Brock v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brock v Minister for Home Affairs [2010] FCA 1301

Citation: Brock v Minister for Home Affairs [2010] FCA 1301
Parties: GEORGE BROCK v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
File number: NSD 1044 of 2009
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 25 November 2010
Catchwords: EXTRADITION – whether, in circumstances where, pursuant to s 19 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act), a magistrate has determined that a person is an eligible person within the meaning of that expression in s 22(1) of the Act and has also specified the offences in respect of which extradition is sought and where all avenues of review of those decisions under s 21 of the Act have been exhausted, it is an abuse of process and futile for that person to seek to set aside a subsequent determination by the Minister under s 22(2) of the Act that that person should be surrendered to the requesting country and a decision made under s 23 of the Act to issue a surrender warrant on the ground that the issue of the relevant Notice under s 16 of the Act at a point in time necessarily anterior to the s 19 proceedings and s 21 review is invalid – leave to amend sought by the applicant to raise such a case refused – whether the Minister was guilty of jurisdictional error when making his s 22 and s 23 decisions because those decisions were made under a misapprehension as to the facts and the law – applicant failed to establish that the Minister’s reasons included matters which were incorrect on the facts and the law – in any event, even if alleged misapprehensions existed, errors were within jurisdiction – no jurisdictional error established – s 16 Notice not invalid in any event – application dismissed with costs
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1988 (Cth), s 19A
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), ss 5, 12, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 21, s 23
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth), O 20 r 5  
Cases cited: Brock v Minister for Home Affairs (2008) 170 FCR 434 applied
Brock v Minister for Justice and Customs (2007) 243 ALR 315 applied
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528 cited
Harris v Attorney-General (Cth) (1994) 52 FCR 386 applied
Mokbel v Attorney-General (Cth) (2007) 162 FCR 278 cited
Oates v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia (2001) 181 ALR 559 applied
Rashid v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 25 applied
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1699 cited
Vasiljkovic v Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 614 cited
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 applied
Williams v Minister for Justice and Customs (2007) 157 FCR 286 cited
Date of hearing: 16 March 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 94
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms LA Clegg (Pro Bono)
Counsel…
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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 1301
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Brock v Minister for Home Affairs, the primary issue was whether the Minister's decision to issue a notice under section 16 of the Extradition Act was valid and if any challenge to this decision constituted an abuse of process. The plaintiff, Mr. Brock, argued that the notice was invalid because it did not meet the dual criminality requirement. He contended that the Minister did not have the necessary materials identifying his acts and omissions as alleged by the United States, and thus, the Minister's satisfaction of this requirement was flawed. The court needed to decide if Mr. Brock's challenge to the validity of the section 16 Notice in the current proceeding, after having lost similar challenges in previous proceedings, amounted to an abuse of process.

The court reasoned that the concept of abuse of process is based on broader public policy considerations, such as the need for finality in litigation and the efficient use of judicial resources. The court found that the section 16 Notice was indeed valid, as it had been upheld in previous proceedings. Moreover, the court held that it was an abuse of process for Mr. Brock to challenge the notice's validity again, especially since the outcome of such a challenge would not preclude the Minister from exercising his discretion to surrender Mr. Brock. The court also noted that the Minister was not bound to take into account Mr. Brock's submissions regarding the notice's validity when making his determination under section 22 of the Act. Consequently, the Minister's decision was not vitiated by jurisdictional error, and any error in the departmental advice provided to the Minister was an error within jurisdiction that did not invalidate the Minister's decision.

