Chang v Laidley Shire Council

Link copied
Case Copied 64 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

SHU-LING CHANG & ANOR   APPELLANTS

AND

LAIDLEY SHIRE COUNCIL  RESPONDENT

Chang v Laidley Shire Council
[2007] HCA 37
29 August 2007
B46/2006

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation

D R Gore QC with T N Trotter for the appellants (instructed by Robert Milne Legal)

M D Hinson SC for the respondent (instructed by Connor O'Meara)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIRBY J.   This appeal comes from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland[1].  That Court refused leave to appeal from a decision of the Planning and Environment Court of Queensland[2].  The appeal concerns the interpretation of successive provisions of Queensland planning law affecting a parcel of land at Blenheim in South-East Queensland. 

    [1]Chang v Laidley Shire Council (2006) 146 LGERA 283.

    [2]Chang v Laidley Shire Council [2006] QPELR 91.

  2. Under earlier provisions of the planning law, the land in question could, with the requisite approval of a development application, have been reconfigured (in the old language "subdivided"[3]) into lots of a modest size.  After supervening changes to the planning law, reconfiguration as sought was prohibited.  In these proceedings, the owners of the land have been seeking to recover what they claim is their entitlement to statutory compensation, accrued before that change took effect.

    [3](2006) 146 LGERA 283 at 286 [2] per Jerrard JA.

  3. The owners' claim has been rejected (so far successfully) on the basis that, although the compensation sought was available for a time, it was removed by an amendment to the planning law which rendered the development application invalid.  A valid development application was necessary to enliven the statutory entitlement to compensation.  The owners argue that the supervening law, containing this amendment, did not apply to their case because, immediately before it came into operation, they had a vested entitlement to recover compensation for the loss of value of their interest occasioned by earlier changes to the planning law.  They contend that the new procedural requirement for such applications did not clearly and explicitly govern their case.  Conformably with statutory provisions[4] and common law principles[5], defensive of accrued entitlements (and protective against their extinguishment by amending laws not clearly stated as having that effect), the supervening law should be read so as not to apply. 

  4. In their reasons ("the joint reasons"), Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ have concluded that the appeal must be dismissed.  They have done so by reference to the language of the planning law as in force at the time the relevant application was made[6].  Upon…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Chang v Laidley Shire Council and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2007] HCA 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned Shu-Ling Chang and Tai-Hsing Chen (the appellants) and the Laidley Shire Council (the respondent). The appellants sought approval to reconfigure their land into 25 lots, a proposal that was permissible under an earlier planning scheme but not under the new planning scheme adopted in 2003. This change in planning provisions resulted in a diminution in the value of the appellants' land. The appellants contended they were entitled to compensation for this loss in value, arguing they had an "accrued right" or "accrued entitlement" to compensation under section 5.4.2 of the *Integrated Planning Act 1997* (Qld).

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the appellants were entitled to compensation for the diminution in value of their land due to the inability to reconfigure it as previously permitted, and whether they possessed an "accrued right" or "accrued entitlement" to such compensation. A related issue was whether a development application that contravened draft regulatory provisions constituted a "properly made application" under section 3.2.1 of the *Integrated Planning Act 1997* (Qld), and whether this section should be interpreted in a way that preserves vested interests unless a contrary legislative purpose is manifest.

