Zentai v Republic of Hungary

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zentai v Republic of Hungary [2009] FCAFC 139

CORRIGENDUM

CHARLES ZENTAI v REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY and BARBARA LANE

WAD 47 of 2009

BLACK CJ, TRACEY AND BARKER JJ
8 OCTOBER 2009 (CORRIGENDUM 19 OCTOBER 2009)
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 47 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

CHARLES ZENTAI
Appellant

AND:

REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY
First Respondent

BARBARA LANE
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, TRACEY AND BARKER JJ

DATE:

8 OCTOBER 2009 (CORRIGENDUM 19 OCTOBER 2009)

PLACE:

PERTH

CORRIGENDUM

  1. On the orders page and at [79], in orders 4 and 5 replace the date "20 August 2009" with the date "20 August 2008". 

I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Black CJ, Tracey and Barker.

Associate:

Dated:        19 October 2009

Date of Hearing: 25 August 2009
Date of Judgment: 8 October 2009

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zentai v Republic of Hungary [2009] FCAFC 139

EXTRADITION – function of magistrate in conducting hearing under s 19 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) – function of primary judge in conducting review of magistrate decision under s 21 of the Extradition Act 1988 – whether magistrate and primary judge were required to determine whether alleged war crime was an extradition offence or whether appellant was an extraditable person – no appellable error – appeal dismissed

Constitution s 75(v)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s 5, s 10(4), s 11(1), 11(1A), s 11(1C), s 11(3), s 11(6), s 12, s 12(1), s 12(3), s 15, s 16, s 16(1), s 16(2), s 18, s 19, s 19(1), s 19(2), s 19(2)(a), s 19(2)(b), s 19(3), s 19(3)(a), s 19(3)(c)(ii), s 19(5), s 19(6), s 19(7), s 19(7A), s 19(9), s 21, s 21(1)(b), s 21(2)(b)(ii), s 21(6)(g), s 22, s 22(1), s 22(1)(b), s 22(2), s 22(3), s 22(3)(e), s 22(3)(f)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Extradition (Republic of Hungary) Regulations reg 3, reg 4

Bennett v United Kingdom (2000) 179 ALR 113
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528
Dutton v O'Shane (2003) 132 FCR 352
Federal Republic of Germany v Parker (1998) 84 FCR 323
Harris v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (1994) 52 FCR 386
Oates v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (2002) 118 FCR 544
O'Donoghue v Ireland (2008) 234 CLR 599
Papzoglou v Republic of the Philippines (1997) 74 FCR 108
Prabowo v Republic of Indonesia (1997) 74 FCR 599
Timar v The Republic of Hungary [2000] FCA 755
Unkel v Director of Public Prosecutions (1990) 95 ALR 44

Zoeller v Federal Republic of Germany (1989) 23 FCR 282

CHARLES ZENTAI v REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY and BARBARA LANE

WAD 47 of 2009

BLACK CJ, TRACEY AND BARKER JJ
8 OCTOBER 2009
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 139
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Zentai v Republic of Hungary involved the appellant challenging the legality of his extradition to Hungary, where he faced charges of war crimes. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the magistrate and the primary judge erred in their jurisdiction to conduct eligibility proceedings under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). The appellant argued that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction because the offence alleged against him did not constitute an "extradition offence" under the Act. Specifically, he contended that the magistrate should have determined the existence of an extradition offence, rather than relying on the Notice given under s 16 by the Attorney-General that he was an "extraditable person". The appeal raised questions about the role and jurisdiction of the magistrate under s 19 of the Act and whether the primary judge correctly reviewed the magistrate's decision.

The court needed to decide whether the magistrate had the jurisdiction to determine whether the offence alleged against the appellant constituted an "extradition offence" and if the primary judge correctly reviewed this decision. It also had to consider whether the magistrate should have considered the retrospective operation of Hungarian legislation in determining the existence of an extradition offence. Additionally, the court examined the scope of judicial review available to the appellant regarding the Attorney-General's decision to issue a Notice under s 16 of the Act.

The court found that the magistrate did not err in proceeding with the eligibility proceedings based on the Notice issued by the Attorney-General under s 16. It held that the magistrate's jurisdiction was contingent on the existence of an extradition offence, as determined by the Attorney-General, and that this decision was not subject to review under s 19. The court affirmed that the primary judge correctly reviewed the magistrate's decision, and that the appellant's contentions regarding the jurisdiction of the magistrate and the scope of review were without merit. The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, and the magistrate's and primary judge's decisions were upheld.

The court made several orders, including dismissing the appeal, confirming the appellant's eligibility for surrender under the Extradition Act, and staying the execution of these orders for 14 days. The court also confirmed the appellant's bail on the same terms as previously granted. The ratio of the decision was that the magistrate under s 19 of the Extradition Act did not have the jurisdiction to determine the existence of an extradition offence, and this decision was not subject to review. Instead, the determination of whether an offence is an extradition offence is a matter for the Attorney-General under s 16, and judicial review of this decision is available at a later stage.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.

3. For the purposes of s 21(6)(g) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) the appellant is eligible for surrender within the meaning of s 19(2) of the Act in relation to an extradition offence.

4. The order of the second respondent made pursuant to s 19(9) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) on 20 August 2009 be confirmed.

