Chan v Minister for Justice and Customs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chan v Minister for Justice & Customs [2001] FCA 718

EXTRADITION – extradition to Hong Kong – judicial review of decision made under s 22(2) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) – failure to take into account relevant considerations – whether the decision-maker was bound to take into account certain matters – whether there was evidence that the decision-maker failed to take certain matters into account – where the decision-maker did not provide any reasons for her decision

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) subss 22(2) and 22(3)
Extradition (Hong Kong) Regulations (Cth) cl 5 and Schedule

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40 followed
Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 at 375 followed
Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice (2000) 200 CLR 442 considered
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Sinclair [1992] Imm AR 293 at 301 followed
R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; ex parte Lonrho plc [1989] 1 WLR 525 at 540 followed

ALLAN CHAN v MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
N 90 of 2001

STONE J
14 JUNE 2001
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 90 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

ALLAN CHAN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 JUNE 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        the application be dismissed;

2.        the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 90 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

ALLAN CHAN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE:

14 JUNE 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. In April 1999, the Hong Kong Department of Justice requested the Australian Government to issue a provisional warrant for the arrest of the applicant, Mr Allan Chan, an Australian citizen, in connection with criminal offences alleged to have been committed in Hong Kong in 1993 and 1994. Hong Kong is an ‘extradition country’ by virtue of the definition in s 5 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (“Act”) and the declaration in reg 4 of the Extradition (Hong Kong) Regulations (Cth) (“Regulations”).

  2. On 10 January 2001, the Minister determined under s 22(2) of the Act that Mr Chan was to be surrendered to the Hong Kong authorities (“Minister’s Decision”) and signed a surrender warrant under s 23 of the Act.

  3. The applicant now seeks review of the Minister’s Decision under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). In addition to orders setting aside the Minister’s Decision and quashing the surrender warrant, the applicant also sought interlocutory relief staying the execution of the warrant and releasing him from custody pending the outcome of the review of the Minister’s Decision. In support of his claim for interlocutory relief, which I considered in March this year, the…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 718
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Chan v Minister for Justice and Customs, the applicant, Mr Chan, sought to challenge the Minister's decision to authorise his extradition to Hong Kong. Mr Chan argued that the Minister had failed to consider certain relevant considerations in making her decision, including the likelihood of a lengthy prison sentence and the potential impact on his health due to his HIV status. The central issue before the court was whether the Minister was legally bound to consider these specific factors in her decision-making process under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth).

The court considered whether the statutory framework imposed any obligation on the Minister to take into account the specific humanitarian considerations presented by Mr Chan's case. The court noted that while the Minister had a discretion to refuse extradition on humanitarian grounds, there was no explicit requirement in the Act that compelled her to consider the detailed humanitarian aspects suggested by Mr Chan. The court found that while the Minister was required to consider humanitarian considerations generally, there was no legal mandate for her to delve into the particular details proposed by Mr Chan, such as the precise length of the potential prison sentence and its impact on his health.

Ultimately, the court held that the Minister was not legally bound to consider the specific humanitarian issues as suggested by Mr Chan. The court concluded that, based on the evidence presented, it could not be determined that the Minister had failed to consider the relevant matters. Consequently, Mr Chan's application was dismissed, and the court ordered that he pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the application be dismissed;

