Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ

KENNETH JOHN FOOTS   APPELLANT

AND

SOUTHERN CROSS MINE MANAGEMENT

PTY LTD & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd
[2007] HCA 56
7 December 2007
B26/2007

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation

P J Dunning SC with S A McLeod and S J Williams for the appellant (instructed by Conroy & Associates)

No appearance for the first and third to tenth respondents

W Sofronoff QC with A M Pomerenke for the second respondent (instructed by Allens Arthur Robinson)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ.   This appeal from the Queensland Court of Appeal concerns the interrelationship between federal bankruptcy law and the civil procedure of the courts of that State.  The litigation arises out of a costs order made by the Supreme Court of Queensland on 3 February 2006 in favour of the second respondent, Ensham Resources Pty Ltd ("Ensham"), against the appellant, Mr Foots.  He had become bankrupt on 15 September 2005, upon his own petition.  Other respondents were joined in the appeal to this Court but Ensham was the only active participant. 

  2. A significant part of the argument in this Court concerned the authority to be accorded in Australia to a 19th century English decision, In re British Gold Fields of West Africa[1].  The English case law concerning the bankruptcy statutes as they were developed in that century is part of the context for an understanding of the modern legislation in this country, using the term "context" in the wide sense spoken of in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd[2]. Nonetheless, this should not obscure the consideration that the appeal essentially turns upon the construction of s 82 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ("the Bankruptcy Act") in particular the identification of the debts and liabilities which are provable in bankruptcy. When s 82 is construed it is apparent that in Australia British Gold Fields does not retain the significance for which the appellant contends.

    [1][1899] 2 Ch 7.

  3. Atypically, this case does not involve an attempt by a creditor to bring its claim within s 82 so as to prove in the bankruptcy of the debtor. Rather, it is the bankrupt debtor, Mr Foots, who wishes to bring a claim against himself within the statutory definition. He does so apparently for two reasons. First, if the costs order made by the Supreme Court were a debt or liability provable in his bankruptcy within the meaning of s 82, the proceedings in which the costs order was made would have been subject to s 58(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. This requires the leave of the Federal Court or Federal Magistrates Court before a creditor takes any fresh step in such…

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Details
Case
[2007] HCA 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr Foots against a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland. The dispute concerned whether a costs order made against Mr Foots after he declared bankruptcy was a provable debt under the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth). Mr Foots had been found liable for damages in a complex mining dispute, and subsequently became bankrupt. After his bankruptcy, the trial judge made an order for indemnity costs against him in favour of Ensham, a party to the original proceedings.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the indemnity costs order, made after Mr Foots' bankruptcy, constituted a provable debt within the meaning of s 82 of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth). Mr Foots argued that this costs order was a debt or liability arising from an obligation incurred before his bankruptcy, or alternatively, that it was a debt incidental to a provable debt. The Court also considered whether proceedings in which the costs order was sought should have been stayed under s 58(3) of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth).

The High Court, by majority, dismissed the appeal. The majority reasoned that a costs order made after bankruptcy, even if related to proceedings where a provable debt existed and judgment was given before bankruptcy, does not fall within the definition of a provable debt under s 82(1) of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth). This is because the liability for costs is not a debt or liability to which the bankrupt was subject at the date of bankruptcy, nor is it a liability to which they may become subject before discharge by reason of an obligation incurred before bankruptcy. Instead, the costs order arises from the discretionary judgment of the court based on the proceedings and the conduct of the parties, and the liability is created only when the order is made. Therefore, the costs order was not a provable debt, and the proceedings to obtain it were not automatically stayed by s 58(3) of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan JJ; Kirby J dissenting)

