O'Shannassy v Sarina (Appeal)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

O’Shannassy v Sarina (Appeal) [2024] FCA 880   

Appeal from: Sarina v O’Shannassy (No 7) [2024] FedCFamC2G 102
File number: NSD 220 of 2024
Judgment of: STEWART J
Date of judgment: 8 August 2024
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – where by an order for judgment liability has been determined but damages not yet assessed on a defamation claim at the time the defendant became bankrupt – whether the unassessed claim constitutes a provable debt in their bankruptcy – whether such a judgment resulted in a merger of the cause of action in the judgment – whether it otherwise remains a demand in the nature of unliquidated damages – whether such a judgment is relevantly analogous to an unquantified costs order – leave to appeal granted – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 82, 58(3), 153(1)
Cases cited:

Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 16; 259 CLR 1

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Kritharas; Re Kritharas [2000] FCA 1442; 105 FCR 444

Barodawala v Perinparajah [2022] VSCA 198; 68 VR 329

Burns v Lipman [1975] HCA 2; 132 CLR 157

Camberwell City Council v Camberwell Shopping Centre Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 163

Clayton v Bant [2020] HCA 44; 272 CLR 1

Coventry v Charter Pacific Corp Ltd [2005] HCA 67; 227 CLR 234

Davey v Vrsecky (Trustee), in the matter of Dessmann [2023] FCA 1274

Director General, Department of Services, Technology & Administration v Veall (No 6) [2012] NSWSC 1118

Durolek v Pier (WA) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] WASCA 138

Electricity Commission of New South Wales v Lapthorne [1971] HCA 11; 124 CLR 177

Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 56; 234 CLR 52

Goldrei, Foucard & Son v Sinclair and Russian Chamber of Commerce in London [1918] 1 KB 180 (CA)

Hahn v Conley [1971] HCA 56; 126 CLR 276

Hall v Busst [1960] HCA 84; 104 CLR 206

Henderson v Henderson (1844) 6 QB 288

Henley v Soper (1828) 8 B&C 16

Major Engineering Pty Ltd v Timelink Pacific Pty Ltd [2007] VSCA 228

Marston v Phillips (1863) 9 LT 289

Mensink v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [2022] FCAFC 102; 294 FCR 101

Minister Administering the Environmental Protection and Assessment Act 1979 v Carson (1994) 35 NSWLR 342

Monash Health v Singh [2023] FCAFC 166

National Australia Bank Ltd v Maher (No 2) [1999] VSCA 189; 3 VR 589

Pekar v Jess (Trustee) [2022] FCA 1367

Polis v Zombar [2019] FCA 69; 134 ACSR 486

Ryan v Davies Bros Ltd [1921] HCA 53; 29 CLR 527

Sarina v O’Shannassy (No 5) [2020] FCCA 2911

Sarina v O’Shannassy (No 7) [2024] FedCFamC2G 102

Sarina v O’Shannassy [2021] FCA 1649

Thomas v Bunn [1991] 1 AC 362

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507

Warramunda Village Inc v Pryde [2002] FCA 250

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 880
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal by the appellant, O'Shannassy, against a decision concerning the provability of certain debts in the context of bankruptcy. Specifically, the issue at hand was whether unassessed damages stemming from a defamation claim, which were determined to be a liability before the respondent's bankruptcy but had not yet been quantified, constituted a provable debt in the respondent's bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The appellant argued that the unassessed damages did not constitute a provable debt because they were contingent upon being assessed, whereas the respondents contended that such debts should be treated as provable. The central legal issue revolved around the interpretation of section 82 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), particularly whether the unassessed damages were excluded by subsection 82(2), which excludes "demands in the nature of unliquidated damages" from being provable in bankruptcy.

The court considered the appellant's argument that the right of action for the original wrong had merged in the judgment, thus creating a new, higher, and different obligation. The court, however, distinguished this case from those where a final judgment has been rendered, noting that the judgment in question did not finally determine all the issues in dispute as it left the quantification of damages unresolved. The court held that a judgment on liability for damages to be assessed does not satisfy the finality requirement for merger, as it does not quell the entire controversy. This finding was based on established jurisprudence which holds that where damages are the gist of the cause of action, liability cannot be divorced from damages as a separate and independent matter. Consequently, the court concluded that the unassessed damages remained a demand in the nature of unliquidated damages and thus were not provable in bankruptcy under section 82(2) of the Act.

The appeal was allowed, but the appeal itself was dismissed with costs. The court's reasoning was rooted in the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and the established legal principles surrounding the merger of causes of action in final judgments. The court granted leave to appeal to ensure that the matter was thoroughly examined, but ultimately upheld the lower court's decision regarding the provability of the unassessed damages in the context of bankruptcy.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be granted leave to appeal.