In conclusion, the court found that Mr. Brock's challenge to the validity of the section 16 Notice was an abuse of process and refused to grant leave to amend. The Minister's decision to issue the notice was upheld as valid, and Mr. Brock's contentions regarding the notice's invalidity were dismissed. The court emphasized the importance of finality in litigation and the need to prevent the fragmentation of legal avenues that could lead to an unnecessary waste of judicial resources.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

I am not convinced of the correctness of the reasoning of the majority of the Full Court in Brock 170 FCR 434 at [77] (p 448) of their Honours’ Reasons to the effect that the s 16 Notice was spent once the s 19 stage was reached and that any challenge to the Minister’s satisfaction of the dual criminality requirement must take place within the framework of a s 21 review of the magistrate’s order. Whilst it may be accepted that a notice under s 16 of the Act will have done its work when a magistrate commences to hear a s 19 proceeding, the fact that the notice is “spent” in that sense may not preclude judicial review of the decision to issue the notice at a time when the s 19 proceeding has not concluded and all opportunities for review have not been exhausted. However, I do not need to decide whether I should follow their Honours on this point and I expressly refrain from doing so. I prefer to approach the matter upon the basis which I have explained at [48]–[59] above. Jurisdictional Error (Misapprehension as to Facts and the Law) Mr Brock raised the validity of the s 16 Notice in the written submissions which he forwarded to the Minister for his consideration when making his s 22 determination. There is no evidence which establishes that the Minister did not read those submissions nor is there any evidence that he did not consider those submissions before making his s 22 determination and his s 23 decision. The evidence suggests the contrary since all of Mr Brock’s written submissions were placed before the Minister when he came to consider his obligations under s 22 of the Act. The Minister was not bound to take those submissions into account. It was entirely a matter for him to decide whether to take them into account and, if so, in what way. Mr Brock does not allege in the present proceeding that he was denied procedural fairness in respect of the Minister’s s 22 determination or in respect of his s 23 decision. Mr Brock contends that those decisions were made by the Minister under a fundamental or material misapprehension as to the relevant facts and as to the law. It was submitted on behalf of Mr Brock that this conclusion is obvious when regard is had to par 49 of Attachment E to the departmental submission which paragraph should be held by me to contain a material part of the Minister’s reasons for making those decisions. The departmental submission comprised a covering memorandum to the Minister signed by the Acting Assistant Secretary of the relevant section within the Attorney-General’s Department and various attachments. In the covering memorandum, the author recommended that the Minister determine that Mr Brock be surrendered and that he sign the necessary surrender warrant. The author referred in the memorandum to the Department’s “… detailed advice on the statutory criteria…”. This advice was Attachment E. In Attachment E, the Department correctly advised that s 22(2) was engaged—essentially for the reasons which I have explained at [48]–[59] above. The Department also tendered advice on the many points raised by Mr Brock in his submissions. In respect of Mr Brock’s contention that the s 16 Notice was invalid, the Department said:(c) The section 16 notice issued by the then Minister for Justice and Customs receiving the extradition request was invalid48. In his letter dated 31 July 2009, Brock states that the required warrant and the extradition request were not put before the then Minister at the section 16 stage in the extradition proceedings. Brock contends that the case of Williams v Minister for Justice and Customs (2007) 157 FCR 286 at [31] and [47] held that the Minister was bound by statute to consider the matters called for under section 16 himself, and specifically to know what the alleged conduct was. Brock therefore contends that the section 16 notice was invalid and that his extradition should be refused.Departmental comment49. This assertion was the basis for Brock's recent application for special leave to the High Court. On 31 July 2009 the High Court denied special leave to Brock thereby affirming the decision of Justice Flick in the Federal Court to dismiss Brock’s application in respect of the section 16 notice on 24 December 2007. Flick J decided that to now permit Mr Brock to commence separate proceedings in respect to the validity of the section 16 notice, when he had previously abandoned proceedings in respect to section 16 at an earlier time, “would certainly not promote finality in litigation and would only encourage a fragmentation of the avenues by which litigants can seek review of each of the four stages of extradition”. The Full Federal Court refused Brock’s application for leave to appeal and upheld Justice Flick’s decision on 17 September 2008. All avenues of appeal have now been exhausted by Brock. You may therefore be satisfied that the section 16 notice was indeed valid and that this argument against its validity was unsuccessfully argued by Brock and dismissed by the Federal Court. In any event, if a challenge had been permitted by the Federal Court, the Department considers that it is arguable that the material placed before the then Minister in the submission for his consideration of whether to issue the section 16 notice would have satisfied the test in Williams.