Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) v WJI

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR THE
NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

WJI  RESPONDENT

Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) v WJI [2004] HCA 47

6 October 2004
D14/2003

ORDER

Appeal dismissed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia

Representation:

D F Jackson QC with W J Karczewski QC and M J Carey for the appellant (instructed by Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Northern Territory)

S J Odgers SC with S J Cox for the respondent (instructed by Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ.   This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Northern Territory which, by a majority of four to one[1], upheld a trial judge's directions to a jury in a case of alleged rape where the principal issues related to the complainant's consent, or lack of it, and the accused's state of mind about that matter.  The relevant directions were as follows: 

    [1]Director of Public Prosecutions Reference No 1 of 2002 (2002) 12 NTLR 176 (Martin CJ, Thomas and Bailey JJ and Gallop AJ; Angel J dissenting).

    "A ...

    1.        The indictment contains one charge of having sexual intercourse without consent.

    2.        The charge consists of three elements.  The Crown must prove each of the elements beyond reasonable doubt.

    B1.     The charge consists of the following three elements:

    1.1That on or about 27 January 1998 at Palmerston the accused had sexual intercourse with TRR.

    1.2That TRR did not give her consent to the accused having sexual intercourse with her.

    1.3That the accused intended to have sexual intercourse with TRR without her consent.

    ...

    4.Element 1.3

    4.1The accused knew TRR was not consenting or may not be consenting and proceeded regardless.

    4.2If the accused mistakenly believed that TRR consented to his having sexual intercourse with her, he will NOT have intended to have sexual intercourse with her without her consent.  The Crown must therefore prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused held no mistaken belief that TRR consented to having sexual intercourse with him.

    4.3Such a 'mistaken belief' does NOT have to be based on reasonable grounds.  However, if there is no reasonable basis for such a mistaken belief, you are entitled to take that into account in deciding whether or not the Crown has proved that no mistaken belief existed."

  2. Those directions, we were told, followed a pattern that had been used in the Northern Territory for several years[2], but there was a dispute about whether they were in conformity with the currently applicable provisions of the Criminal Code (NT) ("the Code" or "the Northern Territory Code"). They would not come as a surprise to a lawyer from one of the "common law States"[3], but they are different from the law as applied in other "code States"[4].…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCA 47
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) appealed to the High Court of Australia against the acquittal of the respondent, WJI, on a charge of sexual intercourse without consent, contrary to s 192(3) of the *Criminal Code* (NT). The appeal concerned points of law arising from the trial judge's directions to the jury.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the prosecution was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to have sexual intercourse with the complainant without her consent, and whether a mistaken belief in consent, to be a defence, needed to be based on reasonable grounds. These issues arose from the trial judge's directions which stated that the Crown must prove the accused intended to have intercourse without consent, and that a mistaken belief in consent did not have to be based on reasonable grounds.

The High Court considered the interpretation of the *Criminal Code* (NT), particularly ss 23 and 31, which deal with general criminal responsibility and excuses. The Court held that s 31, which provides a general excuse from criminal responsibility, applies to offences like that under s 192(3) where no specific mental element is otherwise prescribed. The Court reasoned that the "act" referred to in the general provisions on criminal responsibility should be interpreted broadly to encompass the factual elements of the offence. Consequently, the prosecution must prove the mental element of the offence, which in this context means proving the accused intended to engage in the act of sexual intercourse without consent. The Court also determined that a mistaken belief in consent, to operate as an excuse under s 31, must be based on reasonable grounds.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court ordered that both questions reserved for the Court of Criminal Appeal be answered in the negative, meaning the trial judge's directions on the intent required and the reasonableness of a mistaken belief were incorrect.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Vallance v The Queen[15], the Court was concerned with the unlawful wounding provision of the Tasmanian Code. Kitto J and Menzies J held[16] that the word "act" in the provision in s 13(1) that no person was to be criminally responsible for an act unless it be voluntary and intentional, referred to the physical action of a person charged; it did not extend, in its application to the unlawful wounding provision of s 172, to all that was comprised in the notion of wounding. Dixon CJ and Windeyer J[17] were of the contrary view; Taylor J tended[18] to favour the opinion of Kitto J and Menzies J. The Code was enacted in terms which involved a response to Vallance[19]. Before coming to the particular legal issues involved in the appeal, it is necessary to say something of the facts.[15](1961) 108 CLR 56.[16](1961) 108 CLR 56 at 64, 71 respectively.[17](1961) 108 CLR 56 at 60‑61, 79 respectively.[18](1961) 108 CLR 56 at 68‑69. See Kaporonovski v The Queen (1973) 133 CLR 209 at 228‑230 where Gibbs J discusses Vallance and the subsequent support given the views of Dixon CJ and Windeyer J in Timbu Kolian v The Queen (1968) 119 CLR 47.[19]Gray, "A Class Act, an Omission or a Non‑event? Criminal Responsibility Under Section 31 of the Criminal Code (NT)", (2002) 26 Criminal Law Journal 175 at 176.The facts The respondent was acquitted at his trial in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory before Riley J and a jury on a count of sexual intercourse without the consent of the complainant, contrary to s 192(3) of the Code. Section 192(3) states:"Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person, is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for life." An aide memoire distributed to the jury as part of Riley J's directions in part read:"If the accused mistakenly believed that [the complainant] consented to his having sexual intercourse with her, he will NOT have intended to have sexual intercourse with her without her consent.The Crown must therefore prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused held no mistaken belief that [the complainant] consented to having sexual intercourse with him.Such a 'mistaken belief' does NOT have to be based on reasonable grounds. However, if there is no reasonable basis for such a mistaken belief, you are entitled to take that into account in deciding whether or not the Crown has proved that no mistaken belief existed." Section 414(2) of the Code states:"A Crown Law Officer may, in a case where a person has been acquitted after his trial on indictment, refer any point of law that has arisen at the trial to the [Court of Criminal Appeal] for its consideration and opinion thereon."The term "Crown Law Officer" is defined in s 1 of the Code so as to include the present appellant. Under s 414(2) of the Code, the following points of law were referred for consideration:"1. Was the learned trial judge correct in directing the jury, in respect of the elements of the offence prescribed by section 192(3) of the [Code], that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only(a)that the accused had sexual intercourse with the complainant, and(b)that the complainant did not give her consent to the accused having sexual intercourse with herbut also(c)that the accused intended to have sexual intercourse with the complainant without her consent?2. Was the learned trial judge correct in directing the jury, in respect of the issue of the accused's mistaken belief as to consent, that such a mistaken belief need not be based on reasonable grounds?"