2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant’s case is that the respondents’ claims are “liabilities” that are “contingent” on their extent being assessed. On that basis, the appellant submits that the claims come within subs (1). That much is common ground. The real question is whether the claims are excluded by subs (2).Submission 1: no “demand” as the claim merged in the liability judgment The appellant’s first principal submission, with reference to Ryan v Davies Bros Ltd [1921] HCA 53; 29 CLR 527 at 533, is that the right of action for the original wrong has merged in the judgment, and a new, higher and different obligation has been created by the judgment. He submits that since that occurred prior to the intervention of bankruptcy, the claim on the judgment is a provable debt within s 82(1) and it is not a “demand” within s 82(2). In Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507 (at [20]) it was explained that an exercise of judicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or classes of persons. It was said that in that way a final judgment “quells” the controversy between those persons; the rights and obligations in controversy, as between those persons, cease to have an independent existence: they “merge” in that final judgment. Such a merger is treated in Australia as “equating to ‘res judicata’ in the strict sense.” The key difference between this case and the leading cases on merger is that the judgment of Rares J is not a judgment that finally determined all the issues in dispute between the parties; it did not in that sense finally quell the controversy. The controversy between the parties which is the subject of the litigation below, and the first appeal to this Court, includes not only the respondents’ right to damages, which was determined by Rares J, but also the quantification of those damages. The “judgment” on liability entered by Rares J did not quell the controversy, but only part of it. Whether or not a judgment on liability with quantum still to be assessed results in a merger of the cause of action with the judgment is a question of some nicety. The debate centres on whether such a judgment is final in the requisite sense because one of the recognised requirements for merger, also termed a plea of former recovery, is that the judgment is a final judgment capable of supporting an action: Keane PA, Spencer Bower and Handley: res judicata (6th ed, LexisNexis, 2024) at [19.03] and [20.08]. It has long been recognised that where damages are the gist of the cause of action, liability cannot relevantly be divorced from the damages as a separate and independent matter: Electricity Commission of New South Wales v Lapthorne [1971] HCA 11; 124 CLR 177 at 184 per Barwick CJ, McTiernan J agreeing. It was held that a judgment on liability for damages to be assessed is not a final judgment. Also, a judgment or order that determines that there is a liability with quantum still to be assessed is not a judgment debt as a judgment debt can only arise where the judgment itself quantifies the sum which the judgment debtor owes to their judgment creditor: Thomas v Bunn [1991] 1 AC 362 (HL) at 380. Spencer Bower cites these cases as authority for the proposition that a judgment for liability without the final assessment of damages does not satisfy the finality requirement for merger: Spencer Bower at [20.08] referring back to [5.08]. It was also decided in Hahn v Conley [1971] HCA 56; 126 CLR 276 at 278 (Barwick CJ) and 296 (Walsh J) and Burns v Lipman [1975] HCA 2; 132 CLR 157 at 159 (Barwick CJ, Stephen, Mason and Jacobs JJ) that a judgment on liability with damages to be assessed is not a final judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In written submissions, the appellant submits that s 82(6) of the Act acknowledges that some claims are incapable of determination and therefore cannot be the subject of proof, whereas the calculation of defamation damages does not fall into that category. In response to that submission, the respondents raise an “alternative argument” that the relevant debt in this matter “cannot be fairly estimated” and is therefore not a provable debt as provided for by s 82(6). That point had not been advanced below and is not the subject of a notice of contention. Be that as it may, on the view I take of the matter it is not necessary for me to deal with the point.ConsiderationIntroduction The corpus of provable debts is set out in s 82(1) of the Act and further elucidated or expanded in subss (1A) and (8). The claims (using “claims” as a neutral word in relation to the issues to be decided) identified in subss (2), (3), (3AA), (3AB), (3A), (3B) and (6) are subtracted from that corpus of provable debts: see Coventry at [21]. As stated there, “[s]ub-section (2) which is at the centre of this appeal is, therefore, an exception to an otherwise broadly drawn definition of debts provable in bankruptcy.” The following are the presently relevant provisions:82 Debts provable in bankruptcy(1)Subject to this Division, all debts and liabilities, present or future, certain or contingent, to which a bankrupt was subject at the date of the bankruptcy, or to which he or she may become subject before his or her discharge by reason of an obligation incurred before the date of the bankruptcy, are provable in his or her bankruptcy.…(2)Demands in the nature of unliquidated damages arising otherwise than by reason of a contract, promise or breach of trust are not provable in bankruptcy. The appellant’s case is that the respondents’ claims are “liabilities” that are “contingent” on their extent being assessed. On that basis, the appellant submits that the claims come within subs (1). That much is common ground. The real question is whether the claims are excluded by subs (2).Submission 1: no “demand” as the claim merged in the liability judgment The appellant’s first principal submission, with reference to Ryan v Davies Bros Ltd [1921] HCA 53; 29 CLR 527 at 533, is that the right of action for the original wrong has merged in the judgment, and a new, higher and different obligation has been created by the judgment. He submits that since that occurred prior to the intervention of bankruptcy, the claim on the judgment is a provable debt within s 82(1) and it is not a “demand” within s 82(2). In Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507 (at [20]) it was explained that an exercise of judicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or classes of persons. It was said that in that way a final judgment “quells” the controversy between those persons; the rights and obligations in controversy, as between those persons, cease to have an independent existence: they “merge” in that final judgment. Such a merger is treated in Australia as “equating to ‘res judicata’ in the strict sense.”