Kelly v Hilton [No 6] - [2025] WASC 43

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   KELLY -v- HILTON [No 6] [2025] WASC 43
CORAM:   SEAWARD J
HEARD:   10 DECEMBER 2024
DELIVERED          :   14 FEBRUARY 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 2228 of 2020
BETWEEN:   ALLAN JOHN KELLY
First Plaintiff
ALLAN JOHN KELLY AS TRUSTEE FOR THE KELLY FAMILY TRUST
Second Plaintiff
XGS PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE KELLY SUPERANNUATION FUND
Third Plaintiff
DEBNAL PTY LTD
Fourth Plaintiff
AND
JOHN CHARLES HILTON
Defendant

Catchwords:

Contempt - Contempt of court - Communication of documents provided under compulsion to regulatory authorities and third parties - Breach of Harman undertaking - Penalty - Appropriate penalty - Purge application

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 55 r 4, r 7, r 8
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 16
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6

Result:

Plaintiff to pay a total fine of $30,000

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Plaintiff	:	S B Nadilo
Second Plaintiff	:	S B Nadilo
Third Plaintiff	:	S B Nadilo
Fourth Plaintiff	:	S B Nadilo
Defendant	:	D J Pratt

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff	:	HHG Legal Group
Second Plaintiff	:	HHG Legal Group
Third Plaintiff	:	HHG Legal Group
Fourth Plaintiff	:	HHG Legal Group
Defendant	:	Bennett

Cases referred to in decision:

Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84; (2012) 42 WAR 425
Attorney General v Morrison [No 3] [2022] WASC 323
Circuit Finance Australia v Sobbi [2010] NSWSC 912
CJ v Flintshire Borough Council [2010] ECWA Civ 393
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 13; (2003) 196 ALR 350
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 21; (2015) 256 CLR 375
Dental Board of Australia v Traianou [2011] WASC 293
Gap Constructions Pty Ltd v Vigar Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1061
Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316
Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (Unreported, BC9803318, 16 July 1998)
Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v DFD Rhodes Pty Ltd [No 2] [2023] WASCA 108
Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90
Kelly v Hilton [No 5] [2024] WASC 343
Khoury v Kirwan (No 4) [2021] VSC 333
Pacific Basin Exploration Pty Ltd v XLX (NL) [1985] WAR 11; (1984) 2 IPR 489
Peterson v Ceccon [2023] WASC 488
Peterson v Ceccon [No 2] [2024] WASC 387
Porter v Steinberg [No 2] [2019] WASC 473
R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77
State of Western Australia v Rayapen [2023] WASCA 55
The State of Western Australia v Galati [No 4] [2017] WASC 162
United Telecasters Sydney Ltd v Hardy (1991) 23 NSWLR 323
Wood v Staunton [No 5] (1996) 86 A Crim R 183
Yap v Matic [No 7] [2023] WASC 55

SEAWARD J:

Introduction

In Kelly v Hilton [No 5] (liability reasons),[1] I considered two applications regarding the conduct of Mr Allan John Kelly in the substantive proceedings commenced by him against Mr John Charles Hilton:
(1)A notice of motion for committal of Mr Kelly for criminal contempt of court pursuant to O 55 r 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) (Committal motion); and
(2)A chamber summons filed by Mr Kelly for orders dealing with the breaches of the implied (Harman) undertaking (Purge application).
[1] Kelly v Hilton [No 5] [2024] WASC 343.
The two applications arose following the communication by Mr Kelly to third parties of documents and information obtained by him in the course of the ordinary compulsory processes of the court and information disclosed during a court ordered mediation conference.
In my liability reasons published on 19 September 2024, I made findings that Mr Kelly:
(a)committed criminal contempt in the form of 12 contumacious breaches of the Harman undertaking as alleged in charges 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15 of the Committal motion;[2]
(b)committed a civil contempt by sending an email which revealed communications between Mr Hilton and Mr Kelly during a court ordered mediation conference as alleged in charge 16 of the Committal motion; and
(c)committed civil contempt in the form of four further breaches of the Harman undertaking as particularised in items 6A, 6C, 6D and 6F of the Purge application.
[2] See Schedule 1 of Kelly v Hilton [No 5] [2024] WASC 343 for the particulars of each charge.
In those reasons, I indicated that I would hear further from the parties in relation to whether Mr Kelly has purged each contempt or, alternatively, the appropriate penalty for each contempt.

