McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice [2005] FCAFC 180

EXTRADITION – Request for surrender of alleged fugitive offender from foreign state – Surrender determination by Attorney-General – Where legislation requires an undertaking by virtue of which the offender will not be executed – Whether undertaking given by requesting state - Whether undertaking must be legally enforceable

COSTS – Exercise of Court’s discretion – Whether Court may take into account the deprivation of liberty of the appellant

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 18C
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 19, 22, 23
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cabal v United Mexican States (No 6) [2000] FCA 651 considered
McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice [2004] FCA 1273 affirmed
McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice [2004] FCA 1401 affirmed
Te v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 15 considered

MICHAEL MCCREA v MINISTER FOR CUSTOMS AND JUSTICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
V 1323 OF 2004

BLACK CJ, FINKELSTEIN AND FINN JJ
MELBOURNE

30 AUGUST 2005

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

V 1323 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

MICHAEL McCREA
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR CUSTOMS AND JUSTICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BLACK CJ, FINN AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 AUGUST 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal be dismissed.

  2. The cross appeal be dismissed.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

V 1323 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

MICHAEL McCREA
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR CUSTOMS AND JUSTICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BLACK CJ, FINN AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE:

 30 AUGUST 2005

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

bLACK CJ, FINN and Finkelstein jj:

Introduction

  1. This appeal is concerned with the construction of s 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Act”) in circumstances where extradition has been sought by the Republic of Singapore for crimes that include those punishable by the mandatory penalty of death. The appeal is from an order of a judge of the Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Customs and Justice that the appellant be surrendered to the Republic of Singapore under s 22 of the Act in relation to two charges of murder and one charge of criminal intimidation. Under s 302 of the Penal Code of Singapore, the crime of murder is punishable by penalty of death.

  2. Singapore alleges that on or about 2 January 2002, in Singapore, the appellant murdered his driver and his driver’s girlfriend and threatened to kill a third person if she revealed his crimes.  The appellant then left Singapore and flew to Australia.

  3. The particular provision of the Act with which this appeal is concerned is s 22(3)(c)(iii) which provides in substance that where an offence for which extradition is sought is punishable by penalty of…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 180
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

McCrea v Minister for Customs and Justice was an appeal brought by the appellant against the determination of the respondent Minister to surrender the appellant to Singapore for the purpose of his extradition. The appeal related to a statutory requirement that the death penalty, if imposed on the person, will not be carried out. The central legal issue in the case was whether the Act required that the death penalty would not be carried out as an objective fact or only that an undertaking be given in the required terms. The court considered the language of the section, read in the context of the Act as a whole, and in particular, read in the context of Part II of the Act, which concerns extradition from Australia.

The court found that s 22(3)(c) only required the requesting state to provide an undertaking in the terms set out in the section, and that there was no additional requirement that the undertaking be effective to prevent the execution of the fugitive offender. The court considered that the conferral by s 22(3)(f) of a broad overriding discretion upon the Attorney-General pointed to the conclusion that the undertaking need only be in the terms specified and that the efficacy of such an undertaking was a matter that the Attorney-General might consider in exercising the discretion conferred upon him by s 22(3)(f). The court held that the construction that it favoured was indicated by the language of the section, read in the context of the Act as a whole, and in particular, read in the context of Part II of the Act, which concerns extradition from Australia. The court also took into account related contextual factors, namely that extradition involved international relations, the conduct of which was a function of the executive branch, and that it was to be expected that the Parliament would commit questions of policy and political judgment relating to the surrender of fugitive offenders to the executive branch.

The appeal was dismissed, and the cross appeal was dismissed. The determination of the Minister to surrender the appellant to Singapore for the purpose of his extradition was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The appeal be dismissed.

2.

