Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor & Ors (No. 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zentai v Honourable Brendan O’Connor (No 3) [2010] FCA 691

Citation: Zentai v Honourable Brendan O’Connor (No 3) [2010] FCA 691
Parties: CHARLES ZENTAI v THE HONOURABLE BRENDAN O'CONNOR, COMMONWEALTH MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS, COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY-GENERAL, BARBARA LANE, THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN OFFICER IN CHARGE, HAKEA PRISON and THE FORMER MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS, THE HONOURABLE CHRISTOPHER MARTIN ELLISON
File number: WAD 220 of 2009
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 2 July 2010
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review – s 39B(1) and s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) - review of decisions made pursuant to ss 16, 19 and 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) - failure to consider a relevant matter - jurisdictional error - Wednesbury unreasonableness

EXTRADITION - whether the applicant was ‘accused’ for the purposes of the Extradition Act and therefore an ‘extraditable person’ - where extradition sought for investigation and criminal proceedings not commenced by the requesting country - material before the Minister when he decided to issue a Notice under s 16 of the Extradition Act - where decisions pursuant to s 19 and s 22 of the Act are parasitic on the decision made pursuant to s 16 - where new material became available to the Minister- whether extradition was sought for an ‘extraditable offence’ - double criminality - where offence was not an offence in the requesting country at the time of the conduct constituting the offence - humanitarian considerations - where requesting country may not be capable of providing a fair trial - where applicant is 89 years old and in poor health - where alternatives were available to the Minister pursuant to the legislative scheme if extradition were refused

Legislation:

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3(a), 6, 11, 16, 16(1), 16(2), 19, 19(9), 19(10), 21, 22, 22(2), 22(3)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), 39B(1A)

Treaty on Extradition Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Hungary 1995 Arts 1, 2, 3, 7

Constitution s 75(v)

Cases cited:

A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221
ARM Constructions Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 10 FCR 197
(Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation 1948] 1 KB 223
Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353
Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513
Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163
Cabal v Vanstone (2000) 101 FCR 112
Cabal v United Mexican States (No 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188
Chang v Laidley Shire Council (2007) 234 CLR 1
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v Australian Securities Commission (1996) 136 ALR 453
Fares Rural Meat & Livestock Co Pty Ltd v Australian Meat & Live-Stock Corporation (1990) 96 ALR 153
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Brian Hatch Timber Co. (Sales) Pty. Ltd.(1972) 128 CLR 28
Foster v Minister for Customs & Justice (1999) 164 ALR 357
Foster v Minister for Customs…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 691
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor & Ors (No. 3) involved Mr. Zentai, an 89-year-old man in poor health, challenging the decision of the Minister to issue a Notice under section 16 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) seeking his extradition to Hungary for investigation into a war crime. The legal issues before the court included whether the Minister had failed to consider relevant matters, whether there was a jurisdictional error, and whether the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable. The court had to determine if Mr. Zentai was an 'accused' person for the purposes of the Extradition Act, whether the offence was an 'extraditable offence', and if humanitarian considerations warranted refusal of extradition.

The court found that the Minister's decision to issue the extradition Notice was not subject to judicial review on the basis of lack of reasons, as the Minister was not required to give reasons for his decision. However, the court emphasised that the Minister must consider relevant matters and satisfy jurisdictional preconditions before exercising his power under the Act. The court noted that the Minister had extensive advice and while minor errors in advice would be inconsequential, fundamental errors such as the absence of a charge or the non-existence of the offence at the relevant time, would be jurisdictional errors. The court held that the decision to extradite was within the Minister’s discretion, and the court could not substitute its view for that of the Minister. The court further noted that Australia's treaty obligations in extradition matters are of paramount importance, and there is a presumption that legal systems of sovereign states conform to their own domestic requirements and international law obligations.

The court concluded that the Minister had exercised his discretion in accordance with the Act and did not commit a jurisdictional error. The court found that the decision to extradite Mr. Zentai was not Wednesbury unreasonable given the strict observance of Australia’s treaty obligations and the necessity for a degree of flexibility in accommodating cooperation between different legal systems.

The final orders included directions for the applicant to file and serve submissions supporting a minute of orders he contended should be made, for the respondents to file and serve submissions in reply and propose a minute of orders, and for the applicant to file any submissions in reply and amended orders within specified timeframes. Costs were reserved and liberty to apply was granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant, within 28 days, do file and serve submissions supporting a minute of orders which the applicant contends should be made.

2. The respondents who wish to do so, do file and serve within 28 days submissions in reply and a minute of orders proposed.

