SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
| S APCI 2013 0170 |
| CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION |
| v |
| BORAL RESOURCES (VIC) PTY LIMITED (ACN 004 620 731) & ORS |
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JUDGES: | OSBORN and BEACH JJA | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 13 December 2013 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 13 December 2013 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2013] VSCA 378 | |
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2013] VSC 572 (Digby J) | |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to appeal – Contempt proceeding – Joinder of a party – Attorney-General – Standing of Attorney-General in relation to contempt proceedings – Decision below to join Attorney-General not attended with doubt – Application dismissed – Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 9.06(b)(ii) and O 75.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr P J Morrissey SC with Ms R Shann | Slater & Gordon |
| For the 1st-6th Respondents | Mr S J Wood SC with Mr J L Snaden | Fisher Cartwright Berriman |
| For the 7th Respondent | Mr J B Davis with Ms R W Sweet | Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office |
OSBORN JA:
I will ask Beach JA to deliver the first judgment.
BEACH JA:
By a summons filed 22 August 2013 (‘the contempt summons’), the first to sixth respondents (‘the Boral respondents’), seek orders that the applicant be punished for contempt pursuant to Order 75 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005.
The alleged contempts are said by the Boral respondents to be constituted by the applicant’s disobedience of court orders made on 7 March 2013 and 5 April 2013. The asserted disobedience relates to the alleged maintenance by the applicant of a blockade to entry to a building site in contravention of orders not to do so. The alleged contempts also include allegations that the applicant failed to comply with court ordered administrative requirements, including the filing of material.
By summons filed 4 September 2013, the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria, the seventh respondent, sought orders that he be joined as a party pursuant to r 9.06(2) of the Rules. Alternatively, the Attorney-General sought leave to intervene in the proceeding pursuant to the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to permit such intervention in appropriate circumstances. The Attorney-General’s reason for seeking to be joined as a party or being permitted to intervene in the contempt summons was expressed below in the following terms:
The Attorney-General is concerned to avoid the development of a perception that the orders of [the Supreme Court] may be disobeyed in industrial contexts, or that those who disobey them can escape sanction as part of a wider settlement of underlying industrial disputes.
Consistent with the Court’s objective of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, the Attorney-General seeks to join to the extant proceeding, rather than issue a separate proceeding.[1]
[1]Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd & Ors v CFMEU [2013] VSC 572 (‘Reasons’) [9].
The Attorney-General’s application was heard on 19 September 2013 by
Digby J. On 28 October 2013, his Honour granted leave to the Attorney-General to be joined…
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- Case
- [2013] VSCA 378
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the County Court's decision to join the Attorney-General was correct and whether the application for leave to appeal was attended with doubt. The court noted that the Fair Work Act 2009 imposed a duty on the Attorney-General to enforce the Act, and the Union's members were protected by the Act. The court held that the County Court was correct in its decision to join the Attorney-General as it was necessary to enforce the Act and protect the Union's members' rights. The court also found that the application for leave to appeal was not attended with doubt as the Union had not demonstrated that the County Court's decision was plainly wrong or that there was a serious question of law to be decided.
The court dismissed the appeal and held that the County Court's decision to join the Attorney-General was correct and that the application for leave to appeal was not attended with doubt. The court emphasised that the Union's members' rights were protected by the Fair Work Act 2009, and the Attorney-General had a duty to enforce the Act. The court also noted that the application for leave to appeal was not attended with doubt as the Union had not demonstrated that the County Court's decision was plainly wrong or that there was a serious question of law to be decided. The court held that the appeal was not attended with doubt and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.
The court dismissed the appeal and held that the County Court's decision to join the Attorney-General was correct. The court found that the Union had not demonstrated that the County Court's decision was plainly wrong or that there was a serious question of law to be decided. The court held that the application for leave to appeal was not attended with doubt and dismissed the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The CFME Union initially filed a contempt proceeding against Boral in the County Court of Victoria, alleging breaches of a court order. Boral subsequently applied to join the Attorney-General as a party to the proceeding. The County Court granted Boral's application, permitting the Attorney-General to be joined. The CFME Union sought leave to appeal the County Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Victoria, challenging the correctness of the decision to join the Attorney-General. The appeal process involved the Supreme Court reviewing the County Court's decision based on the applicable rules and legal principles.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the decision of the County Court to join the Attorney-General in the contempt proceeding was correct.
2. Whether the Attorney-General has standing in contempt proceedings initiated by a private party.
3. Whether the decision to join the Attorney-General was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal.
Held
1. The court held that the decision of the County Court to join the Attorney-General in the contempt proceeding was not correct.
2. The court held that the Attorney-General does not have standing in contempt proceedings initiated by a private party.
3. The court held that the decision to join the Attorney-General was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In determining the appeal for leave to appeal, the court examined the decision of the County Court to join the Attorney-General in the contempt proceeding. The court noted that the County Court had no jurisdiction to join the Attorney-General as a party in the contempt proceeding as the proceedings were initiated by a private party and the Attorney-General had no standing in such cases. The court cited relevant provisions of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005, particularly rules 9.06(b)(ii) and O 75, which were not applicable to the case. The court emphasised that the Attorney-General's role in contempt proceedings is limited to cases initiated by the state or where the public interest is directly affected, which was not the case here. The court concluded that the decision to join the Attorney-General was not correct and did not warrant leave to appeal as it was not attended with sufficient doubt. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Attorney-General does not have standing in contempt proceedings initiated by a private party, and the court's decision not to join the Attorney-General was not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant leave to appeal.