents. These are the Bar Association respondents.
On 25 March 2022 the Bar Association respondents filed a notice of motion seeking that “paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 13-30 … of the Statement of Charge dated 15 March 2022 be summarily dismissed or struck out”, and that “[p]aragraph 1A of the Further Amended Notice of Motion … be dismissed”. Paragraph 1A of the Further Amended Notice of Motion is the paragraph seeking that the Bar Association respondents be held in contempt.
On 30 March 2022 the Attorney-General filed a notice of motion seeking that “prayers for relief 12 and 14 of the Notice of Motion filed by the Applicant on 9 March 2022 and paragraphs 7 to 10 of the Statement of Charge filed on 9 March 2022 be summarily dismissed or struck out”. Prayers for relief 12 and 14 are, respectively, the seeking of an order that the contempt proceedings against the Attorney be heard separately to the other matters in the notice of motion, and the seeking of an order that the Attorney be adjudged guilty of contempt.
On 31 March 2022 the applicant withdrew her application against Nationwide News Pty Ltd.
On 28 April 2022 the applicant withdrew her application against the Law Society of New South Wales.

Issue (1): Review of Order of Registrar Riznyczok

The applicant seeks review of the order of Registrar Riznyczok of 14 February 2022 granting leave to amend the motion filed against the Law Society and the Bar Association respondents on the condition that various paragraphs be omitted from the motion. The Registrar gave written reasons in support of the orders he made.
The applicant, by prayer 4 of her motion filed on 9 March 2022, seeks that the decision of the Registrar be set aside “so far it relates to Prayers 2 to 8” (ie of her motion filed on 17 January 2022). Those prayers are set out below. The applicant’s motion also seeks orders which are consequential on prayer 4, which seek to restore the position in terms of the relief she seeks to what it was under her motion of 17 January 2022. Prayers 1-3 were procedural and fell away.
The Registrar’s order of 14 February 2022 relevantly reads:

“(3) Grant leave to amend the motion by 7 March 2022 on condition that:
(a) Prayers 2 to 8, and proposed prayer 1B, are omitted …”

The source of my power to hear and determine this motion is s 121(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) together with UCPR rr 49.19(1) and 51.59. The former provides that the Court “may … review” an order or decision of a registrar, “and make such order, by way of confirmation, variation, discharge or otherwise, as the court thinks fit”. The latter provides that “[a] Judge of Appeal may exercise the powers of the Court under Part 49 to review a decision of the Registrar”.
The power of review is discretionary. A review does not require demonstration of error, although “there is an onus on a person seeking to have a court set aside or vary a registrar's decision to make out a case that the court, in the interests of justice, should exercise its discretion to do so”: Tomko v Palasty (No 2) (2008) 71 NSWLR 61; [2007] NSWCA 369 at [7] per Hodgson JA (and see generally at [4]-[11]), Ipp JA agreeing at [17], note also Basten JA at [52]-[53]; see also Dae Boong International Co Pty Ltd v Gray [2009] NSWCA 11 at [18] per Hodgson JA; Collier v Country Women’s Association of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 36 at [48]-[49] per Gleeson JA.

The Registrar’s powers at issue

A preliminary issue is the nature of the power exercised by the Registrar in making the order at issue. On its face, the order is an order granting leave to amend. Yet in his reasons the Registrar explains at [21]-[22] that relevant prayers “ought to be struck out as incompetent”.
The source of the Registrar’s power to make an order granting leave to amend is to be found in a direction made by Bathurst CJ on 17 December 2018 under s 13 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which authorises the senior judicial officer of a court to “direct that any function of the court … may be exercised by such registrars or other officers of the court, and in such circumstances and subject to such conditions, as are specified in the instrument”. Bathurst CJ directed that a registrar of the Supreme Court may exercise the power of amendment conferred on the Court by s 64 of the Civil Procedure Act.
The applicant complains that the Registrar’s decision was “wrong” because “prayers [2] to [8] were included in the Applicant's original Notice of Motion that was duly filed by the Court on 17 January 2022. The applicant did not require any leave from the Registrar in respect of prayers [2] to [8]”. This observation is correct, but there were other amendments which the applicant did seek, and which required leave. The Registrar’s order was not to refuse leave to include paragraphs 2 to 8, but rather to grant leave to amend the motion, subject to a condition that paragraphs 2 to 8 be omitted. If the effect of imposing the condition to omit prayers 2 to 8 was to allow the real questions raised by the proceedings to be determined (consistently with s 64(2) of the Civil Procedure Act) and to correct defects or errors, then the order made was an appropriate exercise of the amendment power. The applicant duly complied with the order, omitting prayers 2 to 8 in her amended notice of motion. Should she now wish to further amend her notice of motion, that would require a further application for leave to amend.
The source of the Registrar’s power to dismiss proceedings or specific claims for relief is to be found in a direction made by Spigelman CJ on 2 January 2008. It directs that the Registrar of the Court of Appeal may exercise the power conferred on the Court by UCPR r 13.4, subject to the restriction that the power be exercised only in relation to “[i]ncompetent proceedings and failure to prosecute”. The language of competence does not appear in r 13.4. However, the restriction imposed by the direction on the Registrar’s exercise of the powers under r 13.4 may fairly be understood as encompassing cases where proceedings are an abuse of process, or disclose no reasonable cause of action, because the proceedings could then be described as incompetent.
It is not necessary to decide which of the two powers – amendment or dismissal – the Registrar exercised here. On review of the Registrar’s decision I am not persuaded that I should exercise my discretion to make a decision other than that which the Registrar did in fact make, whichever power he then exercised.

Prayers 2 and 3 of the motion of 17 January 2022

Prayer 2 sought a declaration that an order made by Judge 5 in the 2019 proceedings was a “mistake”. That order concerned the extension of suppression and non-publication orders. Prayer 3 sought the extension of suppression and non-publication orders made and amended by Judge 1 in the 2019 proceedings, so as “to comply” with the Suppression Order made in this proceeding.
The Registrar concluded that these prayers were “incompetent”. He was right to do so.
To the extent that the relief sought in paragraphs 2 and 3 would involve an exercise of the power to set aside or vary a judgment under UCPR Pt 36, Div 4, the appropriate means of proceeding would have been a notice of motion in the proceedings in the relevant Division.
To the extent that the relief sought might be said to be a “review” of the suppression and non-publication orders for the purposes of s 13 of the Court Suppression Act, then the power so to review the orders is properly exercised by the court that made the orders: s 13(1). The court that made the orders was the Supreme Court. Such a review is properly heard in the Division in which the orders were made.
Section 14 of the Court Suppression Act also provides that, with leave, a party may appeal from an order made under the Act to “the court to which appeals lie against final judgments or orders of the original court”. Here, that court would be the Court of Appeal. Appeals to the Court of Appeal which require leave are properly brought by summons and, if leave is granted, by notice of appeal under UCPR Pt 51 Divs 4-5. Neither paragraphs 2 and 3 of the motion can be characterised as an appeal. Any such appeal would also be well out of time.
It was misconceived to seek relief relating to separate and subsequent proceedings through this Court of Appeal proceeding, which was resolved seven years ago. It is one thing to seek to bring contempt charges in this proceeding based on an order made by this Court in this matter. It is quite another to seek to vary or overturn orders made by the Supreme Court in other proceedings, involving different defendants.
This proceeding was brought as an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court, pursuant to s 101 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). It is an appeal from a specific decision. The appeal from that decision has been determined and is at an end. The Suppression Order has some ongoing effect and thus is capable of being varied or rescinded by the Court. It, like any other imperative order, may found a charge of contempt for non-compliance. But the potential reinvigoration of this appeal matter by way of filing charges of contempt based on the Suppression Order does not give the applicant the right to seek relief not directly connected to the appeal heard in 2015. As counsel for the Attorney-General aptly put it in written submissions, these proceedings “do not supply the Applicant with a perpetual vehicle through which she may agitate applications for interim and final relief relevant to substantively and procedurally distinct proceedings of which this Court is not otherwise seised”.
Accordingly, the relief sought by prayers 2-3 was not relief which could appropriately be sought by filing a notice of motion in appeal proceedings which had already been determined. No reasonable “claim for relief in the proceedings” was disclosed (to quote UCPR r 13.4(1)).

Prayers 4, 5 and 6 of the motion of 17 January 2022

Prayers 4 to 6 of the motion read:

“4. A declaration that the diagnosis of “paranoid schizophrenia” was removed from the DSM-5 in or about 2013, and is an obsolete medical diagnosis in Australia and the United States.
The Court notes: the currently accepted medical position is that advances in neuroscience have revealed that even schizophrenia can be cured.
5. A declaration that the Resolution of the NSW Bar Council of 5 or 9 December 2019, annexed to the Affidavit of Gregory John Tolhurst dated 16 September 2020 at page [61], is false on the basis that [the applicant] was and is the holder of an Australian practising certificate.
6. A declaration of failure to observe procedural fairness in relation to the Resolution of the NSW Bar Council of 5 or 9 December 2019.”

As the Registrar reasoned in respect of these paragraphs, “[d]eclarations are allocated to the Divisions and are commenced by summons”: see ss 48 and 49 of the Supreme Court Act and r 6.4(2)(d) in the UCPR. The applicant’s motion cannot be characterised as a summons.
Further, as the Attorney-General submitted, paragraphs 5 and 6 effectively seek again to challenge a resolution of the Bar Council, where that was the subject of the 2019 proceedings. If she was discontented with the outcome of that matter it was open to her to seek leave to appeal.
More generally, these declarations cannot be sought within this proceeding for the reasons set out above at [63]-[64].
The Registrar’s decision to reject these prayers was correct.

