Tachnat Pty Ltd v Orsini - [2022] NSWSC 393

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Tachnat Pty Ltd v Orsini [2022] NSWSC 393
Hearing dates: 17 September 2021
Date of orders: 5 April 2022
Decision date: 05 April 2022
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Harrison AsJ
Decision:
The Court orders:
(1) Tachnat give security for the costs of the first defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000
(2) Tachnat give security for the costs of the second defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000;
(3) The proceedings against the first defendant be stayed until order (1) above has been complied with;
(4) The proceedings against the second defendant be stayed until order (2) above has been complied with;
(5) The first defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 30 July 2021 and paragraph [16] of the second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021 seeking security for costs, are to be stood over with liberty to the defendants to restore in order to seek further security for costs;
(6) In regards to the second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021: Paragraphs [2] and [9] seeking a permanent stay of proceedings are dismissed. Paragraphs [13] and [17] seeking answers to particulars are stood over to the Registrar at 9.00am on 27 April 2021 for directions. The plaintiffs’ claims in relation to drafting pleadings with no reasonable prospects of success, those pursuant to s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and those seeking damages for mental harm as against the second defendant are dismissed. Of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the second defendant: in relation to the period until 22 September 2015 those in negligence, and those for breach of contract remain, and for the period after 22 September 2015 the claim in negligence by Tachnat remains. All other claims made by the plaintiffs’ as against the second defendant are struck out.
(7) So far as the second defendant is concerned the plaintiff’s request for particulars needs to be recast now that the surviving claims against her have been narrowed;
(8) The second plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 19 June 2021 seeking summary judgment, and the plaintiffs’ Notices of Motion dated 27 July 2021, and 5 August 2021 seeking default judgment and the assessment of damages against both defendants are dismissed;
(9) The first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the first defendant’s costs of their notices of motion filed 19 June 2021, 5 August 2021, and 27 July 2021 respectively and the first defendant’s Notice of Motion dated 30 July 2021 seeking security for costs. As the second defendant was almost entirely successful in her Notice of Motion, the first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the second defendant’s costs of the second defendant’s Notice of Motion dated 27 July 2021.

Catchwords:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Summary Judgment – Summary Dismissal – Stay of Proceedings – Whether there are serious issues to be tried – Whether there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed – Default Judgment – Application for default judgment while defendants awaiting particulars – Security for Costs – Where party has provided undertaking but has not provided security or set out ability to meet costs orders

Legislation Cited:
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW), rr 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 14.2
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 67
Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), s 174
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 7.2, 13.1, 13.4, 14.3, 14.28, 16.7, 30.1, 42.21, 43.4,

Cases Cited:
About life v Maddocks [2021] NSWSC 1370
Across Australia Finance v Bassenger [2008] NSWSC 799
Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Ptd Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1; [2016] HCA 16
Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Brundza v Robbie & Co (No 2) (1952) 88 CLR 171
Connellan v Murphy [2017] VSCA 116
Dennis vJoukhador [2021] NSWSC 870
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12
Epping Plaza v Bevendale [2010] VCC 805
Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Gentry Bros v Wilson Brown & Associates [1992] FCA 592
Giannarelli and Others v Wraith and Others (1988) 165 CLR 543
GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2021] NSWSC 1204
Griffiths v Evans [1953] 1 WLR 1424
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41
Intercraft Cabinets Pty Ltd v Sampas Pty Ltd (1997) 18 WAR 306
Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad [2007] NSWCA 291
Kounnas v Citywide Civil Engineering Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 287
KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189
Live Board Holdings Ltd v Cody Live Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 302
Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79
MoubarakbhtCoorey v Holt (2019) 100 NSWLR 218
Newcastle City Council v Batistatos [2006] HCA 27
Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28
Studer v Boettcher [2000] NSWCA 263
The Nominal Defendant v Cordin [2019] NSWCA 85
Treloar Constructions Pty Limited v McMillan [2016] NSWCA 302
Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598

Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Tachnat Pty Ltd (First Plaintiff)
Hulio Gash (Second Plaintiff)
Rejani Rajan (Third Plaintiff)
Julie Orsini (First Defendant)
Vera Culkoff (Second Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
B McManus (First Defendant)
J Catsanos (Second Defendant)
Solicitors:
Hulio Gash (Plaintiffs)
DLA Piper (Defendants)

File Number(s): 2021/166049
Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment

HER HONOUR: This hearing involves five notices of motion. Three have been filed by the plaintiffs, one has been filed by first defendant and one by the second defendant. In summary, the plaintiffs seek summary judgment against both defendants, default judgment against both defendants, an order for maximum costs and an order for joinder of case number 2021/25515. While both defendants seek security for costs against the first defendant, and the second defendant seeks that the claims brought by the second and third plaintiffs as against her are dismissed, or stayed, or for the statement of claim filed on 9 June 2021 be struck out, and for the statement of claim filed on 9 June 2021 insofar as it relates to the first plaintiff’s claims against her to be struck out in part.
The first plaintiff is Tachnat Pty Ltd (“Tachnat”), the second plaintiff is Mr Gash, the third plaintiff is Ms Rajan. Mr Gash, a director of Tachnat, seeks leave to act for the plaintiff. Ms Rajan, also a director of Tachnat, consented to this course of action (T2.5-15). The defendants did not oppose leave being granted to Mr Gash to appear on behalf of Tachnat. I allowed him to do so before me in these current applications on the basis of his undertaking to comply with r 7.2 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) in providing a supporting affidavit within seven days. Mr Gash has provided the requisite affidavit. The first defendant is Julie A Orsini (a solicitor), and the second defendant is Vera Culkoff (a barrister).
The plaintiffs rely upon the affidavits of Mr Gash dated 18 June 2021, 27 July 2021, 5 August 2021, 9 August 2021, 22 August 2021, 29 August 2021 and 2 September 2021. The first defendant relies upon the affidavits of Ms Orsini dated 29 July 2021, Peter Moran, solicitor, dated 2 August 2021 and Christopher Harrison, solicitor, dated 5 August 2021. The second defendant relies on affidavits of James Derek Berg, sworn 27 July 2021 and Ms Culkoff, sworn 27 July 2021 and 6 September 2021.

Background

In 2013, the second plaintiff had a trademark registered for a menswear business and also a trademark registered for a company that designed menswear. He planned to have garments manufactured in Australia and exported to India (T9.37-50).
The underlying proceedings to which this matter relates involved a dispute between Tachnat and Pick Packers Pty Limited (“Pick Packers”). It was a commercial dispute between two corporate entities. In 2018, Tachnat had an agreement to store goods in Pick Packers’ warehouse. On about 22 February 2015 the stored goods were water damaged (T10.20-30).
After some preliminary email exchanges between the second defendant and the second and third plaintiffs, the first defendant was retained as the solicitor for Tachnat on 22 September 2015. Curiously the first defendant retained the second defendant, a barrister, to advise and appear for Tachnat in its dispute with Pick Packers on 30 June 2015, before she herself was retained. It should also be noted that the second defendant had some contact with the plaintiffs prior to 22 September 2015 (CB Vol 2, 813).
Proceedings between Tachnat as plaintiff and Pick Packers as defendant were commenced in the District Court. The statement of claim in the District Court sought damages of $443,278.69. The District Court proceedings settled at mediation for the sum of $100,000 (“the settlement”). That sum was the maximum recoverable under Pick Packers’ insurance policy.
Tachnat filed an application for assessment of the first defendant’s costs in 2018/24202 Tachnat Pty Ltd v Julie Orsini. The first defendant sought costs and disbursements of $293,093.75. On 6 December 2018, Costs Assessor Richard Hamwood (“the Costs Assessor”), provided reasons for his decision and issued a certificate. He assessed that a fair and reasonable sum for the first defendant’s costs was $242,018.85 (CB Vol 1, 174).
Tachnat appealed to the costs review panel. On 18 May 2019, a Review Panel comprised of Stephen Lanken and Michael Robinson (“the Review Panel”) substituted the sum of $192,702.75 in lieu of the Costs Assessor’s decision (CB Vol 1, 202).

The pleading in the Amended statement of claim (“ASC”)

On 9 June 2021, the plaintiffs filed a statement of claim in this Court. On 11 August 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended statement of claim (“ASC”). The alleged conduct of the defendants is said to have resulted in a number of losses to the plaintiffs including loss of income, loss of profits, loss of business opportunities, loss of the opportunity to have children, and to have caused the second and third plaintiffs mental harm.
It should be noted that the defendants acknowledge the amendments made in the ASC are not material to the motions before the Court save for the fact that the pleadings in the ASC should be substituted for the original statement of claim, where referenced, in the second defendant’s Notice of Motion.
The plaintiffs seek the following:

a judgment or declaration on the financial disadvantage caused to the plaintiff(s) pursuant to s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW);

a judgment or declaration on misleading and deceptive conduct pursuant to s18 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth);

a judgment or declaration on breach of duty of care pursuant to Division 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW);

a judgment for damages under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth);

a judgment or declaration for breach of contract for negligent, misleading, dishonest and deceptive conduct;

an order or judgment that the defendant pays damages/compensation.

More specifically, the plaintiffs plead the following in the ASC:

the “defendant” withheld notices, and settlement offers issued by Pick Packers or its lawyers;

the defendants were intentionally negligent and knowingly brought false detinue and conversion claims against Pick Packers;

the defendants knowingly initiated proceedings with no reasonable prospects of success for their own financial advantage and contrary to the plaintiffs’ instructions; and

the defendants intentionally misled the plaintiffs, thereby breaching contract, their duty of care, and their fiduciary duties.

At [82] of the ASC, the plaintiffs seek punitive and exemplary damages in addition to a number of heads of other damages, including for mental harm to the second and third plaintiffs.
As can be appreciated, these are serious allegations made against the first and second defendants, both of whom are legal practitioners.

The notices of motion

The best way, in my opinion, to organise the orders sought in each these 5 notices of motion is to group each subject matter raised in the various motions. I shall firstly deal with the plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment and second defendant’s application for summary dismissal or to strike out pleadings. Secondly, I shall address the second defendant’s application for a permanent stay of proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs. Thirdly, I will deal with the plaintiffs’ Notices of Motion seeking default judgment and that damages be assessed as against both defendants. Finally, I will address the first and second defendants’ applications seeking security for costs from Tachnat.

The second plaintiff’s summary judgment and the second defendant’s summary dismissal or strike out motions

The second plaintiff’s Notice of Motion filed 19 June 2021

The second plaintiff’s first Notice of Motion filed on 19 June 2021 (“Summary Judgment Motion”) relevantly seeks:

summary judgment pursuant to UCPR 13.1.

an order for maximum costs pursuant to UCPR 43.4.

an order for joinder of case number 2021/25515 pursuant to UCPR Division 5.

So far as the Summary Judgment Motion is concerned, in relation to paragraph [2], costs of the proceedings are normally determined after trial. Maximum costs are not determined at the hearing of these notices of motion, it is only the costs of the motions can be dealt with in this judgment. Hence I dismiss paragraph [2] of the Summary Judgment Motion.
In relation to paragraph [3], at the hearing I made an order that the plaintiff serve the defendants in this proceeding with the Summary Judgment Motion and supporting affidavit in 2021/25515. I directed that this file be made available to the Registrar on 25 October 2021 when it is listed for a directions hearing. That leaves only paragraph [1], the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment under UCPR 13.1 to be determined.
As there is an application by the second defendant to summarily dismiss the plaintiff’s statement of claim, I will take the plaintiff’s case at its highest. Therefore, I will deal with all the applications on the basis of the pleading in the ASC.