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As noted by Lindgren and Tracey JJ at [74] (p 447) of their Reasons in Brock 170 FCR 434, the concept of abuse of process is not limited by reference to the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel but rather is predicated on broader public policy notions, in particular the public interest that there be finality in litigation and that judicial resources not be wasted or put to purposes unrelated to the determination of genuine disputes (see Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1699 at [58]–[70], and the cases therein cited by French J (as he then was)). The Decision of the Full Court in Brock 170 FCR 434 In Brock 170 FCR 434, the majority comprised Lindgren and Tracey JJ. Gray J dissented. Gray J held that Mr Brock’s proceeding before Flick J did not constitute an abuse of process. At [4]–[8] (pp 436–437), his Honour observed that:(a)The ground upon which Mr Brock had challenged the s 16 Notice before Flick J was different from the ground upon which he had challenged that Notice in NSD 1612 of 2005. His second challenge was based upon the reasoning in Williams. The decision in Williams was published on 22 March 2007, after Wilcox J had dismissed NSD 1612 of 2005. Therefore, Williams was not available as an authority before NSD 1612 of 2005 was dismissed. (b)It was at least arguable that:(i)The opportunity for Mr Brock to challenge the s 21 decision of the Minister on the ground that the s 16 Notice was invalid and of no effect remained open to Mr Brock; and(ii)If the s 16 “decision” were overturned, the subsequent decisions made by the Minister were of no effect; and(c)These arguments had sufficient substance not to be dismissed summarily. Lindgren and Tracey JJ came to a different conclusion. Their Honours held that, where the validity of a magistrate’s order under s 19 of the Act has been upheld in proceedings in which that order was challenged, it is an abuse of process for a person then to challenge the exercise of jurisdiction by the magistrate under s 19 of the Act by seeking to have the relevant s 16 Notice set aside as invalid. This reasoning was in line with the reasoning of Flick J. At [63]–[67] (pp 445–446), Lindgren and Tracey JJ said: Consideration 63 Mr Brock wishes to challenge the issue of the Notice of Receipt of Extradition Request under s 16 on a different basis from that on which he relied in relation to s 19(2)(c) in the earlier s 21 proceeding. While the ground is again a failure to satisfy the dual criminality requirement, the argument is no longer that in the USA he would be subject to two convictions, while in Australia only one. Rather, it is that there were not before the Minister the materials identifying Mr Brock's acts and omissions (conduct) as alleged by the USA, required for the Minister to make a decision to issue the Notice of Receipt of Extradition Request. Mr Brock relied on Williams 157 FCR 286 at [50]. We have previously discussed Williams at 43 above.64 It should be assumed in favour of Mr Brock that he would be able to establish that the required materials were not before the Minister; that the Minister was therefore not entitled to be satisfied that the dual criminality requirement expressed in s 16(2)(a)(ii) was met; and that at least if he had challenged the Minister's decision under s 16 without the intervention of the earlier s 21 proceeding, he would have succeeded in having that decision and the Notice of Receipt of Extradition Request set aside. (The Minister does not dispute that the Court has jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act to grant such relief.)65 The result would be that Mr Brock was not eligible for surrender and that the warrant of committal of 24 November 2005 was invalidly issued by Magistrate Huber because the Minister had not given a notice under s 16(1) in relation to Mr Brock as required by s 19(1)(b) of the Act. Yet the question of the validity of the magistrate's determination that Mr Brock was eligible for surrender and the consequential issue of the warrant of committal to prison was the very matter decided adversely to Mr Brock in the earlier s 21 proceeding.66 There can be only one object of Mr Brock’s challenge to the Minister’s decision under s 16 as Mr Brock acknowledged on the