Prayers 7 and 8 of the motion of 17 January 2022

Prayers 7 and 8 seek “an order in the nature of certiorari” in relation to the decisions of Judge 1 and Judge 5 respectively.
The applicant submitted that the power of this Court to grant certiorari in these circumstances is “an unresolved question”. It is not. No order in the nature of certiorari lies against a decision of a judge of the Supreme Court acting in their capacity as such: see eg Penson v Titan National Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 404 at [8] per Meagher, Gleeson and Simpson JJA, and authority there cited.
The applicant sought to argue, in effect, that the two decisions she sought to impugn fell within some exception to the general principle on the basis that the judges could only have been acting in a personal or administrative capacity. In her supplementary submissions, she contended that:

“With respect, [Judge 1] and [Judge 5] are not obeying the Court of Appeal’s 2015 Suppression Order – they can only be acting in a personal capacity because the law and rules of court would never authorise them to exceed their jurisdiction like this.”

It is not necessary to address here whether there may be any such exceptions to the general principle: note Penson at [9]; cf Singh v State of NSW [2021] NSWCA 260 at [7] per Leeming JA. Here, in hearing and determining the applicant’s proceedings in which she sought interim and final relief, Judge 5 and Judge 1 were exercising judicial power in the Court’s jurisdiction, as opposed to some other power conferred on them personally. Orders of superior courts are valid until set aside, even if made beyond power: New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; [2013] HCA 26 at [33]-[34]. To argue that any purported exercise of judicial power is necessarily personal and non-judicial is contrary to that principle.
Again, if the applicant wished to challenge the orders made in the 2019 proceedings then she should have appealed. The Registrar was correct to strike out prayers 7 and 8, which seek relief which could not be granted.

Procedural fairness

The applicant also challenged the Registrar’s decision on the basis that it was made “without notice, fair hearing or consideration”. She says that she was denied procedural fairness and that the reasons of the Registrar were inadequate. It is unnecessary to resolve these contentions, because, on review, I have determined that the prayers were rightly required to be omitted.

Conclusion on issue (1)

For the reasons set out above, prayer 4 of the applicant’s motion of 9 March 2022 – seeking to set aside the Registrar’s orders of 14 February 2022 – should be dismissed. I note that the Attorney-General acted as contradictor on this application, providing written submissions which I found useful.
I should address the other prayers sought in that motion. Prayers 1-3 related to some procedural matters which have now fallen away.
With respect to prayers 5-10, the applicant said the following (Tcpt, 5 May 2022, p 18):

“Prayer 5 repeats the relief that was sought in the original motion that I am seeking to review. So, prayers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 are consequential relief. If the Court is minded to allow me to go back and have my original motion heard, those are - that is the consequential relief that I would be seeking to apply for.”

I thus understand that prayers 5-10 hang or fall on the success of the review application in prayer 4. Those prayers should thus also be dismissed.
Prayers 11 and 13 sought orders that Nationwide News Pty Ltd be joined to the proceedings and be adjudged guilty of contempt. I was informed that the applicant was withdrawing that application with the consent of Nationwide News Pty Ltd, so they may be taken to not be pressed.
Prayers 12 and 14 related to the contempt application brought against the Attorney-General, which is the subject of Issue (2).

Legal principles relevant to the second and third issues

Summary dismissal and strike-out powers with respect to contempt applications

The Attorney and the Bar Association respondents invoke UCPR rule 13.4 or “the inherent jurisdiction of the Court” as the basis for orders that the relevant prayers and charges against them be “summarily dismissed or struck out”.
Rule 13.4 gives powers to the Court to make dismissal orders “in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings”. Such orders can be made if it appears to the Court that the proceedings or claims for relief are frivolous or vexatious, disclose no reasonable cause of action, or are an abuse of process of the Court. The Dictionary to the Rules provides that “relief includes remedy”.
The applicant’s motion of 9 March 2022 seeks an order that the Attorney “be adjudged guilty of contempt of court”. The applicant’s further amended motion of 15 March 2022 seeks a declaration that the Bar Association respondents “be adjudged guilty of contempt of court”. These motions seek “relief” in the relevant sense, such as to be potentially subject to an exercise of power under r 13.4: note further Markisic v Commonwealth of Australia [2006] NSWCA 150; Liristis v Corrective Services NSW (No 4) [2020] NSWSC 147 at [42]-[46]; GR v Family and Community Services [2021] NSWSC 39 at [106]-[117].
The power of summary dismissal is, of course, to be exercised sparingly and with care. It requires “a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way”: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41 at [57]. That being said, “[a]rgument, perhaps even of an extensive kind, may be necessary to demonstrate that the case of the plaintiff is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed”: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130; [1964] HCA 69.
As regards the strike-out aspects of their applications, the respondents do not seek to rely on UCPR rule 14.28, presumably because it is a power directed to “a pleading”. However, strike-out orders may also no doubt be authorised by the “inherent jurisdiction” of the Court, founded on s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), as was contemplated for example in General Steel. Furthermore, UCPR r 4.15 empowers the Court to order, amongst other things, that any matter contained in a document on the court file may be struck out if it is “scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, irrelevant or oppressive”. Something which is embarrassing – in the sense of being vague, generalised, excessively prolix or otherwise not presented in an intelligible form – may be characterisable as oppressive or irrelevant: note eg Davy v Garrett (1877) 7 Ch D 473.

The bringing of charges of contempt

A distinction has traditionally been drawn between “civil” and “criminal” contempts. The distinction is by no means clear: Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 532-534; [1995] HCA 3. It has a complex history not readily amenable to rationalising taxonomy. Nonetheless, in Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36 the distinction was said to depend upon whether the proceedings are “essentially punitive (in which case they will be classified as ‘criminal’),” or “remedial or coercive (in which case they will be classified as ‘civil’)” (at [22] per Gleeson CJ, see also [133] and [141] per Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). In Witham, at 530, Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ stated that:

“In general terms, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is that a civil contempt involves disobedience to a court order or breach of an undertaking in civil proceedings, whereas a criminal contempt is committed either when there is a contempt in the face of the court or there is an interference with the course of justice. However, disobedience or breach of an undertaking amounts to a criminal contempt if it involves deliberate defiance or, as it is sometimes said, if it is contumacious.” [citation omitted]

The manner in which contempt applications are to be dealt with in this Court is set out in Part 55 of the Supreme Court Rules. Rule 6 provides that “[w]here contempt is committed in connection with proceedings in the Court, an application for punishment for the contempt must be made by motion on notice in the proceedings”. Rule 7 states that a “statement of charge, that is, a statement specifying the contempt of which the contemnor is alleged to be guilty, shall be subscribed to, or filed with, the notice of motion or summons”.
The applicant has sought to comply with these requirements. Aside from their more substantive arguments, the respondents submit that she has not done so in accordance with the necessary degree of specificity or clarity. The Attorney submits that “the procedural steps for commencement of contempt proceedings is one of few remaining areas where strict adherence to the rule and processes is required, with the absence of adherence to those procedures supplying a sufficient basis to quash the charge”. He argues that in contempt proceedings the principles concerning summary dismissal or the striking-out of pleadings are slightly modified, so that defects in form and procedure which might not otherwise have warranted summary dismissal or the striking-out of pleadings may well justify such orders. In support of this argument, the Attorney cites Skouvakis v Skouvakis [1976] 2 NSWLR 29, McDonnell v Novello [2006] NSWSC 1186 and Liristis v Corrective Services NSW (No 4) [2020] NSWSC 147.
In Skouvakis v Skouvakis, after noting the then applicable rules, Street CJ explained at 32:

“Due observance of these rules is of no little importance. It has long been recognized that to deprive a subject of his liberty for contempt of court, particularly in summary proceedings, is a serious step, and it is one which should be attended by full regard for form and regularity. In Oswald on Contempt, 3rd ed., pp. 8, 9, it is said: ‘The specific offence charged should be distinctly stated where the contempt is criminal in its nature, and an opportunity given of answering it. And, indeed, in all cases of contempt the charge should be specifically made. …’”

The Court set aside an order for committal of a contemnor to prison on the basis that the rules were not strictly adhered to. The case concerned an alleged criminal contempt.
In Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Timania Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 823; [2005] FCAFC 155, at [32], Tamberlin, North and Dowsett JJ summarised relevant principles as follows (citations omitted):

“(a) appropriate safeguards must be applied to protect the rights of parties accused of contempt;
(b) parties accused of contempt are entitled to know the gist or substance of the charges against them;
(c) where there is a statement of charge, the gist or substance of the allegations must be contained within the statement of charge and any particulars, and any deficiency cannot be remedied by resort to affidavit evidence;
(d) amendments to charges will only be allowed to correct minor deficiencies, in circumstances where the accused suffers no prejudice;
(e) where amendments are allowed, accused parties must be given an opportunity to put anything they fairly wish to say as to the evidence, the law and the sentence as they pertain to the amended charges;
(f) parties accused of contempt are entitled to conduct their case on the basis that the only charge which they are required to meet is that which has been particularised against them … ”

Their Honours added at [34] that the “concept of the ‘gist’ of the charge is one that should be approached with some caution in the area of contempt, where precision in formulation is critical”. Their articulation of principle does not appear to have been limited to criminal contempts.
Ultimately, the charge of contempt “must be distinctly stated” so that the respondent is “given a proper opportunity to answer the charge”: Doyle v Commonwealth (1985) 156 CLR 510 at 516; [1985] HCA 46. But the requirement for clarity and formality is not only to serve the end of procedural fairness. It also serves the purpose of ensuring that “such matters will not be lightly raised”: Matthews v ASIC [2009] NSWCA 155 at [41] per Tobias JA, quoting approvingly an earlier statement by Nicholson J in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

Issue (2): Summary dismissal as regards the Attorney-General

The second motion which falls for determination is the Attorney’s application for summary dismissal of the applicant’s charge of contempt brought against him.