The second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021

The second defendant does not seek to strike out the majority of the claims made by Tachnat, having accepted that they are matters that are to be determined at trial. Rather, the second defendant focuses on the summary dismissal and strike out of the second and third plaintiff’s claims against her.
The second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021 (“Second Defendant’s Motion”) is lengthy and involves all three plaintiffs. The relief sought against the second and third plaintiff is almost identical. I have excised paragraph [16] concerning security for costs and reproduced it later in this judgment where I deal with that topic. The second defendant’s Motion relevantly reads:

“With respect to the third plaintiff:
[1] The proceedings, insofar as they are brought by the third plaintiff, be dismissed as against the second defendant pursuant to rule 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
[2] In the alternative to Order 1, stay the proceedings, insofar as they are brought by the third plaintiff, permanently as against the second defendant pursuant to s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. (“Permanent stay of proceedings”)
[3] In the alternative to Orders 1 and/or 2, the whole of the Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the third plaintiffs claims against the second defendant, be struck out pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
[4] In the alternative to Order 3, the Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the third plaintiffs claims against the second defendant, be struck out in part (to the extent that it purports to plead a cause of action against the second defendant) pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
[5] The third plaintiff pay the second defendant's costs of and incidental to these proceedings, including with respect to this Notice of Motion.
[6] In the alternative to Orders 1 to 5 above, the third plaintiff to provide particulars in answer to paragraphs 31.6, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the correspondence from the second defendant's solicitors to the plaintiffs dated 29 June 2021. (“Particulars”)
…
With respect to the second plaintiff:
[8] The proceedings, insofar as they are brought by the second plaintiff, be dismissed as against the second defendant pursuant to rule 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
[9] In the alternative to Order 8, stay the proceedings, insofar as they are brought by the second plaintiff, permanently as against the second defendant pursuant to s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. (“Permanent stay of proceedings”)
[10] In the alternative to Orders 8 and/or 9, the whole of the Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the second plaintiff’s claims against the second defendant, be struck out pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
[11] In the alternative to Order 10, the Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the second plaintiff’s claims against the second defendant, be struck out in part (to the extent that it purports to plead a cause of action against the second defendant) pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
[12] The second plaintiff pay the second defendant's costs of and incidental to these proceedings, including with respect to this Notice of Motion.
[13] In the alternative to Orders 8 to 12 above, the second plaintiff to provide particulars in answer to paragraphs 31.6, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the correspondence from the second defendant's solicitors to the plaintiffs dated 29 June 2021. (“Particulars”)
…
With respect to the first plaintiff
[15] The Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the first plaintiff’s claims against the second defendant, be struck out in part pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
[16] [“Security for costs”]
[17] The first plaintiff to provide particulars in answer to paragraphs 31.6.1, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the correspondence from the second defendant's solicitors to the plaintiffs dated 29 June 2021. (“Particulars”)
…”

Paragraphs [6], [13] and [17] relate to particulars. I note that paragraph [6] is not pressed at this stage (T51.47-52.22). By arrangement paragraphs [13] and [17] have not been dealt with by me at this hearing, they are to be referred to the Registrar for directions, if appropriate.
In summary, the main issues in the second defendant’s Notice of Motion to be addressed in the summary judgment / strike out application are whether:

certain relief sought by the plaintiff should be struck out/dismissed;

claims for summary dismissal against the second and third plaintiffs should be granted;

proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs should be stayed; and

security for costs as against Tachnat should be granted.

The law – summary judgment/strike out proceedings

UCPR 13.1, 13.4 and 14.28 provide:

“13.1 Summary judgment
(1) If, on application by the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff's claim for relief or any part of the plaintiff's claim for relief--
(a) there is evidence of the facts on which the claim or part of the claim is based, and
(b) there is evidence, given by the plaintiff or by some responsible person, that, in the belief of the person giving the evidence, the defendant has no defence to the claim or part of the claim, or no defence except as to the amount of any damages claimed,

the court may give such judgment for the plaintiff, or make such order on the claim or that part of the claim, as the case requires.
(2) Without limiting subrule (1), the court may give judgment for the plaintiff for damages to be assessed.
(3) In this rule, a reference to "damages" includes a reference to the value of goods.
13.4 Frivolous and vexatious proceedings
(1) If in any proceedings it appears to the court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings--
(a) the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or
(b) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or
(c) the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court,

the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed generally or in relation to that claim.
(2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1).
14.28 Circumstances in which court may strike out pleadings
(1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the whole or any part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading --
(a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading, or
(b) has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings, or
(c) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

(2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1).”

The power to enter summary judgment should be exercised with great care, and an order under the rule should only be made where it is clear that there is no real question to be tried: see Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99; Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 at [5]; Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28; Dennis v Joukhador [2021] NSWSC 870 at [17]. If there is a real question, either of fact or law, and the rights of the parties depend on it, it is not open for the court to intervene summarily: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91. It must be clear that there are no facts in issue.
The test applied in considering an application for summary judgment is similar to that applying to an application for summary dismissal as per General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 (“General Steel”) at [8], eg "so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed", "manifestly groundless", "so manifestly faulty that it does not admit of argument".
UCPR 14.28 enunciates grounds, upon which a defective pleading may be struck out. Whereas UCPR 13.4 focuses on the weakness of a party’s case rather than defects of pleading: see Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937.
The plaintiffs, in their submissions seeking summary judgment, rely upon s 174 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) (“LPUL”) which reads:

“174 Disclosure obligations of law practice regarding clients
(1) Main disclosure requirement A law practice--
(a) must, when or as soon as practicable after instructions are initially given in a matter, provide the client with information disclosing the basis on which legal costs will be calculated in the matter and an estimate of the total legal costs; and
(b) must, when or as soon as practicable after there is any significant change to anything previously disclosed under this subsection, provide the client with information disclosing the change, including information about any significant change to the legal costs that will be payable by the client-- together with the information referred to in subsection (2).

(2) Additional information to be provided Information provided under--
(a) subsection (1)(a) must include information about the client's rights-
(i) to negotiate a costs agreement with the law practice; and
(ii) to negotiate the billing method (for example, by reference to timing or task); and
(iii) to receive a bill from the law practice and to request an itemised bill after receiving a bill that is not itemised or is only partially itemised; and
(iv) to seek the assistance of the designated local regulatory authority in the event of a dispute about legal costs; or

(b) subsection (1)(b) must include a sufficient and reasonable amount of information about the impact of the change on the legal costs that will be payable to allow the client to make informed decisions about the future conduct of the matter.

(3) Client's consent and understanding If a disclosure is made under subsection (1), the law practice must take all reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the client has understood and given consent to the proposed course of action for the conduct of the matter and the proposed costs.
…
(8) Change in amount of total costs--where previously below higher threshold If the law practice has not made a disclosure under subsection (1) but has made a disclosure under subsection (5) because the total legal costs in the matter are not likely to exceed the higher threshold, the law practice must, when or as soon as practicable after the law practice becomes aware (or ought reasonably become aware) that the total legal costs (excluding GST and disbursements) are likely to exceed the higher threshold--
(a) inform the client in writing of that expectation; and
(b) make the disclosure required by subsection (1).”

The costs agreements

The plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment centres upon the two costs agreements; the first being between Tachnat and the first defendant (“Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement”) and the second between the first and second defendants (“Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement”).
The Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement reads (CB Vol 1, 96):

“COST DISCLOSURE
TO: HULIO GASH REJANI RAJAN TACHNAT PTY LIMITED
AC15918889S TACHNAT)'
From: Julie A Orsini
XXX Catherine Street, Lilyfield NSW. 2040
Date: 22 September 2015
RE: Tachnat-v- Pickpackers
Proceedings re Contract & damages
We note your Instructions to act in the above matter.
The Work. (Schedule 1)
The work you require us to do is to take all action necessary to advise and act in your behalf in respect of Contractual Claim by Tachnat against Pick Packers and to represent you in Court Proceedings, Including negotiations with the other parties representative, drafting and engrossing any Interlocutory Applications or Motions, Affidavit evidence, arranging any expert evidence, in support of both any interlocutory process and final orders, issue of Subpoenas, engagement of experts, attending court for directions, briefing counsel, attending the hearing & all necessary other attendances required for determination of all issues between Tachnat and Pickpackers.

Professional fees: (Schedule 2)
In accordance with me terms of our General Cost Agreement, by reason of the referral, we agree to charge you afee of $450.00 per hour excluding GST, given the urgency of the application', and charged in minimum 6 minute unite as set out In our General Cost Agreement

Other Charges:
We will charge you for other services we supply as set out in our general cost agreement. We are likely to Incur expenses and disbursements, being money mat we are liable to pay others on your behalf. You are required to pay these in accordance with the terms of our General Cost Agreement. We will inform you of these expenses and disbursements as well as other payments required to be made as soon as practicable.

Present Estimate: (Schedule 3)
it is not possible to provide you with an accurate estimate of the total costs. Instead a range of time estimates of billable time is provided for different stages. There are a number of stages in your matter which will vary but broadly:-
1.   Instructions and Investigation of matter   5-10 [hours]
2.   Considering evidence, perusing documents, preparing
originating and interlocutory processes, financial statements &
lay evidence   40-70 [hours]
3.   Briefing counsel including conferences   10-20 [hours]
4.   Addressing other parties evidence & any expert Evidence or
expert accounting evidence (If required)    30-50 [hours]
5.   Issue Subpoenas and consideration of documents Produced
5-10 [hours’
6.   Arranging for expert evidence   5 [hours]
7.   Attendances at Court for directions (est 5-8) 10 [hours]
8.   All other general attendances, preparation for Hearing and
attendance for hearing (est 3 days) 60-80 [hours]

These estimates are made on the information available to us at this time. They may and probably will change when more information is available or if more evidence is filed by the other party. Major factors which affect the estimates are:
1. More evidence being filed which may require consideration and reply;
2. Interlocutory applications being brought or to be brought requiring us to deal with them;
3. Failure to reach hearing times by Court or applications by other parry requiring further adjournments, directions or further attendances at Court.

Engagement of another Law practice/ Barrister
It will be necessary to engage a Barrister on your behalf. We will consult you when this is required. You may be asked to enter into a costs agreement with that party. The Barrister will disclose costs in a similar fashion and we will dispose those to you. We are of the view that a senior barrister may be required for this matter. Briefing a senior barrister will require, at some stage, the briefing of a junior barrister to assist. A barrister's fee ranges from 3000.00 per day to 10000.00 per day for senior counsel. Please note that this is an estimate only and a retainer will be provided by the barrister agreed to be briefed when required.

Billing Arrangements
You are generally billed monthly in accordance with our General cost agreement. You will generally be billed at monthly intervals and/or upon any orders tor costs being; made pursuant to any interlocutory application or motion. Payment is required in accordance with the terms of our General Cost Agreement.

Termination of Retainer
In the event that you terminate the services of this firm, all outstanding fees and disbursements are required to be paid prior to collection of the file.

Substantial changes to disclosure
You will be informed, as soon as is reasonably practicable of any substantial changes to anything contained in this disclosure document.

Persons responsible for your matter and costs
The persons responsible for the provision of instructions and for payment of costs is Hulio Gash. Persons further responsible for the provision of instructions and for the payment of costs are Rejani Rajan and Tachnat. All terms of this disclosure and the Cost Agreement apply to those parties jointly and severally. By your continued Instructions, you accept these terms apply to the work referred to herein.

Costs In Court Proceedings
In accordance with the terms of our general cost agreement, the court may order the other parry to pay your costs of the proceedings. This sum will not necessarily cover the whole of your legal costs due to us. It Is possible that the court may make an order that you pay the other parties costs (if, for instance, you lose the-case). These costs are payable by you to the other party in addition to the costs payable to us.

