Snedden v Republic of Croatia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Snedden v Republic of Croatia [2009] FCAFC 111

EXTRADITION — extradition sought of Serbian to the Republic of Croatia — extradition opposed on basis of an extradition objection — prejudice claimed ‘at trial’ — punished or detained — a mitigating factor in sentence unavailable to the person by reason of political opinions — reliance upon statistics as to numbers of persons charged and convicted and conviction rates

Held:  Appeal allowed

WORDS AND PHRASES —  an ‘extradition objection’ — ‘substantial grounds for believing’ — ‘punished’ — at trial  — ‘by reason of’ — ‘political opinions’ 

Extradition Act1988 (Cth) ss 3(a), 7, 19, 21
Extradition (Croatia) Regulations2004 (Cth) reg 4
Extradition (Croatia) Regulations 2004 Statutory Rules 2004 No. 339 (Cth) Explanatory Statement

Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, applied
In re Arton [1896] 1 QB 108, cited
Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514, cited
Brown v Lizars (1905) 2 CLR 837, cited
Cabal v United Mexican States (2001) 108 FCR 311, applied
Cabal v United Mexican States(No 2) (2000) 172 ALR 743, applied
Cabal v United Mexican States (No 3) (2000) 186 ALR 188, cited
De Bruyn v Republic of South Africa (1999) 96 FCR 290, cited
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528, cited
DJL v The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226, applied
Harris v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (1994) 52 FCR 386, cited
Hempel v Attorney-General (Cth) (1987) 77 ALR 641, cited
O’Donoghue v Ireland [2009] FCA 618, cited
Prabowo v Republic of Indonesia (1995) 61 FCR 258, cited
Rahardja v Republic of Indonesia [2000] FCA 1297, considered
Schlieske v Federal Republic of Germany (1987) 14 FCR 424, cited
Snedden v Republic of Croatia [2009] FCA 30, reversed
Timar v Republic of Hungary [1999] FCA 1518, cited
Travica v The Government of Croatia [2004] EWHC 2747 (Admin), considered
Vasiljkovic v The Commonwealth of Australia (2006) 227 CLR 614, applied

Aughterson EP, Extradition – Australian Law and Procedure (The Law Book Company Limited, 1995)
Nicholls C, Montgomery C and Knowles JB, The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2007)

DANIEL SNEDDEN v REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

NSD 126 of 2009

BENNETT, FLICK AND MCKERRACHER JJ
2 SEPTEMBER 2009
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NSW DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 126 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

DANIEL SNEDDEN
Appellant

AND:

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Respondent

JUDGES:

BENNETT, FLICK AND MCKERRACHER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

2 SEPTEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The appellant is to be released from custody.

3.Order 2 is stayed until 3 pm on Friday 4 September 2009.

4.The respondent is to pay…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Snedden v Republic of Croatia, the appellant contested the extradition order issued by a magistrate. The central issue before the court was whether the appellant had established a valid extradition objection under section 7(c) of the relevant Act. This section allows for an objection if there are substantial grounds for believing that the person may be prejudiced at trial or punished by reason of their race or political opinions. The appellant argued that statistical evidence indicated a higher rate of prosecution and conviction for Serbians compared to Croatians, suggesting discrimination based on nationality or political opinion. The court examined the interpretation of the phrase "at his or her trial" in section 7(c), considering whether it encompasses all steps leading up to the trial or is limited to the trial itself. The court ultimately decided that the interpretation of this phrase was not necessary to resolve the case due to other findings, but it highlighted the importance of focusing on trial practices and potential discrimination during the trial process.

The court concluded that the appellant had made out an extradition objection as the magistrate failed to properly consider the evidence of discrimination and its potential impact on the appellant's trial. This failure constituted a substantial error of law. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the extradition order was quashed. The court ordered the appellant's release from custody, subject to a temporary stay to allow for appropriate submissions from both parties. The respondent was also directed to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. Additionally, the court reserved the right for either party to apply to vary the release order within a specified period.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The appellant is to be released from custody.