Legal principles

Penalty for contempt

This court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt is conferred by s 16(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA). The applicable penalty for contempt is provided for by O 55 r 7 and r 8 of the RSC which provide:
7. Punishing contemnors
(1) The Court may punish contempt of court by committal of the contemnor to prison, or by imposing a fine on him, or by both committal and fine.
(2) When the Court imposes a fine, it may order that the contemnor be imprisoned, or further imprisoned, until the fine is paid.
(3) Where the contemnor is a corporation the Court may punish contempt of court by sequestration, or fine or both.
(4) An order of committal may be in Form No. 66.
8. Execution of committal order may be suspended
The Court making an order of committal may by order direct that the execution of the order of committal shall be suspended for such period or on such terms or conditions as the Court thinks fit.
The determination of the appropriate punishment for contempt is entirely a matter falling within the discretion of the court.[3] In accordance with O 55 r 7, there is no maximum penalty.[4]
[3] Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84; (2012) 42 WAR 425 [215].
[4] Peterson v Ceccon [2023] WASC 488 [31]; Dental Board of Australia v Traianou [2011] WASC 293 [39].
The cardinal feature of the power to punish for contempt is that it is an exercise of judicial power by the courts to protect the due administration of justice.[5] The importance of contempt cases transcends each individual case because they support and enhance the integrity of judicial proceedings in general.[6]
[5] Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 21; (2015) 256 CLR 375 [41].
[6] Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90 [97].
The provisions of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (Sentencing Act) do not apply to or in respect of a person being punished by a court for contempt of court,[7] and therefore a sentence of imprisonment of six months or less is an available sentencing option.[8]
[7] Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 3(3)(a).
[8] Peterson v Ceccon [2023] WASC 488 [102]; Peterson v Ceccon [No 2] [2024] WASC 387 [36].
However, it is appropriate to have regard to the general principles set out in s 6 of the Sentencing Act. In particular, the punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the conduct and should not be manifestly excessive.[9]
[9] Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84; (2012) 42 WAR 425 [218] and [251].
Further, imprisonment should not be imposed unless the seriousness of the conduct is such that imprisonment is the only appropriate disposition.[10] If imposing a fine, the court should take into account the capacity of the contemnor to pay.[11] In assessing an appropriate fine, the court may take into account the financial impact of an adverse costs order on the contemnor. In some cases, an order for costs may be a sufficient penalty.[12]
[10] Peterson v Ceccon [2023] WASC 488 [36] ‑ [37]; Peterson v Ceccon [No 2] [2024] WASC 387 [37].
[11] Circuit Finance Australia v Sobbi [2010] NSWSC 912 [8].
[12] The State of Western Australia v Galati [No 4] [2017] WASC 162 [37]; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 13; (2003) 196 ALR 350 [7] ‑ [13].
It is also appropriate to have regard to the factors that are ordinarily relevant to the punishment of criminal offences. Whilst there is no closed list of factors that are relevant, the Full Court of the Federal Court in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California)[13] endorsed the following non‑exhaustive list of factors that may be relevant in any given case:
[13] Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90 [101] ‑ [102]. See also the factors outline by Tottle J in The State of Western Australia v Galati [No 4] [2017] WASC 162 [34], citing Wood v Staunton [No 5] (1996) 86 A Crim R 183, 185.
(1)the seriousness of the contempt proved;
(2)the contemnor's culpability;
(3)the reason or motive for the contempt;
(4)whether the contemnor received, or tried to receive, a benefit from the contempt;
(5)whether there has been any expression of genuine contrition by the contemnor;
(6)the character and antecedents of the contemnor;
(7)the contemnor's personal circumstances;
(8)personal and general deterrence; and
(9)the need for denunciation of contemptuous conduct.
It is also relevant to consider whether the contempt was admitted.[14]
[14] Peterson v Ceccon [2023] WASC 488 [42].
Whilst it is relevant to have regard to the range of penalties customarily imposed in similar cases, the variation in the facts and circumstances giving rise to contempt means there is no tariff or sentencing range,[15] and it is difficult to discern any substantial pattern which could provide a 'meaningful yardstick' or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing.[16]
[15] Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84; (2012) 42 WAR 425 [251].
[16] Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90 [118]; Porter v Steinberg [No 2] [2019] WASC 473 [37].
In a case such as the present where the contemnor has committed multiple counts of contempt, the court may impose a global penalty, or may impose individual penalties for each charge. However, the imposition of a global penalty should not lead to a different total sentence than would be arrived at by imposing individual penalties for discrete charges and then applying the totality principle by ordering the penalties to be served cumulatively or concurrently. If a global penalty is imposed, the court must impose a sentence that is proportionate to the criminality involved in the offending considered as a whole, having regard to all of the circumstances, including those personal to the contemnor.[17]

The Purge application

[17] R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77 [80] - [81] and [86].

The present case does not simply involve a committal for contempt, there is also Mr Kelly's Purge application. All of the charges the subject of the Committal motion of which Mr Kelly was convicted are also the subject of the Purge application. There are also four additional civil breaches of the Harman undertaking which fall within the scope of the Purge application only.
Wilson LJ in CJ v Flintshire Borough Council described the action of purging a contempt as follows:[18]
To purge a contempt would in my view ordinarily mean to atone for a contempt, eradicate it or cleanse it of its previous ill-effect.
[18] CJ v Flintshire Borough Council [2010] ECWA Civ 393 [6].
However, Wilson LJ went on to observe that this description of the concept of purging contempt fits more comfortably with a contempt involving a breach of a mandatory order to do an act, as opposed to a breach of a prohibitory order.
Whilst there are conceptual differences between purging each type of contempt, I respectfully agree with the conclusions expressed by Professor Rolph as to whether both types of contempt should be able to be purged:[19]
[T]he better view is that all forms of contempt should be able to be purged. What constitutes sufficient purging will depend upon the particular circumstances of the given contempt. A contemnor should be encouraged so far as possible to comply with his or her legal obligations or to undo the consequences of his or her contempt. Adopting this approach to purging contempt would seem to further the end of promoting respect for the administration of justice.
[19] Rolph D, Contempt (Federation Press, 2023) 813.
The authorities refer to various steps a contemnor will ordinarily be required to take in order to purge their contempt. These include expressing a genuine an unreserved apology; offering to pay compensation for any damages suffered and offering to pay the costs of the contempt proceedings, usually on an indemnity basis.[20]
[20] See United Telecasters Sydney Ltd v Hardy (1991) 23 NSWLR 323, 340; Khoury v Kirwan (No 4) [2021] VSC 333 [112] and the authorities cited therein.
However, none of the authorities provide that if one or more of these steps are taken that the contempt is automatically purged. It remains for the court to consider whether the contempt has been purged and the contemnor should be discharged without further penalty. The question of whether a contempt has been purged will depend upon all of the circumstances of the case. It may be that the court considers that additional steps are required to purge the contempt, or that the circumstances require the imposition of an additional penalty on the contemnor on the basis that the contemnor has not suffered punishment proportionate to the contempt.
There is a significant degree of overlap between the facts and circumstances relevant to imposing a penalty on a contemnor and considering whether the contemnor has purged their contempt. This is unsurprising given the task in each case involves a consideration of the contempt in the context of its circumstances, including matters personal to the contemnor. In addition to the factors referred to above in the context of determining the appropriate penalty for a contempt, it may also be relevant to consider the extent of the steps taken by the contemnor to purge the contempt.[21]
[21] See also CJ v Flintshire Borough Council [2010] ECWA Civ 393 [21].