The cross appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The particular provision of the Act with which this appeal is concerned is s 22(3)(c)(iii) which provides in substance that where an offence for which extradition is sought is punishable by penalty of death the eligible person is only to be surrendered if, by virtue of an undertaking given by the extradition country to Australia, the death penalty, if imposed on the person, will not be carried out. The whole of s 22, other than the definition provisions of s 22(1), was referred to in argument and is set out later in these reasons. background facts On 31 May 2002, the Government of Singapore, through its Department of the Attorney-General, made a request to Australia for the provisional arrest of the appellant pending a formal request for his extradition to Singapore on two counts of murder and one count of criminal intimidation. On 11 June 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, with the approval of the Cabinet, sought to fulfil the requirements of s 22(3)(c)(iii) of the Act by providing a diplomatic note stating:‘The Ministry wishes to state that Michael McCrea’s extradition is being sought on the charge of murder, which is punishable by death under Singapore law. Nevertheless, every condemned prisoner can petition the President of Singapore for an exercise of the prerogative of mercy, who would, under Article 22P of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, act on such petitions on the advice of Cabinet. If Michael McCrea is convicted and sentenced to death, and he petitions the President for commutation of the death sentence, the Ministry assures the High Commission that the President will be advised to accede to the petition.’ This note was not acceptable to the Attorney-General’s Department, which proposed forms of assurance that, in the Department’s opinion, would satisfy the requirements of s 22. On 12 June 2002, Singapore sent another diplomatic note, the terms of which were drawn from the forms of assurance submitted by the Attorney-General’s Department here. This note relevantly stated: ‘The Ministry wishes to inform the High Commission that the Government of Singapore assures the Government of Australia that if the death penalty is imposed on Michael McCrea upon conviction of the offence(s) on which his extradition is sought, the death penalty will not be carried out.’ On 13 June 2002, a magistrate in Victoria issued a warrant for the provisional arrest of the appellant, who was then taken into custody. Singapore subsequently submitted its formal request for extradition. On 15 November 2002, a magistrate in Victoria determined that the appellant was eligible for surrender under s 19 of the Act and on 8 September 2003 the respondent Minister, acting as the delegate of the Attorney-General (see Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 18C(1)), determined that the appellant was to be surrendered to Singapore pursuant to s 22(2) of the Act. Having so determined, the Minister executed a surrender warrant pursuant to s 23 of the Act. the decision at first instance

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BLACK CJ, FINKELSTEIN AND FINN JJ
On 15 November 2002, a magistrate in Victoria determined that the appellant was eligible for surrender under s 19 of the Act and on 8 September 2003 the respondent Minister, acting as the delegate of the Attorney-General (see Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 18C(1)), determined that the appellant was to be surrendered to Singapore pursuant to s 22(2) of the Act. Having so determined, the Minister executed a surrender warrant pursuant to s 23 of the Act. the decision at first instance The appellant immediately challenged the validity of the Minister’s determination and the surrender warrant in proceedings by way of judicial review brought in this Court in reliance upon s 39B(1) and (1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The ground of the application was that the determination was beyond jurisdiction in that, by reason of the terms of s 22(3)(c) of the Act, the Minister’s power to determine that the appellant be surrendered was conditional upon the existence of a valid and enforceable undertaking given by the Republic of Singapore by virtue of which it was objectively established that, if the death penalty was imposed on the appellant, it would not be carried out. It was said that no such undertaking had been given by the Republic of Singapore and that no such undertaking could be given. Consequently, it was said, the determination was beyond power and of no effect and the warrant, being dependent upon the validity of the determination, was a nullity. The learned primary judge saw the central issue as being whether the Act, and specifically s 22(3)(c)(iii), required that, as an objective fact, the death penalty would not be carried out or, as his Honour put it, only that an undertaking be given in the required terms. His Honour found that s 22(3)(c) only required the requesting state to provide an undertaking in the terms set out in the section, and that there was no additional requirement that the undertaking be effective to prevent the execution of the fugitive offender. His Honour considered that the conferral by s 22(3)(f) of a broad overriding discretion upon the Attorney-General pointed to the conclusion that the undertaking need only be in the terms specified and that the efficacy of such an undertaking was a matter that the Attorney-General might consider in exercising the discretion conferred upon him by s 22(3)(f). His Honour considered that the construction that he favoured was indicated by the language of the section, read in the context of the Act as a whole, and in particular, read in the context of Part II of the Act, which concerns extradition from Australia.The judge also took into account related contextual factors, namely that extradition involved international relations, the conduct of which was a function of the executive branch, and that it was to be expected that the Parliament would commit questions of policy and political judgment relating to the surrender of fugitive offenders to the executive branch. In these circumstances the judge considered it unnecessary and undesirable to determine whether the undertaking given by Singapore was valid and enforceable according to the law of Singapore. His Honour went on to note, however, that the contention that the undertaking was not effective did not involve the suggestion that Singapore intended to renege on its promises. Rather, he observed: “The facts placed before the Court leave no doubt that Singapore intends to honour its undertaking.”the appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLACK CJ, FINKELSTEIN AND FINN JJ

Full text does not contain this section.