Estimate of costs payable to other party if unsuccessful
If you are successful in the litigation the following is the range of costs that may be recovered from the other party. The sums given below are merely estimates.
Prior to hearing: $100,000
Est 3 day contested hearing (including junior counsel: $40,000

Estimate of costs payable to other party if unsuccessful
If you are unsuccessful in the litigation you may be ordered to pay the other party's costs. The sums given below are merely estimates, and based on my/our estimate of what the other party's law practice may charge.
Prior to hearing: $80,000
Up to and including weeks (if senior and junior counsel briefed) contested hearing: $40,000

Settlement and Costs
If settlement of your claim is being negotiated, we will provide you before settlement with a reasonable estimate of my/our costs payable by you on settlement AND a reasonable estimate of the costs you would obtain from the other party on settlement if the settlement is favorable to you OR a reasonable estimate of the costs you may have to pay the other party (eg. Your case is weak, etc).

Provisions of the General Cost Agreement
In all other respects, the arrangements in respect of this matter are set out In the General Cost Agreement dated 22 September 2015 and which is adopted by you and applies to this matter as though each term of the agreement has been set out herein.

Applicable law
The law of NSW applies to legal costs regarding this matter. However, see your rights in the accompanying Form.

Your understanding of this disclosure
You should ensure that you fully understand the terms of the General Cost Agreement and of this disclosure. By either executing and returning a copy of the Cost agreement and/or by simply continuing to instruct this firm at any time after 7 days of receipt of the Cost Agreement and this disclosure, you confirm that you have fully understood the terms of the Cost Agreement and Disclosure and you -willingly accept its terms.
Dated 22 September 2015
[Signed first defendant]”

With regards to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement, the first defendant deposes in her affidavit dated 29 July 2021 (“Orsini Aff 29 July 2021”) at [4] that on 25 June 2015, she had an oral conversation with the second defendant. Shortly after that discussion, she commenced acting for Tachnat, and retained the second defendant as Counsel in relation to Tachnat’s dispute with Pick Packers.
The Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement reads as follows (CB Vol 3, 1974):

“Dear Julie,
Tachnat Pty Limited v Pick Packers Pty Ltd Fee Disclosure and Costs Agreement
Thank you for your brief in this matter.
What follows is my current fee disclosure with respect to the above matter.
Fee Disclosure
Pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, 2004 (NSW) ("the Act"), I set out below the basis of my charges and billing arrangements.
The information set out below should be sufficient to enable you to comply with section 310(1) of the Act, having regard to your knowledge of the matter and your professional experience and skill.
Basis of Charges and Billing Arrangements
1. My charges are primarily a function of my hourly rate, together with any disbursement and any separately negotiated fee increase.
Hourly Rate
2. My hourly rate: $480 per hour (plus GST). My hourly rate is charged for all work performed and is charged for each hour or part thereof. For directions hearings I shall charge an amount equivalent to one hour, unless it exceeds one hour's duration.
Daily Rate
3. My daily rate for any hearing is $3,850 per day (plus GST). This includes all work performed between 9am-5pm. If I am briefed to appear at a contested interlocutory application, I will charge an amount equivalent to half my daily rate. If the time exceeds half a day, I will charge an additional amount according to my hourly rate. If the hearing is adjourned or the matter is settled,in either case less than one week before the hearing, I shall charge a brief on hearing for the first day of the hearing.
4. My fee rates include waiting and travelling time, if any.
Disbursements
5. I charge as disbursements the following:
•   Couriers and international telephone and facsimile charges;
•   Fares for travelling;
•   When away from Sydney, accommodation, breakfast and dinner expenses; and
•   Photocopying costs.

GST
6. A liability to pay Goods and Services Tax ("GST") will be incurred in respect of the charges set out above. An amount equal of that liability will be included by me in any memorandum of fees rendered in accordance with these arrangements.
Billing Arrangements & Interest
7. I may render a memorandum of fees at any time. My fees are payable upon receipt. Outstanding fees carry interest at 10% or the cash rate published by the Reserve Bank plus 2%, whichever is the lesser, until paid. Please note that your firm, and not your client, carries responsibility for my fees.
Fee Increases
8. From time to time I review my hourly rate. If following such review I determine to increase my hourly rate, such increase will be notified to my instructing solicitors. If the amount of the increase is agreed it will be applicable from the date of notification. Acceptance of any increase is signified by your continuing to brief me.
Return or Withdrawal of the Brief
9. If I receive no instructions at all in the matter for a period of three months or if there should be a failure to reach agreement on any cancellation fee or any fee increase which may be sought (provided the proposed fee increase is not more than 10% in any calendar year) or the amount of any memorandum of fees remains unpaid for more than two calendar months from its date, I shall be entitled to return the brief on giving 14 days' notice to my instructing solicitors regardless of the position of the matter at that time. Further if the Bar rules indicate or I am unable to be given instructions when reasonably needed on an important matter I shall be entitled to return the brief on such shorter notice as is reasonable. Where the brief is returned or withdrawn I am still to be paid for all memoranda of fees rendered and all work performed but unbilled.
Counsels' Immunity
Nothing herein is intended nor should be understood to limit or affect in any way whatsoever my independence as counsel; my legal and professional duties to the courts (or any other tribunals) and to the legal representatives of other parties; the operation of any law or any professional rules promulgated by the New South Wales Bar Association; nor my immunity from suit which exists under the general law.
Without limiting the generality of any immunity, my retainer is to be on the basis that I have immunity from suit with respect to, at least, all forensic and/or tactical decisions and/or judgments made by me in the course of the preparation for or the conduct of any hearing. Also, please note that any liability I might have is limited by reason that the New South Wales Bar Association Scheme is approved under the Professional Standards Act, 1994 (NSW).
Costs Agreement
Acceptance of the above terms of my retainer set out in this letter will constitute a costs agreement between us under section 322(1)(c) of the Act. Acceptance of these terms is signified by your continuing to brief me or by signing and returning a copy of this letter at your earliest convenience.
Yours faithfully,
[signed second defendant]”

The plaintiff’s submissions for claim for summary judgment against both defendants

Tachnat, through the second plaintiff, submitted that it gave instructions to the defendants to request and provide the information to Pick Packers’ lawyers that would settle the dispute. It submitted this was an appropriate instruction for the plaintiffs given circumstances at that point in time and relied on the comments of Fitzgerald JA (with whom Sheller and Handley JJA agreed) in Studer v Boettcher [2000] NSWCA 263 at [74]:

“[74] The client, not the lawyer, is entitled to decide whether to compromise or to litigate.
The duties of a legal practitioner in relation to settlement negotiations were considered by the State Administrative Tribunal in Legal Practitioner's Complaints Committee and Fleming [2006] WASAT 352.”

Tachnat also referred to Across Australia Finance v Bassenger [2008] NSWSC 799 in which it was stated at [78]:

“[78] A solicitor or barrister retained to conduct litigation ordinarily has implied as well as ostensible authority to bind his or her client to a compromise of the proceedings provided that he or she does not act contrary to instructions, the circumstances do not otherwise indicate that express instructions are required, the compromise does not include matters collateral to the action, and the compromise is effected in a fair and reasonable manner so that it is fairly within the limits of authority (Donellan v Watson (1990) 21 NSWLR 335 at 342; Prestwich v Poley (1865) 18 CB (NS) 806; 144 ER 662; Waugh v H B Clifford & Sons Ltd [1982] Ch 374 at 387).”

Tachnat noted that the public interest is served by practitioners encouraging an early settlement of their client's dispute, and that practitioners are under a duty to seek such a settlement citing UCPR 5.7. I interpose at this point, that UCPR 5.7 deals with privileged documents. However, solicitors do have a fundamental ethical duty to act in the best interests of their clients and to deliver legal services competently, diligently and as promptly as reasonably possible: rr 4.1.1, 4.1.3 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW) (“ASCR”).
Tachnat further noted that certain relationships are recognised as being fiduciary in character, and that the traditional categories of fiduciary relationship include solicitors and clients: see Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41 (“Hospital Products”).
Tachnat then submitted that the first and second defendants pursued the litigation purely for their financial benefit from the accruing of legal bills. Tachnat stated that the defendants did not provide any information as to the prospects of the litigation’s success pursuant to Schedule 2 of the LPUL.
Tachnat noted the following:

on 22 September 2015, at 12:11:30 pm, the first defendant sent the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement to the plaintiffs by email. It gave an estimate of a successful recovery for $100,000 and $40,000 for counsel;

on 6 September 2017, at 4:16 pm, after mediation the second defendant wrote to the second plaintiff "very unusual for such a large business [Pick Packers] to have such a limited cap on insurance cover [of $100,000]";

on the same date, at 4:59 pm, the second defendant wrote to the second plaintiff "Legal practitioners would be out of business very quickly if they guaranteed success and no legal costs".

Tachnat submitted that the first defendant acted for all the plaintiffs, for the first as a company, and the second and third plaintiffs as directors and natural persons, and that the defendants’ conduct caused personal injury and harm to the second and third plaintiffs as pleaded in the ASC.
In support of this contention Tachnat noted the following:

on 22 September 2015, the first defendant's covering email for the costs disclosure stated "You will see from the Disclosure document that as Tachnat is a company, the persons who are responsible for the payment of my fees and any disbursements are Tachnat itself, and also each of you personally (i.e. both being directors and instrumental in providing instructions)”;

the first defendant's costs disclosure agreement is addressed to “HULIO GASH, REJANI RAJAN, and TACHNAT PTY LIMITED ACN XXX (TACHNAT).”

The clause in the costs agreement under the heading "Persons responsible for your matter and costs" states: "The persons responsible for the provision of instructions and for payment of costs is Hulio Gash. Persons further responsible for the provision of instructions and for the payment of costs are Rejani Rajan and Tachnat. All terms of this disclosure and the Cost Agreement apply to those parties jointly and severally".

on 15 March 2018, The plaintiffs rely on the first defendant's submission to the supreme court costs assessor that states: “I note that the cost applicant is Tachnat. Neither Mr. Gash nor Ms. Rajan are named as applicants, notwithstanding they are jointly and severally liable to pay the fees".

[plaintiffs’ emphasis]

Tachnat submitted it is not an error or mistake that the first defendant included the second and third plaintiffs personally in the costs agreement. A solicitor is learned, and the first defendant had reasons as to why second and third plaintiffs were included as natural persons. Tachnat referred to the following passage in Griffiths v Evans [1953] 1 WLR 1424 (“Griffiths”) where Denning LJ stated:

“…the word of the client is to be preferred to the word of the solicitor because the client is ignorant and the solicitor is, or should be, learned and a lawyer who does not take the precaution of getting a written retainer has only himself to thank for being at variance with his client over it and must take the consequences.”

I interpose at this point, it should be noted that Griffiths applies to a situation where there is an oral agreement between the client and his or her solicitors. The circumstances as between the first defendant and Tachnat is that there is a written costs agreement and as such Griffiths is not instructive here.
In relation to the second defendant, Tachnat submitted that from 24 June 2015 to 22 September 2021, the second defendant provided professional services in return for monies pursuant to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), and hence she owed a duty of care towards the plaintiffs. Tachnat noted the second defendant charged professional fees for professional services, in addition to fees charged by the first defendant, and that the monies were paid directly into the second defendants' bank account by the plaintiffs.
Tachnat noted that the second defendant started providing professional advice from 24 June 2015, and that between 24 June 2015 and 22 September 2015 there was no costs agreement or a retainer between the plaintiffs and the second defendant.
Tachnat noted the following:

on 22 September 2015, at 11:08am, the second defendant emailed the second plaintiff that "Julie suggested I send the invoice directly to you as it includes work before Julie became involved";

on the same date, at 12:10pm: the first defendant emailed the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement to the plaintiffs. There is a clause in the cost agreement under the heading "Engagement of another Law practice/ Barrister" which reads:

"It will be necessary to engage a Barrister on your behalf. We will consult you when this is required. You may be asked to enter into a cost agreement with that party. We are of the view that a senior barrister may be required for this matter. A barrister's fee ranges from 3000.00 per day to 10000.00 per day for senior counsel. Please note that this is an estimate only and a retainer will be provided by the barrister agreed to be briefed when required”.