Orders sought and questions to be determined

In the Committal motion, Mr Hilton seeks the following orders:[22]
[22] See First defendant's minute of proposed orders dated 24 October 2024.
1.[Mr Kelly] be committed to prison or otherwise be dealt with in such manner as this Honourable Court may direct for contempt of this Honourable Court and interfering with the due administration of justice by reason of his conduct as set out in orders 1 to 17 of the orders of the Honourable Justice Seaward made 19 September 2024.
2.Within 7 days of the making of these orders, [Mr Kelly] provide a copy of:
2.1the Court's reasons for decision in Kelly v Hilton [No 5] [2024] WASC 343;
2.2the orders of the Honourable Justice Seaward made on 19 September 2024;
2.3the Court's reasons for decision as to penalty and any orders of the court in relation to penalty,
to the following entities or individuals:
2.4the Australian Securities Exchange Ltd (ASX);
2.5the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC);
2.6the Western Australia Police Force (WAPOL);
2.7Mr Heng Pheng (Mr Pheng); and
2.8Mr Jay Klopper (Mr Klopper).
3.[Mr Kelly] pay [Mr Hilton's] costs of and incidental to the defendant's Notice of Motion for Committal of [Mr Kelly] for criminal contempt of court pursuant to Order 55 rule 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) and of [Mr Kelly]'s Chamber Summons for orders dealing with breaches of the implied undertaking together with all reserved costs on an indemnity basis, such costs to be assessed if not agreed, and paid forthwith.
4.The proceedings be stayed until such costs are paid.
In the Purge application, Mr Kelly seeks orders that he:
(a)be discharged from punishment for his breach of the implied undertaking and that he pay Mr Hilton's costs of and incidental to the Purge application on an indemnity basis, to be assessed if not agreed; or alternatively
(b)be punished for his breach of the implied undertaking by way of an order that he pay Mr Hilton's costs of and incidental to this application on an indemnity basis, to be assessed if not agreed; and
(c)such further orders or relief as the court sees fit.
The issue which arises is whether Mr Kelly has sufficiently purged each contempt such that no further penalty should be imposed on him other than those set out in Mr Kelly's proposed orders. If I am not satisfied that Mr Kelly has sufficiently purged each contempt, it will be necessary for me to consider what is an appropriate penalty to impose for each contempt.
As can be seen from the respective orders sought, Mr Hilton's position is that Mr Kelly has not sufficiently purged the contempts, and seeks orders over and above those proposed by Mr Kelly.
By way of overview, Mr Kelly submits that prison is not an appropriate sentence in the present case. Mr Kelly does not object to order 2 as proposed by Mr Hilton, save for some clarifications or amendments to address Mr Kelly providing the documents via his solicitors. There is no objection to this from Mr Hilton. Finally, Mr Kelly objects to the entire proceedings being stayed pending the payment of costs.
In order to resolve this issue, it is necessary to have regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, which includes all of the matters which are relevant to considering the appropriate penalty to be imposed for each contempt. It will also be relevant to consider the fact that Mr Kelly has made an application to purge the contempts, and the content and scope of that application.
The balance of my reasons considers the relevant facts and circumstances, before expressing a conclusion as to whether Mr Kelly has sufficiently purged the contempts, or whether an additional penalty should be imposed, and if so, what that penalty will be.

Seriousness of the contempt and Mr Kelly's culpability

Mr Kelly's actions in breaching the Harman undertaking were objectively serious. Full details of the content and nature of the disclosures constituting the breaches are contained in my liability reasons published on 19 September 2024.
Mr Kelly committed a total of 16 breaches of the Harman undertaking, 12 of which were deliberately defiant, and therefore contumacious breaches. The four civil breaches of the Harman undertaking are necessarily less serious than the contumacious breaches.
Mr Kelly's breaches were not a 'one off' breach, but rather a sustained course of conduct committed over a period of approximately one year, with the majority of the breaches occurring in the four‑month period between July 2022 and October 2022. They involved disclosures to five different regulatory authorities or individuals.
Mr Kelly was aware of the requirements of the Harman undertaking from 22 February 2021, including that the undertaking applied to regulatory authorities, and made two applications in the substantive proceedings to be released from the Harman undertaking, the first application on 28 May 2021 and the second application on 25 October 2022. Nine of the breaches of the Harman undertaking occurred at or around the time of the second application.
Many of the disclosures underpinning the breaches consisted of communications concerning the same discovered documents, the most relevant being the MME Letter and the Draft Terms Sheet. Some of the communications were also in similar terms, see for example, the communications to the regulatory authorities the subject of charges 3 and 4. Some of the communications were sent around the same time as other communications. See, for example, the four communications to Mr Pheng and Mr Klopper the subject of charges 7 ‑ 10 and the communication to the WA Police the subject of charge 11, which were all sent on the same day.

Mr Kelly's breach of the confidentiality requirements of the court ordered mediation conference was also serious, notwithstanding my conclusion that such a breach is a civil contempt. Mr Kelly was aware of those requirements and yet proceeded to disclose details of what Mr Hilton said during the mediation conference to the WA Police.
Mr Kelly accepts that the nature of the contempts are very serious. However, Mr Kelly also draws attention to the following mitigatory factors which are relevant to the assessment of the seriousness of the contempts, and their overall context. First, the disclosures were private disclosures and not disclosures in the public domain or to the public at large. Mr Kelly did not ridicule or embarrass Mr Hilton in the public domain. Secondly, in my liability reasons of 19 September 2024, I found that Mr Kelly was not motivated so as to interfere with the administration of justice. Further, to the extent that the disclosures were to the regulatory authorities, such communications are not necessarily improper, provided a release from the Harman undertaking is first obtained. Thirdly, there is no evidence before the court of the disclosures having any impact on Mr Hilton or the issues to be determined in the substantive proceedings, save as to the costs incurred by Mr Hilton.

