FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Zentai v Honourable Brendan O’Connor (No 3) [2010] FCA 691
Citation: Zentai v Honourable Brendan O’Connor (No 3) [2010] FCA 691 Parties: CHARLES ZENTAI v THE HONOURABLE BRENDAN O'CONNOR, COMMONWEALTH MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS, COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY-GENERAL, BARBARA LANE, THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN OFFICER IN CHARGE, HAKEA PRISON and THE FORMER MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS, THE HONOURABLE CHRISTOPHER MARTIN ELLISON File number: WAD 220 of 2009 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 2 July 2010 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review – s 39B(1) and s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) - review of decisions made pursuant to ss 16, 19 and 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) - failure to consider a relevant matter - jurisdictional error - Wednesbury unreasonableness
EXTRADITION - whether the applicant was ‘accused’ for the purposes of the Extradition Act and therefore an ‘extraditable person’ - where extradition sought for investigation and criminal proceedings not commenced by the requesting country - material before the Minister when he decided to issue a Notice under s 16 of the Extradition Act - where decisions pursuant to s 19 and s 22 of the Act are parasitic on the decision made pursuant to s 16 - where new material became available to the Minister- whether extradition was sought for an ‘extraditable offence’ - double criminality - where offence was not an offence in the requesting country at the time of the conduct constituting the offence - humanitarian considerations - where requesting country may not be capable of providing a fair trial - where applicant is 89 years old and in poor health - where alternatives were available to the Minister pursuant to the legislative scheme if extradition were refused
Legislation: Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3(a), 6, 11, 16, 16(1), 16(2), 19, 19(9), 19(10), 21, 22, 22(2), 22(3)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), 39B(1A)Treaty on Extradition Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Hungary 1995 Arts 1, 2, 3, 7
Constitution s 75(v)
Cases cited: A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221
ARM Constructions Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 10 FCR 197
(Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation 1948] 1 KB 223
Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353
Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513
Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163
Cabal v Vanstone (2000) 101 FCR 112
Cabal v United Mexican States (No 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188
Chang v Laidley Shire Council (2007) 234 CLR 1
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Australian Securities Commission (1996) 136 ALR 453
Fares Rural Meat & Livestock Co Pty Ltd v Australian Meat & Live-Stock Corporation (1990) 96 ALR 153
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Brian Hatch Timber Co. (Sales) Pty. Ltd.(1972) 128 CLR 28
Foster v Minister for Customs & Justice (1999) 164 ALR 357
Foster v Minister for Customs…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 691
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Minister's decision to issue the extradition Notice was not subject to judicial review on the basis of lack of reasons, as the Minister was not required to give reasons for his decision. However, the court emphasised that the Minister must consider relevant matters and satisfy jurisdictional preconditions before exercising his power under the Act. The court noted that the Minister had extensive advice and while minor errors in advice would be inconsequential, fundamental errors such as the absence of a charge or the non-existence of the offence at the relevant time, would be jurisdictional errors. The court held that the decision to extradite was within the Minister’s discretion, and the court could not substitute its view for that of the Minister. The court further noted that Australia's treaty obligations in extradition matters are of paramount importance, and there is a presumption that legal systems of sovereign states conform to their own domestic requirements and international law obligations.
The court concluded that the Minister had exercised his discretion in accordance with the Act and did not commit a jurisdictional error. The court found that the decision to extradite Mr. Zentai was not Wednesbury unreasonable given the strict observance of Australia’s treaty obligations and the necessity for a degree of flexibility in accommodating cooperation between different legal systems.
The final orders included directions for the applicant to file and serve submissions supporting a minute of orders he contended should be made, for the respondents to file and serve submissions in reply and propose a minute of orders, and for the applicant to file any submissions in reply and amended orders within specified timeframes. Costs were reserved and liberty to apply was granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant, within 28 days, do file and serve submissions supporting a minute of orders which the applicant contends should be made.
2. The respondents who wish to do so, do file and serve within 28 days submissions in reply and a minute of orders proposed.
