Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zentai v Honourable Brendan O’Connor (No 4) [2010] FCA 1385

Citation: Zentai v Honourable Brendan O’Connor (No 4) [2010] FCA 1385
Parties: CHARLES ZENTAI v THE HONOURABLE BRENDAN O'CONNOR, COMMONWEALTH MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS, COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY-GENERAL, BARBARA LANE, THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN OFFICER IN CHARGE, HAKEA PRISON and THE FORMER MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS, THE HONOURABLE CHRISTOPHER MARTIN ELLISON
File number: WAD 220 of 2009
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 10 December 2010
Catchwords:

EXTRADITION - final orders - basic principles to be applied when awarding relief - whether a successful applicant on a review of a decision under s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) should remain on bail - whether declaratory relief is a necessary incident of the substantive relief - whether declaratory relief would be inconsistent with a decision of the Full Court.

COSTS - basic principles - whether costs should be apportioned.

Legislation: Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 16, 19, 22
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 21, 23
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Cases cited: Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust v Northern Territory (2007) 157 FCR 255
Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd  (1996) 68 FCR 406
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Holloway (2000) 35 ACSR 276
Australian Trade Commission v Disktravel [2000] FCA 62
BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v National Competition Council (No 2) [2007] FCA 557
Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCAFC 107
Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528
Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602
Emirates v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 2) [2009] FCA 492
Forster v Farquhar (1893) 1 QB 564
Foster v Minister for Customs & Justice (1999) 164 ALR 357
Henderson, Russell Fraser & Ors v Amadio Pty Ltd & Ors (No. 3) [1996] FCA 184
Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) (986) ATPR 40-748
Mok v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 81
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Hodgson CJ, 3 June 1998)
Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656
Rediffusion Simulation Ltd v Link-Miles Ltd [1993] FSR 369
Republic of Croatia v Snedden (2010) 84 ALJR 334
Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited (No 4) [2010] FCA 645
Ritter v Godfrey (1920) 2 KB 47
Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1989) AI PC para 90-567
Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229
Snedden v Republic of Croatia (2009) 178 FCR 546
Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd  (1990) 27 FCR 284
Zentai v O'Connor (2009) 263 ALR 511
Zentai v O'Connor and Others (No 3) (2010) 187 FCR 495
Zentai v Republic of Hungary [2009] FCA…
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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 1385
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor (No 4), the applicant, Mr Zentai, sought declaratory relief and an injunction in relation to decisions made by the Commonwealth in the extradition process. The case involved the challenge of the legality of decisions made by the Commonwealth in the extradition process of Mr Zentai to Hungary. The central legal issues the court had to address were whether the court had the authority to make declaratory relief concerning earlier decisions in the extradition process and whether such relief should be stayed pending an appeal. The court found that the requested declaratory relief was a necessary incident of the substantive relief and conclusions concerning the surrender decision. The court also ruled that there was no basis to stay the declaratory relief as it would not normally be given and that Mr Zentai should be allowed to enjoy the fruits of his victory in the usual way, with the orders being stayed pending the appeal period only.

The court's reasoning was based on the statutory provisions of sections 21, 22, and 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, which allow the court to make binding declarations of right, grant remedies, and make orders as appropriate. The court noted that the jurisdictional source for the challenge to the ultimate decision under sections 22 and 23 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) is section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The court also considered the Full Court's decision in Zentai v Republic of Hungary (2009) 180 FCR 225, which anticipated the probability of the course being pursued when a challenge to the ultimate surrender decision was made. The court concluded that there was a real issue at stake and that the declaratory relief was not a hypothetical issue, and therefore, it should not be stayed pending an appeal. The court found that Mr Zentai should not be deprived of the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of his victory in the usual way, and the orders would be stayed for a 21-day appeal period. If there was no appeal, the orders would become absolute, and if there was an appeal and the Commonwealth considered it necessary, it could take appropriate measures to seek other orders pending the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

In terms of preservation of the status quo, it is not evident why Mr Zentai should not ‘enjoy the fruits of his victory’ in the usual way. The effect of the orders to be made will be that they are stayed pending the 21 day appeal period only. If there is no appeal, the orders become absolute. If there is an appeal and the Commonwealth considers it necessary to seek other orders pending the appeal, it will no doubt take such measures as it considers appropriate. BACKGROUND In Zentai No 3, of 13 grounds argued, I upheld grounds 3, 4 and 9 of Mr Zentai’s grounds of review. Ground 3 dealt with the question of whether or not Mr Zentai was ‘accused’ of an offence within the meaning of the Act: see Zentai No 3 (at [177]-[179]). I held he was not. In relation to ground 4, I concluded that by reason of Art 2 para 5(a) of the Treaty on Extradition Between Australia and the Republic of Hungary 1995 (the Treaty) as incorporated into the Extradition (Republic of Hungary) Regulations 1997, Australia must refuse the Extradition Request since there was no relevant ‘extradition offence’ of ‘war crime’ at the relevant time. In relation to ground 9, I concluded that the first respondent erred in law and committed jurisdictional error by failing to take into account relevant considerations when determining, in accordance with Art 3 para 2(f) of the Treaty, whether it would be oppressive and incompatible with humanitarian considerations to surrender Mr Zentai for extradition to Hungary (see Zentai No 3 at [346]). In Zentai No 3 I did not uphold grounds 1 and 2 (indeed they were not ultimately pressed). They were the second respondent’s initial decision to issue a Notice of Receipt of Extradition Request to a Magistrate pursuant to s 16(1) of the Act (the s 16 Notice) and the third respondent’s decision that Mr Zentai was eligible for extradition and the issue of the warrant on 20 August 2008 pursuant to s 19(9) of the Act committing Mr Zentai to imprisonment in Hakea Prison (the Committal Order). Mr Zentai argues that given the Surrender Decision should be quashed, it is necessary and appropriate to provide ancillary relief in relation to the second and third respondents’ decisions (that Mr Zentai was an ‘eligible person’ (the s 16 Decision) and the Committal Order). The concern Mr Zentai has is that in the absence of such ancillary relief, it may leave the Magistrate’s warrant committing Mr Zentai to prison in place indefinitely or ‘simply hovering’. Not only would the Committal Order be left hovering but so also would the second respondent’s decision to issue the s 16 Notice on the basis that Mr Zentai was an ‘eligible person’. The Commonwealth argues that because of the failure of Mr Zentai on grounds 1 and 2, it is not now open to ‘attack’ the earlier decisions because the information that he was only wanted for questioning did not come to light until the time of making the Surrender Decision. CONSIDERATIONThe nature of the relief

