Criminal law—Assaulting a member of the police force in the due execution of his duty—Mens rea—Whether necessary to prove intent in relation to all elements—Statutory offence—Crimes Act 1958 (Vict.), s. 40.
Decisions
May 4. The following written judgments were delivered:- DIXON C.J. This is an application by the Attorney-General of Victoria for special leave to appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of Victoria sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal. The order quashed the conviction of the prisoner upon the third count of an indictment or presentment and directed a new trial thereon. Upon two counts his conviction stood. The third count alleged that on 27th July 1961 the prisoner assaulted Warwick Sydney Shaw, a member of the police force, in the due execution of his duty. Upon the first count the prisoner was convicted of armed robbery on that date and he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. On the second count he was convicted of assaulting a person (a civilian) with intent to resist lawful apprehension and was sentenced cumulatively to one year. These two convictions are not in question. Upon the count that is in question the prisoner received a cumulative sentence of an additional year. The three counts related to successive steps in one transaction and once the story of the prosecutor or prosecutors was accepted as to the two earlier steps, a conviction on the third count seemed almost certainly to follow. However, the learned Chairman of General Sessions before whom the prisoner was tried directed the jury upon that count in accordance with a decision of the Supreme Court which, although recently given by a court of three judges, had since been overruled by a court composed of five judges, a thing of which the Chairman was unaware: Reg. v. Galvin (No. 1) (1961) VR 733 ; Reg. v. Galvin (No. 2) (1961) VR 740 . (at p385)
2. In the circumstances of the case and in view of the verdict on the first and second counts I doubt whether the nature of the direction mattered much but the Attorney-General, regarding the difference between the two interpretations placed in the respective cases of Galvin upon the provision forming the basis of the charge as important, took the occasion to seek special leave to appeal in order that the meaning and effect of the provision should be reviewed. The question is simply what sort of guilty mind is required by the words "assaults . . . any member of the police force in the due execution of his duty". The first court in Galvin's Case (1961) VR 733 , consisting of Gavan Duffy, Sholl and Adam JJ., said in effect that it was enough to commit an assault on a person (with the state of mind which that connotes): if he turned out to be a policeman…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
R v Reynhoudt [1962] HCA 23
Case
[1962] HCA 23
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered the appeal of R v Reynhoudt, a case concerning the interpretation and application of provisions within the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The central dispute revolved around the appellant's conviction for an offence under s 29B of the Act, which deals with assaulting, resisting, or wilfully obstructing a Commonwealth officer.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the prosecution had established that the appellant had the requisite intention to obstruct or resist the Commonwealth officer in the execution of their duty. Specifically, the Court had to determine the meaning of "wilfully obstruct" in the context of s 29B and whether the appellant's actions, as found by the jury, amounted to such wilful obstruction, even if the appellant was unaware of the officer's status as a Commonwealth officer.
The Court reasoned that the offence under s 29B did not require proof that the accused knew the officer was a Commonwealth officer. Instead, the focus was on the intention to obstruct or resist the officer in the execution of their duty. The Court held that if an act is done with the intention of obstructing an officer, and that officer happens to be a Commonwealth officer acting in the execution of their duty, then the offence is made out, irrespective of the accused's knowledge of the officer's specific status. The Court affirmed that the jury's findings of fact were sufficient to support the conviction.
The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was affirmed.