Fordyce v Wong
[2017] FCCA 87
•25 January 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FORDYCE v WONG | [2017] FCCA 87 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Costs – Application for costs – matter settled before final hearing – whether costs should follow the event. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.32, 41 Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.79 |
| Cases cited: Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v John Boland & Ors [1997] FCA 760 |
| Applicant: | PAUL MERVYN FORDYCE |
| Respondent: | WILSON KIM LING WONG |
| File Number: | SYG 1184 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | Matter decided on the papers |
| Date of Last Submission: | 5 August 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 25 January 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mr P Fordyce of Pmf Legal Pty Limited |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr D Ratnam |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | HWL Ebsworth Lawyers |
ORDERS
The applicant in the substantive proceedings pay the costs of the respondent in the proceedings as agreed or assessed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1184 of 2016
| PAUL MERVYN FORDYCE |
Applicant
And
| WILSON KIM LING WONG |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 28 April 2016 the bankruptcy notice BN 189992 issued on 19 April 2016, was served on Mr Paul Mervyn Fordyce. On 11 May 2016 Mr Fordyce made an application to this Court seeking orders that the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice be extended and, ultimately, that it be set aside.
Mr Wilson Kim Ling Wong was the creditor on the bankruptcy notice and is the respondent in these proceedings.
On 6 July 2016, the Court made orders by the consent of both parties, that the application, as amended on 31 May 2016, be dismissed. Mr Wong applied to the Court for an order that his costs be paid by Mr Fordyce. Mr Fordyce did not agree that he should pay Mr Wong’s costs of the proceedings and opposed the application. The parties made written submissions and filed evidence by way of affidavits in support of their respective positions. They were content for the Court to proceed to judgement on the issue of costs in light of the documents filed pursuant to the orders made on 6 July 2016. For the purposes of the disposition of this issue I have proceeded on the basis of the written submissions and the affidavits to which the parties refer and on which they rely.
Mr Wong relied on the following documents ([4] – [5] of the respondent’s written submissions filed on 27 July 2016):
“[4] …
(a) Application filed by the Applicant on 12 May 2016 (Application);
(b) Amended Application filed by the Applicant on 31 May 2016 (Amended Application);
(c) affidavit of Mr Fordyce (the Applicant) dated 11 May 2016 [filed 12 May 2016];
(d) affidavit of Mr Fordyce (the Applicant) dated 30 May 2016 [filed 30 May 2016]
(e) affidavit of Mr Fordyce (the Applicant) dated 31 May 2016 [filed 31 May 2016]; and
(f) affidavit of Mr Fordyce (the Applicant dated 19 July 2016 [filed 19 July 2016].
[5] …
(a) Notice of Grounds of Opposition to Application dated 27 May 2016 [filed 27 May 2016];
(b) Respondents Chronology dated 27 July 2016 (Annexure “A” to these submissions);
(c) affidavit of Mark Webeck dated 27 May 2016 [filed 27 May 2016];
(d) affidavit of Mark Webeck dated 1 July 2016 [filed 1 July 2016]; and
(e) affidavit of Mark Webeck dated 14 July 2016 [filed 14 July 2016].”
[Errors in original.]
Mr Wong seeks costs in a fixed sum. Initially this was said to be $6973.69 (see [18] of the affidavit of Mark Webeck of 14 July 2016 and filed on the same day).
Neither of the parties made submissions on the Court’s power to award costs or how that power should be exercised. No reference to any relevant authorities was made on that matter.
Section 32 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides the power to the Court, as a Court of bankruptcy, to make a costs order in in a bankruptcy matter in which the application has been dismissed. Rule 13.01 of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) (“the Bankruptcy Rules”), sets out the bases on which such a costs order may be may be made.
The power to award costs also derives from s.79 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth). The power to award costs is unfettered, but plainly it must be exercised judicially in the context of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCC Rules”) (see Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd v John Boland & Ors [1997] FCA 760).
Mr Wong’s submissions do not expressly state the central principle underlying his application. However, it can be reasonably inferred that his starting position is that “costs follow the event”. As was said by Justice Toohey in Re Kimberley John Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association & Ors [1986] FCA 382:
“[9]… 1. Ordinarily, costs follow the event and a successful litigant receives his costs in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order: Ritter v Godfrey (1920 2 KB 47).”