2. the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Whether the Minister was bound to consider the considerations set out in par [5] above is a matter of statutory construction. In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (supra) at 40 Mason J stated:“… where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act.”Was Minister bound to consider evidence concerning possible prison sentence? Mr Jordan, counsel for the applicant, submitted that, in considering this matter, the Minister was bound to take into account the relevant consideration that the prison sentence given in Hong Kong would probably be at least as long as the applicant’s remaining life expectancy (the “life expectancy consideration”). The medical evidence before the Minister suggested that Mr Chan’s life expectancy was in the range of 1 to 5 years. The Hong Kong authorities had indicated that, if found guilty, Mr Chan would most likely receive a custodial sentence for a period of 3 to 5 years. Obviously, as time passes, the likelihood increases that the sentence given will amount to a life sentence. It was submitted for the respondent that, although the Minister was bound to consider humanitarian considerations generally, there was no requirement for her to consider the matter at the level of particularity suggested by the applicant; Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice (2000) 200 CLR 442 at [45]. In particular, it was submitted that the Minister was not bound to consider whether the life expectancy consideration applied or, if it applied, whether it would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations. I do not accept this submission. As the statutory framework summarised in par [12] shows, Article 7(e) of the Surrender Agreement gives the Minister discretion to refuse surrender on humanitarian grounds. Under s 22(3)(e)(ii) and (iv), the Minister must be satisfied either that the circumstances referred to in Article 7(e) do not exist, or that, despite their existence, the person should still be surrendered. I do not understand how the Minister could reach the requisite state of satisfaction without considering the humanitarian issues specifically referred to in Article 7(e), the details of which were included in the material submitted to her. The statutory provisions that the Minister must consider here are different in form (if not in substance) from those considered by the High Court in Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice (supra). In that case, as Gleeson CJ and McHugh J pointed out at [7], there was “a double layer of satisfaction” involved in s 22(3)(e) and the relevant regulation concerning extradition to the United Kingdom. This required that the Minister “must be satisfied that he or she is not satisfied that [surrender] would be unjust, oppressive or too severe a punishment.” In this case, even if the Minister is satisfied that she does not consider that surrender would be incompatible with the humanitarian considerations, she still has, under Article 7, a discretion to refuse surrender (in addition to her discretion under s 22(3)(f)). That being said, I am not convinced that these differences of form are significant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

STONE J
After the applicant dropped several grounds of review at the hearing, only two grounds of review in the amended application remain, both alleging that the Minister’s Decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by s 22(2) of the Act in that the Minister failed to take into account relevant considerations. Those considerations are:(a)the increased significance for the applicant of extradition, trial and, if convicted, a sentence ranging from 3.5 to 5 years, given that he is HIV positive and has a life expectancy estimated at only 15 years; and(b)expert forensic document examination evidence concluding that the signatures allegedly forged by the applicant, being the basis of the forgery charges giving rise to the extradition request, may well be genuine.CONCLUSION For reasons set out below I have decided to dismiss this application. Material dealing with both of the issues referred to in par [5] was before the Minister and, on the evidence presented, it is not possible to conclude that she did not take these matters into account. That being so, the applicant has failed to establish his claims and the application must be dismissed. For this reason it is not strictly necessary to consider whether the Minister was bound to consider one or both of the issues referred to in par [5]. Nevertheless, in deference to the detailed submissions, both written and oral, I have expressed an opinion on this issue. REASONSThe statutory framework Once the extradition request had been made, it was necessary to determine whether Mr Chan was eligible for surrender to the Hong Kong authorities. A person’s eligibility for surrender is determined in accordance with the provisions of s 19(2) of the Act. Those provisions concern only the formal requirements for extradition. They are not directed to determining whether the person is guilty of the alleged offence. In the proceedings before the magistrate, the applicant was not entitled to adduce evidence to contradict the allegation that he engaged in conduct constituting the extradition offence for which his surrender was sought; s 19(5). In any proceeding reviewing the Magistrate’s decision, such evidence is also excluded; s 21(6)(d). In October 1999, a Local Court Magistrate determined, pursuant to s 19 of the Act, that Mr Chan was eligible for surrender in respect of the alleged offences. As a result of the Magistrate’s determination (and after an application to this Court to review that decision was withdrawn), the applicant was committed to prison pending surrender or release pursuant to a warrant issued under s 19(9) of the Act. The applicant has been in prison since June 2000. Section 22(2) of the Act provides that at such point, “The Attorney-General shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, having regard to the circumstances, after a person becomes an eligible person, determine whether the person is to be surrendered in relation to a qualifying extradition offence or qualifying extradition offences.”The Attorney-General’s powers in this respect were exercised by the Minister for Justice and Customs (“Minister”).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STONE J

Full text does not contain this section.