The applicant’s charge of contempt against the Attorney-General

The applicant’s allegations principally concern the publication of the judgments in the 2019 proceedings. She makes four charges against the Attorney. First, she alleges that the Attorney “allowed information to be disclosed revealing the identity of the Applicant”, by:

failing to challenge the orders of Judge 5 in the 2019 proceedings;

allowing or sanctioning the publication on the internet of the judgments in the 2019 proceedings;

allowing or sanctioning the Registrar of the Supreme Court “to misapprehend that he or she could properly grant access to the Court files for the Judgments where I am identified as Z”; and

ignoring correspondence from the applicant requesting that these matters be addressed.

Secondly, the applicant charges the Attorney with having “publicly defied” the Suppression Order, but particularises the charge merely by repeating the previous charge, and by making reference to articles published in The Australian, the Attorney’s connection to which is not explained.
Thirdly, the applicant charges the Attorney with scandalising the Court. The particulars to this charge repeat those given for the first and second charges, and make further points of a similar nature. It is said that by reason of the Attorney’s inaction in addressing the matters raised, he has “impaired confidence in and respect for the Court”.
Fourthly, the applicant charges the Attorney with interfering with the course of justice. The particulars to the first three charges are repeated. Some other matters are raised, again of a similar kind, but with an additional allegation that the Attorney has legal liability to the applicant because she "was involuntarily injected with chemicals causing allergic reactions in 2014 and 2015". There is also reference to a complaint having been made against the Attorney to the Australian Human Rights Commission.

Determination of motion

The Attorney seeks summary dismissal on both procedural and substantive bases. The former basis critiques the manner in which the statement of charge against the Attorney has been formulated. Those arguments appear to have some merit, but in my view the problems with the charge against the Attorney are more fundamental, and it is appropriate that I focus on the matters of substance.
The first charge, as noted, is that the Attorney “allowed information to be disclosed revealing the identity of the Applicant”. It is not alleged that the Attorney himself breached the Suppression Order. Rather, to quote the applicant’s primary written submissions on this motion, the “gist of charge [1] is that in breach of the 2015 Suppression Order information revealing the Applicant’s identity has been disclosed since in or about March 2020 and the NSW Attorney has responsibility”. Based upon the particulars to the charge, that responsibility is said to extend to the decision of Judge 5 to lift the suppression order made in the 2019 proceedings; to the decisions of unidentified persons (presumably including Supreme Court staff) to publish the relevant judgments on the internet; to the actions of the Registrar of the Supreme Court as to management of court files; all in circumstances where the Applicant had sought to draw these matters to the attention of the Attorney by way of emails.
This charge is based upon two fundamental misconceptions. First, it is most certainly not the responsibility of the Attorney-General to direct judges or court staff as to what to do. The independence of the judiciary is a defining characteristic of courts in the Australian constitutional system: see eg Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38; [2013] HCA 7 at [125]. Any attempt by the Attorney to direct judges, registrars or court staff in the manner suggested by the applicant would be decidedly improper. It cannot be contempt of court to fail to do something that it would be quite improper to do.
Secondly, the premise of the first charge – and indeed the other three charges – is that the Attorney has a legal duty to seek to enforce court orders, either generally as first law officer of the State, or where he is a party to the proceeding in which the order was made. The applicant’s suggestion is that if he fails to give effect to that duty, he himself is in contempt of the court. The applicant put the argument in oral address as follows (Tcpt, 5 May 2022, pp 91-92):

“the Attorney General is a party to the 2015 suppression order in this case, so his discretion, if he has any, ought be exercised differently to a case where he is not a party to the actual suppression order that is being breached. The second point is that the current attorney is also a barrister, so he is also bound by the Bar Rules, so he has the same duty as Mr Griffin and Mr McHugh to correct any misapprehension by the Court. So, where [Judge 5] has misapprehended that he could lift the 2019 suppression order and reveal me to the world as Z, the Attorney has a duty - has a positive duty - he had a positive duty to fix it two years ago. He has a positive duty to fix it today.”

In her supplementary written submissions, she said this:

“The emails are admitted. The NSW AG cannot deny that the matter was brought to his attention. As he is a party to the 2015 Suppression Order he is obliged to take action. It is not discretionary.
The key point is that the NSW Attorney is a party to the 2015 Suppression Order.”

It might well be thought that if there was such a duty, the remedy for it would be some form of order seeking to compel its performance, rather than by finding the Attorney himself in contempt. But it is not necessary to pursue that point.
The applicant’s submissions are wrong. Neither generally as first law officer of the State, nor specifically as a party to particular proceedings, does the Attorney have a legally enforceable duty to bring contempt proceedings with respect to breach of a court order.
Insofar as the contempts alleged are criminal in nature, then it seems likely that the Attorney (in his capacity as first law officer) has the same discretion as any prosecutor. It is “for the prosecuting authorities, not the courts, to decide who is to be prosecuted and for what offences”: Magaming v The Queen (2013) 252 CLR 38; [2013] HCA 40 at [20]. Such a discretion is obviously inconsistent with there being a duty to prosecute criminal contempts, let alone with a principle that failing to do so constitutes contempt. That being said, applications relating to contempt based upon orders in a civil proceeding are dealt with as a matter of civil process: CFMEU v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375; [2015] HCA 21 at [40]-[47]; Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd (2018) 98 NSWLR 1002; [2018] NSWCA 306 at [16]-[17]. But even if that general prosecutorial discretion is not directly relevant (which is not necessary to decide), it is certainly at least relevant by analogy, and supports what has been said more specifically in relation to the position of the Attorney as first law officer.
In that regard, in Killen v Lane [1983] 1 NSWLR 171 at 177 Moffitt P, speaking for the Court of Appeal, said this (emphasis added):

“The initiation by the Crown or other constituted authority of criminal proceedings generally, or the initiation of proceedings by the court or Attorney-General to punish for criminal contempt, involves different considerations to proceedings by a person for the exercise by the court of a power to make an order which will enforce private rights. A person may allege to the Crown or authority having the power to commence criminal proceedings that a criminal offence has been committed or may allege facts which constitute such an offence, but has no right to compel the Crown or such authority or, in the case of criminal contempt, the court or the Attorney-General to commence proceedings or to seek a court order having this consequence.”

It is open to an Attorney-General to make an application relating to civil contempt in proceedings to which they were not a party: note Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 (Distillers Case) at 293-4 per Lord Reid, Lord Morris at 306, cf Lord Diplock at 307-8; Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2013] VSC 572. There is no reason to think that any different principle applies as regards their discretion in making any such application. So much is supported by what was said by Lord Reid in the Distillers Case at 293-4 (emphasis added):

“the Attorney-General has a right to bring before the court any matter which he thinks may amount to contempt of court and which he considers should in the public interest be brought before the court. The party aggrieved has the right to bring before the court any matter which he alleges amounts to contempt but he has no duty to do so. So if the party aggrieved failed to take action either because of expense or because he thought it better not to do so, very serious contempt might escape punishment if the Attorney-General had no right to act. But the Attorney-General is not obliged to bring before the court every prima facie case of contempt reported to him. It is entirely for him to judge whether it is in the public interest that he should act.”

Thus in his capacity as first law officer the Attorney has no legal duty to bring contempt proceedings. If he chooses not to do so, it cannot possibly be said that he is in contempt of the court which made the order said to have been breached.
The applicant sought to emphasise, however, that the position here was distinct because the Attorney was a party to the Court of Appeal proceedings in which the Suppression Order was made, and had consented to that order being made. Yet there is also no duty on a litigant to bring a contempt application against another party which has breached a court order. So much is implicit in the statement by Lord Reid, just quoted (see also Lord Diplock at 308 and 312). There had even been some question as to the entitlement of a private litigant to pursue another for contempt, a question resolved in favour of there being such an entitlement: see European Asian Bank AG v Wentworth (1986) 5 NSWLR 445 at 459-460; Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1987) 7 NSWLR 588 at 595. The fact that the question was raised reinforces that there could not possibly be any such duty. In the latter case, five members of this Court said at 595 that “any party to litigation may bring proceedings in respect of a contempt alleged to prejudice the due administration of justice in relation to that litigation”. That is not the language of obligation. Were there to be a duty on litigants to bring contempt charges with respect to breaches of court orders then the courts would be busy indeed dealing with such applications.