Reasons or motive for the contempt

Mr Kelly submits that the findings made in my liability reasons of 19 September 2024 regarding his motives and state of mind are mitigatory factors, which whilst not excusing his behaviour are nonetheless relevant.
Mr Kelly has identified a number of different paragraphs of my liability reasons in his written submissions in support of this proposition.[23] It is not necessary to set each out in detail here, but I have considered those identified. Most significantly, Mr Kelly refers to my findings concerning Mr Kelly' strongly held belief that he had been wronged by Mr Hilton; that he was not believed by the board of Riversgold Limited (Riversgold) and the regulatory authorities; his general anger and frustration at his position; and his desire for vindication.
[23] Reasons [167], [195], [205] - [206], [223], [225] and [276].
Mr Kelly also relies on my finding that his actions in communicating with the regulatory authorities was for the purposes of seeking to have the authorities investigate and take some form of action against Riversgold and Mr Hilton. Importantly, Mr Kelly relies on my findings that his disclosures were not for the purposes of an interference with the administration of justice.
Mr Hilton also refers to various paragraphs of my liability reasons dated 19 September 2024.[24] Again, it is not necessary to set all out in detail, but I have considered those identified.
[24] Reasons [101], [106], [110], [114], [178], [181], [193], [206] - [208], [213], [222] - [223], [244], [304], [306] - [307].
In addition to the matters identified by Mr Kelly, Mr Hilton draws attention to my findings that, in relation to the communications with Mr Pheng and Mr Klopper, that Mr Kelly knew they were potential witnesses; was angry and frustrated with them; that he wanted them to know what he had learned from the discovery process; and that his message to them read as someone boasting that he now knew the true position.
Mr Hilton submits that these motives are not mitigatory and do not diminish the significance of Mr Kelly's conduct. Rather, Mr Hilton submits that the court should conclude that Mr Kelly made a calculated decision to make disclosures in breach of the Harman undertaking to further his own objectives, and should be liable to a serious penalty, including imprisonment.

Whether Mr Kelly has received a benefit from the contempt

Mr Kelly submits that he has not gained any benefit, financial or otherwise, from the disclosures of confidential information underpinning each contempt. There is no evidence to the contrary and I accept the submission.

Whether there has been any expression of genuine contrition and remorse

The importance and relevance of remorse in the sentencing process was outlined by the Court of Appeal in State of Western Australia v Rayapen as follows:[25]
139 Remorse is, as the authorities make clear, an important element in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. Not only does it enhance the prospects of rehabilitation and reduce the need for specific deterrence, demonstrable remorse can also have a significant restorative effect on victims of crime, by the clear and unambiguous recognition by an offender of the wrong that the offender has done to the victim or victims of their offending and of the harm done to those victims.
140 While an important sentencing consideration, remorse nevertheless remains a sometimes elusive concept, and does not lend itself to easy definition. As Thomas à Kempis said, 'I would far rather feel remorse than know how to define it'.
141 Remorse is not to be equated with an offender's regret over the consequences for themselves and their non-victim family members (including any consequences for themselves under the criminal law) of their actions. It is, rather, the genuine regret for the wrong itself, penitence and contrition for that wrong and a desire to atone. …
142 Being a matter relating to the moral conscience of the offender, remorse is not something that can be directly perceived by a court. Rather, a finding that an offender is remorseful, and the degree to which the offender is remorseful, are matters that must be inferred from other facts, including the words and conduct of the offender. The offender bears the onus of establishing remorse on the balance of probabilities.
(citations omitted)
[25] State of Western Australia v Rayapen [2023] WASCA 55 [139] ‑ [142].
Mr Kelly has expressed contrition and remorse in two ways.
First, by bringing the Purge application. In so doing, Mr Kelly has admitted to the instances of civil contempt particularised in the application. However, the admissions by Mr Kelly did not occur at an early stage in the factual history of this matter. Mr Kelly initially denied, to his own lawyers, that he had engaged in the disclosures. Mr Kelly only made his first admissions after subpoenas had been issued and documents obtained. The admissions themselves, and the subsequent commencement of the Purge application, occurred only when the breaches had been clearly uncovered. However, Mr Kelly did go on in the Purge application to identify additional instances of breaches of the Harman undertaking, or possible breaches. Whilst Mr Kelly filed two affidavits outlining these instances, I did not find that Mr Kelly had been less than full and frank in so doing.
Secondly, Mr Kelly has offered an apology to the court and Mr Hilton and expressed his remorse. Mr Kelly has apologised as follows:
(a)In his supplementary affidavit sworn on 14 April 2023:
109. I unreservedly apologise for my actions in using documents and information which I have obtained in these proceedings in the manner in which I describe above.
110. I did not intend to show any contempt to the court. I acted rashly, out of anger and frustration. I say that only to explain my conduct: I accept it does not excuse my conduct.
111. I would be happy to write to each person I have mentioned above regarding their use of the documents or information which I provided to them but I have not taken such steps yet because I consider that it may not be appropriate for me to do so without the express sanction of the Court.
112. I respectfully seek to purge that contempt by seeking the forgiveness of the Court and satisfying any sanction the Court seeks to impose.
(b)In his supplementary affidavit sworn on 26 October 2023:
72.With respect to all of my breaches of the implied undertaking referred to in my First Affidavit and in this affidavit, I meant no disrespect to the Court and unreservedly apologise for my action.
(c)In his affidavit sworn on 20 November 2024 for the purposes of the penalty hearing:
6. I deeply regret and apologise unreservedly to the Court, to Mr Hilton, and to any other person affected for my conduct giving rise to the civil and criminal contempts found by this Court in the Decision. I accept the Court's findings, and I humbly seek to purge my contempt by my application filed on 14 April 2023.
7. I have deep regret and remorse for my decisions made in contempt of this Court, to communicate in the way that I did with the various third parties.
8. I wish to make good any harm caused by my communications which were found to have constituted my contempts.
The question which arises is the genuineness of these apologies. Mr Hilton submits that the court should not accept Mr Kelly's apologies as being a genuine expression of remorse for the following reasons:
(a)Mr Kelly initially only apologised to the court for the contempts, and not to Mr Hilton. Mr Kelly only apologised to Mr Hilton in his affidavit on 20 November 2024. Mr Hilton submits that this indicates that Mr Kelly remains of the view that his actions were justified;
(b)Mr Kelly has not made any voluntary attempt to ameliorate or reduce the effect of his breaches of the Harman obligation; and
(c)the court should be sceptical of the sincerity of Mr Kelly's apology in circumstances where he has a history of not being truthful with his own lawyers and not providing full and frank answers. Mr Hilton submits that Mr Kelly has demonstrated a history of being prepared to lie or obfuscate to minimise or avoid the consequences of his actions.
Mr Kelly submits that the court should accept his expressions of remorse as genuine both from his evidence and his conduct. In terms of his conduct, Mr Kelly refers to his bringing of the Purge application, which identified a number of additional breaches or possible breaches of the Harman undertaking over and above those contained in the Committal motion. Mr Kelly has, as part of the Purge application, sought an order that he pay Mr Hilton's costs on an indemnity basis. Mr Kelly submits that this is a tangible manifestation of a contemnor coming to the court and wishing to repent for what they have done.
Mr Kelly submits that he has also admitted the underling conduct the subject of the Committal motion and agreed that he is to pay Mr Hilton's costs of the Committal motion on an indemnity basis. To the extent aspects of the Committal motion were not accepted, they concerned whether some disclosures were for a purpose associated with the litigation and whether the conduct was contumacious in nature.
Mr Kelly also submits that he has not consistently failed to apologise to Mr Hilton and refers to the broad scope of the apologies above. In the alternative, Mr Kelly submits that any failure to apologise to Mr Hilton (if that is how the apologies are construed) does not lead to a conclusion that Mr Kelly remains of the view that his actions were justified. Mr Kelly has accepted in his affidavit evidence that there is no excuse for his actions.
Finally, Mr Kelly submits that no adverse inference should be drawn from his failure to ameliorate or reduce the effects of his conduct. Mr Kelly deposed as follows in his affidavit sworn 14 April 2023:
111I would be happy to write to each person I have mentioned above regarding their use of the documents or information which I provided to them but I have not taken such steps yet because I consider that it may not be appropriate for me to do so without the express sanction of the Court.
I am satisfied that Mr Kelly's expression of remorse and contrition is genuine. I form this view, notwithstanding my previous conclusions as to Mr Kelly's credit, on the basis of his actions in commencing the Purge application and the nature and scope of it and the orders sought. I am satisfied that subsequent to committing the contempts, Mr Kelly has accepted and reflected on the full gravity of his offending, and has offered a genuine, albeit late, apology for his actions.
I also accept that Mr Kelly has offered a sufficiently fulsome apology for his actions. Whilst the initial wording of that apology was directed to the court, that is not necessarily an indication that Mr Kelly considered his actions to be justified. The Harman undertaking is a substantive obligation owed to the court. An apology directed to the court is one which addresses the failure by Mr Kelly. Following cross‑examination of Mr Kelly, where the lack of a specific reference to Mr Hilton in the apology was identified, Mr Kelly offered an apology to Mr Hilton specifically.
However, I accept that all of Mr Kelly's apologies, like the Purge application itself, only occurred after the question of the breach of the Harman undertaking was raised with Mr Kelly, and Mr Kelly denied any breaches. Mr Kelly's apology, no matter how genuine, was delayed and occurred only after clear evidence of the breaches were discovered.

