Santhirarajah v Attorney-General (Cth)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Santhirarajah v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia
[2012] FCA 940

Citation: Santhirarajah v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 940
Parties: THULASITHARAN SANTHIRARAJAH v ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH
File number: VID 216 of 2012
Judge: NORTH J
Date of judgment: 31 August 2012
Date of hearing:  14, 15 and 16 May 2012
Catchwords:

EXTRADITION –  Respondent determined to surrender applicant to United States under s 22(2) of Extradition Act – whether s 22(2) prescribes a time by which the power to make a determination must be exercised – whether determination made when power had ceased to exist

EXTRADITION – Whether respondent erred in forming satisfaction under s 22(3)(a) – Where applicant raised extradition objection – whether offences were political offences – consideration of development of political offence exception – consideration of contemporary meaning of political offence

EXTRADITION – Whether respondent erred in forming satisfaction under s 22(3)(b) that applicant would not be subjected to torture on surrender – where respondent misunderstood obligation of US under Art 3(1) of Convention Against Torture
Whether respondent’s discretion under s 22(3)(f) miscarried – where respondent relied on assurance by US
Whether respondent asked wrong question in considering best interests of child  
Whether applicant denied procedural fairness

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Where respondent approved briefing paper from department – where respondent not obliged to provide reasons for determination – whether inference can be drawn from respondent’s approval of briefing paper that respondent adopted its reasoning

Words and Phrases “Surrender determination”, “as soon as reasonably practicable”, “Extradition objection”,  “Political offence”
Legislation:

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 5, 7 and 22
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 6 ILM 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976)  Arts 6 and 7
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) Art 3
Convention on the Rights of the Child opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) Art 3

Cases cited: Brock v Minister for Home Affairs [2010] FCA 1301 cited
Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor (No 3) (2010) 187 FCR 495 cited
NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470 distinguished
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 applied
David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265 referred to
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Victoria) Inc v Marson Constructions Pty Ltd (2000) 1 VR 274 considered
R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 cited
Re Griffiths [1991] 2 Qd R 29
Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] HCA 32 referred to
Prevato v Governor, Metropolitan Remand Centre and Others (G16 of 1986); Prevato v Miszalski and Another (1986) 8 FCR 38 considered
Bodruddaza v…
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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 940
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Santhirarajah v Attorney-General (Cth), the applicant, Thulasitharan Santhirajah, sought a declaration that the determination made by the Attorney-General to surrender him to the United States was invalid. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Attorney-General had the power to make the surrender determination after the time when it was reasonably practicable to do so, as required by section 22(2) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). The court also considered whether the offences for which the applicant was charged constituted political offences under the Extradition Act.

The court found that the phrase “shall, as soon as is reasonably practicable, having regard to the circumstances” in section 22(2) of the Act imposed a mandatory requirement on the Attorney-General to make the determination within the specified time frame. The ordinary meaning of “shall” in this context obliged the Attorney-General to act without delay once the circumstances allowed. The court emphasised that the power to make a determination ceased if it was not made within the stipulated time. The court concluded that the determination to surrender the applicant was made two years after it first became reasonably practicable, rendering the determination invalid. Therefore, the court granted the applicant's request for a declaration that the Attorney-General did not have the power to make the determination on 21 February 2012.

Regarding the political exception issue, the court examined whether the offences for which the applicant was charged constituted political offences. The court found that the offences were not political in nature, and thus, the Attorney-General did not make a jurisdictional error in determining that there was no extradition objection based on the political offence exception. The court held that the offences charged against the applicant did not involve acts of a political character, and therefore, the applicant could be surrendered to the United States.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