The fact that the litigant may be the Attorney-General does not alter this position. If he has no duty as first law officer generally, and if private litigants have no such duty, then there is also no such duty where the Attorney is himself a party to the proceedings in which an order is said to have been breached.
The applicant sought to make something of the fact that the current Attorney, the Hon Mark Speakman SC MP, is himself a barrister and in any event is subject to obligations as a model litigant. The position of Attorney-General in Australian jurisdictions and in the United Kingdom has commonly been filled by barristers. It is not a requirement of the office: note Anne Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales (Federation Press, 2004), 692. No doubt that means that there may be certain obligations of barristers which apply to Attorneys who are barristers when they are acting as such, most notably when personally appearing in court as counsel (a rare event in recent times). But the Attorney was not acting as a barrister when joined as a party to this proceeding to act as contradictor in 2015. Indeed, at the time of the 2015 proceedings the current Attorney did not even hold that office. It was held by a person who was not a barrister.
As for model litigant obligations, the applicant tendered the current NSW Government model litigant policy. It does nothing to alter the legal position I have just outlined.
The applicant suggested in her supplementary submissions that the Attorney “should not have made an application for summary dismissal”. The criticism is unfounded. The model litigant policy itself states, reasonably, that “[t]he State or an agency is not prevented from acting firmly and properly to protect its interests”, including by “moving to strike out or otherwise oppose untenable claims or claims which are an abuse of process”.
The applicant’s second charge of contempt is that the Attorney “publicly defied the Suppression Order”. The defiance appears to be that the Attorney has not taken steps to enforce the order. The applicant’s third charge is that the Attorney “scandalised and is scandalising the Court”. These charges proceed on the incorrect premise that the Attorney has a duty to enforce the order.
The applicant’s fourth charge is that the Attorney “interfered with the course of justice”. In part, this is again a misconceived complaint about the Attorney failing to take action against entities or persons said to be acting in breach of the Suppression Order. There are other aspects of this charge, but these are also without legal foundation:

One particular of the claim suggests that the Attorney is legally liable to the applicant because she was “involuntarily injected with chemicals causing allergic reactions in 2014 and 2015”. That appears to be a complaint about what occurred pursuant to the community treatment order that was the subject of challenge in the appeal in this matter. Any such claim has nothing to do with the Suppression Order, and has no link to any plausible allegation for contempt.

Another particular refers to a complaint made by the applicant to the Australian Human Rights Commission. That point appears irrelevant to anything at issue here.

It is then suggested that the Attorney “has brought improper pressure upon the Applicant”, but this pressure is not identified. In any event, again, any such complaint has nothing to do with the Suppression Order, nor any link to any plausible allegation for contempt of this Court.

The statement of charge against the Attorney-General discloses no reasonable cause of action or claim. It is legally unsustainable. Accordingly the statement of charge, along with paragraphs 12 and 14 of the applicant’s Notice of Motion filed on 9 March 2022, should be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.

Issue (3): Summary dismissal of charges against Bar Association respondents

The charges of contempt against the Bar Association respondents largely, though not exclusively, concern preparation for and participation in the 2019 proceedings on the part of the Bar Association respondents. Submissions were made as to whether the various charges should be characterised as civil or criminal, but I do not consider it necessary to resolve that issue on this application.
I will address each of the charges in turn. Before doing so, it is necessary to consider the Suppression Order more closely.

The Suppression Order

The Order is in the following terms:

“Pursuant to the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010, prohibit the disclosure of information tending to reveal the identity of the applicant, including by disclosure of information which might indirectly lead others to identify the applicant.”

It appears from 2015 CA at [3] that the Order was jointly requested by the active parties in the appeal (the applicant and the Attorney-General) and I infer it was drafted by them. That drafting leaves something to be desired. Indeed, this case illustrates the problems that can arise in connection with such orders.
First, the Order is expressed in terms of prohibiting “the disclosure of information tending to reveal the identity of the applicant”. This cannot be read literally. The order is obviously directed to protect the identity of the applicant as the applicant in the proceeding – that is to say, as the litigant “Z” who had brought the appeal. It does not prevent the applicant herself, or others, identifying her in ways not connected to the proceeding.
Secondly, the Order does not “specify the ground or grounds on which the order is made”, as required by s 8(2) of the Court Suppression Act. That being said, the ground – namely that it was necessary in the public interest pursuant to s 8(1)(e) – was identified in the judgment at [4].
Thirdly, the Order does not indicate its duration, inconsistently with the requirement in s 12(1) of the Act: cf eg Nationwide News Pty Ltd v JS and SD [2022] NSWSC 774 at [45] per Basten AJ; Porter v Dyer [2022] FCAFC 116 at [28] per Besanko and Abraham JJ and [166] per Lee J.
Fourthly, the Order is expressed as a suppression order, even though the relevant part of the judgment is headed “Non-publication order”. The Act draws a distinction between the two types of order. A non-publication order is defined in s 3 as one which “prohibits or restricts the publication of information (but that does not otherwise prohibit or restrict the disclosure of information)”. The term “publish” is defined to mean “disseminate or provide access to the public or a section of the public by any means” (emphasis added), with four inclusive examples then given. There is good reason to think that this notion does not encompass provision of information to a court, including by analogy to the principle that in general prohibitions on disclosure to a “person” do not encompass disclosure to courts: see eg Kizon v Palmer (1997) 72 FCR 409 at 430-1 per Lindgren J (Jenkinson and Kiefel JJ agreeing at 412-413), and Osborne v R [2014] NSWCCA 17 at [8]-[13] per Basten JA.
A suppression order is defined in s 3 as “an order that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of information (by publication or otherwise)”. The prohibition or restriction is thus broader than a non-publication order, because its reach is not limited to dissemination of the information to the public. The Bar Association respondents made an undeveloped point in their supplementary submissions that this might be read as implicitly still requiring disclosure to a person. The point is arguable, but it is one of some potential significance. I am not prepared to accept it without the benefit of having received developed arguments by both sides. I note in passing that there are some legal requirements which may prevent parties disclosing things to courts. The implied Harman obligation is a general law example. Subject to constitutional constraints, statutes may have that effect: see eg Commonwealth v Kupang Resources Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 77.
Despite the heading in the judgment, given that the order is expressed to “prohibit the disclosure of information”, and does not employ the notion of publication, it must be regarded as a suppression order and not a non-publication order.
The Act does carve out an area where suppression orders do not apply. Section 15(1) provides:

A suppression order does not prevent a person from disclosing information if the disclosure is not by publication and is in the course of performing functions or duties or exercising powers in a public official capacity—
(a) in connection with the conduct of proceedings or the recovery or enforcement of any penalty imposed in proceedings, or
(b) in compliance with any procedure adopted by a court for informing a news media organisation of the existence and content of a suppression order or non-publication order made by the court.

It may be arguable that the Bar Association respondents were acting in a public official capacity when responding to the litigation initiated by the application in connection with the Bar Council’s statutory role in issuing practising certificates. Section 15, and its Federal Court counterpart, appear to have received little judicial consideration, with the exception of a reference in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v JS and SD [2022] NSWSC 774 at [46]. However, as no such argument was put to me, I will not consider it further.
Fifthly, an issue arises as to whether the Suppression Order should be construed as restricting the applicant herself from disclosing her identity in connection with the 2015 CA proceedings. The Order was designed to protect her privacy as part of the broader public interest in facilitating persons subject to community treatment orders being able to exercise their statutory rights “without the fear of prejudice or public humiliation which might follow from the disclosure of the person’s identity”: 2015 CA at [4]. I have noted above that it would be a surprising consequence if the applicant’s own disclosure to the LPAB, Law Society and Bar Association would constitute a breach of the Order.
There could be very good reason for the applicant to disclose her identity as the applicant in the 2015 proceedings to others. She might have wished, or might now wish, to seek legal advice about the proceedings or the effect of the Suppression Order itself. It is difficult to conceive that that would be forbidden. More generally, she might wish to discuss it with a partner, relative or friend, or wish to raise it in the context of receiving medical or psychological assistance.
If the Order were construed so that such disclosures were not a breach, then a further question would arise whether any such disclosure by the applicant could be regarded as a waiver of compliance with the order by those to whom she has disclosed it if those persons use the disclosed information consistently with the purpose of the disclosure.
However, these issues were not explored in any significant detail in argument before me. They raise matters of possible broader significance for suppression orders. I will not address them further.
I will now turn to examining the charges against the respondents.

Michael McHugh SC (2^nd respondent)

At [13] of the statement of charge the applicant charges Michael McHugh SC with acting in “wilful disobedience and contravention of the Suppression Order” because he “disclosed information relating to the identity of the Applicant”. The particulars of the charge are as follows:

“a. In 2019, the Second Respondent was Vice-President of the NSW Bar Council and Association.
b. In 2019, an issue arose between the Applicant and the Second Respondent in relation to Legalwise Seminars. The Applicant says the Second Respondent improperly pressured her in relation to unrelated Federal Court proceedings [xxxxxxx] against Legalwise Seminars, by requiring her to undergo an involuntary medical examination, disparaging her and blocking her livelihood, amongst others, through his position on NSW Bar Council. At the time, Elizabeth Raper of Counsel, a fellow member of NSW Bar Council, represented Legalwise Seminars against the Applicant.
c. From 2020 to the present, the Second Respondent has been and is President of the NSW Bar Council an Association.
d. In October 2019, the NSW Bar Council and Association retained Hicksons Lawyers in relation to [the dispute before Judge 1].
e. In October 2019, the NSW Bar Council and Association revealed the identity of the Applicant to Hicksons Lawyers.
f. Application for an Australian Practising Certificate to the NSW Bar Association dated 1 August 2019 (the “PC Application”) and including Statutory Declaration to the Legal Profession Admission Board dated 14 November 2016 (the “LPAB Disclosure”). The LPAB Disclosure contains the identity of the Applicant.
g. In October 2019, the PC Application and the LPAB Disclosure were wrongly tendered to [Judge 1] for the NSW Bar Council.
h. On 5, 6 or 9 December 2019, the NSW Bar Council issued a false notice of 58-pages purportedly under Section 464 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (the “S464 Notice”). The S464 Notice refers to these proceedings and identifies the Applicant as “Z”.
i. On 9 December 2019, the S464 Notice was provided to [Judge 4] in open court for the NSW Bar Council.
j. On 16 December 2019, the S464 Notice was tendered to [Judge 5] in open court for the NSW Bar Council.
k. Knowing that it would be contrary to the Suppression Order, on 16 December 2019, the NSW Bar Council allowed [Judge 5] to misapprehend that his Honour could lift the suppression and non-publication orders made by [Judge 1] on 10 and 11 October 2019.
l. Knowing that it would be contrary to the Suppression Order, from March 2020, the NSW Bar Council allowed the Registrar of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to Grant access to the Court files for [the decision of Judge 1] and [the decision of Judge 5] (the “Judgments”).
m. Knowing that it would be contrary to the Suppression Order, from about 10 August 2020, the NSW Bar Council allowed the Judgments to be published on the Internet. The S464 Notice is referred to in [the decision of Judge 5].
n. Knowing that it would frustrate the Suppression Order, from 14 August 2020, the NSW Bar Council allowed The Australian newspaper to report and to false report on the Judgments.
o. On 17 September 2020, the NSW Bar Association filed a Motion in these proceedings to vary the Suppression Order.
p. The NSW Bar Association did not inform the Court about subparagraphs (g) to (n) above.
q. Having already approached the Court in September 2020, the NSW Bar Association did not properly apply to vary the Suppression Order to allow for independent legal representation.”

At [14] it is alleged that Mr McHugh obstructed, breached or frustrated the process of the Court and the Suppression Order. These charges rely on the particulars to [13], and stand or fall with the allegation in that paragraph.
The applicant at [15] charges Mr McHugh with contempt for "misus[ing] statutory power by compelling the Applicant to answer questions, produce documents and provide information". This is a distinct allegation.
At [16] the applicant charges Mr McHugh with contempt for “interfer[ing] with the course of justice”, which she particularises by repeating the previous paragraphs. This charge again stands or falls with the other charges.
The allegations against Mr McHugh in these charges can be grouped as follows:

wrongly tendering in the 2019 proceedings (as part of the Bar Council) material which identified the applicant in connection with the 2015 CA proceedings and allowing Judge 5 to misapprehend the situation relating to suppression (particulars (g)-(k));

allowing things to occur contrary to the Suppression Order (particulars (l)-(n));

matters relating to the Bar Association’s application to vary the Suppression Order (particulars (o)-(q));

the complaint relating to the Legalwise Seminars dispute (particular (b)); and

the charge of misusing a statutory power (at [15]).

Allegation of wrongly tendering material (particulars (g)-(k))

The Bar Association respondents submit that the statement of charge fails to articulate a connection between Mr McHugh and conduct which is said to amount to contempt on his part, other than that he was Senior Vice President of the Bar Association in 2019 and, from 2020 up until at least the time of the hearing, was its President (see particulars (a)-(f)). They point out that the statement of charge does not allege that Mr McHugh had any personal knowledge of the Suppression Order.
The applicant sought to draw a connection between Mr McHugh and the disclosures as follows in her written submissions:

“the Second Respondent admits his Presidential position on Bar Council. … Further, the Applicant relies upon sections 29 and 412 of the LPUL as well as the Constitution of the New South Wales Bar Association. The President of Bar Council must have reviewed the Applicant’s disclosures of 1 August 2019 in her Application for a Practising Certificate before he unlawfully rejected her in December 2019. The President governed the disclosure of the Applicant’s identity to Hicksons, Patrick Griffin SC and the public as set out in the Statement of Charge.”

Mere “review” of the disclosures would not be a breach of the Suppression Order.
As to the assertion that Mr McHugh “governed” the disclosure of the applicant’s identity, it appears that the argument is that as chair of the Bar Council he must be presumed to have instructed that the 2019 proceedings be defended. Even if that were presumed, no presumption could be made that Mr McHugh (or any other particular member of the Bar Council) gave specific instructions about what evidence was to be filed, whether suppression orders should be sought, let alone how issues raised by Judge 5 in the course of the hearing before him should have been addressed.
In oral submissions the applicant said that “[t]his is not a personal attack on Mr McHugh. Unfortunately, he is the person in the position of responsibility and he has to be held accountable, and he is accountable, and he is personally involved” (Tcpt, 5 May 2022, p 84). That type of generic assertion is not a sufficient basis to found an allegation that Mr McHugh committed a contempt of the Court. As recorded above at [95], allegations of contempt must be distinctly stated and are not lightly to be made. It is incumbent on the applicant to set out the material facts supporting the allegation of contempt, going to his alleged knowledge of the Order and how it is that he is said to have breached it himself or been a party to others doing so.
Section 29 of the LPUL, as invoked by the applicant, provides that “[t]he designated local regulatory authority may accredit or reaccredit law courses or providers of practical legal training in accordance with the Admission Rules”. Section 412(2) provides that such an authority, and its delegates, “must exercise their functions under this Law in accordance with applicable provisions of this Law, the Uniform Regulations and the Uniform Rules and applicable guidelines and directions under this Chapter”. Working on the assumption that the Bar Association is such an authority, these provisions still do nothing to cure the problems with the charge. They say nothing about the law of contempt.
The charges against Mr McHugh based upon particulars (g)-(k) do not articulate a reasonable basis for an allegation of contempt. They should be struck out. I will not order that they be summarily dismissed, as in theory it could be possible to articulate a basis on which Mr McHugh did have sufficient involvement to constitute a possible contempt based upon the Suppression Order. That is not to suggest that it is likely that such a charge could properly be formulated.

Allegation of allowing things to occur contrary to the Suppression Order (particulars (l)-(n))

These particulars complain about the Bar Council having “allowed” the Registrar of the Supreme Court and The Australian newspaper to do certain things, and “allowed” the judgments of Judge 1 and Judge 5 to be published on the internet.
These particulars suffer from the same core problem as identified for the preceding particulars – they do not identify what Mr McHugh himself knew and did to found an allegation that he breached the Suppression Order.
More substantially, much as I have addressed above in dealing with the position of the Attorney-General, it is not in Mr McHugh’s power to determine what the Registrar, the Court, or The Australian newspaper does.
The charges should be summarily dismissed insofar as they are based upon these particulars.

Allegations connected to the application to vary the Suppression Order (particulars (o)-(q))

The allegations here overlap with the allegation in the charge at [29]. For the reasons set out below when dealing with [29], to the extent that charges [13], [14] and [16] are based on these particulars they should be summarily dismissed.

Allegations connected to Legalwise Seminars (particular (b))

The applicant’s allegation here is that Mr McHugh “improperly pressured her in relation to unrelated Federal Court proceedings … against Legalwise Seminars, by [inter alia] requiring her to undergo an involuntary medical examination”. This allegation has no connection to orders made by this Court, nor is there any other plausible basis for alleging this to be a contempt of this Court.
The charges based on this particular should be summarily dismissed as disclosing no reasonable claim in this proceeding.

The charge of misusing a statutory power (charge [15])

As noted, the charge here is that Mr McHugh “misused statutory power by compelling the Applicant to answer questions, produce documents and provide information”. The focus of the particulars is on a resolution by the Bar Council that the applicant be medically examined as part of consideration of the applicant’s application for a practising certificate, along with what is said to be a subsequent “[f]alse resolution of December 2019 stating that the Applicant ‘is not a fit and proper person to hold an Australian practising certificate’ knowing that the Applicant did hold at all relevant times, and does hold, an Australian practising certificate”.
The Bar Association respondents attack this charge on the basis that it is “not one that makes any allegation recognisable as a contempt”, adding that “[t]he alleged conduct, which is in any event denied, is not alleged to bear any connection to court proceedings that were pending at the time”.
In oral submissions the applicant accepted that this charge was “not about the suppression order” (Tcpt, 5 May 2022, p 87). She stated that “It is not strictly a contempt of the Court of Appeal. If, if it were to be brought as a standalone charge it probably would have been brought in the Court at first instance” (ibid).
This argument suffers from the fundamental problem I have addressed above at [63]-[64], namely that the power of this Court to deal with allegations of contempt within this proceeding arises only by virtue of the Suppression Order.
This charge should be summarily dismissed as again disclosing no reasonable claim in this proceeding.

Conclusion on charges [13]-[16]

Charge [13] should be summarily dismissed insofar as it is based upon particulars (b) and (l)-(q), and struck out as regards the remaining particulars. Charges [14] and [16] have the same fate, insofar as they are based upon [13]. Charge 15 should be summarily dismissed. The remaining bases of charges [13], [14] and [15] should be struck out.
Further allegations are made about Mr McHugh at [29] and [30] of the statement of charge. As explained below, those charges should be summarily dismissed.
In the result, no allegations against Mr McHugh survive, and his name should be struck out from prayer 1A of the applicant’s further amended motion of 15 March 2022. As will be seen, the same result follows for the other Bar Association respondents, save for Mr Griffin.