In short, Mr Wong’s position is that “the event” is that Mr Fordyce’s application was dismissed, albeit with consent, and therefore costs should “ordinarily” follow in these circumstances.
It is clear that in this case there has been no hearing on the merits. In this circumstance, what was said by Justice McHugh in Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (Cth); Ex Parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622 is of assistance (at [6] – [7]):
“[6] In most jurisdictions today, the power to order costs is a discretionary power. Ordinarily, the power is exercised after a hearing on the merits and as a general rule the successful party is entitled to his or her costs. Success in the action or on particular issues is the fact that usually controls the exercise of the discretion. A successful party is prima facie entitled to a costs order. When there has been no hearing on the merits, however, a court is necessarily deprived of the factor that usually determines whether or how it will make a costs order.
[7] In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. In some cases, however, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties has acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the action…”
Further, there may be exceptional circumstances that may lead to the discretion being exercised contrary to the proposition that “costs follow the event”. The conduct of the parties may be a relevant factor (see for example Cummings v Lewis (Wilcox J, Federal Court of Australia, 29 May 1992, unreported) and Re Skase ex parte Donnelly [1992] FCA 429; (1992) 37 FCR 509)). The dispute between the parties now arises from their claimed respective conduct.
The issue between the parties for current purposes is whether the issuing of the bankruptcy notice by Mr Wong was reasonable in the circumstances. Mr Wong says the issuing of the bankruptcy notice was “justified”. Mr Fordyce says it was “inappropriate”.
Mr Wong’s position is that a costs order should be made because of the conduct of the matter by Mr Fordyce, and that in any event, the grounds of the application had no merit.
Mr Wong’s submissions, with reference to the affidavits filed, provide the following background. On 28 November 2014, a costs order was made against Mr Fordyce, and in favour of Mr Wong, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in proceedings where Mr Fordyce was the applicant and Mr Wong one of the respondents.
On 13 May 2015, another costs order was made in the Supreme Court of New South Wales whereby Mr Fordyce was ordered to pay further costs to Mr Wong (“as agreed or assessed”).
Mr Wong says that Mr Fordyce did not pay the amounts that had been assessed as costs that Mr Fordyce was liable to pay to him. In that circumstance, Mr Wong took steps to register the relevant Certificate of Determinations as judgements. The Supreme Court of New South Wales subsequently entered judgement against Mr Fordyce, in favour of Mr Wong, in the amount of $26,899.87 on 16 March 2016.
On 19 April 2016, Mr Wong caused a bankruptcy notice to be issued upon Mr Fordyce. This was served on Mr Fordyce on 28 April.
Mr Fordyce then made the application to the Court on 11 May 2016, and as amended on 31 May 2016, to set aside the bankruptcy notice. Mr Wong submits that the application of 11 May 2016 did not disclose the grounds for the setting aside of the bankruptcy notice, nor for extending the time for compliance.
Mr Wong acknowledges however, that by his affidavit of 11 May 2016, Mr Fordyce sought to disclose the basis on which he asserted to extend time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice and set aside the bankruptcy notice. In his submissions, and as supported by his affidavit of 11 May 2016, Mr Fordyce makes reference to ss.373 and 378 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (“LPA”).
Mr Wong also submits that Mr Fordyce sought (by way of affidavit) to raise further “grounds”, including that Mr Wong was liable for incurring legal expenses, the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice was excessive, and that the bankruptcy notice was invalid.
Leave was granted to Mr Fordyce, unopposed, to amend his application, which he did so on 31 May 2016. In his amended application, the grounds for setting aside the bankruptcy notice were that the amount claimed exceeded the amount due (with reference to s.41(5) of the Act), and that Mr Fordyce had instituted proceedings to set aside the judgement order which led to the bankruptcy notice being issued (with reference to s.41(6A)(a) of the Act).
In this context, Mr Wong argues that the conduct of Mr Fordyce in “shifting” the grounds of the application for the setting aside and/or extending the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice, is such that it supports Mr Wong’s application for costs. Further, and in the same context, the grounds as amended lacked merit.
