FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CBW20 [2021] FCAFC 63
File number: NSD 1004 of 2020 Judgment of: PERRAM, MOSHINSKY AND THAWLEY JJ Date of judgment: 4 May 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – where the first respondent entered Australia by boat and was taken to what was then thought to be a “proclaimed port” – where the first respondent’s case was dealt with for several years on the assumption he was an “unauthorised maritime arrival” – where that assumption was incorrect – where, purportedly pursuant to s 195A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Minister granted the first respondent a temporary safe haven visa (for one week) and a bridging visa (for 12 months) – whether the grant of the temporary safe haven visa was valid – whether the first respondent’s application for a safe haven enterprise visa was valid – whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 5AA, 36, 37A, 46, 46A, 65, 91J, 91K, 91L, 189, 195A, 412, 415
Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (Cth)
Cases cited: Arnold v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 [2014] NSWCA 386
Barrett v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 18 ALD 129
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651
Brock v Minister for Home Affairs [2010] FCA 1301
DBB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 447
Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 263 CLR 1
Hala v Minister for Justice [2014] FCA 457
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE (2006) 154 FCR 365
Oates v Attorney-General (2001) 181 ALR 559
O’Donoghue v O’Connor (No 2) (2011) 283 ALR 682
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (Offshore Processing Case) (2010) 243 CLR 319
Plaintiff M79/2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 252 CLR 336
Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 253 CLR 219
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57
Vasiljkovic v O’Connor (2010) 276 ALR 326
Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 64 Date of hearing: 8 February 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Lloyd SC with Mr BD Kaplan Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J King Solicitor for the First Respondent: Legal Aid NSW Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs Counsel for the Intervener: Mr C Lenehan SC with Ms K Pham Solicitor for the Intervener: Australian Human Rights Commission ORDERS
NSD 1004 of 2020 BETWEEN: MINISTER…
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- AGLC
- Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v CBW20 [2021] FCAFC 63
- Case
- [2021] FCAFC 63
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal was correct in concluding that the grant of the temporary safe haven visa was invalid, and therefore, CBW20's application for a safe haven enterprise visa was valid. The court held that the Minister's decision to grant the temporary safe haven visa was based on a mistaken understanding of the law, and this error was fundamental to the decision. The court also noted that the Minister would not have granted the visa if he had not believed that CBW20 was an unauthorised maritime arrival. As a result, the application was dismissed. The court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs of the proceeding, to be fixed by way of a lump sum, and that there be no order as to costs in relation to the costs of the intervener. If any party or the intervener wishes to seek a different costs order, they may file and serve a written submission within seven days, and the issue of costs will be determined on the papers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. Subject to paragraph 3:
(a) the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding, to be fixed by way of a lump sum; and
(b) there be no order as to costs in relation to the costs of the intervener.
3. If any party or the intervener wishes to seek a different costs order, they may file and serve a written submission (of no more than two pages) within seven days. In that event, a responding submission (of no more than two pages) may be filed within a further seven days, and the issue of costs will be determined on the papers.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
4. Subject to paragraph 3 above, within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
5. In the absence of any agreement:
(a) within 21 days, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);
(b) within a further 14 days, the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS); and
(c) in the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Further, in relation to s 195A itself, in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (Offshore Processing Case) (2010) 243 CLR 319, the High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) stated at [78]:The Minister having decided to consider the exercise of power under either or both of ss 46A and 195A, the steps that are taken to inform that consideration are steps towards the exercise of those statutory powers. That the steps taken to inform the consideration of exercise of power may lead at some point to the result that further consideration of exercise of the power is stopped does not deny that the steps that were taken were taken towards the possible exercise of those powers. Nor does it deny that taking the steps that were taken directly affected the claimant’s liberty. There being no exclusion by plain words of necessary intendment, the statutory conferral of the powers given by ss 46A and 195A, including the power to decide to consider the exercise of power, is to be understood as “conditioned on the observance of the principles of natural justice”. Consideration of the exercise of the power must be procedurally fair to the persons in respect of whom that consideration is being given. And likewise, the consideration must proceed by reference to correct legal principles, correctly applied.(Footnote omitted; emphasis added.) In the present case, the Minister’s view that it was in the public interest to grant the Temporary Safe Haven visa proceeded on the basis of an incorrect understanding of the law (as described at [51]-[52] above). Those legal errors were fundamental to the Minister’s decision. The October 2014 Submission was specifically directed to persons who were believed to be unauthorised maritime arrivals (albeit referred to as Illegal Maritime Arrivals or IMAs). The submission recommended that the Minister exercise the power in s 195A to grant them Temporary Safe Haven visas (and bridging visas) in a context where, it was assumed, they were not entitled to make a valid application for a visa while in detention (see paragraph 14 of the submission). In that (assumed) context, the combined effect of the grant of the Temporary Safe Haven visa and the bridging visa would be that the persons covered by the submission could be released from detention and access Medicare and financial support, while maintaining the (assumed) position that they were subject to a bar on making a valid application for a visa. It is evident, and was conceded by the Minister (T15), that the Minister would not have granted the Temporary Safe Haven visa had he not thought that CBW20 was an unauthorised maritime arrival. The assumption that CBW20 was an unauthorised maritime arrival underpinned the formation of the view regarding the public interest. Further, as noted above, the Minister may be taken to have assumed that CBW20 was already subject to a bar on making a valid application for a visa (namely, the bar in s 46A) and that the effect of a decision to grant a Temporary Safe Haven visa would be to substitute one bar (that in s 91K) for another. However, in truth CBW20 was not subject to any bar, and the effect of the decision was to subject CBW20 to a bar when none previously applied to him.