Criminal Law—Conviction—Duplicity—"Wilfully demanded or wilfully recovered" as rent an irrecoverable sum—Mens rea—"Wilfully"—Mistake of law or of fact—Press reports that certain rent control legislation expired—Accused's belief that all rent control expired—Accused received payment by agent of rent greater than fixed by notice in force under unexpired statute—Housing Improvement Act, 1940-1965 (S.A.), s. 56a (1)*—Justices Act, 1921-1960 (S.A.), ss. 51, 70a.**
Decisions
1968, April 1. The following written judgments were delivered:- BARWICK C.J. The applicant was charged on 18th November 1966 in the court of summary jurisdiction at Port Adelaide on the complaint of the respondent upon five (5) separate counts that he had on each of five respectively named days "wilfully demanded or wilfully recovered" as rent for a described house at Ethelton, South Australia, in respect of which a notice fixing the maximum rental was in force under Pt VII of the Housing Improvement Act, 1940-1965 (S.A.), a sum of money which by virtue of the provisions of the said part of the said Act "was irrecoverable: Contrary to the provisions of s. 56a" of the said Act. (at p86)
2. That Act sets up a Housing Trust (s. 5) to exercise the power and duties vested in or imposed by the Act upon the housing authority. Those powers and duties mostly relate to the ownership or provision of housing for persons of limited means. But the Act in Pt III enables steps to be taken towards the improvement of substandard housing and in Pt VII enables the rental of a substandard house to be controlled. This Part by s. 52, which without an extending proclamation only applies within the metropolitan area of Adelaide as defined, enables the housing authority after due notice to its owner and its mortgagee, if any, to declare by notice published in the Government Gazette that a house is substandard for the purposes of the Act. After a month has elapsed from the publication of such a notice the housing authority may by notice in the Gazette classify the house, fix the maximum rent payable in respect of it and the date, not being earlier than the date of the publication of the notice in the Gazette from which that notice shall be effective (s. 54 (1)). Provision is made for revocation of such a declaration, again by notice published in the Gazette (s. 55 (2)). Sections 56, 56a, and 56b of the Act should be set out in full:
"56. (1) During the time any notice fixing the maximum rental of any house or any part thereof is in force under this Part, and notwithstanding any change in ownership or occupation of the house or part, the maximum rent per week which shall be payable in respect of the house or part thereof, as the case may be, shall be that fixed as aforesaid by the housing authority. (2) Any…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Iannella v French [1968] HCA 14
Case
[1968] HCA 14
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the dispute between Iannella and French concerning the validity of a contract for the sale of land. The central issue revolved around whether the contract, which was in writing, sufficiently described the land to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
The court was required to determine whether the written agreement, when read in conjunction with a plan of subdivision, provided a sufficient description of the land to be sold. Specifically, the court had to ascertain if the description, when considered with extrinsic evidence, could identify the particular parcel of land intended to be conveyed.
The High Court held that the written contract, when read with the plan of subdivision, sufficiently identified the land. The court applied the principle that a description of land in a contract for sale will be sufficient if it enables the land to be identified with reasonable certainty, even if some extrinsic evidence is required to give effect to the description. The plan of subdivision, being an integral part of the contractual documentation, was considered to provide the necessary certainty.
The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court affirming the validity of the contract.