3. The applicant, within 14 days thereof, do file any submissions in reply and any amended orders.
4. There be liberty to apply.
5. Costs be reserved.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Hindi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 1 (at 11-15), Sheppard J. observed that:In case this judgment should be read by persons not familiar with the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), I should emphasise that this Court has no power to review the merits of a case of this kind. Whether an application for resident status is granted or refused is a matter for the Minister and appropriate officers of his Department. The court's power is supervisory in nature. It obliges the court to ensure that any decision made by the Minister or one of his delegates is made according to law. If it is, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere. …In order to endeavour to demonstrate that this case had not been dealt with according to law, counsel for Mr Hindi said that the material in evidence disclosed that there had been no proper or separate consideration of the matters relied upon by Mr Hindi either when the ultimate decision was made on 4 August 1987 or when the Minister's delegate considered the matter after the Panel had made its recommendation. It should be observed that it is not open to Mr Hindi to challenge any decision except the one made on 4 August 1987 which was notified to him in the letter to his solicitors dated 26 August 1987. Indeed that is the only decision of which the amended application seeks review. But what counsel for Mr Hindi has submitted is that there was no separate consideration given to the matter once the Panel had made its recommendation. The Minister's delegate was said to have "rubber stamped" the Panel's decision and the decision to maintain that decision reached on 21 August 1987 was said to have been made, when analysed, upon the basis of what is contained in the Panel's recommendation without any separate attention being paid to a number of new matters which were raised in the solicitor's letter written on 12 June 1987. The way in which this submission was fitted into the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) was to claim that the evidence revealed that the delegates who dealt with the matter left relevant considerations out of account and exercised their discretion in accordance with a rule or policy (the policy contained in the Handbook) without regard to the merits of the particular case: see s 5(1)(e) and 2(b) and (f) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. In support of his submissions counsel relied upon two unreported decisions of single judges of this Court and on authorities referred to in those judgments. The two decisions are Brelin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Wilcox J, 14 May 1987) and Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Gummow J, 11 December 1987). Both cases involved situations in which it was submitted that inadequate consideration had been given to applications. In the Brelin case Wilcox J said of the criticisms made of the Panel's consideration of the matter (at 9-10):"These criticisms do not go to the weight of the various factors to be taken into account. Weight was for the Panel and, ultimately, for the Minister to determine. Rather they concern the question whether the Panel gave to the application proper and adequate consideration: see Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 at 1053; or, expressing the question another way, whether there was `a real exercise of discretion': see Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Provincial Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 228."Earlier his Honour indicated that the provision of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act upon which reliance had been placed was s 5(2)(b), namely, that the Minister's delegate failed to take into account a relevant consideration (at 8-9). In Kahn's case, Gummow J reached the conclusion (at 12) that on the whole of the evidence in that case, the applications in question had not each been given "proper, genuine and realistic consideration upon the merits". He relied on s 5(2)(f) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act which provides a ground for judicial review where there has been an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case. Gummow J said (at 11-12): "[W]hat was required of the decision maker, in respect of each of the applications, was that in considering all relevant material placed before him, he give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case and be ready in a proper case to depart from any applicable policy: Howells v Nagrad Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 169 at 195; Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 604; Chumbairux v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 74 ALR 480 at 4992-494. That consideration included, in respect of each application, the effect or likely effect of refusal of the application upon members of the family; cf Tabag v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1982) 70 FLR 61 at 67, referred to by Wilson J in Kioa v West (supra) at 604. The assertion by a decision maker that he has acted in this fashion will not necessarily conclude the matter; the question will remain whether the merits have been given consideration in any real sense: Turner v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 55 FLR 180 at 184; Chumbairux v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 74 ALR 480 at 495-496." I would, with respect, adopt what both Wilcox and Gummow JJ have said in these two cases. It matters not that one judge approached the matter by treating it as a case where a relevant consideration had been omitted from count and the other by treating the case as one where a policy had been applied without regard to the merits of the case. The essential principle upon which counsel for Mr Hindi relied was that the Minister, the Panel and the delegates were required to give proper consideration to the merits of the cases before them. So the question for decision is whether that consideration has been given to the applicant's case here. The answer to the question necessitates an analysis of the various decisions and memoranda to which reference has been made.I have reflected about the matter for some time conscious of the matters stated earlier in these reasons concerning the difficulty under which immigration officers operate, but I am driven to the conclusion that the way in which the submission based on Mr Hindi's difficulty in returning to Liberia is put reflects a situation in which the matter was not given any genuine or proper consideration either by the recommending officer or by the delegate who accepted the recommendation. (emphasis added)