Mr Kelly's character, antecedents and personal circumstances

Mr Kelly is 56 years old and is presently the Executive Chairman of Miramar Resources Ltd, a company he founded in 2019 and which listed on the ASX in October 2020.
Mr Kelly is an experienced geologist, having obtained his undergraduate university qualifications in 1993 ‑ 1994. Mr Kelly also has graduate qualifications in brewing and distilling. Mr Kelly has a history of managing numerous business and companies in the exploration, mining, hospitality and tourism industries.
Mr Kelly has two dependents, being his wife who has chronic health issues and who works casually, and his 19 year old son who also has health issues. Both dependents have limited to no ability to increase their earning capacity in the short term.
Mr Kelly suffers from ongoing depression, and his capacity to manage his mental health has worsened since the commencement of these applications.
Mr Kelly accepts that he should pay Mr Hilton's costs of the Committal motion and the Purge application on an indemnity basis. Mr Kelly's own legal costs of both applications is in the order of $465,000 (up to the date of publication of my liability reasons on 19 September 2024). Mr Kelly has funded these costs to date from drawing down on his saving and selling assets. Mr Kelly has obtained an estimate of Mr Hilton's costs, which are in the order of $300,000.
Mr Kelly has provided information in his affidavits regarding his income, assets and liabilities. I will not set out those details here. Mr Kelly submits that he expects to have to sell his family home in order to be able to meet any adverse costs order and/or financial penalty imposed upon him. This would leave Mr Kelly with one asset, being a property which is currently rented.
Mr Hilton submits that the court should be cautious about placing any significant weight on Mr Kelly's affidavit evidence regarding his financial position. Mr Hilton submits that Mr Kelly has not provided a full and frank explanation of current income, assets and liabilities, and in his written submissions goes on to identify a number of alleged deficiencies.
Following the receipt of Mr Hilton's written submissions to this effect, Mr Kelly filed additional affidavit evidence, without accepting the criticism made by Mr Hilton.
I do not accept the criticisms of Mr Kelly's evidence in this regard. The relevance of Mr Kelly's financial circumstances to the present task concerns the ability of Mr Kelly to pay any fine imposed and also the broader consequences for Mr Kelly as a result of his actions. There is no requirement that providing financial information in this context requires the level of detail to descend to providing a complete account of every aspect of Mr Kelly's financial circumstances. It is not a means enquiry. Mr Kelly provided his information in sufficient detail for the present purposes. Further, Mr Kelly has provided additional evidence regarding his financial circumstances, which does not change the fundamental submission made by Mr Kelly, which is as to how he will pay any fine and legal costs incurred.
Mr Kelly has no prior convictions for or findings of contempt. Mr Kelly has no prior criminal record at all.
Mr Kelly has filed four character references with the court. It is not necessary to set out the contents of these character references in detail. It is sufficient to observe that each have known Mr Kelly for some time, including prior to Mr Kelly's involvement with Mr Hilton. All the character references refer to Mr Kelly's past business and personal activities and each express the opinion that Mr Kelly's conduct is out of character for him.
I accept that Mr Kelly's conduct in breaching the Harman undertaking and disclosing information from the court ordered mediation conference is out of character.