Tachnat finally submitted that at no point in time did the second defendant notify the plaintiffs that she does not accept direct instructions from litigants noting the following:

on 24 June 2015, at 3:24pm, the second plaintiff wrote to the second defendant stating: "Once we have you on board for this issue can you request for the insurance copy and take the necessary steps?”.

on the same day, at 3:42 pm, the second defendant wrote back "I will talk with David tomorrow and we can take it from there". This suggests that the second defendant agreed to assist the plaintiffs, invoiced the plaintiffs, and received payments directly into her account. Hence it should be concluded that the second defendant failed to have a retainer with the plaintiffs in compliance with the LPUL and the first defendant’s costs agreement.

The first defendant’s submissions – Opposing summary judgment against her

The first defendant noted that on 30 July 2021, she filed Orsini Aff 29 July 2021, and therein denied the allegations of negligence and disputed the other matters raised in the ASC. She deposed that she:

contends that the District Court statement of claim in the Pick Packers matter was prepared in accordance with Tachnat’s instructions at [11];

denies that there were unconditional settlement offers sent by Pick Packers;

denies that any offers made by Pick Packers were not passed to the plaintiffs at [15];

denies that the terms of collection of all stock were acceptable to Tachnat at [18];

states that the settlement of the matter was made on the instructions of the plaintiffs at [28];

denies that the dispute was a minor dispute limited to $40,000 at [29]; and

refers to sworn affidavit evidence from the second plaintiff from 2016 and 2017 which confirms the much wider scope of the losses said to have been incurred by Tachnat, which were not limited to water damaged stock but extended to Pick Packers’ responsibility for delays in the first defendant's business proceeding.

The first defendant submitted that on 6 September 2021, she filed and served a defence in these proceedings, following delays in the fullsome provision of particulars by the plaintiffs. The defence denies the allegations of negligence made by the plaintiffs and either denies or does not admit large numbers of the factual assertions made by the plaintiffs.
The first defendant noted that at [5] of the 18 June 2021 Hulio Gash Affidavit it is stated “the particulars make the following submission in support of the summary judgment because the defendants have no defence as they do not have a copy of the plaintiff’s file contrary to ASCR 14.2 and further there are no issues that needs or must be tried” (CB Vol 3, 2144).
The first defendant submitted that:

the status of her file is incorrectly stated by the second plaintiff. The first defendant has explained how she has been able to retain the vast majority of her file in Orsini Aff 29 July 2021 at [8]-[9];

the submission is incorrect legally. ASCR 14.2 simply states that "A solicitor or law practice may destroy client documents after a period of 7 years has elapsed since the completion or termination of the engagement"; and

even if there was no file retained, it would not be a proper basis for a summary judgment application.

The first defendant finally submitted that as illustrated by her defence and Orsini Aff 29 July 2021, there are serious concerns surrounding the plaintiffs' claims and if being pressed, the matter should proceed to hearing in the usual course.

The second defendant’s submissions – Opposing summary judgment against her

The second defendant submitted that the plaintiffs' application for summary judgment is doomed to fail and does not pass the General Steel test, as there are serious issues to be tried.
The second defendant noted that Mr James Berg, a partner of the solicitors acting for the second defendant, in his affidavit dated 27 July 2021 (“Berg Aff 27 July 2021”) relevantly deposes:

“Allegations in these proceedings
[17] In the Statement of Claim filed 9 June 2021, the plaintiffs plead at paragraph 2 that the defendants acted for the plaintiffs to resolve the dispute with Pickpackers. In this paragraph, there is no delineation between the defendants, on the one hand, or the plaintiffs on the other.
[18] Miss Culkoff instructs me she denies any relevant retainer with any of the plaintiffs.
[19] In addition the plaintiffs, collectively, plead:
19.1 intentional negligence by Miss Culkoff - from paragraph 64 of the Statement of Claim;
19.2 initiating proceedings with no prospects in the underlying dispute, although it is not clear to me what the legal cause of action is said to be in this respect - from paragraph 66 of the Statement of Claim;
19.3 breach of duty and contract - from paragraph 67 of the Statement of Claim;
19.4 a failure to provide a costs agreement to the plaintiff- at paragraph 74(e) of the Statement of Claim; and
19.5 an entitlement to damages for various alleged losses, including for what appears to be personal injury, which are set out from paragraph 75 of the Statement of Claim.

[20] At page 3 of Exhibit JDB is an email from Mr Gash to me dated 26 July 2021 setting out some proposed amendments to the Statement of Claim.
[21] Miss Culkoff instructs me that she denies each of the allegations.
[22] In addition, Miss Culkoff instructs me she no longer holds the brief she had for the purposes of the underlying proceedings.”

The second defendant noted that the retainer is the starting point for consideration of the legal relationship between the parties, and submitted that Any work undertaken by the second defendant from 30 June 2015 was:

undertaken pursuant to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement;

undertaken in the context of Tachnat's dispute with Pick Packers; and

invoiced to Ms Orsini.

The second defendant submitted that the nature and scope of the duty of care allegedly owed by the second defendant to the second and third plaintiffs is not articulated in the ASC, and in any event, the second defendant was retained by first defendant to advise and appear for Tachnat. The second defendant was not retained by Tachnat however, in line with conventional authority, the first defendant does not deny she owed Tachnat a duty of care in the provision of her services pursuant to the retainer, subject to the terms and conditions of the retainer.
It is clear, however, in the second defendants’ submission that she:

was not retained/engaged by the second defendant and/or the third defendant in respect of the impugned conduct which is the subject of the claims; and

did not owe the second or third plaintiffs a duty of care.

The second defendant further submitted that while it is true that the second defendant charged some fees for work undertaken prior to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement, none of the work undertaken in respect of those fees relates to conduct which the plaintiffs seek to impugn in these proceedings, nor could it. Even if, for the sake of argument, there was an engagement of the second defendant by one or more of the plaintiffs prior to 30 June 2015, that engagement did not extend beyond 30 June 2015 and all work done by the second defendant after that date was pursuant to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement.
The second defendant noted that neither the second nor third defendants were parties to the dispute between Tachnat and Pick Packers. The second defendant noted that the first defendant did not act for either of them at any stage and they were, for all relevant purposes, strangers to the litigation. The fact that they were directors of Tachnat, in the second defendant’s submission, cannot operate to impose any duty on her.
The second defendant submitted that Tachnat has a cause of action against the second defendant in negligence. That is a matter which Tachnat can pursue and not one which vests in the second and third defendants as individuals.
The second defendant further submitted that in short, there was no contractual arrangement between herself and any of the plaintiffs and the law does not recognise the existence of a duty of care between the second defendant and second plaintiff, or the second defendant and third plaintiff, in the circumstances of the second defendant’s engagement by the first defendant pursuant to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement.
On that premise, the claims in contract and tort, by the second and third plaintiff, in the second defendant’s submission, have no prospects of success. Likewise, in the second defendant’s submission there being no relationship between the second and third plaintiffs and second defendant there is no scope for argument that the second defendant owed either a fiduciary duty.
The second defendant noted that from [64] of the ASC which follows a heading of "Intentional negligence, incorrect and false detinue and conversion claims", it is alleged claims of this nature should never have been made in the underlying proceedings. The second defendant submitted that whether that be true or not, such claims could only ever vest in Tachnat as they relate to goods owned by Tachnat which were the subject of the alleged detinue and conversion.
The second defendant noted that the plaintiffs included, as part of the 'Relief Claimed', a judgment or declaration on the financial disadvantage caused to the plaintiff (singular) pursuant to section 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). In the second defendant’s submission, this is not a justiciable claim, nor does it reflect a form of relief available to any of the plaintiffs, and therefore it ought to be dismissed.
Further the plaintiff noted that in the ASC, under the heading 'Relief Claimed', the plaintiffs assert an entitlement to damages under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)(“TPA”), and there is also reference to misleading and deceptive conduct. For the purposes of these motions, the second defendant makes no complaint about references to the TPA instead of the Australian Consumer Law. However, on review of the ASC, in the second defendant’s submission it is difficult to discern any pleading of misleading and deceptive conduct, and no cause of action under the Australian Consumer Law is actually pleaded.
The second defendant submitted that aside from questions of form, the substance of the position is:

there can be no claim for misleading and deceptive conduct by the second or third plaintiffs against the second defendant given all services provided by the second defendant were in the context of advising Tachnat; and

there is no basis for a claim to the effect that the second or third plaintiffs, in their respective personal capacities relied upon, and/or were induced into error by, any representations made by the second defendant.

The second defendant submitted that as such the ASC fails to disclose a cause of action for misleading and deceptive conduct.
The second defendant noted that part of the relief pleaded by the second or third plaintiffs is for damages in relation to mental harm, and submitted that the law does not recognise, as compensable, the type of harm pleaded. To this extent, the second defendant submitted:

the mental harm is not consequent on personal injury of another kind; and

the mental harm does not arise wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with another person being killed, injured or put in peril by the alleged acts or omissions of the second defendant.

In the second defendant’s submission, the claim for damages in respect of alleged mental harm has no reasonable prospects of success.
The second defendant acknowledged that, in accordance with the principles established in General Steel, the bar is high for her to succeed on this application. However, the claims by the second or third plaintiffs against the second defendant fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action and are so clearly without legal substance that it would be inappropriate to allow them to continue.
For these reasons, the second defendant submitted that the claims by the second and third plaintiffs against the second defendant should be dismissed.

Resolution

Before resolving the issue of summary judgment or dismissal something should be said about advocates’ immunity. Advocates are afforded protection from suit in respect of participation in the judicial process, and this extends to work undertaken outside of court which affects the conduct of a case: see Giannarelli and Others v Wraith and Others (1988) 165 CLR 543 at 560; D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12 (“D’Orta”). However advocates immunity does not extend to advice which leads to settlement (D’Orta at [155]; Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Ptd Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1; [2016] HCA 16 (“Attwells”) at [38]) or negligent advice to bring proceedings which are doomed to fail (Attwells at [50]). This matter is therefore one where advocates immunity does not apply.

The first defendant

The starting point for the relationship between Tachnat and the first defendant, its solicitor, is the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement. I note:

firstly, that the first defendant addressed her costs disclosure to Hulio Gash, Rejani Rajan and Tachnat;

secondly, there is a clause headed ‘Engagement of another Law Practice/Barrister’ that relevantly states;

“It will be necessary that to engage a barrister on your behalf. We will consult you when this is required. You may be asked to enter into a costs agreement with that party.”

thirdly, there is a clause under the heading ‘Persons responsible for your matter and costs’ which relevantly reads;

“The persons responsible for the provision of instructions and for payment of costs is Hulio Gash. Persons further responsible for the provision of instructions and for the payment of costs are Rejani Rajan and Tachnat. All terms of this disclosure and the Cost Agreement apply to those parties jointly and severally. By your continued instructions, you accept these terms apply to the work referred to herein.”

fourthly, under the heading ‘The work (schedule 1)’, the first defendant stipulates that;

“the work you require us to do is to take all action necessary to advise and act in your behalf in respect of Contractual Claim by Tachnat against Pick Packers and to represent you in Court Proceedings, including negotiations with the other parties representative, drafting and engrossing any Interlocutory Applications or Motions, Affidavit evidence, arranging any expert evidence, in support of both any interlocutory process and final orders, issue of Subpoenas, engagement of experts, attending court for directions, briefing counsel, attending the hearing & all necessary other attendances required for determination of all issues between Tachnat and Pick Packers.”

