Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ

GREGORY IAN ATTWELLS & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

JACKSON LALIC LAWYERS PTY LIMITED  RESPONDENT

Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Limited

[2016] HCA 16

4 May 2016

S161/2015

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside orders 3, 4 and 5 of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 1 October 2014 and in their place order that:

(a)the appeal be allowed;

(b)the orders of Harrison J made on 17 October 2013 be set aside, and in their place order that the separate question of whether the plaintiffs' claim is defeated entirely, because the defendant is immune from suit, be answered:  "No".

3.Set aside the orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 28 October 2014.

4.The respondent pay the appellants' costs of the proceedings on the separate question in the courts below and of the appeal to this Court.

5.The Law Society of New South Wales pay the costs of the appellants and the respondent occasioned by its intervention in the proceedings.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

G O'L Reynolds SC with R C A Higgins, R A Yezerski and D W Robertson for the appellants (instructed by L C Muriniti & Associates)

A S Bell SC with P D Herzfeld for the respondent (instructed by Sparke Helmore Lawyers)

R P L Lancaster SC with N J Owens for the Law Society of New South Wales, intervening (instructed by Allens)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Legal practitioners – Negligence – Advocate's immunity from suit – Advice given out of court – Where advice given by advocate led to agreed settlement of proceedings – Where terms of settlement reflected in consent orders made by court and court's noting of agreement – Where negligence proceedings issued in respect of advice – Whether advocate immune from suit.

High Court – Stare decisis – Whether D'Orta‑Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 and Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 should be reconsidered.

Words and phrases – "advocate's immunity", "collateral attack", "consent orders", "finality", "intimately connected", "judicial determination", "judicial power", "statement of agreed facts".

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 90, 133(1).
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), Pt 36.

  1. FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ.   In these proceedings, the appellants claim that earlier litigation to enforce a guarantee was settled on terms unfavourable to the first appellant as a result of the negligent advice of the respondent, his solicitor at the time.  The respondent has raised the advocate's immunity from suit as a complete answer to the appellants' claim.  The respondent contends that the advocate's immunity extends not only to negligent advice which leads to a final judicial determination, but also to negligent advice which leads to an…

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Details
Case
[2016] HCA 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the appellants, who had sued Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (the respondent) for alleged negligence in providing advice that led to the settlement of prior proceedings. The dispute centred on whether the respondent, as legal practitioners, was immune from suit for this advice, which was given out of court but resulted in consent orders being made by the court. The Law Society of New South Wales was granted leave to intervene in the proceedings.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether advocate's immunity, as previously established in cases like *Giannarelli v Wraith* and *D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid*, extended to advice given by a legal practitioner out of court that led to the settlement of proceedings, which were then formalised by consent orders. The High Court was also asked to consider whether those prior decisions should be reconsidered. The appellants contended that the respondent's advice, even if given out of court, was not so intimately connected with the judicial determination of the case as to attract immunity, and that the negligence proceedings did not constitute a collateral attack on any judicial determination.

The High Court, by majority, allowed the appeal, holding that the advocate's immunity does not extend to advice given out of court that leads to a settlement, even if that settlement is subsequently embodied in consent orders. The Court reasoned that the immunity is confined to work that is an essential part of the judicial process, such as work done in court or work done out of court that directly affects the conduct of proceedings in court and leads to a judicial determination. Giving advice on settlement, while important, does not involve the exercise of judicial power or a judicial determination of the parties' rights. The Court distinguished the present case from *Giannarelli* and *D'Orta-Ekenaike*, finding that the alleged negligence in providing settlement advice did not involve a "collateral attack" on a judicial decision, but rather a challenge to the conduct of the legal practitioner in advising on the settlement itself.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and the primary judge, and ordered that the separate question of whether the respondent was immune from suit be answered in the negative. The matter was remitted for determination on the merits, with the respondent ordered to pay the appellants' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside orders 3, 4 and 5 of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 1 October 2014 and in their place order that:

(a) the appeal be allowed;

(b) the orders of Harrison J made on 17 October 2013 be set aside, and in their place order that the separate question of whether the plaintiffs' claim is defeated entirely, because the defendant is immune from suit, be answered: "No".

3. Set aside the orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 28 October 2014.

4. The respondent pay the appellants' costs of the proceedings on the separate question in the courts below and of the appeal to this Court.