5. Execution of these orders and the order of the second respondent made 20 August 2009 be stayed for 14 days.

6. The appellant’s bail is confirmed on the same terms as granted by Gilmour J on 12 May 2009.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

BLACK CJ, TRACEY AND BARKER JJ
We do not consider that the principle to be drawn from Kainhofer is distinguishable in the circumstances of the appellant, where he wishes to contend that the effect of Art 2, para 5(a) of the Treaty is such that he cannot be said to have committed an "extraditable offence" as described by Art 2, para 5, or an "extradition offence" as defined by the Act as modified by the terms of the Treaty.CONCLUSION AND ORDER We accept that the answer sought by the appellant to the substantive question concerning Art 2, para 5(a) of the Treaty is demonstrably an important one. We appreciate that, while in theory it may be possible for a person in the position of the appellant to make representations on such a question before a s 12 magistrate when an application for a provisional arrest warrant is considered, or with the Attorney‑General before a notice is issued under s 16 of the Act, it will not always be the case that such questions are fully considered at that stage. We recognise, however, that it is open to a person in the position of the appellant to seek judicial review, at least of the decision of the Attorney‑General to issue a notice under s 16, before a determination is made by a s 19 magistrate. We also consider that it may well be the case that, following a declaration under s 19(9), the question can again be raised before the Attorney‑General before he or she makes a surrender decision under s 22 of the Act. Any decision of the Attorney‑General under s 22 would also, on the face of it, be amenable to judicial review in the manner described above. It might be said, as was observed by Toohey J in Kainhofer at 541 and repeated by the Full Federal Court in Papazoglou at 140 – 141, that the system established by the Act represents a substantial shift away from judicial review of the extradition process towards the exercise of unreviewable executive discretion. Nevertheless, the reviewable exercise by the Attorney‑General of the power under s 22 of the Act to consider whether, in the final analysis, a person should be surrendered to another country, plainly is of critical importance to the rights or interests of a person affected by an extradition proceeding. None of that means, however, that the primary judge made any appellable error in determining that it was no part of the function of the second respondent in conducting the hearing under s 19 of the Act, and no part of the function of the primary judge in conducting a review of that decision under s 21, to determine whether the war crime alleged against the appellant was an extradition offence or whether the appellant was an extraditable person for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed. The Court would therefore make the following orders:1.The appeal be dismissed.2.The appellant pay the first respondent's costs.3.For the purposes of s 21(6)(g) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) the appellant is eligible for surrender within the meaning of s 19(2) of the Act in relation to an extradition offence.4.The order of the second respondent made pursuant to s 19(9) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) on 20 August 2009 be confirmed. 5.Execution of these orders and the order of the second respondent made 20 August 2009 be stayed for 14 days. 6.The appellant’s bail is confirmed on the same terms as granted by Gilmour J on 12 May 2009.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLACK CJ, TRACEY AND BARKER JJ

In turn, a general issue arises whether it is open, or indeed necessary, at each stage of the administrative or executive decision‑making process described, for the decision‑maker to determine whether an affected person is an "extraditable person" and whether the proceedings concern an "extradition offence" under the Act. As discussed below, authority suggests that these questions may be considered by the relevant decision‑maker under s 12 and s 16. We have suggested that, on the face of it, it may also be a question for consideration by the Attorney‑General under s 22. However, authority indicates that it is not a question open for consideration under s 19. We now turn to that issue.CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE The appellant's basic contention, set out in the written submissions of counsel, is that the s 19 magistrate lacked jurisdiction to conduct eligibility proceedings because her jurisdiction was dependent on the existence of an extradition offence. It was submitted that the offence alleged against the appellant was not such an offence. The appellant further submitted that, in purporting to exercise power under s 19, the magistrate erred in two respects:·in holding that because the Minister for Justice had given the Notice under s 16 that the appellant was an "extraditable person", she was bound not to inquire further in order to satisfy herself that a relevant "extradition offence" existed as a matter of Hungarian law at the time when the relevant conduct constituting the offence occurred; and ·in holding, in any event, that there was a relevant extradition offence operative under Hungarian law at the relevant time because of the retrospective operation of the Hungarian legislation. The appellant contends that the primary judge accordingly erred in the review proceeding conducted under s 21 of the Act in holding that the s 19 magistrate was correct to proceed on the basis that the Notice authorised her to determine that the appellant was an "eligible person", and not to proceed to determine whether there was an extradition offence. The appellant particularly takes issue with the primary judge's finding that the effect of the decision of the High Court of Australia in Kainhofer was that the opinion of the Attorney‑General formed under s 16 of the Act, prior to the giving of the Notice that the appellant was an "extraditable person", and the related opinion of the Attorney‑General that there was an "extraditable offence", were not reviewable by the magistrate under s 19. The appellant contends in the written submissions of counsel that the primary judge should not have found that:·for the purposes of s 19(1) of the Act, the "extradition offence" was, by virtue of s 10(4), the extradition offence to which the Notice relates, and the Notice in the instant case expressed the extradition offence to be the alleged war crime;·by reason of s 11(6) of the Act, the matters that a magistrate has to consider in proceedings to determine eligibility for surrender under s 19(2) do not include restrictions or limitations arising under the Treaty; or that·the sole avenue for judicial review of whether the war crime was an "extradition offence" at the s 19 eligibility hearing stage was if the s 16 Notice was on its face invalid and then by way of proceedings under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903.