Finally, the costs agreement does not refer to any work to be undertaken on behalf of the second or third plaintiffs.

While the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement states that the plaintiffs may be asked to enter a costs agreement with a barrister, none of the plaintiffs were ever asked to enter into a separate agreement with the second defendant.
Furthermore, despite the agreement specifing ‘Hulio Gash, Rejani Rajan and Tachnat’ as the ‘Persons responsible for the provision of instructions and payment of costs’, Tachnat, not being a natural person, requires a director to give instructions on its behalf. Payment of costs by the second or third plaintiff on behalf of Tachnat does not give rise to the first defendant owing a duty of care to the second and third plaintiffs. Nor does the clause in the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement that all terms of disclosure and the costs agreement apply to the parties “jointly and severally” make the first defendant liable to all three plaintiffs.
It is arguable that the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement complies with s 174 of the LPUL. The other matters raised by the plaintiffs give rise to disputed facts and circumstances. These can only be resolved at trial.
Despite the retainer being the starting point for the relationship between the parties, it should be noted that in her defence filed on 6 September 2021 the first defendant ostensibly admits undertaking work prior to 22 September 2015. For example: she admits having been referred to the plaintiffs by the second defendant on 24 June 2015 and afterwards scheduling an inspection of the stock held at the Pick Packers warehouse (at [8]); that she communicated with Pick Packers on 29 June 2015 (at [10]) and on 9 July 2015 (at [12]); and that she corresponded with the second plaintiff on 14 August 2015, 31 August 2015, and 15 September 2015 (at [13]-[16]). What claims may be brought in relation to the period between the first defendant’s first involvement in the matter before the existence of the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement is a matter for trial.
Although the first defendant has not sought to dismiss or strike out any claims by the second or third plaintiffs as against her, it should be said that there are circumstances in which a solicitor may be found to owe a duty of care to the directors of their corporate clients due to special features in their relationship: See About life v Maddocks [2021] NSWSC 1370 at [701]. The existence of such special features in this case is matter for resolution at trial.
One further matter should be noted. The plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the basis that the first defendant has not retained her complete file. The loss of the first defendant’s file is disputed by the first defendant in Orsini Aff 29 July 2021 at [8]-[9], and in any event, the destruction of a legal practitioner’s complete file does not give rise to an order for summary judgment.

The second defendant

Again the starting point for the relationship between the parties is the retainer. The second defendant was retained by the first defendant to advise and appear for Tachnat in the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement. It is dated some 3 months before the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement.
It is unusual for a solicitor to engage a barrister to act without first contracting with their client, as the usual course is that barristers do not deal directly with clients but instead receive instructions and fees through the intermediary of their instructing solicitor.
There is also evidence that the second defendant dealt directly with Tachnat and the second plaintiff directly, before the date of the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement and (logically) before the date of the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement. In Orsini Aff 29 July 2015 the first defendant deposes that she had an oral conversation with the second defendant on 25 July 2015 and thereafter commenced acting for Tachnat. Further there is email correspondence between the second defendant and the second plaintiff predating both costs agreements. On 22 September 2015, the second defendant emailed the second plaintiff an invoice saying “[the first defendant] suggested I send the invoice directly to you as it includes work before [the first defendant] became involved”, and on 24 September 2015 there is further correspondence wherein the second plaintiff asks that the second defendant request the plaintiffs’ insurance copy once on board, to which the second plaintiff responds she will talk with David the following day.
Given the unusual circumstances of this matter the correct chronology of events is at best uncertain. On this basis, in my opinion it makes sense to split the plaintiffs’ claims into two periods, the claims which relate to conduct before the first defendant entered into an agreement with Tachnat on 22 September 2015, and those which relate to conduct after that date.
However before addressing the plaintiffs’ claims by reference to those two periods, some claims may be briefly dealt with.
Under the heading ‘Intentional negligence, incorrect and false detinue and conversion claims’ the plaintiffs allege that the defendants drafted pleadings that had no reasonable prospects of success. I agree with the second defendant that such claims could only ever vest in Tachnat as they relate to goods owned by Tachnat, however perhaps more pointedly, this claim is at odds with the fact that Tachnat recovered the sum of $100,000 from Pick packer’s insurer after the District Court statement of claim had been filed and served. A claim cannot be characterised as having ‘no reasonable prospects of success’ if there is evidence that it was in fact successful. There is therefore no discernable claim pleaded by any of the plaintiffs against the second defendant, and as it stands this claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be summarily dismissed.
The second and third plaintiffs claim for relief in the form of a judgment or declaration for the financial disadvantage caused to a “plaintiff” (singular) pursuant to s192E of the Crimes Act. This provision reads:

192E Fraud
(1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly--
(a) obtains property belonging to another, or
(b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage,

is guilty of the offence of fraud.
: Maximum penalty--Imprisonment for 10 years.

(2) A person's obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property.
(3) A person may be convicted of the offence of fraud involving all or any part of a general deficiency in money or other property even though the deficiency is made up of any number of particular sums of money or items of other property that were obtained over a period of time.
(4) A conviction for the offence of fraud is an alternative verdict to a charge for the offence of larceny, or any offence that includes larceny, and a conviction for the offence of larceny, or any offence that includes larceny, is an alternative verdict to a charge for the offence of fraud.

It is not pleaded as to how this could be a justiciable claim by the plaintiffs against the second defendant. As it stands this claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be summarily dismissed.
Finally the second and third plaintiffs seek damages in relation to mental harm which is said to be consequent on the actions of the defendants. The mental harm has not been pleaded as being consequent on personal injury of another kind, nor as arising from mental or nervous shock in the connection with another person being killed, injured or put in peril by the acts or omissions of the second defendant. The law does not recognise the type of harm pleaded. This claim also fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be summarily dismissed.
The General Steel test imposes a high bar for summary dismissal, however it is clear these three claims are without substance such that they cannot be repleaded to assert a variable claim. It is clear that there is no question to be tried. It would therefore be inappropriate for them to continue to trial.

Before 22 September 2015

As before stated there is evidence that the second defendant carried out legal work on Tachnat’s instruction before both the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement and the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement. There is also evidence that the second defendant dealt directly with the second plaintiff during this period. While the second defendant says there was no contractual relationship between herself and any of the plaintiffs, in my opinion the factual matrix is such that it would be inappropriate to accept the second defendant’s contention without the matter proceeding to trial. The existence of such a relationship before 22 September 2015 is a matter for trial, as is the effect of the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement on that relationship.
The plaintiffs submitted that the second defendant breached her fiduciary duty to them citing Hospital Products as authority for the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the second defendant and each of the plaintiffs. The solicitor/client relationship is accepted as a category of fiduciary duty: see Hospital Products at [53]. Notwithstanding the existence of clear examples, there is no single test to identify whether a relationship is fiduciary in character, and it is not every case in which there is a relationship of trust that fiduciary obligations will be imposed: see Hospital Products at [54]. The plaintiffs have asserted the existence of a fiduciary relationship without having properly pleaded their claim. Further, as there may have been a contractual relationship between Tachnat and the second defendant during this period, there is ostensibly scope to bring a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law by Tachnat as against the second defendant. Again, no such claim has been properly pleaded. These two claims fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out.
As to the claim of breach of contract, if a contract between the second defendant and any of the plaintiffs is found to have been in existence during this period it is conceivable that the second defendant breached its terms and that breach caused damage to the plaintiff(s). The existence of such a contract, its breach and the damage which flowed from that breach are all in issue and are all for resolution at trial.
To the allegation of negligence, it is uncontroversial that in circumstances where the second defendant may have been acting directly for one or more of the plaintiffs that she would have owed them a duty of care. Further, in accordance with About life v Maddocks there may have existed special features in the relationship between the second defendant and second and third plaintiffs such that the second defendant could be said to owe them a duty of care directly. I note that About Life v Maddocks refers only to a solicitor owing a duty to the directors of a corporate client, however this is an unusual situation in which a barrister may have dealt directly with the directors of a corporate client. Whether the principle in About life v Maddocks extends to such a scenario is not a matter to be resolved here, however in my opinion the claim should not be struck out as it is not clear that there is no real question to be tried and is a matter which again should be left for trial.
Therefore, in relation to the period before 22 September 2015, I propose to strike out all remaining claims except those for breach of contract and in negligence.

After 22 September 2015

None of the parties have sought to question the existence of the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement. The first defendant does not deny she owed Tachnat a duty of care in the provision of her services subject to the terms and conditions of the retainer. The nature and scope of the duty of care allegedly owed by the second defendant to the second and third plaintiffs has not been articulated in the ASC.
As from 22 September 2015, there was no contractual arrangement directly between the second defendant and any of the plaintiffs. It follows that a claim for breach of contract cannot succeed and should be struck out for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action. Further, the law does not recognise the existence of a duty of care between the second defendant and second plaintiff, or the second defendant and third plaintiff, in the circumstances where the second defendant’s engagement by Tachnat is pursuant to Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement as it was after 22 September 2015. These claims should also be struck out as they disclose no reasonable cause of action. However, as is not disputed by the second defendant, she nevertheless owed Tachnat a duty of care. Therefore, the claim in negligence by Tachnat as against the second defendant should be left for trial. Similarly, there being no relationship between the second and third plaintiffs and the second defendant, there is no scope for argument that the second defendant owed them fiduciary duties. These claims should also be struck out for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
Further, while it is theoretically possible for Tachnat to bring a justiciable claim for misleading and deceptive conduct as against the second defendant, there is no such discernable claim pleaded by any of the plaintiffs. As it currently stands the claim for damages due to misleading and deceptive conduct fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out.
The result is that I strike out all remaining claims during this period as against the second defendant save the claim for negligence by Tachnat which is to be left for trial.

Stay of proceedings generally

The second defendant seeks a permanent stay of proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs: see [2] and [8] of the Second Defendant’s Motion.
Section 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) reads:

“67 Stay of proceedings
Subject to rules of court, the court may at any time and from time to time, by order, stay any proceedings before it, either permanently or until a specified day.”

The applicable principles to a grant of permanent stay are well known. They were summarised by Campbell J in GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2021] NSWSC 1204 (“GLJ”) at [37] referring to Bell P in Moubarak bht Coorey v Holt (2019) 100 NSWLR 218 (“Moubarak”) as:

“(i) the onus lies “squarely” on the defendant;
(ii) a permanent stay should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances;
(iii) a permanent stay should be granted when the interests of the administration of justice so demand;
(iv) the categories of case are not closed;
(v) one category of case where a permanent stay may be ordered is where the proceedings or their continuance would be vexatious or oppressive;
(vi) the continuation of proceedings may be oppressive if that is their objective effect;
(vii) proceedings may be oppressive where their effect is seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging;
(viii) proceedings may be stayed on a permanent basis where their continuation would be manifestly unfair to a party; and
(ix) proceedings may be stayed on a permanent basis where their continuation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”

The prejudice that a delay in bringing proceedings occasions to the ability to have a fair hearing has been subject to examination in many cases: see, Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 (“Taylor”); Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; Connellan v Murphy [2017] VSCA 116 (“Connellan”) at [44]-[47]; Newcastle City Council v Batistatos [2006] HCA 27 (“Batistatos”).
The factors that have been identified as giving rise to prejudice include:

the death of witnesses;

the destruction or inability to locate documents;

“unknown unknowns” i.e. prejudice that is caused by the disappearance of evidence that no one was aware existed: See Taylor at [551]:

“As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Barker v Wingo, “what has been forgotten can rarely be shown”. So, it must often happen that important, perhaps decisive, evidence has disappeared without anybody now “knowing” that it ever existed. Similarly, it must often happen that time will diminish the significance of a known fact or circumstance because its relationship to the cause of action is no longer as apparent as it was when the cause of action arose… The longer the delay in commencing proceedings, the more likely it is that the case will be decided on less evidence than was available to the parties at the time that the cause of action arose.”

the general diminution of the body of evidence available; and

the unreliability of evidence that either fades or is subject to reconstruction by being recalled over a number of times particularly where the events provoke an emotional reaction: See The Nominal Defendant v Cordin [2019] NSWCA 85.