hearing of his present application: to establish that the ex facie regular Notice of Receipt of Extradition Request was not valid, that the condition precedent to the magistrate’s authority to conduct a proceeding to determine eligibility for surrender was not satisfied, and therefore that the magistrate's determination of eligibility for surrender and the issue of the warrant of committal to prison were invalid.67 Indeed, it is to the point to note that in the Primary Proceeding Mr Brock sought, not only a declaration that the s 16 notice was invalid and should be set aside, but also declarations that the warrant of committal issued by the magistrate under s 19(9) of the Act was invalid and should be set aside, and that his detention since 12 May 2005 pursuant to that warrant was unlawful. It will be recalled that similarly, in the earlier s 21 proceeding Mr Brock had sought orders that the warrant issued under s 19(9) of the Act be quashed, and that he be released from custody forthwith (see [23] above).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that:(a)The s 16 Notice was found by the Full Court in Brock 170 FCR 434 to be ex facie valid. The magistrate exercised power under s 19 of the Act upon the basis that the s 16 Notice is valid (Brock 170 FCR 434 at [35] (pp 441–442) and [65]–[66] (p 446)). The same may be said of the basis upon which Moore J conducted a review of the magistrate’s decision under s 21 of the Act;(b)The s 16 Notice is spent (Brock 170 FCR 434 at [77] (p 448));(c)For reasons (a) and (b) above, this Court has already determined that the s 16 Notice is valid;(d)Because Mr Brock has raised the validity of the s 16 Notice in previous proceedings in this Court and lost those proceedings, it is an abuse of process for him to raise the validity of that Notice in the current proceeding (Brock 170 FCR 434 at [64]–[76] (pp 446–448));(e)In any event, the Minister was not bound to form a view as to whether the s 16 Notice was valid for the purpose of making his s 22 determination. The validity of that Notice was not a mandatory consideration which had to be taken into account by the Minister in making his s 22 determination. The mere fact that Mr Brock had argued that the s 16 Notice was invalid in the written submissions which he sent to the Minister in 2009 in connection with the Minister’s consideration of his power under s 22 of the Act did not convert the issue into a matter which the Minister was required to take into account in making his s 22 determination;(f)The Minister’s s 22 determination is not vitiated by jurisdictional error. The issue of a valid s 16 notice is not a pre-condition to surrender. Even if the s 16 Notice were held to be invalid, that conclusion would not preclude the Minister from exercising his discretion in favour of surrendering Mr Brock to the US;(g)In any event, before he issued the s 16 Notice, the Minister was provided with information which more than adequately satisfied the test laid down by the Full Court in Williams. That information was contained in the attachments to the departmental submission;(h)Leave to amend should be refused because there is no evidence of several matters which are integral to the case which Mr Brock now seeks to make. The assertions made by Mr Brock in respect of which there is no evidence are that, in making his s 22 determination:(i)The Minister was satisfied that the s 16 Notice was valid;(ii)The Minister was satisfied that Mr Brock had unsuccessfully argued in previous proceedings that the s 16 Notice was invalid;(iii)The Minister was satisfied that Mr Brock’s argument that the s 16 Notice was invalid had been dismissed by this Court in previous proceedings; and (iv)The Minister’s view (if he had formed any view at all on the matter) as to whether the material placed before him for the purpose of obtaining the issue of the s 16 Notice satisfied the test in Williams. (i)The Minister was not required to give reasons for making his s 22 determination. He did not give reasons for that determination. His reasons for making that determination cannot be equated with the reasoning contained in the departmental submission. The reasons which a Minister has for making a particular decision cannot be assumed to be the same as the reasons advanced by departmental officers to him or her in support of their recommendation that a particular decision be made. Whether a particular document should be regarded as setting out a decision-maker’s reasons is a question of fact. In this case, par 49 of Attachment E to the departmental submission should not be found by the Court to contain the Minister’s reasons for his s 22 determination; and (j)Even if the departmental advice given to the Minister for the purpose of assisting him to decide whether Mr Brock should be surrendered pursuant to s 22 of the Act was wrong and the Minister made his determination on the basis of that wrong advice, the error was an error within jurisdiction. It did not vitiate the Minister’s s 22 determination.CONSIDERATION AND DECISIONAbuse of Process and Futility