Personal and general deterrence and the need for denunciation

The nature of the contempt committed by Mr Kelly is such that there is a need for both personal and general deterrence.
Turning to general deterrence, the Harman undertaking serves an important role and function in the context of litigation. As outlined by the Court of Appeal in Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v DFD Rhodes Pty Ltd [No 2]:[26]
Discovery and other compulsory process of the court serve the interests of justice. They are procedural measures made available to litigants to better attain justice according to law. For example, full and proper discovery assists the court to determine a case fairly so far as the disclosure of documents ensures that the truth emerges and that justice is done as between the parties; it also encourages settlement and the narrowing of issues. But, while serving the interests of justice, discovery and other compulsory process of the court are an incursion of privacy and confidentiality. In this respect the authorities have acknowledged a general right to privacy - there is, ordinarily, a right to keep one's own documents and information to oneself. The Harman obligation ameliorates the interference with privacy and confidentiality by providing a safeguard as to the use that may be made of documents or information obtained by compulsion through court process, thereby limiting the interference to what is required 'for the purpose of securing that justice is done.' In this way the Harman obligation promotes the efficacy of the compulsory process of the court so as to achieve justice.
So understood the Harman obligation is itself grounded in and exists to serve the interests of justice.
(citations omitted)
[26] Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v DFD Rhodes Pty Ltd [No 2] [2023] WASCA 108[69] ‑ [70].
The Harman undertaking therefore serves the important purpose of providing the balance and protection needed to ensure the efficacy of the compulsory processes of the court so as to achieve justice according to law in the proceedings.
It is essential to the administration of justice that parties to litigation, and all those bound by the undertaking, observe and comply with it. A failure to do so risks undermining those processes in the context of both the specific litigation in question and also the broader administration of justice.
Likewise, the confidentiality requirements contained in s 71 of the Supreme Court Act1935 (WA) regarding court ordered mediation conferences serve an essential purpose in the administration of justice. The ability for parties and their lawyers to speak freely and frankly in a mediation conference is an essential part of the mediation process and encourages parties to attempt to resolve their civil disputes without the associated cost and time of a trial for both the parties and the resources of the court. The disclosure of confidential information from such a conference has the potential to undermine the utility of mediation conferences in the substantive matter and the administration of justice more broadly.

Firm denunciation of Mr Kelly's conduct by the court is appropriate.
Mr Kelly accepts there is a need for general deterrence.
It is also relevant that the finalisation of this matter act as a personal deterrent to Mr Kelly.
I have found that Mr Kelly engaged in a total of 17 instances of contempt - 16 of which constitute breaches of the Harman undertaking. However, I am of the view that the likelihood of Mr Kelly engaging in this behaviour again is minimal. The conduct is not ongoing, and Mr Kelly has deposed that he will take steps ensure that he does not act contrary to any court orders and undertakings again the future and that he keeps confidential anything said in any future mediation conferences. Mr Kelly's actions have resulted in him incurring substantial costs; findings of contempt being made against him and published, including findings of criminal contempt; and have also resulted in the delay of his substantive action against Mr Hilton. Therefore, whilst I consider there is a need for personal deterrence, it is less significant than the need for general deterrence in this case.

