FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
O’Shannassy v Sarina (Appeal) [2024] FCA 880
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read O'Shannassy v Sarina (Appeal) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2024] FCA 880
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the appellant's argument that the right of action for the original wrong had merged in the judgment, thus creating a new, higher, and different obligation. The court, however, distinguished this case from those where a final judgment has been rendered, noting that the judgment in question did not finally determine all the issues in dispute as it left the quantification of damages unresolved. The court held that a judgment on liability for damages to be assessed does not satisfy the finality requirement for merger, as it does not quell the entire controversy. This finding was based on established jurisprudence which holds that where damages are the gist of the cause of action, liability cannot be divorced from damages as a separate and independent matter. Consequently, the court concluded that the unassessed damages remained a demand in the nature of unliquidated damages and thus were not provable in bankruptcy under section 82(2) of the Act.
The appeal was allowed, but the appeal itself was dismissed with costs. The court's reasoning was rooted in the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and the established legal principles surrounding the merger of causes of action in final judgments. The court granted leave to appeal to ensure that the matter was thoroughly examined, but ultimately upheld the lower court's decision regarding the provability of the unassessed damages in the context of bankruptcy.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant be granted leave to appeal.
2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In written submissions, the appellant submits that s 82(6) of the Act acknowledges that some claims are incapable of determination and therefore cannot be the subject of proof, whereas the calculation of defamation damages does not fall into that category. In response to that submission, the respondents raise an “alternative argument” that the relevant debt in this matter “cannot be fairly estimated” and is therefore not a provable debt as provided for by s 82(6). That point had not been advanced below and is not the subject of a notice of contention. Be that as it may, on the view I take of the matter it is not necessary for me to deal with the point.ConsiderationIntroduction The corpus of provable debts is set out in s 82(1) of the Act and further elucidated or expanded in subss (1A) and (8). The claims (using “claims” as a neutral word in relation to the issues to be decided) identified in subss (2), (3), (3AA), (3AB), (3A), (3B) and (6) are subtracted from that corpus of provable debts: see Coventry at [21]. As stated there, “[s]ub-section (2) which is at the centre of this appeal is, therefore, an exception to an otherwise broadly drawn definition of debts provable in bankruptcy.” The following are the presently relevant provisions:82 Debts provable in bankruptcy(1)Subject to this Division, all debts and liabilities, present or future, certain or contingent, to which a bankrupt was subject at the date of the bankruptcy, or to which he or she may become subject before his or her discharge by reason of an obligation incurred before the date of the bankruptcy, are provable in his or her bankruptcy.…(2)Demands in the nature of unliquidated damages arising otherwise than by reason of a contract, promise or breach of trust are not provable in bankruptcy. The appellant’s case is that the respondents’ claims are “liabilities” that are “contingent” on their extent being assessed. On that basis, the appellant submits that the claims come within subs (1). That much is common ground. The real question is whether the claims are excluded by subs (2).Submission 1: no “demand” as the claim merged in the liability judgment The appellant’s first principal submission, with reference to Ryan v Davies Bros Ltd [1921] HCA 53; 29 CLR 527 at 533, is that the right of action for the original wrong has merged in the judgment, and a new, higher and different obligation has been created by the judgment. He submits that since that occurred prior to the intervention of bankruptcy, the claim on the judgment is a provable debt within s 82(1) and it is not a “demand” within s 82(2). In Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507 (at [20]) it was explained that an exercise of judicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or classes of persons. It was said that in that way a final judgment “quells” the controversy between those persons; the rights and obligations in controversy, as between those persons, cease to have an independent existence: they “merge” in that final judgment. Such a merger is treated in Australia as “equating to ‘res judicata’ in the strict sense.”