WEAVING COMPANY LIMITED Constitutional Law-Powers of Commonwealth Government-Executive power-
Power to contract-Granting of licence-Consent to sell wool tops-Taxation-- ConsiderationAppropriation of public revenue-Authority under statute of Commonwealth Parliament--Responsibility of Ministers to Parliament--Com- monwealth of Australia Constitution Act (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), sec. V.--The Constitution, secs. 2, 53, 55, 61, 64, 81-War Precautions Act 1914-1916 (No. MELBOURNE, 10 of 1914-No. 3 of 1916), sec. 4-War Precautions (Wool) Regulations 1916 Oct. 10-12; (Statutory Rules 1916, No. 322), reg. 10-Bill of Rights (1 W. &M., sess. 2, Nov. 8-10. e. 2).
During the continuance of the War and after the making of the War Pre- cautions (Wool) Regulations 1916 and the War Precautions (Sheepskins) Regu- agreements with a company, which was engaged in the manufacture within the Commonwealth and the sale of wool tops, each of which agreements was either an agreement to give consent to a sale of wool tops by the company in return for a share of the profits of the transaction (which was called by the parties a " licence fee "), or an agreement that the business of manufacturing wool tops should be carried on by the company as agent for the Commonwealth in consideration of the company receiving an annual sum from the Common- wealth, or a combination of both these agreements.
Held, by Knox C.J., Isaacs, Higgins, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ., that, apart from any authority conferred by an Act of the Parliament of the Com- monwealth or by regulations thereunder, the Executive Government of the Commonwealth had no power to make or ratify any of the agreements.
Held, also, by Isaacs, Higgins and Gavan Duffy JJ., that neither the War Precautions (Wool) Regulations 1916 nor the War Precautions Act 1914-1916, under which those regulations were made, conferred any authority for the making of any of the agreements.
Per Isaacs J.:-(1) Sec. 61 of the Constitution. by its declaration that the executive power of the Commonwealth
extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth, COMBING,
definitely delimits constitutionally the King's executive power as between Commonwealth and States, but the validity of any executive act of the Com- monwealth within the defined limits is not thereby determined: it depends on whether the act is warranted by law. (2) The agreements, SO far as they purported to bind the company to pay to the Government money as the price of consents, were taxation, and without parliamentary authority were void on the principle of Attorney-General v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd., (1922) 91 L.J. K.B., 897; 127 L.T., 822; 38 T.L.R., 781. (3) So far as any agreement pur- ported to bind the Government to pay to the company a remuneration for manufacturing wool tops, it was an appropriation of public revenue, and,…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Ritter v Godfrey
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Ritter v Godfrey [1922] HCA 62
Case
[1922] HCA 62
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Commonwealth and the Central Wool Committee brought an action against the Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. to recover damages for breach of contract. The company also brought a cross-action against the plaintiffs. The dispute concerned three agreements entered into between the parties between March 1917 and September 1918, which involved the Commonwealth Government granting consent to the company's sale of wool tops in return for a share of profits, or the company acting as an agent for the Commonwealth in manufacturing wool tops for an annual sum, or a combination of both. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia.
The primary legal issue before the Full Court was whether the Commonwealth Executive Government possessed the legal power to make or ratify these agreements independently of any Act of Parliament or regulations made thereunder. This question necessitated an examination of the scope of executive power as defined by Section 61 of the Constitution, and whether the agreements fell within the constitutional authority of the Commonwealth Executive.
The Court held that, apart from any statutory authority, the Executive Government of the Commonwealth lacked the power to enter into or ratify the agreements. The reasoning applied was that the agreements, in so far as they purported to bind the company to pay money to the Government as consideration for consents, constituted taxation, which is void without parliamentary authority, following the principle in *Attorney-General v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd.*. Furthermore, to the extent that any agreement obligated the Government to pay remuneration to the company for manufacturing wool tops, it constituted an appropriation of public revenue, which is also void without legislative sanction, as established in *Mackay v. Attorney General for British Columbia*. The Court also noted the constitutional principle that Ministers are responsible to Parliament, implying that Parliament's discretion over public expenditure should not be fettered by executive action without legislative approval.
The Court answered "No" to the question of whether it was within the legal power of the Commonwealth Executive Government, apart from any Act of Parliament or regulation thereunder, to make or ratify the agreements. Consequently, no answer was required for the subsequent question regarding the necessity of Governor-General in Council approval.