Comparable cases

The parties have referred the court to a number of cases in which courts have considered and imposed a penalty for contempt involving a breach of the Harman undertaking. As the parties accepted, owing to the variety of facts and circumstances, these cases are of varying assistance in terms of comparable cases.
The cases that are of most relevance to the present proceedings are Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell[27]and Pacific Basin Exploration Pty Ltd v XLX (NL).[28]
[27] Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (Unreported, BC9803318, 16 July 1998) (see also the related case of Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316.
[28] Pacific Basin Exploration Pty Ltd v XLX (NL) [1985] WAR 11; (1984) 2 IPR 489.
In Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell, an industrial advocate and his associated union published and used five documents in breach of the Harman undertaking. The breaches consisted of providing information from discovered documents obtained by the contemnors in the course of litigation commenced by Hamersley Iron regarding an industrial dispute. The contemnors provided the information to a number of media outlets; union members and employees of the plaintiff; the Chief Commissioner of the Industrial Relations Commission; and the President of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission. The court found that the purpose of the disclosures was to publicly ridicule and condemn the plaintiff, to place pressure on the plaintiff in relation to the substantive litigation and to intimidate witnesses. The court also found that the disclosures tended to interfere with the administration of justice.
The court imposed individual fines totalling $40,000 on the industrial advocate and $55,000 on the union. The contemnors were ordered to pay costs taxed without regard to the limits of the scale. Significant factors relevant to that penalty decision included the importance of general deterrence, the contemnors had been warned that the conduct may constitute a breach of the Harman undertaking, but continued; the contemnors were not legally represented and were not completely aware of the full implications of the Harman undertaking; the breaches were nonetheless deliberate; neither had any prior convictions or findings of contempt and both had expressed regret and provided an apology.
In Pacific Basin Exploration Pty Ltd v XLX (NL),[29] the contemnor (a director of the defendant) sent an expert report prepared using material produced under discovery in court proceedings (and subject to an undertaking of confidentiality by the defendant's counsel) to several stock exchanges and the Financial Times. When the contemnor was notified by the plaintiff that they objected to the disclosure, the contemnor took immediate steps to notify those entities to ensure there was no further publication of the expert report. The court ordered that there be no further penalty imposed on the contemnor. Factors relevant to this decision included that the contemnor sent the disclosures in haste and did not fully understand the Harman undertaking; had the contemnor properly understood, he would have acted differently; the contemnor provided an apology to the court and took immediate steps to stop the further publication of the expert report such that no damage was suffered.
[29] Pacific Basin Exploration Pty Ltd v XLX (NL) [1985] WAR 11; (1984) 2 IPR 489.
The parties also referred the court to a number of penalty decisions which do not concern a failure to comply with the Harman undertaking, but rather a failure to comply with orders of the court or undertakings given. Various examples exist of this nature see, for example, Peterson v Ceccon,[30] Peterson v Ceccon [No 2],[31] Yap v Matic [No 7],[32] R v T,[33] Gap Constructions Pty Ltd v Vigar Pty Ltd,[34] Attorney General v Morrison [No 3].[35]
[30] Peterson v Ceccon [2023] WASC 488.
[31] Peterson v Ceccon [No 2] [2024] WASC 387.
[32] Yap v Matic [No 7][2023] WASC 55.
[33] R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77.
[34] Gap Constructions Pty Ltd v Vigar Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1061.
[35] Attorney General v Morrison [No 3] [2022] WASC 323.
In R v T,[36] the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from a sentence imposed under the Family Law At 1997 (WA) following a finding of guilt on 14 counts of contempt. These counts concerned transferring money and otherwise dealing with property contrary to an interim property order and an injunction restraining the appellant from dealing with certain property. A global sentence of three years ten months imprisonment was set aside as being disproportionate to the offending conduct when considered as a whole and therefore unreasonable or plainly unjust. A term of imprisonment of two years and three months imprisonment was substituted. Factors relevant to the sentencing process included the sustained and persistent defiance of the authority of the Family Court over a period of approximately three years; the motive for the offending behaviour being to frustrate the respondent's application for property orders and to render the exercise of the court's powers futile; the use of false entries in the bank records in an attempt to obfuscate and confuse; the lack of any attempts, even after conviction, to purge the contempts; the lack of any mitigating factors of significance save for the appellant's prior to good character; and the importance of general and personal deterrence.
[36] R v T [2022] WASCA 34; (2022) 58 WAR 77.
In Gap Constructions Pty Ltd v Vigar Pty Ltd,[37] the plaintiffs commenced a claim seeking orders that certain transfers made from its bank account were not made with its consent. This was defended by the defendants. The court made orders requiring the plaintiffs to serve on the defendants an affidavit setting out their knowledge as to the reasons for a series of transactions. These orders were not complied with despite various extensions. The plaintiffs were found guilty of contempt for failing to comply. The plaintiffs then purged the contempts by providing two detailed affidavits. When considering the appropriate sentence, the court dismissed the charges and imposed no further penalty, save as to ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs on an indemnity basis. The factors relevant to this decision included that the plaintiffs were aware of the orders; that the plaintiffs nonetheless failed to comply; the time and costs associated with the contempts; that the plaintiffs purged the contempts by filing the affidavits and providing an unreserved apology to the court; and the lack of any prior convictions, including as to contempt.
[37] Gap Constructions Pty Ltd v Vigar Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1061.
In Attorney General v Morrison [No 3],[38] the first defendant gave an undertaking in guardianship proceedings in the State Administrative Tribunal not to deal with a property in any way. The second defendant was present and was aware of that undertaking. Notwithstanding this, the following day the first defendant transferred the property to the second defendant. The first defendant received a fine of $7,500 and the second defendant received a fine of $10,000. Relevant sentencing factors included the benefits that the defendants stood to obtain from their contravention; the lack of any genuine contrition; the repayment of the proceeds to the estate; and the second defendant's extensive criminal record, including as to dishonesty offences.
[38] Attorney General v Morrison [No 3] [2022] WASC 323.