On the material before the Court, I agree with Mr Wong that (noting no final hearing has taken place), Mr Fordyce’s calculations in support of the claimed “excessive amount” due to Mr Wong, do not on their face demonstrate relevance to the costs judgement itself.
On the material before the Court, on which both parties rely, the costs judgement, that is, the judgement debt was obtained on the basis of the relevant Certificate of Determinations issued as a result of the two costs orders made by Justices of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
In any event, as Mr Wong submits, the basis of this allegation of “miscalculation” in Mr Fordyce’s own affidavit appears to be in relation to certain monies owed to Mr Fordyce’s law firm and not to him personally.
However, what is of immediate relevance is that this case has not proceeded to a final hearing, or indeed any interlocutory hearing. For the purposes of the current costs application I accept, on the material before the Court, that the amount owing set out in the bankruptcy notice is reflective of the costs judgement. That amount being itself based on costs assessments with Certificate of Determinations having been issued.
The second basis on which Mr Fordyce sought to set aside the bankruptcy notice arises from s.41(6A)(a) of the Act. That is, he claimed that at the relevant time he had a “proceeding” on foot. I agree with Mr Wong that that proposition cannot be sustained on the material before the Court.
The background, as identified from both sets of written submissions, is as follows. The Certificate of Determinations was issued to Mr Fordyce and Mr Wong on 9 March 2016. While Mr Fordyce was able to seek a review by the Review Panel of the Certificate of Determinations he was required to do so by 8 April 2016. There is no dispute that he did not do so.
Mr Fordyce did lodge an application “out of time” on 19 April 2016 and not on 12 April 2016 as he asserts in his written submissions. In his submissions, Mr Fordyce explains that the timing was due to an “oversight” on his part, and “due to pressure of other work” (see
[22] – [23] of the applicant’s written submissions dated 5 August 2016).
That may be the case, but what remains is that the application for review was not lodged within what is said to be the relevant statutory time period. Mr Fordyce argues that the LPA (s.377) operates to “suspend” the determination of the costs assessor pending the review. However, given that he had not made the application within time, and no decision was made to refer the matter to the Review Panel, leads to the conclusion that no “proceeding” as claimed, was on foot at the relevant time.
However, it must be said that Mr Wong’s focus on whether a “proceeding” was on foot, and the nature or character of the “application” made by Mr Fordyce diverts attention, in my view, from what was the totality of the conduct of the respective parties and whether each, in the circumstances, acted reasonably or unreasonably.
It is to be remembered that Mr Wong seeks costs because Mr Fordyce brought proceedings in this Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice. These proceedings were subsequently dismissed by consent upon the payment by Mr Fordyce of the relevant amount.
The critical question therefore, is whether Mr Fordyce acted reasonably in the circumstances in bringing the application to this Court, and whether Mr Wong’s conduct was reasonable in response.
In this context, what is set out above is relevant. There is no dispute that the Supreme Court of New South Wales made orders on two occasions concerning the payment of costs by Mr Fordyce to Mr Wong. On the material before the Court, there is nothing to say that Mr Fordyce sought any appeal of the two Supreme Court orders (made by single Judges) that ultimately led to the cost determinations.
It was not unreasonable of Mr Wong on 16 March 2016, to seek judgement against Mr Fordyce in the sum of the Certificate of Determinations. At its highest, Mr Fordyce says that Mr Wong was lacking “courtesy” in not giving him notice of the intention to seek judgement. Even if this could be characterised as discourteous, on its own, it is not unreasonable. Mr Wong had been successful in obtaining costs orders in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. He had obtained cost determinations. It was not unreasonable to then proceed to obtain judgement in the circumstances of this case.
Importantly, the bankruptcy notice was not issued until after what is said to be the time for Mr Fordyce to seek review of the cost determinations had passed. That is, after 8 April 2016 (on 19 April 2016).