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The relief now sought as a consequence of the conclusions reached in Zentai No 3 was all foreshadowed in the application before the Court. It was also less specifically foreshadowed by Mr Zentai and considered by the Full Court in Zentai v Republic of Hungary (2009) 180 FCR 225 (the Full Court decision) when the Full Court was exercising a much narrower function under s 21 of the Act. As I read that decision, the Full Court in substance, anticipated the probability that the course which has been pursued would occur when a challenge to the ultimate surrender decision was made, should it be necessary. As noted in the Background section in Zentai No 3, the decision of the Attorney-General under s 22 is not subject to review under the Act. Decisions under the Act are also excluded from review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act) by virtue of Sch 1 to the ADJR Act. The decisions are, however, subject to the constitutional writs provided for under s 75(v) of the Constitution and s 39B of the Judiciary Act. Those writs lie for jurisdictional error but do not permit a review of the merits of a decision. The Act itself is a code as to the law relating to extradition of persons to extradition countries (s 3(a)). But the jurisdictional source for the challenge to an ultimate decision under s 22 and s 23 is s 39B of the Judiciary Act. For reasons discussed below, the final form of declaratory relief makes it clear (consistently with the reasons in Zentai No 3) that the declaration concerning s 19 of the Act and which is made pursuant to the power in ss 21, 22 and 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA) is a necessary incident of the substantive relief and conclusions concerning s 22 of the Act. There is no basis on which the declaratory relief as ultimately structured has been in some way expressly or by necessary implication ousted by statute. There is a real issue to which the declaratory relief is directed (Mr Zentai’s freedom from bail) and the answer to the determination of that issue produces a real consequence for the parties. There is not some hypothetical issue at stake (cf Lockhart J in Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 406 (at 415-416). There is no coercive element in a declaration. It does, however, have res judicata and issue estoppel effects as between the parties (M Aaronson, B Dyer and M Groves, Judicial Review Administrative Action (Law Book Co, 3rd ed, 2004) p 802). But a declaration does not create rights. It merely indicates what they have always been. It follows that a stay of a declaration pending an appeal would not normally be given (see for example, Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust v Northern Territory (2007) 157 FCR 255). However, Mr Zentai has acceded to a proposal that the declaratory relief be stayed for a 21 day appeal period. In terms of preservation of the status quo, it is not evident why Mr Zentai should not ‘enjoy the fruits of his victory’ in the usual way. The effect of the orders to be made will be that they are stayed pending the 21 day appeal period only. If there is no appeal, the orders become absolute. If there is an appeal and the Commonwealth considers it necessary to seek other orders pending the appeal, it will no doubt take such measures as it considers appropriate. BACKGROUND

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Sections 21, 22 and 23 FCA are directly relevant to the debate. They provide as follows:21 Declarations of right(1)The Court may, in civil proceedings in relation to a matter in which it has original jurisdiction, make binding declarations of right, whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed. (2)A suit is not open to objection on the ground that a declaratory order only is sought. 22Determination of matter completely and finallyThe Court shall, in every matter before the Court, grant, either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks just, all remedies to which any of the parties appears to be entitled in respect of a legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by him or her in the matter, so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided.23 Making of orders and issue of writs The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the Court thinks appropriate. The Commonwealth accepts (for the purpose of this relief argument) that if the s 22 Surrender Decision was not made in accordance with s 22 of the Act, then the s 23 warrant decision was not a lawful exercise of power (Foster v Minister for Customs & Justice (1999) 164 ALR 357 (at [5]) per Drummond J. However it argues that the only basis upon which the s 16 Decision and the s 19 Committal Order were revisited in Zentai No 3, was in the context of an attack on the s 22 Surrender Decision (see [171], [173] and [183]). At those paragraphs I said:171 There is force in the submission made for Mr Zentai that ‘… there is no immutable law of the Medes and Persians…’ that once determined to be eligible at one of the earlier stages of the extradition process, the Minister or the Attorney-General has no option other than to robotically act on those earlier determinations in the face of his positive knowledge that he lacks the proper legal authority for surrender. …173 By 2009, the Minister by Attachment C became aware from Hungary that the ‘criminal proceeding against Mr Zentai is in the investigative phase and no indictment has been lodged so far and consequently there are no criminal proceedings pending … at present.’ …183 It is entirely reasonable to imply into s 22 a requirement that the Minister consider any new material that comes to light which elucidates the status of a person who has been wrongly classified as an ‘extraditable person’ at the first stage. To ignore such material and approve the surrender of a person despite actual or constructive knowledge that that person is not an ‘extraditable person’ would be to defeat the purpose of the Act. Senior Counsel for the Commonwealth, Mr DR Williams QC, submits that there is no legal basis on which to set the s 19 Decision aside and no practical reason why it needs to be set aside. On the material before the decision-maker, the s 16 Decision was unimpeachable as the ‘not accused material’ only came to light well after the s 16 Decision.