Appropriate disposition

In all the circumstances, I am of the view that Mr Kelly has not purged the contempts. In particular, I am not satisfied that the late apology and the payment of costs on an indemnity basis is a punishment which is proportionate to the serious nature of the contemptuous behaviour or one which acts as a sufficient general and personal deterrence.
In my view, it remains significant that Mr Kelly has sought to purge his contempts by bringing the Purge application. This application included additional breaches of the Harman undertaking not included in the Committal motion. It is also significant that Mr Kelly has offered an apology to both the court and Mr Hilton for his conduct and has agreed to Mr Hilton's proposal to notify those to whom disclosure was made as to what has occurred. I accept that Mr Kelly's apology is genuine. However, the Purge application and the apology were only made well after the breaches of the Harman undertaking were first raised by Mr Hilton's solicitors. Instead of immediately admitting to and addressing the disclosures, Mr Kelly was not full and frank with his own solicitors and continued to deny the breaches until after subpoenas had been issued and some of the disclosures identified. That is, Mr Kelly did not purge his contempt or apologise until well after his conduct had been discovered.
In considering the seriousness of Mr Kelly's actions, I have had regard to the nature and number of the breaches of the Harman undertaking, and the contumacious nature of some, but not all, of the breaches. Mr Kelly was aware of the requirements of the Harman undertaking and nonetheless proceeded to make the disclosures. Those which occurred in October 2022, occurred around the same time as Mr Kelly was instructing his lawyers to seek a discharge from the Harman undertaking for other information or documents.
However, I also accept that Mr Kelly's breaches of the Harman undertaking, and the confidentiality requirements concerning mediation conferences, were not motivated by a desire to interfere with the administration of justice or to seek to extract a benefit or to publicly humiliate or disparage Mr Hilton. Rather, I accept that Mr Kelly became so frustrated and angry with what he perceived to be Mr Hilton's wrongdoing, and his desire for vindication, that he allowed those feelings to control his actions.
I have had regard to Mr Kelly's personal circumstances, including his ability to pay a fine, and his lack of a prior criminal record. I accept that Mr Kelly's behaviour is out of character.
It is of importance that any penalty imposed on Mr Kelly is one that has proper regard to the need for personal and general deterrence. I have detailed earlier in these reasons the significance of general deterrence in the context of contempt and the failure to comply with the Harman undertaking and confidentiality requirements regarding mediation conferences. Whilst I accept that this is not a case where Mr Kelly is refusing to comply with a mandatory order of the court (and there is a need for the penalty to have a coercive impact) it is nonetheless important that the penalty act as a personal deterrent to Mr Kelly.
As mentioned earlier in these reasons, owing to the varying facts and circumstances, there is no tariff for a penalty for contempt, or more specifically a failure to comply with the Harman undertaking. Other comparable cases can provide a yardstick for the imposition of a penalty, however the differing circumstances limit the usefulness of the comparable cases. I consider that Mr Kelly's conduct is less serious than that in Hammersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell and R v T. Mr Kelly's offending, whilst serious, was not accompanied by the same motives to interfere with the administration of justice; or the same degree of obfuscation and deceit; did not involve disclosures in the public domain; and does not include the same refusal to apologise or purge the contempt as occurred in R v T. Mr Kelly also did not obtain any benefit, either financial or in terms of the substantive action, as a result of the contempts and Mr Hilton has not suffered any damage (save as to costs).
I also consider Mr Kelly's conduct to be more serious than the facts underpinning the contempt in Pacific Basin Exploration Pty Ltd v XLX (NL). In that case, when the issue of the possible breach of the Harman undertaking was raised, the contemnor took immediate steps to address the breach and apologised. I also consider Mr Kelly's conduct to be more serious in terms of the number and duration of the breaches in Gap Constructions and Attorney General v Morrison [No 3].
I do not consider Mr Kelly's conduct to be so serious as to warrant a term of imprisonment. I consider the appropriate penalty for the breaches of the Harman undertaking to be a global fine of $25,000. I consider this amount, in addition to the costs order that I will make, to adequately reflect the seriousness of Mr Kelly's conduct in light of all relevant personal and mitigatory factors. I consider it is appropriate to impose a global fine, rather than a series of individual fines, owing to the overlapping nature and content of the disclosures, the majority of which concern the same discovered documents or information, and many of which occurred on the same day or in close proximity to each other. In relation to charge 16, being the failure to comply with the confidentiality requirements concerning court ordered mediation conferences, I consider the appropriate penalty to be a fine of $5,000.
It now falls to consider these penalties in the context of the totality principle. Having regard to the seriousness of the offending, and Mr Kelly's mitigating factors, I am satisfied that a total fine of $30,000 (together with the costs order I will make) is proportionate to the overall offending considered as a whole, having regard to all of the circumstances, including those personal to Mr Kelly.
It is also appropriate in all the circumstances that Mr Kelly pay Mr Hilton's costs of the Committal motion and the Purge application on an indemnity basis. The fact that I did not find all contempt charges proven does not alter this conclusion. The entire need for each application arose out of Mr Kelly's actions. Consideration of each of the charges involved an overlap of evidence and legal principles. Therefore, I do not consider this to be an appropriate case to order costs on an issues basis. Mr Kelly accepts this is the appropriate costs order.
Mr Hilton also seeks an order that the substantive matter be stayed until Mr Kelly has paid these costs. For clarity, this stay is different to and separate from the stay of the substantive proceedings sought by Mr Hilton in his chamber summons dated 10 August 2023. That application for a stay has not yet been heard or considered. Mr Hilton submits that a stay until the costs are paid is appropriate to ensure that he is not out of pocket as a result of Mr Kelly's actions. Mr Hilton submits that the position is akin to a situation in which security for costs is ordered.
Mr Kelly submits that Mr Hilton has not referred to any authorities in support of his submissions. Mr Kelly submits that, subject to the appropriate penalties or costs orders, he should not be shut out from prosecuting his underlying case. Mr Kelly submits that there has already been a long delay in this respect to deal with these applications.
In all the circumstances, I consider it is appropriate to order that the substantive proceedings be stayed until Mr Kelly pays the total fine of $30,000. However, I do not consider it to be appropriate to stay the substantive proceedings until Mr Kelly pays the costs. The payment of the fine is a matter which is entirely within Mr Kelly's own ability to pay. However, the finalisation of the amount of costs Mr Kelly is required to pay will ordinarily involve the preparation of an appropriate bill of costs by Mr Hilton's solicitors, conferral between the parties and then, if required, taxation by a taxing officer of this court. These are not matters entirely within Mr Kelly's control, and in particular the time that may be taken to tax the costs is not able to be established at this stage. Accordingly, I do not consider that Mr Kelly's substantive action should be stayed pending these matters.

Orders

I will hear further from the parties in relation to the final wording of the orders, but I propose to make orders to the following effect:
1.The first plaintiff is to pay a global fine of $25,000 for the instances of contempt the subject of charges 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15 of the defendant's notice of motion for committal of the first plaintiff for criminal contempt of court, dated 21 September 2023 and items 6A, 6C, 6D and 6F of the first plaintiff's amended chamber summons for orders dealing with breaches of the implied undertaking, dated 31 October 2023.
2.The first plaintiff is to pay a fine of $5,000 for the contempt the subject of charge 16 of the defendant's amended notice of motion for committal of the first plaintiff for criminal contempt of court, dated 21 September 2023.
3.Within 7 days of the making of these orders, the first plaintiff provide, through his solicitors, a copy of:
3.1the court's reasons for decision in Kelly v Hilton [No 5] [2024] WASC 343;
3.2 the orders of the Honourable Justice Seaward made on 19 September 2024;
3.3 the court's reasons for decision as to penalty and any orders of the court in relation to penalty,
to the following entities or individuals:
3.4 the Australian Securities Exchange Ltd;
3.5 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission;
3.6 the Western Australia Police Force;
3.7 Mr Heng Pheng; and
3.8 Mr Jay Klopper.
4. The first plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of and incidental to the defendant's notice of motion for committal of the first plaintiff for criminal contempt of court, and of the first plaintiff's chamber summons for orders dealing with breaches of the implied undertaking, together with all reserved costs on an indemnity basis, such costs to be assessed if not agreed, and paid forthwith.
5. The proceedings be stayed until the first plaintiff pays the fines imposed in orders 1 and 2 of these Orders.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
HY
Associate to the Hon Justice Seaward
14 FEBRUARY 2025