Neither party made submissions on this issue. The second defendant did not provide any evidence as to prejudice as set out in Batistatos, nor as to there being exceptional circumstances. The second defendant’s prayers for a permanent stay of proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs fail. I dismiss paragraphs [2] and [8] of the Second Defendant’s Motion seeking a permanent stay of proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs respectively. It may be that the second defendant is seeking a stay of proceedings in the event that Tachnat does not lodge security for costs. I have dealt with this issue under the heading ‘Security for costs’.

The plaintiff’s notices of motion seeking default judgment and that damages be assessed

The plaintiffs filed two notices of motion purportedly seeking default judgment and for damages to be assessed, the first on 27 July 2021 and the second on 5 August 2021 (“Default Judgment Motions”). The plaintiff seeks default judgment pursuant to UCPR 14.3, 16.2, 16.3 and 16.7 on the basis of the defendants' failure to file defences and that damages be assessed. It is convenient that I deal with both of these notices of motion together.
By way of email dated 2 August 2021, the second defendant’s solicitor asked the second plaintiff why two motions seeking, in essence, the same thing were required. The second plaintiff responded by advising the plaintiffs seek default judgment because the defendants had not filed their defences to the Statement of Claim within 28 days.
Relevantly UCPR 14.3, 16.7 and 30.1 read:

“14.3 Defence
(1) Subject to these rules, the time limited for a defendant to file a defence is 28 days after service on the defendant of the statement of claim or such other time as the court directs for the filing of a defence.
(2) If, before the defendant files a defence, a notice of motion for summary judgment under rule 13.1 is served on the defendant, but the court does not on that motion dispose of all of the claims for relief against the defendant, the court may fix a time within which the defendant must file a defence.
16.7 Default judgment on claim for unliquidated damages

“[i]t is not possible or appropriate to list all of the matters relevant to the exercise of the discretion. The factors will vary from case to case. The weight to be given to any circumstance depends upon its own intrinsic persuasiveness and its impact on other circumstances which have to be weighed: P S Chellaram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 65 ALJR 642 at 643.”

Notwithstanding the broad unfettered discretion with which the Court approaches an application for security for costs, there are a number of well established guidelines which the court typically takes into account in determining any such application. They are:
1. That such applications should be brought promptly. This is a principle of longstanding: see Grant v The Banque Franco-Egyptienne (1876) 1 CPD 143; see also Smail v Burton; Re Insurance Associates Pty Ltd [1975] VR 776 per Gillard J at 777; Caruso Australia Pty Ltd v Portec (Australia) Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 311 at 313; Bryan E Fencott at 514. I should state immediately that there is no issue of delay in this case.
2. That regard is to be had to the strength and bona fides of the applicant's case are relevant considerations: see M A Productions Pty Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd (1982) 7 ACLR 97 at 100; Bryan E Fencott at 514. As a general rule, where a claim is prima facie regular on its face and discloses a cause of action, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court should proceed on the basis that the claim is bona fide with a reasonable prospect of success. (Bryan E Fencott at 514).
3. Whether the applicant's impecuniosity was caused by the respondent's conduct subject of the claim: see M A Productions v Austarama Television at 100.
4. Whether the respondent's application for security is oppressive, in the sense that it is being used merely to deny an impecunious applicant a right to litigate: see M A Productions v Austarama Television at 100; Yandil Holdings Pty Ltd v Insurance Co of North America (1985) 3 ACLC 542 per Clarke J at 545; Bryan E Fencott at 513. In Yandil Holdings at 545 Clarke J stated the principle in these terms:
“[t]he fact that the ordering of security will frustrate the plaintiff's rights to litigate its claim because of its financial condition does not automatically lead to the refusal of an order. Nonetheless it will usually operate as a powerful factor in favour of exercising the court's discretion in the plaintiff's favour.”

This factor is related to the next, namely:
5. Whether there are any persons standing behind the company who are likely to benefit from the litigation and who are willing to provide the necessary security: see Memetu Pty Ltd v Lissenden (1983) 8 ACLR 364; Sent v Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 201; Bell Wholesale Co Pty Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1; Hession v Century 21 South Pacific Ltd (In liq) (1992) 28 NSWLR 120 at 123; ; Bryan E Fencott at 513; Yandil Holdings at 545. The combined effect of these two principles was summarised by Meagher JA in Hession at 123 as follows:
“ … a company in liquidation against whom an order for security for costs is sought cannot successfully resist such an order merely by proving that it cannot fund the litigation from its own resources if an order for security is made; it must prove that it cannot do so even if it relies on the other resources available to it (the company's shareholders or creditors) … Finally, whilst it is both true and important that poverty must be no bar to litigation, what that means is that the courts must be astute to see that no person pursuing a claim which is not frivolous is precluded from doing so by the erection of obstacles which poverty is unable to surmount; it does not mean that proof of insolvency automatically confers an immunity from statutory provisions which deal with insolvent plaintiffs.”

6. An issue related to the last guideline is whether persons standing behind the company have offered any personal undertaking to be liable for the costs and if so, the form of any such undertaking: see Cameron's Unit Services Pty Ltd v Kevin R Whelpton & Associates (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FCR 46 at 53; Mantaray Pty Ltd v Brookfield Breeding Co Pty Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 304; Clyde Industries Ltd v Ryad Engineering Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 325.
7. Security will only ordinarily be ordered against a party who is in substance a plaintiff, and an order ought not to be made against parties who are defending themselves and thus forced to litigate: see Interwest at 626; Heller Factors Pty Ltd v John Arnold's Surf Shop Pty Ltd (1979) ACLC 32,446; Sydmar Pty Ltd v Statewise Developments Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 480; Weily's Quarries v Devine Shipping where Zeeman J stated (at 189):
“[t]he general proposition that security ought not to be ordered where the proceedings are defensive in the sense of directly resisting proceedings already brought or seeking to halt self-help procedures is no more than that, a general proposition. It ought not to be elevated to being a rule of law. In many cases of that nature it could be considered oppressive to require security and that in itself may be sufficient to refuse to make an order … [see] Sydmar Pty Ltd v Statewise Developments Pty Ltd and Interwest Ltd v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd.”

1. That such applications should be brought promptly.

The plaintiff agrees with the defendants that the applications seeking security for costs have been brought promptly.

2. That regard is to be had to the strength and bona fides of the applicant's case

The plaintiffs are of the opinion that they have provided adequate evidence and submissions so the court can make an determination on the merits of the proceedings.
The second defendant submitted that the plaintiffs’ prospects of succeeding against the second defendant are poor.
It is my view that the plaintiffs’ case against the first defendant is poor. Tachnat’s case against the second defendant has been significantly narrowed. The strength of Tachnat’s case against the second defendant is also poor.

3. Whether the applicant's impecuniosity was caused by the respondent's conduct subject of the claim:

The plaintiff submitted that its impecuniosity was caused by the defendants’ conduct.

The first defendant’s submissions

The first defendant submitted that while this is a relevant factor in considering the exercise of the discretion (Jazabas at [74(3)]) there is no evidence of it in the present case. Tachnat's gross revenue in fact appeared to rise by about $100,000 between 2018 and 2019, the proceedings having been settled in late 2017.

The second defendant’s submissions

In the second defendant’s submission it could not be said, with any force, that Tachnat's purported impecuniosity is attributable to the second defendant’s conduct. In this respect, the second defendant submitted:

Tachnat pleads, amongst other things, loss of profits and opportunity to develop a business as opposed, for example, to damage to property;

if the accountants' letter is accepted as setting out Tachnat's gross revenue for the respective years, it seems clear Tachnat had a significant increase (approx. $100,000) in revenue for the 2019 year when compared to the 2018 year – a time well after the second defendant’s engagement by the first defendant had come to an end; and

having regard to the gross revenue figures, it could hardly be said that any impecuniosity of Tachnat is due to the second defendant’s conduct.

It is my view that Tachnat’s impecuniosity is due to other than the defendants’ conduct

4. Stultification

The plaintiff’s submissions

The plaintiff submitted that the plaintiffs’ current financial status is consequent on the defendants' intentional tort. The plaintiffs' entire stock was detained at the Pick Packers warehouse and consequently it could not commence trading in its Menswear business until the stock was released after 802 days in the Pick Packers warehouse. This led to catastrophic financial losses to the plaintiffs and caused damage to the stock.
The plaintiff submitted that any costs orders against it will stultify the proceedings, and deny the plaintiffs their right to pursue legitimate claims for the financial losses, and personal injury caused to the second and third plaintiffs. The plaintiff also submitted that an order for costs will also deny the fundamental right of access to justice to all the plaintiffs and particularly the second and third plaintiffs who are natural persons.

The first defendant’s submissions

The first defendant submitted that while stultification is a relevant factor, it is a matter which Tachnat must positively establish and it has not done so.
The first defendant submitted that its application for costs is not being used merely to deny an impecunious applicant a right to litigate, but rather the first defendant has serious concerns about the costs involved in the claim which will no doubt be high, exemplified by the fact that the second plaintiff has, over the 3 months since the proceedings were commenced, served some 8 affidavits usually of 15 to 30 pages each, with exhibits usually of between 150 and 250 pages each. While there is duplication within the affidavits and exhibits filed, the first defendant is put to the additional cost of examining all the affidavits and exhibits to determine what in fact is duplicated. So far close to 1600 pages of affidavit and exhibit material has been served: see Jazabas at [74(4)]-[74(5)].

5 & 6. Whether there are any persons standing behind the company who are likely to benefit from the litigation and who are willing to provide security; and/or have offered any personal undertaking to be liable for the costs and if so, the form of any such undertaking:

The plaintiff’s submissions

Tachnat submitted that the second and third plaintiffs who are its directors and shareholders are willing to provide an undertaking to meet any adverse costs orders if the court thinks it is appropriate. Tachnat noted that the third plaintiff is a public servant working with the Department of Communities and Justice, and submitted that being a public servant and natural person is an important factor that the court should take into consideration. In this regard, Tachnat relied on the following passage from Cooper J in Gentry Bros v Wilson Brown & Associates [1992] FCA 592 at 415:

“In the instant case once the shareholders of the applicant have agreed to accept personal liability for any judgment for costs against the applicant, the statutory purpose of s 1335 as explained in the authorities to which reference has been made is satisfied. The making of an order which secures the personal liability of the shareholders is in itself the provision of security: see for example Memutu Pty Ltd v Lissenden (1983) 8 ACLR 364 at 366; Yandil Holdings Pty Ltd v Insurance Co of North America (1985) 3 ACLC 542 at 546 (“Yandil Holdings”); Appleglen Pty Ltd v Mainzeal Corp Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 634 at 635-6.
Once the shareholders have been exposed to personal liability for the applicant's costs, the weight to be given to the statutory purpose is gone. Those who stand behind the applicant once they accept personal liability for the applicant's costs are in no worse position than they would be as litigants in person in the court: Harpur at 533; Yandil Holdings Pty Ltd at 546.”

The first defendant’s submissions

The first defendant submitted that in Intercraft Cabinets Pty Ltd v Sampas Pty Ltd (1997) 18 WAR 306 (“Intercraft Cabinets”) (to which reference was made in Epping Plaza v Bevendale [2010] VCC 805), Malcolm CJ said at 316:

"... the availability of an undertaking of personal liability by the persons who stand behind the company is no more than a factor, albeit an important factor, to be taken into account in the exercise of discretion." (emphasis added).”