3. The applicant, within 14 days thereof, do file any submissions in reply and any amended orders.

4. There be liberty to apply.

5. Costs be reserved.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

There are five affidavits relied upon in support of Mr Zentai’s case. The first of those affidavits dated 19 November 2009 is the most extensive and is the subject of discussion below. Generally, the essential factual material is not in dispute. BACKGROUND The reasons in the following judgments, either interlocutory or final, record previous litigation involving Mr Zentai and various representatives of the Government:Zentai v Republic of Hungary (2006) 153 FCR 104Zentai v Republic of Hungary (No 2) [2006] FCA 1735Zentai v Republic of Hungary (2007) 157 FCR 585Zentai v Republic of Hungary [2007] FCA 842O'Donoghue v Ireland, Zentai v Republic of Hungary, Williams v United States of America (2008) 234 CLR 599Zentai v Republic of Hungary [2008] FCA 1335Zentai v Republic of Hungary [2009] FCA 284Zentai v Republic of Hungary [2009] FCA 511Zentai v Republic of Hungary (2009) 180 FCR 225Zentai v Honourable Brendan O’Connor [2009] FCA 1597Zentai v Honourable Brendan O’Connor (No 2) [2010] FCA 252 The contemporary events commenced on 3 March 2005 when Captain Dr Toth Csaba, a Military Judge of the Military Division of the Budapest Metropolitan Court, issued Warrant Number KBNY V 4/2005/3 for the arrest of Mr Zentai (Hungarian Arrest Warrant). The Hungarian Arrest Warrant on its face alleged that Mr Zentai had committed a war crime contrary to s 165 of Act IV of 1978 (being the Criminal Code of Hungary). In substance, the allegation is that the crime occurred on 8 November 1944 at Budapest in the following circumstances:1.Mr Zentai was a soldier in the Hungarian Royal Army attached to a unit stationed at Budapest.2.Whilst on patrol duty Mr Zentai captured Mr Peter Balazs (a young man of Jewish origin).3.Mr Zentai dragged Mr Balazs back to the unit’s army post.4.Mr Zentai and two other soldiers (Captain Mader and First Lieutenant Nagy) assaulted Mr Balazs over a number of hours. Mr Balazs died of his injuries. 5.Mr Zentai, Captain Mader and First Lieutenant Nagy weighted Mr Balazs’ body and threw it into the Danube River. The Department of International Criminal Law of the Ministry of Justice of Hungary sent a letter dated 23 March 2005 to the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department (the Department) seeking the extradition of Mr Zentai from Australia to Hungary for the purpose of prosecution under the Hungarian Arrest Warrant. The Department prepared a submission dated 8 July 2005 in respect of the s 16 Notice Decision required of the Attorney-General under s 16 of the Act. On 8 July 2005 the Attorney-General made the s 16 Notice Decision. On 8 July 2005 a provisional arrest warrant for the arrest of Mr Zentai was issued under s 12 of the Act: see Zentai v Republic of Hungary (2009) 180 FCR 225 (at [2]). On 8 July 2005, Mr Zentai was arrested and granted bail subject to conditions. On 8 July 2005 eligibility proceedings under s 19 of the Act were commenced in the Perth Magistrates Court in respect of Hungary’s request that Mr Zentai be extradited.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, the Commonwealth is correct in this submission and this ground cannot succeed. CONCLUSION The Court is not empowered to substitute its view for that of the Minister. The only function of this judicial review is to consider whether the process adopted by the Minister accorded with requirements at law. The Minister circled ‘approved’ and signed and dated a Minute. That was his decision. It is a practice which is entirely customary. The Minister was not required to give reasons for his decision to surrender Mr Zentai for extradition. He did, however, have extensive advice. The parties have proceeded, as I have, on the premise that the extensive advice to the Minister was information on which he could rely if he so chose. Whether he did or not, the absence of reasons leave the inference uncontradicted that to the extent considerations were not addressed in that advice, that he did not take them into account. This is relevant only where he was actually required to consider certain matters. To the extent that the advice contained errors, rather than omissions, the position is more complex. The occasional error would be inconsequential largely because it would never be known whether or not the Minister relied on that particular error. As long as it could be seen that it was open to him, on the advice, to exercise his discretion in accordance with the Act, that would completely answer any challenge in the review process. However, in my view, at least those errors which are so central to the issue under consideration that they go to the heart of the statutory objects, are in a different category. An entirely hypothetical example would be this. If by the time the Minister’s surrender decision was to be exercised, it came to light that the requesting country accepted that it had sought extradition of entirely the wrong person, the completely wrong person would not be extraditable just because earlier steps in the process had not revealed such an error. An equally fundamental error would include the fact that Mr Zentai is simply not charged at all with any offence and that the offence of which he is suspected never existed at the relevant time. Such errors which go to the heart of the statutory object are not just merits considerations arising in exercise of a discretion but jurisdictional preconditions to be satisfied before the Minister can exercise his power under the Act. The Act permits extradition of people accused of an offence, not suspected of an offence. The offence (not the conduct constituting the offence) must have existed at the time alleged. To surrender a person for extradition where those basic requirements are not satisfied is beyond power. A challenge is also made, in any event, to the exercise of discretion by the Minister. To be relieved of the consequences of a surrender for extradition on this basis would be rare indeed. The authorities discussed above emphasise the well established paramount importance of Australia’s treaty obligations. Those obligations in the area of extradition are strictly observed. They arguably assume even greater importance in the case of War Crimes. In addition a common sense degree of latitude and flexibility is necessary to accommodate co-operation between different legal systems. There is a presumption that legal systems of sovereign treaty states will conform both with their own domestic requirements and with international law obligations. The discretion to be exercised is entirely a matter for the executive, not the