5. The Law Society of New South Wales pay the costs of the appellants and the respondent occasioned by its intervention in the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants appealed to this Court pursuant to a grant of special leave[26]. In this Court, the Law Society of New South Wales ("the Law Society") sought leave to intervene. That leave was granted on the condition that the Law Society pay the costs of the parties occasioned by the intervention[27].[26]Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ, 7 August 2015.[27]Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 at 603, 615, 628; [1997] HCA 31; Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [No 1] (2011) 248 CLR 37 at 39 [3]; [2011] HCA 54.The agreed facts As already noted, the hearing before the primary judge proceeded on the basis of a statement of agreed facts. These reflected the allegations of fact, including the negligence of the respondent, set out in the statement of claim. It appears clear that they were "agreed" in the sense that the separate question was to be determined on the assumption, made only for the purposes of that determination, that they were established. If the procedure for determination of a separate question is to be useful, it is necessary for those managing the case at the stage when a question is posed for separate determination to ensure that the facts on which the question is to proceed are "the facts … which the [plaintiff] will seek to establish at trial."[28] If the parties are unable to state facts which, if found, will lead to a judgment in the plaintiff's favour, doubts as to the utility of the determination of the proposed separate question may lead a court to decline an application to determine that question separately. [28]Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v JM (2013) 250 CLR 135 at 155 [34]; [2013] HCA 30. In the present case, as appeared from the terms of the statement of agreed facts upon which the separate question was posed for resolution, it must be said, as the appellants' Senior Counsel acknowledged in argument in this Court, that "there is a measure of opacity … on the issues of negligence and causation" in the appellants' claim. The agreed facts stated that the respondent advised the guarantors to sign the consent order containing the terms of settlement "because, if they defaulted in payment of the sum of $1,750,000 by 19 November 2010, it would not make any difference if the judgment in favour of the bank was for $3,399,347.67 or any other sum ('the advice')." The statement of agreed facts then asserted, among other things, that the respondent was negligent: (i)in giving the advice when the guarantors did not have a liability to the bank for $3,399,347 or anything like that sum;(ii)in failing to advise the guarantors that if they defaulted in payment of the sum of $1,750,000 by 19 November 2010, there would be a judgment against them for $1,543,225 more than the guaranteed amount of $1,856,122; and(iii)in failing to advise the guarantors that no legally binding settlement came into existence unless the terms of settlement were signed, and that there were alternatives that they could pursue, including making a counteroffer reflecting the guaranteed sum of $1,856,122 in lieu of $3,399,347 and, failing acceptance of that offer by the bank, resuming the hearing.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ NETTLE J (dissent) GORDON J (dissent)
Nevertheless, his Honour declined to answer the separate question[17]. His Honour was concerned that, without further evidence in relation to the respondent's alleged negligence, he could only form a view about the application of the advocate's immunity on a hypothetical basis[18]. [17]Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1510 at [38].[18]Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1510 at [37].The decision of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ, Meagher and Ward JJA) granted leave to appeal, and held that the primary judge erred in declining to answer the separate question[19]. Their Honours then proceeded to answer that question adversely to the appellants. [19]Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd v Attwells [2014] NSWCA 335 at [30]‑[32]. The Court of Appeal held that the respondent's advice was within the immunity recognised in Giannarelli[20] as "work done in court or work done out of court which leads to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court."[21] Bathurst CJ, with whom Meagher and Ward JJA agreed, said[22]:"In the present case, in my opinion, the work fell within categories of work done out of court affecting the conduct of the case in court. The alleged breach occurred in advising on settlement of the guarantee proceedings …The advice … led to the case being settled. Put another way it was intimately connected with the conduct of the guarantee proceedings."[20](1988) 165 CLR 543 at 560.[21]Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd v Attwells [2014] NSWCA 335 at [36].[22]Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd v Attwells [2014] NSWCA 335 at [37]‑[38]. The Court of Appeal concluded that the negligence proceedings would necessarily involve a re‑agitation of the issues determined in the guarantee proceedings; and a reconsideration of those issues in order to determine whether the respondent had been negligent would offend the principle of finality[23]. Accordingly, the respondent was immune from suit[24], and judgment was entered for the respondent in the proceedings[25].[23]Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd v Attwells [2014] NSWCA 335 at [41].[24]Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd v Attwells [2014] NSWCA 335 at [47].[25]Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd v Attwells [2014] NSWCA 335 at [48]. The appellants appealed to this Court pursuant to a grant of special leave[26]. In this Court, the Law Society of New South Wales ("the Law Society") sought leave to intervene. That leave was granted on the condition that the Law Society pay the costs of the parties occasioned by the intervention[27].[26]Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ, 7 August 2015.[27]Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 at 603, 615, 628; [1997] HCA 31; Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [No 1] (2011) 248 CLR 37 at 39 [3]; [2011] HCA 54.The agreed facts As already noted, the hearing before the primary judge proceeded on the basis of a statement of agreed facts. These reflected the allegations of fact, including the negligence of the respondent, set out in the statement of claim. It appears clear that they were "agreed" in the sense that the separate question was to be determined on the assumption, made only for the purposes of that determination, that they were established. If the procedure for determination of a separate question is to be useful, it is necessary for those managing the case at the stage when a question is posed for separate determination to ensure that the facts on which the question is to proceed are "the facts … which the [plaintiff] will seek to establish at trial."[28] If the parties are unable to state facts which, if found, will lead to a judgment in the plaintiff's favour, doubts as to the utility of the determination of the proposed separate question may lead a court to decline an application to determine that question separately. [28]Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v JM (2013) 250 CLR 135 at 155 [34]; [2013] HCA 30.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ,

Full text does not contain this section.