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant fails to attain these objectives and his appeal should be dismissed.The facts In the Supreme Court of Queensland Chesterman J heard a complex multi-party action concerning the ownership of machinery at an open-cut coal mine. There were many claims and cross-claims, but the relevant outcome was that Ensham succeeded in its cross-claim against the appellant, Mr Foots, who was formerly its Chief Executive Officer. On 26 August 2005, Chesterman J gave his reasons for judgment, and found that Mr Foots breached his fiduciary and contractual duties of good faith towards Ensham, and that he was also liable pursuant to s 75B(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) for breaches of s 52 of that Act by the first respondent, Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd ("Southern Cross")[3]. At that stage, Chesterman J did not make any orders against Mr Foots, although he did do so in respect of other unsuccessful parties.[3]Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd v Ensham Resources Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 233. On 1 September 2005, the matter returned before Chesterman J. He gave judgment for Ensham against Southern Cross and Mr Foots, and awarded damages in the sum of $2,460,000. As noted above, on 15 September 2005 Mr Foots entered bankruptcy. Thereafter, on 3 February 2006, the matter was again listed before Chesterman J. His Honour gave detailed reasons[4], and ordered that Mr Foots pay Ensham's costs on an indemnity basis of its successful counter-claim against him. It appears that the costs order has not been taxed.[4](2006) 196 FLR 419.The legislation In this Court, Mr Foots argues that the costs order made against him was a provable debt within the meaning of s 82 of the Bankruptcy Act as it was a debt or liability arising out of an obligation incurred before his bankruptcy. That "obligation" was said to arise from the judgment against him for the money sum awarded on 1 September 2005. Alternatively, Mr Foots submitted that the phrase "all debts and liabilities" in s 82 is broad enough to encompass an obligation that is incidental to a provable debt, even if the incidental obligation was not a necessary concomitant in law of the provable debt. However, Mr Foots did not submit that the costs order itself was a relevant "obligation" or that it was a "contingent" liability within the meaning of s 82. The soundness of the arguments advanced in support of the appeal must ultimately be tested against the requirements of the statute itself. Section 82 introduces Div 1 of Pt VI of that Act which is headed "Proof of Debts". The section identifies those debts and liabilities which are provable and relevantly provides:"(1)Subject to this Division, all debts and liabilities, present or future, certain or contingent, to which a bankrupt was subject at the date of the bankruptcy, or to which he or she may become subject before his or her discharge by reason of an obligation incurred before the date of the bankruptcy, are provable in his or her bankruptcy....(2)Demands in the nature of unliquidated damages arising otherwise than by reason of a contract, promise or breach of trust are not provable in bankruptcy.…(3B)A debt is not provable in a bankruptcy in so far as the debt consists of interest accruing, in respect of a period commencing on or after the date of the bankruptcy, on a debt that is provable in the bankruptcy.(4)The trustee shall make an estimate of the value of a debt or liability provable in the bankruptcy which, by reason of its being subject to a contingency, or for any other reason, does not bear a certain value.(5)A person aggrieved by an estimate so made may appeal to the Court not later than 28 days after the day on which the person is notified of the estimate.(6)If the Court finds that the value of the debt or liability cannot be fairly estimated, the debt or liability shall be deemed not to be provable in the bankruptcy.(7)If the Court finds that the value of the debt or liability can be fairly estimated, the Court shall assess the value in such manner as it thinks proper.(8)In this section, liability includes:(a)compensation for work or labour done;(b)an obligation or possible obligation to pay money or money's worth on the breach of an express or implied covenant, contract, agreement or undertaking, whether or not the breach occurs, is likely to occur or is capable of occurring, before the discharge of the bankrupt; and(c)an express or implied engagement, agreement or undertaking, to pay, or capable of resulting in the payment of, money or money's worth, whether the payment is:(i)in respect of amount—fixed or unliquidated;(ii)in respect of time—present or future, or certain or dependent on a contingency; or(iii)in respect of the manner of valuation—capable of being ascertained by fixed rules or only as matter of opinion." (emphasis in original)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ (dissent) KIRBY J (dissent)
His Honour concluded that, notwithstanding what had been said in 1899 in British Gold Fields[13], modern authority established that such an order would not be a debt or liability of that nature[14]. He referred in particular to Glenister v Rowe[15] and Australian authorities including Fraser Property Developments Pty Ltd v Sommerfeld (No 2)[16]. Thus, since the costs order would not be a debt provable in Mr Foots' bankruptcy, s 58(3) of the Bankruptcy Act was no impediment to the Court making a costs order. His Honour accordingly granted leave to Ensham pursuant to r 72 of the UCPR to proceed against Mr Foots, and granted its application for indemnity costs[17].[13][1899] 2 Ch 7.[14](2006) 196 FLR 419 at 427.[15][2000] Ch 76.[16][2005] 2 Qd R 404.[17](2006) 196 FLR 419 at 427-428.The decision of the Court of Appeal By majority, the Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by Mr Foots against the decision of Chesterman J (Jerrard and Holmes JJA, Mullins J dissenting)[18]. Jerrard JA noted that the trial judge's strongly adverse findings in the principal judgment delivered 26 August 2005 made it "very likely" that a costs order would be made against Mr Foots. Nonetheless, Jerrard JA observed that[19]:"the liability created by the costs order – and none existed until it was made – was one to which, at the date of Mr Foots' bankruptcy, he might become subject before his discharge 'by reason of' the independent exercise of a discretionary judgment based on the result in the proceedings, the fact that there were proceedings, and on Mr Foots' conduct in those. It was not a liability to which he would potentially be subjected 'by reason of' his obligation to pay $2.4 million to Ensham. That obligation had existed independently of the necessity for, and the fact of, proceedings to explain its existence to Mr Foots. I agree with the submission of Mr Sofronoff [Counsel for Ensham] that the appellant accordingly offered no explanation as a matter of legal reasoning why a post-bankruptcy debt, which is incidental to, or attached to, or associated with, a pre-bankruptcy provable debt falls within any of the words of s 82."[18][2006] QCA 531.[19][2006] QCA 531 at [14]. However, in the light of the full arguments of counsel Jerrard JA turned to the 19th century and other case law. It will be necessary to return to a discussion of some of those authorities later in these reasons. After his review of the authorities, Jerrard JA acknowledged that some support for the appellant's position could be found in the reasoning or results in a number of the earlier cases. However, his Honour concluded that[20]: "those supports are an inadequate basis to demonstrate a long established principle that costs ordered after bankruptcy are provable if judgment in the action in respect of which the costs were incurred was given before the bankruptcy, and if the judgment debt itself is provable. That proposition cannot sit with the language of s 82(1), and there are no unequivocal and authoritative examples of its application ...Accordingly, I agree with the learned trial judge that costs, ordered against Mr Foots after his bankruptcy, would not be a provable debt in it, even though incurred in proceedings in respect of a provable debt and in which judgment had been pronounced before bankruptcy."[20][2006] QCA 531 at [48]-[49].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ,

Full text does not contain this section.