The first defendant submitted that while the second and third plaintiffs have offered such an undertaking "if the Court thinks it appropriate" this is no more than a factor to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion: Intercraft Cabinets at 316; Jazabas at [80].
Further, the first defendant relied on the following passage from Live Board Holdings Ltd v Cody Live Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 302 at [90]: "Candour in a case such as this involves the impecunious claimant which seeks to avoid an order for security for costs presenting evidence of those persons who stand to benefit from the litigation and their own capacity to fund it including by meeting any adverse costs orders." The first defendant submitted that the second and third plaintiffs have provided no such evidence.
It is a relevant factor that the second plaintiff who is a director and shareholder of Tachnat and third plaintiff who is also a director of Tachnat have offered to provide an undertaking concerning any adverse costs order. However, despite undertaking to pay, they have not provided any details of their financial ability to meet such costs orders nor have they offered to provide security. I take these factors into account.

7. Security will only ordinarily be ordered against a party who is in substance a plaintiff, and an order ought not to be made against parties who are defending themselves and thus forced to litigate:

Tachnat is in substance the plaintiff. Tachnat initiated proceedings in the District Court. Tachnat instructed the first defendant to act for it. The second defendant was retained by the first defendant to act as a barrister on behalf of Tachnat.

Another discretionary factor – Whether the proceedings involve a matter of public importance

Tachnat submitted via the second plaintiff that the conduct of the defendants highlights the importance of the honest conduct that is expected from the officer of the court: Gash Aff 29 August 2021 at [79a] (CB Vol 2, 880). The alleged exploitation and trust of their superior position affects people’s lives. The court must take into consideration that where, such as in this instance, an officer of court destroys a client file after an intentional tort, there is no recourse to the clients to fight for their rights.
It should be noted that the first defendant submitted that the state of her file is misstated by Tachnat and that she has retained the ‘vast majority’ of it.
I take into account that the applications for security for costs were brought promptly, Tachnat is in substance the plaintiff, the allegations against both defendants are serious, and that the second and third plaintiffs are willing to provide an undertaking to meet any adverse costs order but note they have not offered any security, nor have they set out their ability to meet any such costs orders. I am not satisfied that Tachnat’s impecuniosity was caused by either defendants conduct nor that Tachnat has established that an order for security for costs will stultify its claim. Taking these factors into account, it is my view that orders for security for costs in favour of each defendant should be made.

Quantum for security for costs

The authorities show that the amount of security ordered should be sufficient, but not a complete indemnity: Brundza v Robbie & Co (No 2) (1952) 88 CLR 171; Dennis vJoukhador [2021] NSWSC 870 at [92].

Assessment of quantum of costs by first defendant

In Moran Aff 2 August 2021, Mr Moran, who has been in practice for 38 years, outlined similar work as in Mr Berg’s affidavit (reproduced below). The same type of work needs to be undertaken by both the first and second defendant’s solicitors in these proceedings. I do not think it is necessary to reproduce them again here.
Mr Moran’s assessment of his costs on a reasonable party/party basis is as follows:

“I provide the following estimate of the costs that will be incurred in respect the work required to defend the proceedings. In calculating the estimate of costs, I assume the following rates (exclusive of GST):
a.   Bill McManus (CO)     $400 per hour and $3,500 per day
b.   Peter Moran (PA)     $420 per hour
c.   Christopher Harrison (SA)   $385 per hour
d.   Chantelle Bauer (SO)     $310 per hour

Task, personal involved and time estimate

Cost estimate

Correspondence: SO@ 10 hours, SA@ 5 hours, PA@ 5 hours

$7,125

Pre-Trial Appearances: SO@ 10 hours

$3,100

Applications: SO@ 10 hours, SA@ 15 hours, PA@ 5 hours, CO@ 2 days

$18,000

Further and Better Particulars: PA@ 2 hours

$840

Defence: PA@ 5 hours and CO@ 5 hours

$4,100

Pleadings: PA@ 2 hours

$840

Plaintiffs' Evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 2 hours, PA @ 2 hours, CO@ 3 hours

$4,360

Second Defendant Evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 2 hours, PA @ 2 hours, CO@ 3 hours

$4,360

Subpoenas: SO@ 10 hours

$3,100

First Defendant Lay evidence: SA@ 5 hours, PA@ 5 hours, CO@ 5 hours

$6,025

First Defendant expert evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 10 hours, PA@ 2 hours, CO@ 10 hours

$10,240

Mediation: SO@ 10 hours and CO@ 1 day

$6,600

Other disbursements including filing fees, fees for the service of court documents, fees incurred in respect of subpoenas and discovery

$20,000

Trial preparation: SO@ 25 hours, PA@10 hours, CO@ 15 hours

$17,950

Trial attendances: SO@ 38 hours, PA@ 10 hours, CO@ 5 days

$33,480

Expert witness expenses for trial

$25,000

Disbursements for trial, including hearing fees, fees for the service of court documents, transcript fees

$15,000 to $25,000

Total

$183,220 to $193,220

Assessment of quantum of costs by second defendant

Mr Berg, in Berg Aff 27 July 2021 deposes the following as to quantum:

“Costs of defending the proceedings
[35]   In order to defend this proceeding on behalf of Miss Culkoff, I anticipate that myself, Ms Puglisi and Counsel will need to undertake the steps set out below:
35.1   reviewing relevant documents in relation to the underlying proceedings, including Miss Culkoff s brief and all documents pleaded in the Statement of Claim - these documents have not yet been obtained however at pages 62 and 63 of Exhibit JDB is a copy of a letter from the solicitors for PPP's insurers in the underlying proceedings which lists the evidence relevant to those proceedings in the lead up to mediation. The affidavits and documents referred to in that letter comprise some 531 pages (Initial Document Review):
35.2   review and consider the plaintiffs' further and better particulars and draft a Defence to the Statement of Claim, including consideration of the legal relationship (if any) as between the plaintiffs, or some of them, and Miss Culkoff, advise in respect of same and having the Defence settled by Counsel (Defence);
35.3   reviewing and considering further pleadings, including from the first defendant, in conjunction with Counsel (Review Pleadings);
35.4   advising and conferring with Miss Culkoff, both generally and in relation to matters not otherwise specifically referred to herein (General Matter Management);
35.5   advising on, drafting and seeking to issue subpoenas, including associated review of documents produced in response to subpoenas (Subpoenas);
35.6   advising on, drafting any necessary application for and proceeding through the process of seeking orders for discovery against the plaintiffs, including associated review of documents discovered by the Plaintiffs (Discovery);
35.7   preparing, drafting, advising on. finalising and serving evidence to be relied on by Miss Culkoff, including:
35.7.1 expert evidence from a senior barrister in the context of a defence pursuant to section 50 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW);
35.7.2   expert evidence from a senior solicitor in the context of an alternative defence of proportionate liability referable to the first defendant; and
35.7.3   in respect of quantum in which a variety of heads of damage are pleaded, potentially including medical evidence, forensic accountant evidence and expert evidence from market experts in relation to the plaintiffs' purported failed business ventures; (Second Defendant's Evidence)

35.8 reviewing, considering and advising on evidence served by the plaintiffs and first defendant (Other Evidence);
35.9 preparing for and attending mediation, including preparing mediation bundle, drafting position paper and considering position paper of the plaintiffs, etc. (Mediation);
35.10 general correspondence/emails with the plaintiffs and first defendant's solicitors (Correspondence);
35.11 preparations for (including briefing counsel) and attending on Court appearances as necessary, including:
35.11.1 directions hearings and/or relatively miconteiitious interlocutor)' applications (Pre-trial Appearances):
35.11.2 contentious interlocutory application(s), including the plaintiffs' notice of motion and the notice of motion filed and served on behalf of Miss Culkoff (Interlocutory Appearances);
35.11.3 a trial taking approximately 6 days (Trial Appearances); and

35.12 preparations for trial including coordinating conclaves of expert witnesses such as drafting questions, indexes and briefs; conferring with witnesses as trial preparation; preparing joint memorandum, objections and chronology; prepare Court Book etc (Trial Preparation).

[36] I have set out in a table below the tasks referred to in paragraph 35 above. Within the table, where applicable, I have also estimated the costs of each task, which I have calculated by multiplying the estimated likely period of time to be spent on the task by each of the individuals involved, and the following assumed rates (all exclusive of GST):
36.1 Mr John Catsanos of Senior Counsel, without junior counsel, (SC) at $575 per hour and $5,750 per day;
36.2 James Berg, Partner of DLA Piper Australia (JB) at $380 per hour; and
36.3 Ms Puglisi, Solicitor of DLA Piper Australia (SOL) at $245 per hour.

TASK, PERSON(S) INVOLVED AND ESTIMATED

TIME

TOTAL

Initial Document Review. SOL @ 20 hours and JB % 5 hours

$6,800

Defence: JB @ 6 hours and SC @ 2 hours

$3,430

Review Pleadings: JB @ 2 hours

$760

General Matter Management: SOL @ 20 hours and JB @ 10 hours

$8,700

Subpoenas: SOL @ 10 hours

$2,450

Discovery: SOL @ 15 hours

$3,675

Second Defendant's Evidence: SOL @ 40 hours, JB @ 10 hours and SC @ 5 hours

$16,475

Other Evidence: SOL @ 10 hours, JB @ 2 hours and SC @ 5 hours

$6,085

Mediation: SOL @ 12 hours and SC @ 1 day (plus 2 hours prep)

$9,840

Correspondence: SOL @ 20 hours and JB @ 4 hours

$6,420

Pre-Trial Appearances: SOL (a), 10 hours

$2,450

Interlocutory Appearances. SOL (a) 20 hours, JB @ 8 hows and SC @ 1 days plus 4 hours prep

$15,990

Other Disbursements:

$50,000 to $75,000

TASK, PERSON(S) INVOLVED AND ESTIMATED TIME	TOTAL
*SUB-TOTAL*	*$133,075* - *$158,075*
Trial Preparation: SOL @ 35 hours, JB @ 10 hours and SC at 8 hours plus expert witness expenses (say $15,000)	$31,975
Trial Appearances: SC @ 8 days (including 2 days preparation), SOL @ 60 hours and JB @ 10 hours	$64,500
Expert witness expenses for trial:	$25,000
Other disbursements: including photocopying and transcript fees	$10,000
*TOTAL*	*$264,550 to $289,550*

[37] The above figures reflect estimates only, calculated based on my experience and in light of information known to date. From my experience, it is also prudent to include some contingency for unexpected developments which may result in further costs being incurred.
[38] The above estimates have been provided as reflecting what I consider to be recoverable party/party costs. I have excluded from the assessment any allowance for advising Miss Culkoff on prospects, strategy and quantum.”

The plaintiff’s submissions and assessment of costs

The plaintiff submitted that the costs of the proceedings are being exaggerated/blown out by the defendants similarly to when the defendants handled the plaintiffs' dispute with the Pick Packers warehouse. The plaintiffs' reiterated that their claim is on the grounds that the defendants made false/incorrect detinue and conversion claims that resulted in damages, and this is very obvious in the statement of claim that states that the conduct of the Pick Packers warehouse between "29 June 2015 and September 2015" led to detinue and conversion of the plaintiffs stock. The plaintiffs submit that on the available evidence, it is clear that before 29 June 2015 and after September 2015 there was no detinue and conversion of the plaintiffs stock. Hence the defendant drafted false claims which need no further explanation.
The plaintiffs submitted that the estimate of costs provided by Mr Berg, must be rejected. Although the plaintiffs note that they are not solicitors, the second plaintiff is a migration agent with 8 years of experience in representing clients at Tribunals. The plaintiffs submit that the amount of time and work they have spent on the matter has provided a guide to provide an estimate of the time and money required for the matter. This is estimated as follows:

Correspondence-trial appearances, applications,defence,evidence.	$20,000
Trial expenses	$10,000
Disbursements	$5000 to $7000
Expert witness or reports	NIL
Total	$40,000 to $42,000

The plaintiffs submitted that the estimate of costs provided by the defendant is misleading, a farce, and an insult to the justice system. The plaintiffs further submitted that the defendants are seeking an order for security of costs to protect white-collar fraud, and “this should be discouraged as it is no lesser crime than a fraud itself.”

