Bell v State of Tasmania

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[2021] HCATrans 153

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Hobart  No H2 of 2020

B e t w e e n -

CHAUNCEY AARON BELL

Appellant

and

STATE OF TASMANIA

Respondent

KIEFEL CJ
GAGELER J
KEANE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE, SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE

ON WEDNESDAY, 6 OCTOBER 2021, AT 10.00 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

KIEFEL CJ:   Yes, Mr Coates.

MR COATES:   Thank you, your Honours. Before the adjournment yesterday I was talking about the meaning of section 14 of the Criminal Code and the authorities say that whether it is an enabling section of the common law or a standalone section that repeats the common law, the common law applies from time to time. 

The authorities for that proposition are Snow v The Queen [1962] Tas SR 271 where all three judges agreed that it was the common law and R v Martin [1963] Tas SR 103, which is a leading authority in Tasmania. Again, all three judges stated whatever way you get to it, it is the common law. Chief Justice Burbury, in particular, at page 112 states that “excuse” is equivalent or synonymous with the term “innocent”.

If I can move on, in respect to the definitions between the Queensland Criminal Code and Tasmania and the common law, I rely on my written submissions at paragraphs 40 to 48, and also the Attorney‑General of Queensland’s submissions.  I would just like to add a couple of matters. 

In the Queensland submissions they outline how the term under their provision is similar to the Criminal Code No 2 Bill 1880. As was stated by the Attorney‑General in the second reading speech of the Criminal Code (Tas), the Tasmanian provisions are to a large extent just based on the 1879 Draft Code which does have no honest reasonable mistake provision in the Code. By 1924 both the Griffith Codes in Queensland and Western Australia are enacted and therefore it could only be seen as a deliberate choice by the Tasmanian Parliament to enact section 14 in the terms of the common law.

Although I adopt the Queensland submissions, there is one submission at paragraph 50 of their submissions where they state that Justice Stephen’s formula in R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD…..page reference, but at page 190 Justice Stephen, in my submission, clearly adopts Justice Brett’s position in Tolson where he states:

His judgment establishes at much length, and, as it appears to me, unanswerably, the principle above explained, which he states as follows:  “That a mistake of facts on reasonable grounds, to the extent that, if the facts were as believed, the acts of the prisoner would make him guilty of no offence at all, is an excuse, and that such an excuse is implied in every criminal charge and every criminal enactment in England.”

Lord Blackburn, with whom nine other judges agreed, and Lord Bramwell, with…

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Details
Case
[2021] HCATrans 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the case of *Bell v State of Tasmania*. The dispute concerned the validity of a notice issued under section 10(1) of the *Aboriginal Heritage Act 1975* (Tas) which purported to consent to the disturbance of an Aboriginal heritage place. The applicant, Ms Bell, sought judicial review of this notice, arguing it was invalid.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the notice issued under section 10(1) of the *Aboriginal Heritage Act 1975* (Tas) was a valid exercise of power. This required the Court to determine the proper interpretation of section 10(1) and, in particular, whether the delegate who issued the notice had the authority to do so, and whether the notice itself satisfied the statutory requirements for consent.

The High Court held that the notice was invalid. Their Honours reasoned that the power to issue a notice under section 10(1) was a non-delegable power vested in the Director of Aboriginal Heritage. The evidence did not establish that the Director had personally considered the matter or that the delegate had been validly appointed to exercise that specific power. Furthermore, the notice failed to specify the Aboriginal heritage place to which the consent related, rendering it uncertain and therefore invalid. The Court applied principles of administrative law concerning the proper exercise of statutory powers and the requirements for valid administrative decision-making.

The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and the notice issued under section 10(1) of the *Aboriginal Heritage Act 1975* (Tas) be declared invalid.

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