The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that while the appellants' situation might be considered unfortunate, the legislative provisions, when viewed in their entirety and against their historical context and purpose, did not support their claim for compensation. The Court noted that the *Integrated Planning Act 1997* (Qld) provided a mechanism for seeking compensation through a "development application (superseded planning scheme)" within two years of a new scheme's adoption. However, the appellants' application was made in 2004, after the relevant timeframes and potentially not in compliance with the requirements for a "properly made application" under section 3.2.1. The Court found that the legislative changes, though perhaps not explicitly communicated, had the effect of extinguishing the appellants' entitlement to compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal fails, in the end, because of the terms of the legislation governing the matter[14]. However, for me, this means the whole of the legislation, yielding from its detail the applicable purpose and policy of Parliament. The solution is not confined to what is meant by a supervening change to the requirements for "a properly made application" for the proposed development[15]. That consideration is but one factor in the analysis that leads to the stated outcome.[14]cf Attorney-General (Q) (2002) 213 CLR 485 at 524 [112].[15]Joint reasons at [108].The facts and legislation The appellants' interest in the land: Many of the background facts are set out in the joint reasons[16]. However, to understand fully the complaint made by the owners, Shu-Ling Chang and Tai-Hsing Chen ("the appellants"), it is helpful to explain the way they presented their case.[16]Joint reasons at [87]-[89]. The appellants' land, the subject of the proceedings, was within the local government area of the Laidley Shire Council ("the Council"). The Council is the respondent to this appeal. Under a previous (1977) planning scheme applicable to it, the land was included in a zone designated for development purposes "Rural A". In July 1992, an application was successfully made by the then owners for the land to be rezoned as "Rural Residential Zone". That rezoning was gazetted in December 1992. When, in 1996, the Laidley Shire Council Town Plan (the "1996 Plan") was adopted and given effect, the land was included in an area designated "Rural Residential A Zone"[17]. That was the relevant zoning of the land when the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Q) ("the 1997 Act") was enacted and came into force.[17](2006) 146 LGERA 283 at 286-287 [3]. Injurious affection in 2003: On 28 March 2003, in accordance with the 1997 Act, a new planning scheme for the Council's local government area was adopted. It replaced the 1996 Plan. Under the 1996 Plan, an application to reconfigure the appellants' single lot of land into 25 lots, which is the subject of these proceedings, was legally permissible. When, however, the 2003 planning scheme was adopted, it required that, for approval for the development which the appellants desired, lots should be larger than the minimum size which they were proposing. On the face of things, this meant that the land could not be reconfigured. To that extent, the introduction of the new planning scheme resulted in injurious affection to the appellants' interest in the land. The value of the appellants' interest was thereby reduced. Yet when the new planning scheme was adopted in 2003, all was not lost for the owners. The 1997 Act, s 5.4.2, afforded owners of land, so affected, a special entitlement (a "privilege" or "liberty"[18]) to seek redress from the Council. They were entitled to do so within two years of the adoption of such a planning scheme[19]. Within that period, owners, such as the appellants, could make a "development application (superseded planning scheme)" ("DA(SPS)"). Such a DA(SPS) gave the "assessment manager" (relevantly, the local government authority[20] and here the Council) an option on how to proceed[21]. As the law then stood, the Council could consent, in whole or in part, to the development sought, and thereby avoid any obligation to pay compensation to the land owner whose land was affected by the supervening scheme[22]. Or it could pay compensation to the owner, being "reasonable compensation", calculated as "the difference between the market values, appropriately adjusted having regard to [specified] matters"[23].[18]Temwood (2004) 221 CLR 30 at 45-46 [31].[19]1997 Act, Sched 10, definition of "development application (superseded planning scheme)".[20]Chang (2006) 146 LGERA 283 at 286 [2]. See 1997 Act, s 3.1.7, Sched 8A.[21]See 1997 Act, s 3.2.5(3).[22]1997 Act, s 3.5.11.[23]1997 Act, s 5.4.9.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIRBY J HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ CALLINAN J
It remains a misfortune that this consequence, if it was realised by the drafters at the time (as by inference it was), was not drawn explicitly to the notice of Parliament either in the text of the statutory amendments or in the supporting documents. And that it was not candidly acknowledged as an outcome to be accepted by Parliament, the people of Queensland and the affected persons as a price for the achievement of a major new planning regime for the SEQ Region. None of this occurred. Instead, the change was effected by stealth[82]. The parliamentary process did not operate as it is intended, so that those who were depriving people, such as the appellants, of their entitlements and expectations, shouldered the responsibility and assumed public accountability for the amendments which they enacted[83]. Although the appellants' delay contributed to their own misfortune, I have some sympathy for the predicament in which they now find themselves. Nevertheless, in the face of the legislative provisions, viewed in their entirety against the background of their history and purpose, there is nothing that this Court can do to breathe new life into the appellants' entitlement to seek compensation for the alteration of their interests.[82]See also reasons of Callinan J at [125].[83]See R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131: "the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost"; approved in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 492 [30] per Gleeson CJ, and in my own reasons in Daniels Corp (2002) 213 CLR 543 at 582 [106].Conclusion and orders For these reasons, and not solely for a textual application of the expression "a properly made application" in s 3.2.1 of the 1997 Act, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. In 2004 the appellants applied to the respondent Council for approval for reconfiguration of their land, at Blenheim in South East Queensland, from one lot into 25 lots. The planning provisions that then applied did not permit the proposed reconfiguration; earlier provisions would have permitted it.The issue In this Court the appellants sought to frame the issue that arises as whether, in these circumstances, the appellants are entitled to compensation from the Council on account of the diminution in value of their land brought about by their being unable to subdivide it as once they could. In the courts below, however, the issue that was decided was more narrowly focused. The determinative issue in those courts was whether the development application the appellants had made to the respondent Council was what the applicable legislation[84] identified as a "properly made application"[85].[84]Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Q), ("the 1997 Act") as amended by the Integrated Planning and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Q) ("IPOLA 2004").[85]See s 3.2.1(7). The Planning and Environmental Court of Queensland held[86] that it was not. The Court of Appeal of Queensland refused[87] the appellants leave to appeal. By special leave the appellants now appeal to this Court. Their appeal should be dismissed with costs.[86]Chang v Laidley Shire Council [2006] QPELR 91.[87]Chang v Laidley Shire Council (2006) 146 LGERA 283.The applicable legislation

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIRBY J, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ, CALLINAN J

Full text does not contain this section.