Manny v David Lardner Lawyers (No 4)

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

COURT OF APPEAL

Case Title:

Manny v David Lardner Lawyers (No 4)

Citation: 

[2024] ACTCA 12

Hearing Date: 

16 November 2022

Decision Date: 

4 April 2024

Before:

Loukas-Karlsson, McWilliam and O’Sullivan JJ

Decision: 

(1) The appeal is dismissed;

(2) The appellants are to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal;

(3) Costs are to be assessed on a party-to-party basis unless the respondents apply to the Court otherwise within seven (7) days of the date judgment is entered.

Catchwords: 

APPEAL – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Whether the primary judge should have recused herself ­– appellant has not demonstrated a basis for apprehended bias – appellant has not demonstrated a lack of procedural fairness – recusal unnecessary – appeal dismissed

APPEAL – CIVIL LAW – Whether rejection of the appellant’s claims in tort, contract, and equity at first instance was correct in law – no error established – primary decision upheld – no breach of duty of care – no economic loss found – advocate immunity applied – no breach of solicitor retainer – no breach of fiduciary obligations – claims precluded by s 153(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – claims not provable in bankruptcy under s 82(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – claims time-barred by s 11(1) of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) – respondents were not retained in Family Court proceedings to act for the fifth appellant – appeal dismissed

Legislation Cited: 

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 27(1), 35, 35A, 58(3), 82(1), 82(2), 153(1), 153(4)

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ss 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46
Constitution s 75

Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) ss 5A, 5A(2)

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 41(1)(b)

Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 11(1)

Partnership Act 1963 (ACT) ss 14, 14(2), 16

Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ss 7, 37E

Cases Cited: 

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; 225 CLR 88

Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Nash [2010] NSWSC 1442

Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 16; 259 CLR 1

Badenach v Calvert [2016] HCA 18; 257 CLR 440

Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas [2010] FCAFC 125; 188 FCR 140

Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; 273 CLR 289

Clark Boyce v Mouat [1994] 1 AC 428

Clifton v Duong [2019] ACTCA 22; 347 FLR 30

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337

Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; 229 CLR 577

Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124

David v David [2009] NSWCA 8

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118

Gindy v Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd [2022] ACTCA 66;

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Details
Case
[2024] ACTCA 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerned a dispute between the appellants, Mr Manny and associated companies, and the respondents, David Lardner Lawyers (DLL). The appellants sought to overturn the primary judge's decision, which had dismissed their claims in tort, contract, and equity. The primary judge had found that none of the causes of action were made out and entered judgment for the respondents. The appeal was heard by Loukas-Karlsson, McWilliam, and O’Sullivan JJ.

The central legal issues before the Full Court were whether the primary judge had demonstrated apprehended bias or denied the appellants procedural fairness. Substantively, the Court was required to determine if the primary judge had erred in rejecting the appellants' claims, which arose from advice and actions taken by DLL in previous Family Court proceedings concerning the division of a substantial property portfolio.

The Court found no error in the primary judge's decision. It held that the appellants had not demonstrated a basis for apprehended bias or a lack of procedural fairness, rendering recusal unnecessary. The Court upheld the primary judge's findings that there was no breach of duty of care, no economic loss established, and that advocate immunity applied. Furthermore, the Court found no breach of the solicitor's retainer or fiduciary obligations. The claims were also precluded by s 153(1) of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth), were not provable in bankruptcy under s 82(2) of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth), and were time-barred by s 11(1) of the *Limitation Act 1985* (ACT).

The appeal was dismissed. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal, to be assessed on a party-to-party basis unless the respondents applied for a different assessment within seven days of judgment entry.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) The appeal is dismissed;

(2) The appellants are to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal;

(3) Costs are to be assessed on a party-to-party basis unless the respondents apply to the Court otherwise within seven (7) days of the date judgment is entered.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The plaintiffs were unsuccessful, with Murrell CJ (primary judge) finding that none of the causes of action were made out and entering judgment for the defendants: Manny v David Lardner Lawyers (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 289 (primary judgment). The notice of appeal was prepared by Mr Manny as a self-represented litigant, acting (with leave) on behalf of the companies. At the front of almost every ground of the unduly prolix and repetitive notice are complaints of apprehended bias and a denial of procedural fairness. The two primary issues on the appeal are therefore:(1)Whether there was any apprehended bias (Issue 1); and (2)Whether there was any denial of procedural fairness (Issue 2). However, when the attempt at legalese is stripped back from the document, the appellants’ substantive complaint is that the primary judge erred in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims in respect of each cause of action. Given the nature of the formal notice of appeal and the appellants’ lack of legal representation, the respondents in their submissions addressed the material findings on each of the causes of action and whether there was any error in those key findings (Issue 3). I have also dealt with the appeal on that substantive basis. The genesis of the appellants’ complaint before the primary judge was advice given and steps taken in previous divorce proceedings in the Family Court of Australia, as it was then known, between his wife (Ms Manny), himself and the JMG companies (FamCA proceedings). The JMG was part of the FamCA proceedings because Mr Manny was the sole director and shareholder of all the relevant corporate entities, and it collectively held a large property portfolio, all of which were considered to be part of the asset pool to be divided between Mr and Ms Manny. The assets were heavily geared, with loan facilities in the total sum of $14,008,000. Several loan facilities were due to expire on 17 October 2010. The FamCA proceedings were heard over the course of a year (July 2009 and July 2010). Final orders were made by Faulks DCJ at first instance on 13 July 2010, with minor amendments made pursuant to the slip rule on 14 July 2010, (Final Orders). One of those orders required Mr Manny to pay to Ms Manny the sum of $1,258,000.00 within 14 days, in default of which, the entire property portfolio was to be sold in 3 tranches. Mr Manny wanted to delay enforcement of the final orders, while hoping the property market improved and the ANZ bank did not foreclose (primary judgment at [333]). On or around 20 July 2010 (on the appellants’ pleaded case), he and the JMG retained DLL, which had not previously been involved in the FamCA proceedings. DLL promptly sought a stay of the order to pay the said sum to Ms Manny, pending an appeal of the final orders made. Importantly for the issues in dispute in this proceeding, the application prepared by DLL did not seek to restrain the sale of any of the properties. The orders proposed provided for a restraint on Mr Manny and the JMG from borrowing any further money against the properties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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