Patrick Griffin SC (3^rd respondent)

As explained above, Mr Griffin was counsel for the Bar Council in the 2019 proceedings. The applicant charges at [17] that Mr Griffin, with “wilful disobedience”, acted in contravention of the Suppression Order by “disclosing information revealing the identity of the Applicant”.
A second charge, at [18] of the statement of charge, alleges that Mr Griffin obstructed, breached and/or frustrated “the process of the Court and/or the Suppression Order by publishing and causing to be published or using or distributing publications with the name of a person who is protected by a pseudonym”. A third charge, at [19], accuses Mr Griffin of “interfer[ing] with the course of justice”. The second charge is particularised by reference to [17], and the third charge invokes [1]-[18]. These charges stand or fall with the first charge against Mr Griffin.
The particulars under [17] are as follows:

“a. The NSW Bar Council and Hicksons Lawyers retained the Third Respondent in October 2019.
b. In October 2019, the Third Respondent wrongly tendered the PC Application and the LPAB Disclosure to [Judge 1] for the NSW Bar Council.
c. On 9 December 2019, the Third Respondent provided or tendered the S464 Notice to Judge 4 in open court for the NSW Bar Council.
d. On 16 December 2019, the Third Respondent tendered or referred the S464 Notice to [Judge 5] in open court for the NSW Bar Council.
e. Knowing that it would be contrary to the Suppression Order, on 16 December 2019, the Third Respondent allowed and/or encouraged [Judge 5] to misapprehend that his Honour could lift the suppression and non-publication orders made by [Judge 1] on 10 and 11 October 2019.
f. Knowing that it would be contrary to the Suppression Order, from March 2020, the Third Respondent allowed and/or encouraged and/or sanctioned the Registrar of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to misapprehend that he or she could properly grant access to the Court file for the judgments,
g. Knowing that it would be contrary to the Suppression Order, from about 10 August 2020, the Third Respondent allowed or sanctioned the Judgments to be published on the Internet. The S464 Notice is referred to in [the decision of Judge 5]. The S646 Notice refers to these proceedings and identifies the Applicant as “Z”.
h. Knowing that it would frustrate the Suppression Order, from 14 August 2020, the Third Respondent allowed and sanctioned the Australian newspaper reporting and falsely reporting on the Judgments and the Applicant.”

Particulars (f) to (h) may be disposed of briefly. They fail to articulate any rational connection between Mr Griffin on the one hand, and the conduct of the Registrar or the publication of the judgments or The Australian on the other hand. Again, these allegations go to matters beyond Mr Griffin’s control. Insofar as they are said to be consequences of Mr Griffin’s actions or omissions in court, it is those matters which would constitute the relevant allegation of contempt. The charges against Mr Griffin should be struck out insofar as they are based on these particulars.
As regards the remainder of the charges against Mr Griffin, the Bar Association respondents contended that no contempt on the part of Mr Griffin could be made out for formal and substantive reasons, which I will address in turn.

The insufficient articulation argument

It was submitted that the charges do not meet the requirements for clearly articulating a charge of contempt and ought therefore be struck out.
The three charges against Mr Griffin, as supported by particulars (a)-(e), are not articulated in a fulsome way. It is notable, for example, that although it is said that he acted in “wilful disobedience” of the Suppression Order in the charge at [17], his having actual knowledge of the Order is not alleged in terms in particulars (a)-(d). That being said, knowledge of the Order is alleged in particular (e), and was alleged in particulars (f)-(h) which I have struck out on other grounds. And wilful disobedience is not alleged in the charges at [18]-[19]. The charge at [18] includes an allegation that Mr Griffin breached the Order simpliciter.
Criticism can be made of particular (e), which does not identify what Mr Griffin did to cause the alleged misapprehension before Judge 5, nor does it indicate why this was a misapprehension. Judge 5 had power under s 13 of the Court Suppression Act to vary the orders of Judge 1. In any event, this appears to have little to do with contravention of the Suppression Order made by this Court.
Nevertheless, it appears to me that the core points sought to be raised by the applicant are relatively clear, namely that Mr Griffin acted in contravention of the Suppression Order by:

tendering before Judge 1 the applicant’s application to the Bar Association for a practising certificate, including material which disclosed her identity as “Z” in this proceeding;

tendering the s 464 notices to Judge 4, which included the same material; and

relying on those notices before Judge 5 in open court.

Although not spelt out in particulars (a)-(d), it is tolerably clear that the applicant alleges that all of this was done in contravention of the Suppression Order. The facts tendered before me suggest that at least at some stage in the course of these events Mr Griffin became aware that this Court had made a suppression order. As for particular (e), although not clearly expressed, it does seek to raise the issue of ongoing suppression orders with respect to the material that had been tendered in the 2019 proceedings. If such an order had been made it might have avoided, in practical terms at least, an argument about contravention of the Suppression Order.
In these circumstances, I decline to strike out these charges against Mr Griffin on grounds of being insufficiently articulated. I do not suggest that their articulation is wholly adequate, especially insofar as wilfulness is alleged. If the applicant proceeds to determination of these charges without amendment then the applicant will be held strictly to this articulation of them, consistently with the principles articulated in Inghams Enterprises quoted above at [93]. But I do not consider it appropriate to strike out what is currently there in circumstances where there is the skeleton of a conceivably maintainable charge, and part of the difficulty with particulars (a)-(e) may arise from my having struck out particulars (f)-(h).

The substantive arguments

The Bar Association respondents submitted that the conduct of Mr Griffin cannot amount to contempt because:

contempt is concerned with protecting the administration of justice and the disclosures were made in furtherance of the administration of justice;

alternatively, the Suppression Order should be read down so as to allow disclosures in the administration of justice (this argument developed in the course of exchanges with the bench during the hearing).

The Bar Association respondents contended in their written submissions that:

“Plainly, the third respondent, his instructors and the Court were acting with due concern for the suppression orders made in the Z proceeding in light of the nature of the relief sought by the applicant. The material facts do not disclose any wilful intention on the part of the third respondent to disobey the suppression order, much less to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice – indeed, to the contrary.”

In oral address, senior counsel pithily summarised the argument as follows (Tcpt, 5 May 2022, p 65):

“the applicant provided that information to the Bar Association, the applicant commenced the proceedings. [The relevant respondents] were participating as officers of the Court assisting judges of the Court exercising judicial power. In that context that cannot be contempt.”

There is some intuitive force in these submissions in circumstances where:

the disclosure to the Supreme Court of the identity of the applicant as “Z” arises from the applicant herself having disclosed that material first to the LPAB, then the Law Society, and then in her application to the Bar Association;

the Bar Association was responding to proceedings brought by the applicant which related to her application to the Bar Association (and doing so, at least to begin with, in circumstances of some urgency); and

the applicant herself had ample opportunity to seek a suppression or non-publication order in the three month period in which Judge 5 ordered that the suppression order made by Judge 1 continue.

At the very least, these points are ones which raise a very large question about whether any penalty would be ordered by this Court even if a contempt was made out.
However, the first argument is apparently a novel one. The Bar Association respondents cited no direct authority for the proposition that conduct which is in breach of a court order will not amount to contempt if in furtherance of or if necessary for the administration of justice.
The Bar Association respondents did invoke Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 107; [1986] HCA 46, where it was said that “the underlying rationale of every exercise of the contempt power [is] that it is necessary to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice”. That proposition does not of itself establish that a breach of a court order will not be a contempt if it occurs in the course of the administration of justice. It is clear that such a breach can occur. That is what would happen if a party sought to tender material in a second proceeding in breach of an implied Harman obligation arising from an earlier proceeding. That is why parties wishing to use such material must apply to the first court to be released from the obligation.
Furthermore, it appears to me that this type of argument may turn on issues of fact and degree relating to precisely what occurred in the course of the 2019 proceedings. For example, were there options available to Mr Griffin other than tendering an unredacted copy of the application to the Bar Association? Would any problem have been solved if the Bar Association had sought ongoing suppression orders which mirrored the terms of the Suppression Order made by this Court? Does the issue turn on precisely what Mr Griffin understood about the Order? Whilst it appears all the relevant transcripts have been tendered before me, it is inappropriate to engage in fine factual analysis when dealing with a summary dismissal application, especially one in which issues of fact and degree may be important.
The second argument, relating to construction, is also a novel one. I have outlined at [124]-[134] above some concerns which arise with respect to the drafting of the Suppression Order. In that discussion I have noted that an issue of construction arises as to whether the Order should be construed so as to restrict the applicant herself.
Just as for that issue, I consider that the construction issues relating to the administration of justice were insufficiently developed for me to make a ruling on them. Whether or not a generic suppression order should be read down so as to permit later actions capable of being characterised as taken in the administration of justice raises a large and important point. I do not consider it appropriate to determine that issue on this application. For example, there was no consideration of how s 15 of the Court Suppression Act might weigh against such a construction. Further, this sort of point is best considered by reference to particular facts as found, and not on a summary judgment application: note, analogously, eg Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149; [2018] HCA 25 at [55].
I do not reject the substantive arguments raised by the Bar Association respondents, but in the circumstances I consider that it is inappropriate that those arguments be employed to resolve an application for summary dismissal.

Conclusion as regards charges against Mr Griffin

The charges against Mr Griffin should be struck out insofar as they are based on particulars (e) to (h) at [17] of the statement of charge. I otherwise consider it inappropriate to dismiss or strike out the charges against Mr Griffin.

The non-active Hickson Lawyers partners (4^th and 7^th-11^th respondents)

At [20] of the statement of charge the applicant alleges that Stewart Cameron, David Fischl, Paul Hendriks, Cameron Leaver, Najeh Marhaba and Quincy Wong (being partners of Hicksons Lawyers) acted in wilful disobedience and contravention of the Suppression Order, doing so because:

“Hicksons Lawyers disclosed information or permitted the disclosure of information or was responsible for the disclosure of information or supervised the disclosure of or coordinated the disclosure of or aided the disclosure of information revealing the identity of the Applicant.”