After explaining some matters concerning the evidence which was before the Court on the application, each of these grounds will be addressed.ISSUES CONCERNING THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT Two affidavits sworn, one on 7 March 2012 and the other on 2 May 2012, by Marie Costa, the solicitor for the applicant, were filed on behalf of the applicant. The affidavits mainly annex documents relied upon by the applicant which were disclosed by the Attorney-General to the applicant in compliance with orders for discovery made by the Court. An affidavit affirmed on 11 May 2012, by Anastasia Harmer, Assistant Secretary of the International Crime Cooperation Central Authority in the Attorney-General’s Department (the Department), was filed on behalf of the Attorney-General. Two issues arise from the annexures to Ms Costa’s second affidavit. Each of these issues will be dealt with later in these reasons in connection with the ground to which it relates. One issue is an objection by the Attorney-General to the use of certain documents on the ground that the particular document is not relevant to any issue before the Court because it was not before the Attorney-General when she made the determination to surrender. The other issue concerns annexure MAC12, which is one of the discovered documents referred to in [21] above. It is a briefing paper dated 15 February 2012, prepared by the Department. The briefing paper has an introductory page and nine attachments. Attachment E is a 53 page legal advice (the legal advice) explaining the Department’s view of the legal issues to be addressed by the Attorney-General. On the single introductory page, which outlines the facts in a general way, there is a paragraph referring to the Departmental advice as follows:Attachment E. The Department considers that it is open to you to be satisfied that the requirements of section 22 for surrendering Mr Santhirajah to the US are met and that you may consider that Mr Santhirajah should be surrendered to the US for the extradition offences. At the foot of the introductory page the author, Ms Harmer, wrote under the heading “Recommendation”:I recommend that:(i) you read the advice at Attachment E and determine under subsection 22(2) of the Act that Thulasitharan Santhirajah be surrendered to the US; Immediately beneath the recommendation, the document provides the Attorney-General with three options, namely, “Approved / Not Approved / Discuss”. The Attorney-General has circled the word “Approved” and signed and dated the page where provided. On 21 February 2012, when the Attorney-General made the determination to surrender the applicant, and also a few days later, the solicitor for the applicant requested that the Attorney-General provide reasons for her determination to surrender the applicant. Ms Harmer responded, first on 21 February 2012, by observing that s 13 of the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act 1977 (Cth), which permits a person to request reasons for an administrative decision, does not apply to the determination to surrender by virtue of the operation of paragraph r of sch 1 of that Act. Then, in a letter dated 27 February 2012, Ms Harmer advised the solicitors for the applicant that the Attorney-General was not obliged by any statute or the common law to provide reasons for her determination to surrender the applicant, and that the practice of the Attorney-General was not to provide detailed reasons for her decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On the evidence before the Court, in or about November 2009, was the time when it was as soon as reasonably practicable having regard to the circumstances for the then Attorney-General, Mr McClelland, to make the determination whether to surrender the applicant. The ordinary meaning of the expression “as soon as” is immediately after. The period of time within which the requisite immediacy exists is not precisely expressed and is a matter to be determined on the facts of each case. As Tadgell J observed at [2] in RSPCA v Marson Constructions, “there will in any case be room for debate as to when that point has been reached”. In the present case, the evidence supports a finding that the determination whether to surrender was made some 2 years after it first became reasonably practicable to do so. In those circumstances, it is not necessary to determine exactly when the period of immediacy came to an end. It had long passed when the determination was made.Conclusion On the proper construction of s 22(2) the power to make a determination to surrender an eligible person ceases if it is not made as soon as is reasonably practicable having regard to the circumstances. As a matter of fact in this case the determination to surrender the applicant to the US was not made as soon as was reasonably practicable having regard to the circumstances. Hence, the Attorney-General did not have power on 21 February 2012 to make the determination to surrender the applicant to the US. The applicant is entitled to a declaration to that effect. THE POLITICAL EXCEPTION ISSUEIntroduction It will be recalled that an eligible person may only be surrendered if the Attorney-General is satisfied that there is no extradition objection in relation to the offence (s 22(3)(a)). There is an extradition objection if the extradition offence is a political offence in relation to the extradition country (s 7(a)). A political offence in relation to a country means an offence against the law of the country that is of a political character, whether because of the circumstances in which it is committed or otherwise and whether there are competing political parties in the country (s 5). The issue raised in this section is whether the four offences with which the applicant was charged are political offences and if so, whether the Attorney-General made a jurisdictional error in arriving at her satisfaction under s 22(3)(a) that they were not political offences. The Legal Advice The legal advice provided by the Department to the Attorney-General explained that the magistrate who conducted the s 19 proceeding found the applicant eligible for surrender for the four following offences:•one count of conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act, in violation of 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) section 371 and 22 U.S.C. section 2778 (Offence 1)•one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organisation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2339B(a)(1)(Offence 2), and•two counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1956(a)(2)(A)(Offences 3 and 4).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In order to demonstrate the reason for the delay Ms Harmer also listed approximately 150 communications between the US and Australia between 10 August 2009 and 14 February 2012 in respect of the determination to surrender the applicant. Public interest immunity was claimed over the substance of these listed communications. ConsiderationThe Construction Question It must be acknowledged that the contending constructions of the phrase “shall, as soon as is reasonably practicable, having regard to the circumstances…determine”, raise a finely balanced question. In the end, the preferable construction is that advanced by the applicant, namely, that once the time stipulated by the section has passed, the Attorney-General no longer has the power to surrender a person under s 22(2). The starting point for the consideration of the construction is the ordinary and natural meaning of the language of the section. There are four elements in the expression of the section which point to a meaning that if the power is not exercised within time it ceases to exist. First, the section specifies a time limitation. Second, that limitation is expressed emphatically – “as soon as”. Third, the limitation is provided with a degree of flexibility – “reasonably practicable”. By providing the Attorney-General with some leeway, this element suggests that the power is intended to be exercised without delay once circumstances, objectively assessed, render it reasonably practicable to do so. Finally, the word “shall” construed in the context of the Act, ought to be given its ordinary prescriptive meaning. As Byrne J said in Re Griffiths [1991] 2 Qd R 29, at 33:In legislation, “shall” ordinarily signifies must. But like all words, its meaning takes colour from its context. A general disposition in favour of construing “shall” as obligatory cannot prevail over other considerations plainly evidencing a contrary legislative intent.The purpose, scope and object of the Act discussed below at [76] support the view that “shall” is used to oblige the Attorney-General to exercise the power within the stipulated time and at no other time. Contrary to the Attorney-General’s submission, this construction does not depend on adding words to the section to the effect that, after the expiration of the period stipulated, the power may not be exercised. Rather, the construction advocated by the Attorney-General would require the addition of words such as “failure to comply with the time limit does not invalidate any exercise of the power to surrender”. Such saving clauses are not uncommon, but no such clause is included in this section. An example of such a saving clause is found in s 175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) which was considered in Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] HCA 32 and which provides:The validity of any assessment shall not be affected by reason that any of the provisions of this Act have not been complied with.