judiciary, subject only to it being exercised within jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Hindi v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 1 (at 11-15), Sheppard J. observed that:In case this judgment should be read by persons not familiar with the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), I should emphasise that this Court has no power to review the merits of a case of this kind. Whether an application for resident status is granted or refused is a matter for the Minister and appropriate officers of his Department. The court's power is supervisory in nature. It obliges the court to ensure that any decision made by the Minister or one of his delegates is made according to law. If it is, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere. …In order to endeavour to demonstrate that this case had not been dealt with according to law, counsel for Mr Hindi said that the material in evidence disclosed that there had been no proper or separate consideration of the matters relied upon by Mr Hindi either when the ultimate decision was made on 4 August 1987 or when the Minister's delegate considered the matter after the Panel had made its recommendation. It should be observed that it is not open to Mr Hindi to challenge any decision except the one made on 4 August 1987 which was notified to him in the letter to his solicitors dated 26 August 1987. Indeed that is the only decision of which the amended application seeks review. But what counsel for Mr Hindi has submitted is that there was no separate consideration given to the matter once the Panel had made its recommendation. The Minister's delegate was said to have "rubber stamped" the Panel's decision and the decision to maintain that decision reached on 21 August 1987 was said to have been made, when analysed, upon the basis of what is contained in the Panel's recommendation without any separate attention being paid to a number of new matters which were raised in the solicitor's letter written on 12 June 1987. The way in which this submission was fitted into the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) was to claim that the evidence revealed that the delegates who dealt with the matter left relevant considerations out of account and exercised their discretion in accordance with a rule or policy (the policy contained in the Handbook) without regard to the merits of the particular case: see s 5(1)(e) and 2(b) and (f) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. In support of his submissions counsel relied upon two unreported decisions of single judges of this Court and on authorities referred to in those judgments. The two decisions are Brelin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Wilcox J, 14 May 1987) and Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Gummow J, 11 December 1987). Both cases involved situations in which it was submitted that inadequate consideration had been given to applications. In the Brelin case Wilcox J said of the criticisms made of the Panel's consideration of the matter (at 9-10):"These criticisms do not go to the weight of the various factors to be taken into account. Weight was for the Panel and, ultimately, for the Minister to determine. Rather they concern the question whether the Panel gave to the application proper and adequate consideration: see Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 at 1053; or, expressing the question another way, whether there was `a real exercise of discretion': see Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Provincial Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 228."Earlier his Honour indicated that the provision of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act upon which reliance had been placed was s 5(2)(b), namely, that the Minister's delegate failed to take into account a relevant consideration (at 8-9). In Kahn's case, Gummow J reached the conclusion (at 12) that on the whole of the evidence in that case, the applications in question had not each been given "proper, genuine and realistic consideration upon the merits". He relied on s 5(2)(f) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act which provides a ground for judicial review where there has been an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case. Gummow J said (at 11-12): "[W]hat was required of the decision maker, in respect of each of the applications, was that in considering all relevant material placed before him, he give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case and be ready in a proper case to depart from any applicable policy: Howells v Nagrad Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 169 at 195; Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 604; Chumbairux v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 74 ALR 480 at 4992-494. That consideration included, in respect of each application, the effect or likely effect of refusal of the application upon members of the family; cf Tabag v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1982) 70 FLR 61 at 67, referred to by Wilson J in Kioa v West (supra) at 604. The assertion by a decision maker that he has acted in this fashion will not necessarily conclude the matter; the question will remain whether the merits have been given consideration in any real sense: Turner v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 55 FLR 180 at 184; Chumbairux v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 74 ALR 480 at 495-496." I would, with respect, adopt what both Wilcox and Gummow JJ have said in these two cases. It matters not that one judge approached the matter by treating it as a case where a relevant consideration had been omitted from count and the other by treating the case as one where a policy had been applied without regard to the merits of the case. The essential principle upon which counsel for Mr Hindi relied was that the Minister, the Panel and the delegates were required to give proper consideration to the merits of the cases before them. So the question for decision is whether that consideration has been given to the applicant's case here. The answer to the question necessitates an analysis of the various decisions and memoranda to which reference has been made.I have reflected about the matter for some time conscious of the matters stated earlier in these reasons concerning the difficulty under which immigration officers operate, but I am driven to the conclusion that the way in which the submission based on Mr Hindi's difficulty in returning to Liberia is put reflects a situation in which the matter was not given any genuine or proper consideration either by the recommending officer or by the delegate who accepted the recommendation. (emphasis added)