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ (dissent) GUMMOW AND HEYDON JJ (dissent) KIRBY J (dissent) HAYNE J (dissent)
As is at least implicit in that last proposition, a mistaken belief not based on reasonable grounds will not excuse an accused from criminal responsibility even if the belief is honestly held. For that reason, the trial judge was wrong to direct the jury, as he did, that a mistaken belief does not have to be based on reasonable grounds. The second question reserved for the consideration of the Court of Criminal Appeal asked whether the trial judge was right to give that direction. That question should have been answered, "No".Conclusion and orders Both of the questions reserved for the consideration of the Court of Criminal Appeal should have been answered, "No". I would order that the appeal to this Court be allowed, the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal be set aside and in their place there be orders that each of the questions reserved for the consideration of that Court be answered, "No".

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

These, then, are the opinions[111] of the judges who have the day to day responsibility for applying the NT Code. The dissenting judge in the Court of Criminal Appeal disagreed[112]. However, the majority adhered to their conclusion that the fact that the State criminal codes had been construed more narrowly than that favoured in the case of the NT Code was "not to the point"[113]. The differences in outcome could be justified by reference to the usual principles governing such matters: legal authority (textual differences); legal principle (the observance of the basic purposes of the criminal law); and legal policy (avoidance of diminishing the element of intention to virtual non-existence in the case of serious crimes)[114]. It is necessary to turn to each of these considerations. In my view, they sustain the decision of the majority in the Court of Criminal Appeal.[111]Reference No 1 (2002) 12 NTLR 176 at 204‑205 [74].[112]Reference No 1 (2002) 12 NTLR 176 at 184 [23].[113]Reference No 1 (2002) 12 NTLR 176 at 205 [75].[114]Reference No 1 (2002) 12 NTLR 176 at 204 [72].Considerations of legal authority Textual analysis:Starting in the right place, with the language and structure of the NT Code, a few general points can be noticed. Section 31 appears in Pt II, a general part of the NT Code dealing with "Criminal Responsibility". That part is introduced by s 23, which appears in Div 1 providing for "General Matters". Section 23 enacts, in broad language, that:"A person is not guilty of an offence if any act, omission or event constituting that offence done, made or caused by him was authorized, justified or excused." Because this part of the NT Code (and in particular s 23) is intended to apply, unless otherwise provided, throughout the NT Code, the words should be given a broad application. To narrow the ambit would be to risk rendering the general provisions on criminal responsibility inapplicable to a particular crime provided in the NT Code. That would be contrary to the obvious purpose evident in the NT Code's language and structure. Section 31 appears in Div 4 of Pt II, titled "Excuse". It picks up the language of s 23. Textually, it does so in three ways. It excuses the subject from "criminal responsibility", the general phrase governing Pt II. It repeats the phrase of wide ambit "an act, omission or event". On its face, this was designed to be broad enough to refer to the factual features of the many particular crimes that appear in the NT Code. It provides a general "excuse" from "criminal responsibility" as foreshadowed by the language of s 23. Correctly, the appellant did not contest that ss 23 and 31 of the NT Code had to be read together and that s 31 applied to s 192(3) governing the specified crime of "sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person". This concession follows from the decision of this Court in Charlie[115]. That decision held that, but for the fact that s 162(1)(a) of the NT Code (there under consideration) contained its own reference to a mental element, the general provisions of s 31 would have been imported. Because, by way of contrast, s 192(3) does not contain its own reference to a mental element, s 31 clearly applies to s 192(3). [115](1999) 199 CLR 387.