The only particulars given are to state that “[f]rom October 2019, Hicksons Lawyers have retained and instructed [Mr Griffin] in relation to the Applicant”, then to repeat the allegations made against Messrs McHugh, Griffin, Moore and Cameron.
Two further charges at [21] and [22] reproduce the charges against Mr McHugh in respect of publication of the name of a person protected by a pseudonym, and for “interfer[ing] with the course of justice”. No further particulars are provided.
The Bar Association respondents submitted:

“These respondents are not alleged to have any connection whatsoever to the proceedings except that they are partners in a large law practice that also includes practitioners acting in this matter. They are not alleged to have any personal knowledge of the suppression order.”

These submissions have force. In her written submissions the applicant appeared to found the liability of contempt of these respondents on sections of the LPUL:

“In reply to paragraphs [38] to [41] of the Respondents submissions, see Section 33 of the LPUL "Obligations not affected by nature of business structures"; Section 34 "Responsibilities of principals"; Section 35 "Liability of principals" and Section 470 "Contraventions by partnerships or other unincorporated bodies".”

None of these sections bears on liability for contempt. Section 470, for example, is addressed to offences against or contraventions of the LPUL itself or the associated Uniform Rules. It does not encompass liability for contempt. Section 34(1) relevantly provides that “[e]ach principal of a law practice is responsible for ensuring that reasonable steps are taken to ensure that … all legal practitioner associates of the law practice comply with their obligations under this Law and the Uniform Rules and their other professional obligations”. Section 34(2) then provides that “failure to uphold that responsibility is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct”. Section 34 does not create liability between partners as a matter of contempt of court.
The statement of charge does not identify any action taken by these respondents which would contravene the Suppression Order, nor does it allege that they had any personal knowledge of the Order, nor does it seek to articulate how these respondents might be liable without taking such actions nor having such knowledge.
These points go to the articulation of the claim, although problems of substance loom large in the background. I will strike out charges [20]-[22].

Christopher Moore (5^th respondent)

The three charges against the 5^th respondent are: first, a charge of wilful disobedience and contravention of the Suppression Order (at [23]); secondly, a charge in respect of publication of the name of a person protected by a pseudonym (at [24]); and thirdly, a charge of having “interfere[d] with the course of justice” (at [25]).

The particulars for all charges are given at [23]. They state that Mr Moore is “the Partner responsible for the disputes between the NSW Bar Association and the Applicant since in or about June 2021”. There is, thus, no allegation he had any particular involvement in the 2019 proceedings.
The applicant’s first complaint against Mr Moore is that she says that Mr Moore failed to apply to the court to vary the Suppression Order when asked by the applicant. Yet the applicant could have made such an application herself. In any event, failing to apply to vary the Suppression Order cannot possibly be a contempt of that order.
Next she complains that Mr Moore “continues to retain and/or instruct” Mr Griffin. Mr Moore is perfectly entitled to do so.
Finally, she complains that Mr Moore “continues to take no action” in relation to the 2019 judgments being on the internet, or in relation to public access to the court files, or in relation to what has been published by The Australian amongst others. The applicant could seek to take such action herself, but she could not sensibly be said to be in contempt by not doing so. Nor can that be said of Mr Moore.
The complaints against Mr Moore are without substance and should be dismissed.

Roderick Cameron (6^th respondent)

The three charges against Mr Cameron at [26]-[28] substantially reproduce those made against the 4^th and 7^th to 11^th respondents, save that it is particularised that he was “the Partner responsible for the disputes between the NSW Bar Association and the Applicant” between October 2019 and January 2021.
As responsible partner, Mr Cameron was no doubt involved in the 2019 proceedings in a manner distinct to the 4^th and 7^th to 11^th respondents. Nevertheless, there is no articulation in the charges of what Mr Cameron did that is said to have been in contravention of the Suppression Order or otherwise in contempt of court. Nor is the issue of knowledge addressed, although it is alleged that he acted in “wilful disobedience” of the Order. It is not sufficient simply to say that Mr Cameron was Mr Griffin’s instructing solicitor. Mr Cameron is entitled to know the gist or substance of the charges against him, including the material facts in support of the allegation.
Accordingly, these charges should be struck out.

Charge concerning the Tolhurst affidavit

At [29] of the statement of charge the applicant charges Messrs McHugh, Griffin and Cameron, “as well as Hicksons Lawyers” (presumably referring to the 4^th and 7^th to 11^th respondents), with contempt in respect of their alleged involvement in the preparation of the affidavit of Gregory John Tolhurst affirmed on 16 December 2020. As noted above, particulars (o)-(q) of charge [13] raised a related point.
None of the particulars at [29], or in (o)-(q) of charge [13], goes to breach of the Suppression Order. However, the affidavit in question was filed in this Court. The affidavit is attacked as being false, as failing “to properly vary the Suppression Order”, as evidencing an improper use of a statutory power, as threatening and embarrassing, as being a “definite attempt to deceive the Court”, and as evidencing “improper pressure” placed on the applicant.
The context of the Tolhurst affidavit was explained in an affidavit of Mr Moore dated 24 March 2022, as follows:

“21. The Bar Association filed a motion in September 2020 seeking to vary the suppression order in these proceedings to permit it to provide other regulatory bodies within Australia with a copy of the Reasons for Decision, in line with its statutory obligations. A copy of the Reasons for Decision was provided to this Court on 17 September 2020 through an affidavit filed in support of that motion, made by the then Executive Director of the Bar Association, Gregory Tolhurst.
22. By email dated 9 October 2020 the Applicant consented to the variation of the suppression order sought by the Bar Association. The variation of the suppression order was made by the Court on 13 October 2020. …
23. The Bar Association was represented in connection with that notice of motion (seeking variation of the suppression order) by Patrick Griffin SC and by Hicksons. No objection was raised by the Applicant at that time to the fact that Patrick Griffin SC and Hicksons were aware of the Applicant’s identity in these proceedings.”

If the applicant had wished to challenge the content of the Tolhurst affidavit she had ample opportunity to do so. More generally, it seems that by this charge the applicant seeks to have it determined that, amongst other things, she is a “fit and proper person”. A contempt charge is an inappropriate means of seeking to achieve that end. As was put to the applicant in the course of the 2019 proceedings, she could have appealed the adverse decision of the Bar Association on her practising certificate application to the Supreme Court.
The charges in [29] and those based upon particulars (o)-(q) of charge [13] are misconceived and should be summarily dismissed.

Charge concerning the Federal Court proceedings

At [30] of the charge the applicant charges Messrs McHugh, Griffin and Moore, “as well as Hicksons Lawyers” (again presumably referring to the 4^th and 7^th to 11^th respondents), with contempt for causing various documents to be filed in the Federal Court, by which it is said that the relevant respondents obstructed, frustrated and/or interfered with the course of justice. The gravamen of the complaint is stated at particulars (i)-(j), as follows:

“(i) The [identified materials filed in the Federal Court] scandalise this Court and deprive this Court of power to fairly and properly determine the Motion and Application for review of the Decision of the Registrar.
(j) The [identified materials] are not bona fide for [xxxxxxx] and are highly prejudicial and embarrassing to these proceedings and to the Applicant.”

The Federal Court proceedings are quite distinct from this matter. The filing of the identified materials could not have, and has not had, any effect on my determination of the applicant’s motion for review of the Registrar’s decisions. Conversely, if the applicant wishes to take issue with the materials filed in the Federal Court, that is a matter she must take up with that Court.
In her submissions, the applicant sought to support the charge on the basis that the filing of an affidavit in the Federal Court proceedings involved disclosure in breach of the Suppression Order, because exhibited to the affidavit was a copy of her s 464 notice. But, as the applicant herself noted in the course of the hearing, the s 464 notice that was filed in the Federal Court proceedings is redacted so as to remove reference to the 2015 CA proceedings. Nothing in the exhibit thus reveals the identity of the applicant as being the applicant in the 2015 proceedings.
The charge at [30] is misconceived and should be summarily dismissed as not disclosing a reasonable claim in these proceedings.

Costs

I have concluded that the charges against all of the Bar Association respondents should be dismissed or struck out save for those against Mr Griffin. There is no reason costs should not follow the event.
One way of approaching costs would be to award costs against the applicant as regards all of the Bar Association respondents except for Mr Griffin, then to award the applicant costs against Mr Griffin as regards the Bar Association respondents’ summary dismissal and strike-out motion. However, taking that approach would be likely to complicate matters of quantification and assessment in a disproportionate manner.
I think a simpler and better way of proceeding is to make a reduced costs order against the applicant. Given the Bar Association respondents may be said to have had substantial success on the issues argued before me, a fair way to proceed is not to award costs to the applicant, and to award the Bar Association respondents 50% of their costs incurred with respect to the applicant’s contempt application to the date of making the order.

