FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Santhirarajah v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia
[2012] FCA 940
Citation: Santhirarajah v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCA 940 Parties: THULASITHARAN SANTHIRARAJAH v ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH File number: VID 216 of 2012 Judge: NORTH J Date of judgment: 31 August 2012 Date of hearing: 14, 15 and 16 May 2012 Catchwords: EXTRADITION – Respondent determined to surrender applicant to United States under s 22(2) of Extradition Act – whether s 22(2) prescribes a time by which the power to make a determination must be exercised – whether determination made when power had ceased to exist
EXTRADITION – Whether respondent erred in forming satisfaction under s 22(3)(a) – Where applicant raised extradition objection – whether offences were political offences – consideration of development of political offence exception – consideration of contemporary meaning of political offence
EXTRADITION – Whether respondent erred in forming satisfaction under s 22(3)(b) that applicant would not be subjected to torture on surrender – where respondent misunderstood obligation of US under Art 3(1) of Convention Against Torture
Whether respondent’s discretion under s 22(3)(f) miscarried – where respondent relied on assurance by US
Whether respondent asked wrong question in considering best interests of child
Whether applicant denied procedural fairnessADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Where respondent approved briefing paper from department – where respondent not obliged to provide reasons for determination – whether inference can be drawn from respondent’s approval of briefing paper that respondent adopted its reasoning
Words and Phrases “Surrender determination”, “as soon as reasonably practicable”, “Extradition objection”, “Political offence” Legislation: Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 5, 7 and 22
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39BInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 6 ILM 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976) Arts 6 and 7
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) Art 3
Convention on the Rights of the Child opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) Art 3Cases cited: Brock v Minister for Home Affairs [2010] FCA 1301 cited
Zentai v Honourable Brendan O'Connor (No 3) (2010) 187 FCR 495 cited
NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470 distinguished
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 applied
David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265 referred to
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Victoria) Inc v Marson Constructions Pty Ltd (2000) 1 VR 274 considered
R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 cited
Re Griffiths [1991] 2 Qd R 29
Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] HCA 32 referred to
Prevato v Governor, Metropolitan Remand Centre and Others (G16 of 1986); Prevato v Miszalski and Another (1986) 8 FCR 38 considered
Bodruddaza v…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 940
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the phrase “shall, as soon as is reasonably practicable, having regard to the circumstances” in section 22(2) of the Act imposed a mandatory requirement on the Attorney-General to make the determination within the specified time frame. The ordinary meaning of “shall” in this context obliged the Attorney-General to act without delay once the circumstances allowed. The court emphasised that the power to make a determination ceased if it was not made within the stipulated time. The court concluded that the determination to surrender the applicant was made two years after it first became reasonably practicable, rendering the determination invalid. Therefore, the court granted the applicant's request for a declaration that the Attorney-General did not have the power to make the determination on 21 February 2012.
Regarding the political exception issue, the court examined whether the offences for which the applicant was charged constituted political offences. The court found that the offences were not political in nature, and thus, the Attorney-General did not make a jurisdictional error in determining that there was no extradition objection based on the political offence exception. The court held that the offences charged against the applicant did not involve acts of a political character, and therefore, the applicant could be surrendered to the United States.
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In order to demonstrate the reason for the delay Ms Harmer also listed approximately 150 communications between the US and Australia between 10 August 2009 and 14 February 2012 in respect of the determination to surrender the applicant. Public interest immunity was claimed over the substance of these listed communications. ConsiderationThe Construction Question It must be acknowledged that the contending constructions of the phrase “shall, as soon as is reasonably practicable, having regard to the circumstances…determine”, raise a finely balanced question. In the end, the preferable construction is that advanced by the applicant, namely, that once the time stipulated by the section has passed, the Attorney-General no longer has the power to surrender a person under s 22(2). The starting point for the consideration of the construction is the ordinary and natural meaning of the language of the section. There are four elements in the expression of the section which point to a meaning that if the power is not exercised within time it ceases to exist. First, the section specifies a time limitation. Second, that limitation is expressed emphatically – “as soon as”. Third, the limitation is provided with a degree of flexibility – “reasonably practicable”. By providing the Attorney-General with some leeway, this element suggests that the power is intended to be exercised without delay once circumstances, objectively assessed, render it reasonably practicable to do so. Finally, the word “shall” construed in the context of the Act, ought to be given its ordinary prescriptive meaning. As Byrne J said in Re Griffiths [1991] 2 Qd R 29, at 33:In legislation, “shall” ordinarily signifies must. But like all words, its meaning takes colour from its context. A general disposition in favour of construing “shall” as obligatory cannot prevail over other considerations plainly evidencing a contrary legislative intent.The purpose, scope and object of the Act discussed below at [76] support the view that “shall” is used to oblige the Attorney-General to exercise the power within the stipulated time and at no other time. Contrary to the Attorney-General’s submission, this construction does not depend on adding words to the section to the effect that, after the expiration of the period stipulated, the power may not be exercised. Rather, the construction advocated by the Attorney-General would require the addition of words such as “failure to comply with the time limit does not invalidate any exercise of the power to surrender”. Such saving clauses are not uncommon, but no such clause is included in this section. An example of such a saving clause is found in s 175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) which was considered in Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] HCA 32 and which provides:The validity of any assessment shall not be affected by reason that any of the provisions of this Act have not been complied with.