Mr Fordyce argues that Mr Wong acted precipitously (“indecent haste”) in issuing the bankruptcy notice particularly in circumstances where the consequences for him, flowing from the bankruptcy notice, would be “very grave”. I accept that submission on its face. But that of itself does not make Mr Wong’s conduct unreasonable. He was entitled to receive payment flowing from orders made by the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
In an attachment to his written submissions, Mr Wong has helpfully provided a chronology of what he says are the relevant events to which the Court should have regard as background to his submissions. The chronology has been reproduced in part below:
9 March 2016
Certificates of costs determinations issued to parties
16 March 2016
Judgment obtained against Paul Fordyce in the sum of $26,899.87 (registration of the certificate of costs)
8 April 2016
Last day for Paul Fordyce to seek a review to the Review Panel
19 April 2016
Wilson Wong issues Bankruptcy Notice
19 April 2016
Paul Fordyce lodges his application to review cost determinations (out of time by 11 days)
28 April 2016
Bankruptcy Notice served on Paul Fordyce
12 May 2016
Paul Fordyce files Application to set aside Bankruptcy Notice and extend time for compliance with Bankruptcy Notice
20 May 2016
Fordyce would have committed an act of Bankruptcy if orders on 12 May were not made out
27 May 2016
Respondent files its grounds of opposition to the Application
31 May 2016
Application listed Registrar Tesoriero [Application was adjourned to 15 June 2016 but subsequently listed on 29 June 2016 before Judge Nicholls]
31 May 2016
Mr Fordyce seeks leave to amend his Application – Leave granted by consent
24 June 2016
The listing date [29 June 2016] for the Application was vacated and
re-listed on 6 July 201627 June 2016
Supreme Court – Manager of Costs Assessment (J Hedge) denies Mr Fordyce’s application to review cost determinations
5 July 2016
Respondent’s solicitor sets out in an email to Mr Fordyce a proposal to dismiss the proceedings together with the costs payable pursuant to the Bankruptcy Notice
6 July 2016
Mr Fordyce attends court with a cheque to discharge the amount claimed in the Bankruptcy Notice ($27,105.66)
6 July 2016
Proceedings dismissed
[Errors in original.]
[Note: the chronology above indicates the Mr Fordyce filed the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice and extend time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice on 12 May 2016. The application was filed with the Court on 11 May 2016.]
However, the chronology does not provide a complete picture of relevant events. Clearly orders were made by the Supreme Court of New South Wales on two occasions, that Mr Fordyce pay costs in those proceedings to Mr Wong. As set out above, it was, in my view, reasonable in the circumstances for Mr Wong to then move to obtain the judgement debt.
Mr Wong’s submission that Mr Fordyce did not seek to challenge the cost orders made by the Justices of the Supreme Court of New South Wales is, in my view, a factual matter that may also be seen in an alternative light to that urged by Mr Wong.
That is, Mr Fordyce did not dispute the fact that he had to pay costs. On the material before the Court, his concern was with the amount and calculations involved in the determinations.
However, it is the case that Mr Fordyce does not dispute that he did not make his application for review within the appropriate time. That is a factor going to his conduct that weighs against him in the current consideration.
The chronology set out above should also be seen in light of the relevant correspondence as set out in the documents annexed to the affidavit of Mark Webeck, sworn 27 May 2016, at annexures “A” and “B” and as also annexed to the affidavit of Mr Fordyce made on 30 May 2016 at annexure “Tab 8”. In my view, the relevant sequence of events determinative of this matter is as follows:
16 March 2016
Judgment obtained by Mr Wong against Mr Fordyce in the sum of $26,899.87.
17 March 2016
Letter from Mr Fordyce to Mr Wong’s solicitor indicating his intention to apply for review of the costs assessment within 7 days from the day the letter is received.
8 April 2016
Last day for Mr Fordyce to apply for review of the costs assessment.
12 April 2016
Email from Mr Wong’s solicitor to Mr Fordyce outlining a potential stay of the judgment (among other conditions) if a reply is received by 5pm tomorrow (13 April 2016).
13 April 2016
No evidence of a reply from the email sent by Mr Wong’s solicitor on 12 April 2016.
19 April 2016
Bankruptcy notice issued by Mr Wong.
Mr Fordyce’s application for review received by the Manager, Costs Assessment.
27 April 2016
Email from the Manager Costs Assessment to Mr Wong’s solicitor and Mr Fordyce indicating that they received an “out of time” application for review on 19 April 2016 (and accompanying letter from Mr Fordyce dated 15 April 2016).