Resolution

I propose to order security for costs up to the close of pleadings and for the close of discovery. The first defendant has already filed her defence to the plaintiff’s ASC, however the second defendant has not. I allow the first defendant security for costs in the sum of $50,000.00 upto the close of pleadings and for discovery. In relation to the application for security for costs by the first defendant I make orders that:

Tachnat gives security for costs of the first defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000;

The proceedings, insofar as they relate to the plaintiff’s claims against the first defendant, be stayed until the above order has been complied with.

So far as the second defendant is concerned, the plaintiffs’ claims in negligence and for breach of contract for the period up until 22 September 2015 remain on foot, as does Tachnat’s claim in negligence for the period after 22 September 2015.
Therefore, I allow the sum of $50,000 for security for costs for the second defendant up to the close of pleading and for discovery.
In relation to security for costs as against the second defendant. I make orders that:

Tachnat give security for the costs of the second defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000;

the proceedings, insofar as they relate to Tachnat, against the second defendant be stayed until the above order has been complied with.

Both notices of motion are to be stood over with liberty to the defendants to restore in order to obtain further security at the appropriate time. Further security for costs will become necessary if Tachnat continues to send voluminous documents to the defendants, rather than confining itself to what is essential.

Result

In regards to the second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021: Paragraphs [2] and [9] seeking a permanent stay of proceedings are dismissed. Paragraphs [13] and [17] seeking answers to particulars are stood over to the Registrar at 9.00am on 27 April 2021 for directions. The plaintiffs’ claims in relation to drafting pleadings with no reasonable prospects of success, those pursuant to s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and those seeking damages for mental harm as against the second defendant are dismissed. Of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the second defendant: in relation to the period until 22 September 2015 those in negligence, and those for breach of contract remain, and for the period after 22 September 2015 the claim in negligence by Tachnat remains. All other claims made by the plaintiffs’ as against the second defendant are struck out.
The second plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 19 June 2021 seeking summary judgment, and the plaintiff’s Notices of Motion dated 27 July 2021, and 5 August 2021 seeking default judgment and the assessment of damages against both defendants are dismissed.

Costs

Costs are discretionary. Costs normally follow the event. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful with their notices of motion seeking default judgment and that damages be assessed.
The first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the first defendant’s costs of their notices of motion filed 19 June 2021, 5 August 2021, and 27 July 2021 respectively and the first defendants Notice of Motion dated 30 July 2021 seeking security for costs. As the second defendant was almost entirely successful in her Notice of Motion, the first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the second defendant’s costs of the Notice of Motion dated 27 July 2021.

The Court orders:

Tachnat give security for the costs of the first defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000;
Tachnat give security for the costs of the second defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000;
The proceedings against the first defendant be stayed until order (1) above has been complied with;
The proceedings against the second defendant be stayed until order (2) above has been complied with;
The first defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 30 July 2021 and paragraph [16] of the second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021 seeking security for costs, are to be stood over with liberty to the defendants to restore in order to seek further security for costs;
In regards to the second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021: Paragraphs [2] and [9] seeking a permanent stay of proceedings are dismissed. Paragraphs [13] and [17] seeking answers to particulars are stood over to the Registrar at 9.00am on 27 April 2021 for directions. The plaintiffs’ claims in relation to drafting pleadings with no reasonable prospects of success, those pursuant to s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and those seeking damages for mental harm as against the second defendant are dismissed. Of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the second defendant: in relation to the period until 22 September 2015 those in negligence, and those for breach of contract remain, and for the period after 22 September 2015 the claim in negligence by Tachnat remains. All other claims made by the plaintiffs’ as against the second defendant are struck out.
So far as the second defendant is concerned the plaintiff’s request for particulars needs to be recast now that the surviving claims against her have been narrowed;
The second plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 19 June 2021 seeking summary judgment, and the plaintiffs’ Notices of Motion dated 27 July 2021, and 5 August 2021 seeking default judgment and the assessment of damages against both defendants are dismissed;
The first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the first defendant’s costs of their notices of motion filed 19 June 2021, 5 August 2021, and 27 July 2021 respectively and the first defendant’s Notice of Motion dated 30 July 2021 seeking security for costs. As the second defendant was almost entirely successful in her Notice of Motion, the first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the second defendant’s costs of the second defendant’s Notice of Motion dated 27 July 2021.

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Decision last updated: 05 April 2022

Medium Neutral Citation:	Tachnat Pty Ltd v Orsini [2022] NSWSC 393
Hearing dates:	17 September 2021
Date of orders:	5 April 2022
Decision date:	05 April 2022
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Harrison AsJ
Decision:	The Court orders: (1) Tachnat give security for the costs of the first defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000 (2) Tachnat give security for the costs of the second defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000; (3) The proceedings against the first defendant be stayed until order (1) above has been complied with; (4) The proceedings against the second defendant be stayed until order (2) above has been complied with; (5) The first defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 30 July 2021 and paragraph [16] of the second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021 seeking security for costs, are to be stood over with liberty to the defendants to restore in order to seek further security for costs; (6) In regards to the second defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021: Paragraphs [2] and [9] seeking a permanent stay of proceedings are dismissed. Paragraphs [13] and [17] seeking answers to particulars are stood over to the Registrar at 9.00am on 27 April 2021 for directions. The plaintiffs’ claims in relation to drafting pleadings with no reasonable prospects of success, those pursuant to s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and those seeking damages for mental harm as against the second defendant are dismissed. Of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the second defendant: in relation to the period until 22 September 2015 those in negligence, and those for breach of contract remain, and for the period after 22 September 2015 the claim in negligence by Tachnat remains. All other claims made by the plaintiffs’ as against the second defendant are struck out. (7) So far as the second defendant is concerned the plaintiff’s request for particulars needs to be recast now that the surviving claims against her have been narrowed; (8) The second plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 19 June 2021 seeking summary judgment, and the plaintiffs’ Notices of Motion dated 27 July 2021, and 5 August 2021 seeking default judgment and the assessment of damages against both defendants are dismissed; (9) The first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the first defendant’s costs of their notices of motion filed 19 June 2021, 5 August 2021, and 27 July 2021 respectively and the first defendant’s Notice of Motion dated 30 July 2021 seeking security for costs. As the second defendant was almost entirely successful in her Notice of Motion, the first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the second defendant’s costs of the second defendant’s Notice of Motion dated 27 July 2021.
Catchwords:	CIVIL PROCEDURE – Summary Judgment – Summary Dismissal – Stay of Proceedings – Whether there are serious issues to be tried – Whether there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed – Default Judgment – Application for default judgment while defendants awaiting particulars – Security for Costs – Where party has provided undertaking but has not provided security or set out ability to meet costs orders
Legislation Cited:	Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW), rr 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 14.2 Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 67 Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), s 174 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 7.2, 13.1, 13.4, 14.3, 14.28, 16.7, 30.1, 42.21, 43.4,
Cases Cited:	About life v Maddocks [2021] NSWSC 1370 Across Australia Finance v Bassenger [2008] NSWSC 799 Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Ptd Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1; [2016] HCA 16 Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 Brundza v Robbie & Co (No 2) (1952) 88 CLR 171 Connellan v Murphy [2017] VSCA 116 Dennis vJoukhador [2021] NSWSC 870 Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12 Epping Plaza v Bevendale [2010] VCC 805 Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 Gentry Bros v Wilson Brown & Associates [1992] FCA 592 Giannarelli and Others v Wraith and Others (1988) 165 CLR 543 GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2021] NSWSC 1204 Griffiths v Evans [1953] 1 WLR 1424 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41 Intercraft Cabinets Pty Ltd v Sampas Pty Ltd (1997) 18 WAR 306 Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad [2007] NSWCA 291 Kounnas v Citywide Civil Engineering Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 287 KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189 Live Board Holdings Ltd v Cody Live Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 302 Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 MoubarakbhtCoorey v Holt (2019) 100 NSWLR 218 Newcastle City Council v Batistatos [2006] HCA 27 Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28 Studer v Boettcher [2000] NSWCA 263 The Nominal Defendant v Cordin [2019] NSWCA 85 Treloar Constructions Pty Limited v McMillan [2016] NSWCA 302 Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598
Category:	Procedural rulings
Parties:	Tachnat Pty Ltd (First Plaintiff) Hulio Gash (Second Plaintiff) Rejani Rajan (Third Plaintiff) Julie Orsini (First Defendant) Vera Culkoff (Second Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: B McManus (First Defendant) J Catsanos (Second Defendant) Solicitors: Hulio Gash (Plaintiffs) DLA Piper (Defendants)
File Number(s):	2021/166049
Publication restriction:	Nil

Task, personal involved and time estimate	Cost estimate
Correspondence: SO@ 10 hours, SA@ 5 hours, PA@ 5 hours	$7,125
Pre-Trial Appearances: SO@ 10 hours	$3,100
Applications: SO@ 10 hours, SA@ 15 hours, PA@ 5 hours, CO@ 2 days	$18,000
Further and Better Particulars: PA@ 2 hours	$840
Defence: PA@ 5 hours and CO@ 5 hours	$4,100
Pleadings: PA@ 2 hours	$840
Plaintiffs' Evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 2 hours, PA @ 2 hours, CO@ 3 hours	$4,360
Second Defendant Evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 2 hours, PA @ 2 hours, CO@ 3 hours	$4,360
Subpoenas: SO@ 10 hours	$3,100
First Defendant Lay evidence: SA@ 5 hours, PA@ 5 hours, CO@ 5 hours	$6,025
First Defendant expert evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 10 hours, PA@ 2 hours, CO@ 10 hours	$10,240
Mediation: SO@ 10 hours and CO@ 1 day	$6,600
Other disbursements including filing fees, fees for the service of court documents, fees incurred in respect of subpoenas and discovery	$20,000
Trial preparation: SO@ 25 hours, PA@10 hours, CO@ 15 hours	$17,950
Trial attendances: SO@ 38 hours, PA@ 10 hours, CO@ 5 days	$33,480
Expert witness expenses for trial	$25,000
Disbursements for trial, including hearing fees, fees for the service of court documents, transcript fees	$15,000 to $25,000
Total	$183,220 to $193,220

TASK, PERSON(S) INVOLVED AND ESTIMATED TIME	TOTAL
Initial Document Review. SOL @ 20 hours and JB % 5 hours	$6,800
Defence: JB @ 6 hours and SC @ 2 hours	$3,430
Review Pleadings: JB @ 2 hours	$760
General Matter Management: SOL @ 20 hours and JB @ 10 hours	$8,700
Subpoenas: SOL @ 10 hours	$2,450
Discovery: SOL @ 15 hours	$3,675
Second Defendant's Evidence: SOL @ 40 hours, JB @ 10 hours and SC @ 5 hours	$16,475
Other Evidence: SOL @ 10 hours, JB @ 2 hours and SC @ 5 hours	$6,085
Mediation: SOL @ 12 hours and SC @ 1 day (plus 2 hours prep)	$9,840
Correspondence: SOL @ 20 hours and JB @ 4 hours	$6,420
Pre-Trial Appearances: SOL (a), 10 hours	$2,450
Interlocutory Appearances. SOL (a) 20 hours, JB @ 8 hows and SC @ 1 days plus 4 hours prep	$15,990
Other Disbursements:	$50,000 to $75,000