[2005] HCATrans 683
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S216 of 2005
B e t w e e n -
STEPHEN GARRY BANDITT
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 8 SEPTEMBER 2005, AT 10.11 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR S.J. ODGERS, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the appellant with my learned friend, MS A. FRANCIS. (instructed by Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales)
MR G.E. SMITH, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent with my learned friend, MR C. McPHERSON. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (New South Wales))
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Odgers.
MR ODGERS: Your Honours, the question raised by this appeal is the meaning of the term “reckless” in section 61R(1) of the Crimes Act (NSW). That provision is referred to on page 1 of the written submissions and is contained in the annexure to the written submissions. It was a provision which was introduced in almost identical terms in 1981 in New South Wales in section 61D(2) of the Crimes Act, and, your Honours, that is also in the annexure.
Although the offence of which the appellant was convicted was under section 112(1) of the Crimes Act, section 61R applied because 112(1) included as an element within it the commission of any serious indictable offence. By reason of section 4(1) of the Crimes Act, a “serious indictable offence” is defined to be any offence punishable by imprisonment for five years or more. Section 61I is an offence punishable by 14 years imprisonment. That is an offence of sexual assault without consent. Section 61R applies to that provision to deem recklessness as to consent knowledge as to absence of consent.
In brief, our submission is that the meaning of the word “reckless” in section 61R(1) is a concept which can be expressed in different ways, all meaning the same thing.
The various ways are indifferent to whether there is consent, not caring whether there is consent, determined to have sex regardless of whether there is consent, would have sex even if one knew there was no consent. They are, we submit, all essentially the same idea, which I will, just for convenience, refer to as indifference.
The trial judge initially directed the jury in this case on recklessness in terms which we do not challenge and I will just take your Honours very briefly to that at page 263 of the appeal book. After noting at line 17 that:
the Crown suggested to you late in the piece in his closing address, that even on the accused’s point of view –
and I think that is another way of saying even on the accused’s own version of events –
you might find that he knew she was not consenting, because he was reckless.
The law says, a…
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- Case
- [2005] HCATrans 683
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the admission of the covert recording at trial constituted a miscarriage of justice, specifically in relation to the application of the exclusionary rule concerning improperly or illegally obtained evidence. The Court also had to consider whether the trial judge had erred in admitting the evidence, and if so, whether that error had led to a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, affirmed the principles governing the admission of improperly or illegally obtained evidence. Their Honours noted that while such evidence is generally inadmissible, it may be admitted if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. In this instance, the Court found that the trial judge had properly exercised their discretion in admitting the recording, as its probative value in establishing the appellant's guilt was significant and outweighed any potential prejudice. The Court concluded that the admission of the evidence did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.
The appeal was dismissed.
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