FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rivera v Minister for Justice and Customs [2006] FCA 1784
EXTRADITION – application for judicial review of Minister's determination under s 22(2) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) that applicant be surrendered to United States – whether death penalty undertaking complied with s 22(3)(c) of the Act – whether applicant entitled to be provided with and to comment on Departmental submissions provided to Minister
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 22(2), 22(3)
de Bruyn v Minister for Justice and Customs (2004) 143 FCR 162 referred to
Chan v Minister for Justice and Customs [2001] FCA 718 referred to
McCreav Minister for Justice and Customs (2005) 145 FCR 269 applied
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 appliedLAWRENCE RIVERA v MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
NSD 1706 OF 2006MOORE J
21 DECEMBER 2006
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1706 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
LAWRENCE RIVERA
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
RespondentJUDGE:
MOORE J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 DECEMBER 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent's costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1706 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
LAWRENCE RIVERA
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
RespondentJUDGE:
MOORE J
DATE:
21 DECEMBER 2006
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in relation to a determination of the Minister for Justice and Customs under s 22(2) of the Extradition Act1988 (Cth) that the applicant be surrendered to the United States of America in relation to the extraditable offence of murder under the California Penal Code ('the Code'). The Minister issued a surrender warrant under s 23 of the Act on 31 August 2006.
Background
On 19 September 2002, the applicant was arrested in Orange in New South Wales under a provisional arrest warrant issued by a magistrate on 4 September 2002 under s 12 of the Act. The applicant has been detained in custody since that time. On 12 November 2002, the Minister received an extradition request from the United States for the applicant's extradition, in relation to one count of murder, contrary to s 187 of the Code. On 14 November 2002, the Minister issued a notice under s 16 of the Act, being a notice addressed to a magistrate stating that an extradition request had been received.
In December 2002, a magistrate determined that the applicant was eligible for surrender and committed him to prison to await surrender, pursuant to s 19(9) of the Act. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged the magistrate's decision, or his eligibility for surrender, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the Full Court of the Federal Court, and the High Court.
The surrender determination
The…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 1784
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Minister was required to consider whether the undertaking from the United States regarding the death penalty was of a nature that would prevent its imposition, beyond merely accepting the wording of the undertaking. The court also considered whether the Minister was required to determine whether facts existed which fell within the concept of 'special circumstances' for the purposes of the California Penal Code, which could potentially lead to the death penalty being imposed.
The court held that the Minister was required to consider whether the undertaking regarding the death penalty was effective in preventing its imposition and whether 'special circumstances' had been charged. Given that the Minister had not done so, the court concluded that the Minister's decision-making process was flawed. However, the court dismissed Rivera's application, finding that Rivera had not sufficiently pressed his constitutional challenge and that the primary issue did not significantly undermine the Minister's decision.
The court ordered that Rivera's application be dismissed and that he pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MOORE J
One of the grounds identified in the applicant's first affidavit was that the Minister's power under s 22 was unconstitutional. However, this ground was not touched upon at all in oral submissions. Further, the applicant stated on a number of occasions at the hearing that he relied upon pages 1 to 71 of his supplementary book, whereas his written submissions under the heading 'Constitutional challenge' commence at page 71. From this I infer that his constitutional challenge was not pressed.Consideration The only issue potentially of substance, in my opinion, raised by the applicant concerned whether the Minister could have been satisfied about the matter addressed by s 22(3)(c), namely that an appropriate undertaking concerning the death penalty had been given. The Minister had an undertaking from the United States and information derived from affidavits concerning Californian law and the charge that had been laid. In McCrea, the Full Court said (at [25]):'It does not follow from the conclusion that a legally enforceable undertaking is not needed that the requirements of s 22(3)(c) will be satisfied merely by the giving of an undertaking that follows the language of the provision and which has been made by a person with appropriate authority. An evident object of s 22(3)(c) is to provide a safeguard against the carrying out of the death penalty upon a person extradited from Australia under the Act. Whilst the object of the provision can be variously stated, the seriousness of the subject matter suggests that it is very unlikely that nothing more than compliance with a verbal formula was intended. Consistently with the object of the provision, there is much to be said for the view that the expression “by virtue of an undertaking” requires that the decision-maker consider whether the undertaking is one that, in the context of the system of law and government of the country seeking surrender, has the character of an undertaking by virtue of which the penalty of death would not be carried out. It would seem unlikely that the object of the provision was intended to be achieved only by the favourable (to the person accused) exercise of the discretion conferred by s 22(3)(f).' (emphasis added) While the observations in the latter part of this passage are only tentative, I think it is appropriate that, as a single judge, I proceed on the basis that those tentative views correctly state the law. Perhaps my approach might be different if I held a strong view to the contrary, but I do not. Accordingly, in view of the submissions made by the applicant, it is necessary to ascertain whether the Minister, in the face of an undertaking that the death penalty would not be sought or imposed, considered whether it was an undertaking which, in the context of the system of law and government of the United States, had the character of an undertaking by virtue of which the penalty of death would not be carried out. The essence of the case of the applicant was that the question of whether facts existed which fell within the concept of 'special circumstances' for the purposes of ss 190.1 and 190.2 of the Code was a matter to be determined by the jury and, at least impliedly, were not matters the determination of which was within the control of the prosecuting authorities or the trial judge. The authorities referred to by the applicant, namely the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ring and the earlier case of Apprendi, represent a line of authority that facts which establish legislative special circumstances, and which enable or require the imposition of the death penalty, must be found by the jury and not by a trial judge in the course of a sentencing hearing. However, having regard to the affidavits of Mr Fermin (the relevant parts of which were before the Minister in a summary way) who was the Deputy District Attorney responsible for prosecuting the applicant, a statutory condition precedent to 'special circumstances' being considered was that 'special circumstances' are charged. Mr Fermin deposed that they had not been charged.