3. Order 2 is stayed until 3 pm on Friday 4 September 2009.

4. The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

5. Liberty is reserved to the parties to apply to vary orders 2 or 3 upon 24 hours’ notice in writing.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appeal should thus be allowed. EVIDENCE AND CONVICTION RATES It was contended by the appellant that the risk of ‘prejudice’ at trial, or the risk of the appellant being ‘punished’ by reason of his race or political opinions, was also made out by reason of available statistics as to rates at which Serbians were being prosecuted and convicted as opposed to their Croatian counterparts. The appellant’s account of those statistics may be summarised by the following table: Notwithstanding the care with which the submissions were advanced on behalf of the appellant, the conclusions to be drawn from these statistics remained elusive. To the extent that conclusions or inferences remained elusive, the respondent contended that the appellant had not discharged the onus of proof imposed by s 19(2)(d). The respondent also contended that such discrimination as may be evidenced by these statistics did not go that further step and establish that the differential treatment arose ‘by reason of … nationality or political opinions’ for the purposes of s 7(c). These submissions of the respondent have more weight if attention is focussed only upon a comparison of the numbers charged and convicted; they have less weight if attention is focussed upon the comparative conviction rates. AT TRIAL The use of the phrase ‘at his or her trial’ in s 7(c) has the potential for ambiguity. There is, perhaps, ambiguity as to whether that phrase is confined to such prejudice as a person facing extradition may face during the trial process itself. On such a confined construction of the phrase, prior steps that have been taken to secure the presence of a person in the country seeking extradition precede that trial process and would assume no relevance. And, upon such a construction, whatever questions which may otherwise arise by reference to the terms in which an extradition request is expressed would equally be of no relevance unless a link to the trial itself or to the judiciary were demonstrated. We note that the extradition request was not prepared by the Croatian judiciary and does not indicate prejudgment. The same analysis would apply to the investigatory steps whereby evidence was gathered for the purposes of later being adduced during the trial process and the decision to prosecute. Questions which may emerge by reason of the potential use of evidence perhaps improperly obtained may fall within the phrase ‘at his or her trial’. The question also may arise as to whether the appellate or other review processes affecting a result secured at trial came within the expression ‘at … trial’. This, in turn, affects the ambit of the evidence relevant to each of these issues in the present appeal. Some of these questions, it was submitted, had been resolved by the decision of the Full Court in Rahardja. Rahardja was said to support a confined interpretation of the phrase ‘at … trial’. One issue there addressed was whether a statement by the primary judge as to whether evidence of a particular witness established that a person ‘would be treated’ in a particular manner evidenced a failure to properly apply s 19(2). The Full Court observed (emphasis in original): [49] … We think his Honour’s comment … about Professor Lindsey’s evidence should be read in the same way; it was a comment about the lack of specificity in that evidence upon the critical question of practices at trial ……[56] However, even if it is true that Indonesian authorities are more disposed to decide not to prosecute a non-Chinese Indonesian than a Chinese Indonesian, that fact does not establish there are substantial grounds for believing that Mr Rahardja may be prejudiced at his trial or punished by reason of his race. The question is what will happen at trial or on sentence, not whether persons of a different race would have a better chance of avoiding trial at all.These passages, the respondent submitted, confined the ambit of the phrase ‘at … trial’ to the hearing process itself and the sentencing stage of any such process.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BENNETT, FLICK AND MCKERRACHER JJ
Notwithstanding the care with which these competing submissions were advanced, in view of our decision on the consequence of the way in which the mitigating factor is applied, it is presently unnecessary for any concluded view to be expressed. CONCLUSIONS The appeal should be allowed. An ‘extradition objection’ has been made out. In such circumstances, s 19(10) and s 21 of the Act assume relevance. Section 19(10) provides as follows:Where, in the proceedings, the magistrate determines that the person is not, in relation to any extradition offence, eligible for surrender to the extradition country seeking surrender, the magistrate shall: (a) order that the person be released; and (b) advise the Attorney-General in writing of the order and of the magistrate’s reasons for determining that the person is not eligible for surrender.On an application for review of a magistrate’s order, s 21 thereafter sets forth the powers of this Court. The terms of those provisions appear to be self-evident. No submissions, however, were advanced during the hearing of the appeal as to whether or not an order should be made for the release of the appellant from custody if the appeal were allowed. Accordingly we propose to make an order for the appellant’s release but also that this order be stayed for a limited period of time. This affords an opportunity to the appellant and the respondent to make such submissions as are considered appropriate. Given that it has been established that there is a valid ‘extradition objection’, any further detention of the appellant would appear to be without lawful authority. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event.ORDERS The orders of the Court are:1.The appeal be allowed.2.The appellant is to be released from custody.3.Order 2 is stayed until 3 pm on Friday 4 September 2009.4.The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.5.Liberty is reserved to the parties to apply to vary orders 2 or 3 upon 24 hours’ notice in writing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BENNETT, FLICK AND MCKERRACHER JJ