The way forward

If the charge against Mr Griffin is maintained then it will need to proceed to hearing. Appropriate directions can be made by the Registrar in this regard. Two other matters arise.
First, I have set out above some of the issues that arise with the drafting of the Suppression Order. Not the least of those is the absence of any limit as to the duration of the order, contrary to the requirements of the Court Suppression Act. Further, there have been a number of amendments made or sought to the operation of the Order to allow particular steps to be taken. The applicant herself asked for some variation to be made to the Suppression Order in the course of the 2019 proceedings, as noted above at [34]. More recently, as I have noted above, the Bar Association applied in September 2020 for variation of the Order to permit it to provide other regulatory authorities with a copy of its reasons for decision for refusing the applicant’s application for a practising certificate. As reflected in those applications, circumstances have changed since the Order was made. As the applicant put to me in oral address, “I think, your Honour, when the order was made it was envisaged that that was the end. I was not pursuing a career in law at that time. So, this set of circumstances was certainly not foreseen” (Tcpt, 5 May 2022, p 76).
Section 13(1) of the Court Suppression Act authorises a court which issued an order under the Act to review the order, including “on the court’s own initiative”. I consider it appropriate that such a review be undertaken. That is so in light of the issues I have raised, the changed circumstances, and the ongoing practical issues that the Order has caused as manifest by the applications to vary its operation. That review should consider if the Order should be maintained and, if so, for how long and on what terms. For example, consideration might be given to whether the Order is more appropriately expressed as a non-publication order than a suppression order. Any such variations to the Order would not affect the charge made against Mr Griffin.
Subject to considering any submission on the point, it currently appears to me that such a review could be undertaken by a single judge of appeal: Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 46(2)(b). Needless to say, the applicant and the Attorney-General will be entitled to be heard on that review (as parties to the proceedings in which the Order was made), as will any person interested in the sense outlined in s 13(2) of the Act, which may well include the Bar Association.
Secondly, it appears that a significant concern of the applicant is that there is material on the Supreme Court file in the 2019 proceedings which identifies her as the applicant in this proceeding, and which could, in theory, still be accessed by members of the public or the media. Pursuant to s 13(3) of the Court Suppression Act a suppression or non-publication order may be made after proceedings have concluded. Here, thus, an order could for example be sought that any references in the Court file in the 2019 proceedings be subject to a non-publication order for a defined period.
If such an order were made it is possible that that might substantially ameliorate the concerns of the applicant including as regards the complaints she makes against Mr Griffin. The applicant submitted to me that the allegations of contempt she had made involved civil, not criminal, contempt (Tcpt, 5 May 2022, p 83). That submission suggests that the applicant’s essential purpose in making the contempt allegations is to seek that any contravention of the Suppression Order be remedied rather than punished (noting the distinction identified at [88] above).
It would be open to either the applicant or the Bar Association respondents to apply for such an order in the 2019 proceedings. I note that it would be possible to seek that any such application in that proceeding be listed before me, as a matter of efficiency.

Orders

The orders of the Court will be as follows:

Prayers 4-10 of the applicant’s motion filed on 9 March 2022 are dismissed.

The contempt application against the Attorney-General of New South Wales (raised by paragraphs 12 and 14 of the applicant’s motion filed on 9 March 2022 and the accompanying Statement of Charge) is dismissed with costs.

The following allegations in the statement of charge filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022 are dismissed:

as against Mr McHugh, at [15], and at [13], [14] and [16] (insofar as those three paragraphs are based on the particulars at [13](b) and (l)-(q));

as against Mr Moore, at [23]-[25];

as against Messrs McHugh, Griffin and Cameron and the 4^th and 7^th-11^th respondents, at [29];

as against Messrs McHugh, Griffin and Moore and the 4^th and 7^th-11^th respondents, at [30].

The following matters are struck out:

the following paragraphs or particulars in the statement of charge filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022, to the extent that they are not summarily dismissed: [13], [14], [16], the particulars at (f)-(h) of [17], [20]-[22] and [26]-[28];

in the further amended notice of motion filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022: all names from paragraph 1A, other than that of Patrick Griffin.

The applicant is to pay 50% of the costs of the 2^nd to 11^th respondents to the further amended notice of motion filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022 with respect to costs incurred to the date of this order.

Pursuant to s 13(1) of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), this matter be listed for further hearing before Kirk JA for review of the suppression order made by this Court on 1 December 2015 (and all subsequent orders varying that order), on a date to be set by the Registrar and in accordance with timetabling directions to be made by him.

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Decision last updated: 27 July 2022

Medium Neutral Citation:	Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal (No 2) [2022] NSWCA 131
Hearing dates:	5 May 2022
Date of orders:	22 July 2022
Decision date:	22 July 2022
Before:	Kirk JA
Decision:	(1) Prayers 4-10 of the applicant’s motion filed on 9 March 2022 are dismissed. (2) The contempt application against the Attorney-General of New South Wales (raised by paragraphs 12 and 14 of the applicant’s motion filed on 9 March 2022 and the accompanying Statement of Charge) is dismissed with costs. (3) The following allegations in the statement of charge filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022 are dismissed: (a) as against Mr McHugh, at [15], and at [13], [14] and [16] (insofar as those three paragraphs are based on the particulars at [13](b) and (l)-(q)); (b) as against Mr Moore, at [23]-[25]; (c) as against Messrs McHugh, Griffin and Cameron and the 4th and 7th-11th respondents, at [29]; (d) as against Messrs McHugh, Griffin and Moore and the 4th and 7th-11th respondents, at [30]. (4) The following matters are struck out: (a) the following paragraphs or particulars in the statement of charge filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022, to the extent that they are not summarily dismissed: [13], [14], [16], the particulars at (f)-(h) of [17], [20]-[22] and [26]-[28]; (b) in the further amended notice of motion filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022: all names from paragraph 1A, other than that of Patrick Griffin. (5) The applicant is to pay 50% of the costs of the 2nd to 11th respondents to the further amended notice of motion filed by the applicant on 15 March 2022 with respect to costs incurred to the date of this order. (6) Pursuant to s 13(1) of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), this matter be listed for further hearing before Kirk JA for review of the suppression order made by this Court on 1 December 2015 (and all subsequent orders varying that order), on a date to be set by the Registrar and in accordance with timetabling directions to be made by him.
Catchwords:	CONTEMPT — alleged breaches of order made under Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) — summary dismissal applications — where contempt application made against barrister who disclosed information potentially in breach of order in course of other proceedings — whether suppression order should be read down to exempt disclosures made in furtherance of the administration of justice — operation of s 15 of Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) — whether defence to contempt charges where breach of court order committed in furtherance of the administration of justice — where Attorney-General was a party to the proceedings in which the suppression order was made — where contempt application also brought against Attorney-General — whether Attorney-General has a duty to enforce suppression order CIVIL PROCEDURE — Registrars — Review of Registrar’s decision — Court of Appeal — where Registrar granted leave to amend notice of motion on condition that various paragraphs be omitted
Legislation Cited:	Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 13, 64 Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 46, 48, 49 and 121(3) Supreme Court Rules, Pt 55 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, rr 4.15, 6.4, 13.4, 49.19(1) and 51.59
Cases Cited:	Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41 Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38; [2013] HCA 7 Attorney General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273 Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station (1986) 161 CLR 98; [1986] HCA 46 Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU [2013] VSC 572 CFMEU v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375; [2015] HCA 21 Collier v Country Women’s Association of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 36 Commonwealth v Kupang Resources Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 77 Dae Boong International Co Pty Ltd v Gray [2009] NSWCA 11 Davy v Garrett (1877) 7 Ch D 473 Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1987) 7 NSWLR 588 Doyle v Commonwealth (1985) 156 CLR 510; [1985] HCA 46 European Asian Bank AG v Wentworth (1986) 5 NSWLR 445 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69 GR v Family and Community Services [2021] NSWSC 39 Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36 Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Timania Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 823; [2005] FCAFC 155 Killen v Lane [1983] 1 NSWLR 171 Kizon v Palmer (1997) 72 FCR 409 Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd (2018) 98 NSWLR 1002; [2018] NSWCA 306 Liristis v Corrective Services NSW (No 4) [2020] NSWSC 147 Magaming v The Queen (2013) 252 CLR 38; [2013] HCA 40 Markisic v Commonwealth of Australia [2006] NSWCA 150 Matthews v ASIC [2009] NSWCA 155 McDonnell v Novello [2006] NSWSC 1186 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v JS and SD [2022] NSWSC 774 New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; [2013] HCA 26 Osborne v R [2014] NSWCCA 17 Penson v Titan National Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 404 Porter v Dyer [2022] FCAFC 116 Singh v State of NSW [2021] NSWCA 260 Skouvakis v Skouvakis [1976] 2 NSWLR 29 Tomko v Palasty (No 2) (2008) 71 NSWLR 61; [2007] NSWCA 369 Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149; [2018] HCA 25 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; [1995] HCA 3 Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWCA 373 Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 1425 Z v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 1943
Texts Cited:	Anne Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales (Federation Press, 2004)
Category:	Procedural rulings
Parties:	Z (applicant in contempt applications) Attorney-General for NSW (applicant in summary dismissal application of 30 March 2022) Michael McHugh, Patrick Griffin, Stewart Cameron, Christopher Moore, Roderick Cameron, David Fischl, Paul Hendriks, Cameron Leaver, Najeh Marhaba, and Quincy Wong (applicants in summary dismissal application of 25 March 2022)
Representation:	Counsel: Z (in person) R J Pietriche (Attorney-General for NSW) K Morgan SC and A Poukchanski (applicants in summary dismissal application of 25 March 2022) Solicitors: Crown Solicitor’s Office (Attorney-General for NSW) Hicksons Lawyers (applicants in summary dismissal application of 25 March 2022)
File Number(s):	2015/00291241
Publication restriction:	Note the suppression order identified at [1] of this judgment.