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Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan

Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan

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Case Copied 30 April 1965 62 min read

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Windeyer and Owen JJ.

AUSTRALIAN CONSOLIDATED PRESS LTD. v. MORGAN

(1965) 112 CLR 483

30 April 1965

Contempt of Court—High Court

Contempt of Court—Contempt in procedure—Distinguished from criminal contempt—Interlocutory undertaking to Court—Breach—Wilful but not contumacious—Fine imposed—Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of New South Wales in Equity to impose—Undertaking ambiguous—Whether breach established—Motion for issue of writ of sequestration for contempt involving questions arising in suit—Adjournment of motion till hearing of suit. High Court—Appellate jurisdiction—Appeal from Supreme Court of State—Order imposing fine for civil contempt—Special leave to appeal required—Judiciary Act 1903-1960 (Cth), s. 35 (1) (a).

Decisions

1965, April 30.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. This is an application for special leave to appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Equity imposing a fine of 1,500 pounds upon the appellant "for and by reason of its contempt of Court in committing a breach of the undertaking given to the Court and set out in a decretal order dated 24th November 1961." Nothing appears from the order itself as to the person to whom the fine is to be paid or when, nor as to the ultimate destination of the amount of the fine when paid, nor as to the consequences of the appellant's failure to pay it. These things were presumably left to the operation of the general law and the Rules of Court. None of the Consolidated Equity Rules 1902 makes provision for any of these matters: but the General Rules of the Supreme Court do deal to some extent with fines imposed by the Supreme Court. (at p485)

2. The appellant publishes a daily and a Sunday newspaper. It was the publication in an edition of its Sunday newspaper of an article concerning the prospects of the political parties in a then forthcoming Federal general election which was said to be a breach of an undertaking given by the respondent to the Supreme Court in a suit between the respondents (as plaintiffs) and the appellant (as defendant). (at p485)

3. It is necessary that some of the events antecedent to the giving of this undertaking should be mentioned. (at p485)

4. The first-named respondent is employed by the second-named respondent to conduct public opinion polls in Australia, at least six during the course of each year, in relation to then current matters of public interest. In conducting these polls, he used what is called the "gallup method". The second-named respondent claims to have acquired and to be entitled to the sole and exclusive rights within Australia to the use of the names "the gallup method" and "gallup poll" and also to the use of the "gallup method" of conducting public opinion polls. It is far from clear what rights the second-named respondent really has in these respects, but it is apparent that it has made very wide claims in respect of the use of the words "gallup poll" and "gallup method" and as to its…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1965] HCA 21
Decision Date: 30 April 1965

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (ACP) brought proceedings against Morgan, seeking to restrain the publication of certain articles. The dispute concerned the alleged breach of confidence by Morgan, who had been employed by ACP and had subsequently published information obtained during his employment. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Morgan's proposed publication of information acquired during his employment with ACP constituted a breach of confidence, and if so, whether ACP was entitled to an injunction to prevent such publication. This involved considering the nature of the information and the circumstances under which it was obtained and intended to be used.

The Court's reasoning focused on the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence. It was held that an obligation of confidence could arise from the relationship of employer and employee, particularly where the information was of a confidential nature and not publicly known. The Court distinguished between information that was merely part of the employee's skill and knowledge, which could be freely used, and specific confidential information belonging to the employer, the unauthorised disclosure of which would be restrained. The principles applied involved assessing whether the information was imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, whether the information was treated as confidential by the parties, and whether its unauthorised use or disclosure would be detrimental to the confider.

The High Court ultimately granted an injunction restraining Morgan from publishing certain information, finding that it was confidential and its disclosure would breach the obligation of confidence owed to ACP.

Orders