Email from Mr Wong’s solicitor to Mr Fordyce attaching the bankruptcy notice and judgment obtained on 16 March 2016
28 April 2016
Parties generally agree that service of the bankruptcy notice was effected on this date.
Mr Wong’s solicitor sends email to the Manager, Costs Assessment and Mr Fordyce in response to email sent by the Manager Costs Assessment on 27 April 2016, indicating that they did not receive the application for review or the accompanying letter dated 15 April 2016.
The Manager, Costs Assessment emails Mr Fordyce and Mr Wong’s solicitor attaching a copy of the review application and the accompanying letter dated 15 April 2016.
29 April 2016
Mr Wong’s solicitor emails the Manager Costs Assessment and Mr Fordyce indicating that they “read” the accompanying letter for the first time on 28 April 2016 and further addressing the grounds of the application for review.
11 May 2016
Mr Fordyce makes his application to the Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice and extend time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice.
6 July 2016
Proceedings dismissed by consent, as Mr Fordyce attends Court with a cheque to discharge the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice.
What emerges, relevant to the issue of the conduct of the respective parties is as follows. First, Mr Fordyce gave notice on 17 March 2016 to Mr Wong’s solicitor of his intention to seek a review of the costs assessment. He stated that he would do so within 7 days from Mr Wong’s solicitor’s receipt of the “letter”. In the circumstances, given the email address of Mr Wong’s solicitor is on that “letter”, the relevant time is on or before 24 March 2016 (see the affidavit of Mr Fordyce of 11 May 2016 at “Tab 1”). He did not make any such application for review of the costs assessment by that date.
Second, the time limit for the making of such an application expired at the end of 8 April 2016. On 12 April 2016, that is, after the last day for the making of the application for review of the costs assessment, Mr Wong’s solicitor gave Mr Fordyce opportunity to seek leave to make his application for review.
In my view, this served the purpose of acting as a reminder that he had not complied with his own stated intention to make the application for review by 24 March 2016 and further, that he had not done so by 8 April 2016, the last day for doing so.
Mr Wong’s conduct in this regard was reasonable. There is no question that he was owed a debt. While he was on notice that Mr Fordyce disputed the relevant amount, as calculated by the assessor, Mr Fordyce took no action, as he had himself indicated that he would, to pursue the resolution of his dispute.
Given the time that had already passed, Mr Wong’s email notice of 12 April 2016, was a fair attempt to remind Mr Fordyce of the need to do what he himself indicated he wanted to pursue. There is no evidence of any reply from Mr Fordyce, and an email sent by Mr Wong’s solicitor to the Manager Costs Assessment on 28 April 2016, indicates that Mr Wong did not receive a response to the email of 12 April 2016 (see the affidavit of Mark Webeck made on 27 May 2016 at page 5 of annexure “B”).
Mr Fordyce’s complaint now that “pressure of other work” led to an “oversight” in not making his application for review within time, even if accepted, does not explain why, when reminded of his “oversight”, he took no steps to pursue his previously stated intention to resolve his dispute with the costs assessment.
Mr Fordyce did not make his application on 24 March 2016. He did not make his application on or before 8 April 2016. He did nothing even when put on notice of his failure on 12 April 2016. To describe this as an “oversight”, over such a period of time and in all the circumstances is in my view a misrepresentation of what occurred.
Further, even at the time of making his written submissions on costs in this matter, Mr Fordyce has left unexplained why even though he “signed”, or more properly, even though the date on the application for review (leave to make the application) is 14 April 2016, it was not “received” by the Manager Costs Assessment until 19 April 2016 (see the affidavit of Mr Fordyce made on 11 May 2016 at annexure “Tab 2”). The email dated 27 April 2016 from the Manager Costs Assessment, makes clear that the application for review was not made until 19 April 2016 (see the affidavit of Mark Webeck, sworn 27 May 2016 at pages 5-6 of annexure “B”).
In this light, Mr Fordyce’s assertion in his written submissions (at [22]) that the application for review was lodged on 12 April 2016 is not accepted. I find that Mr Wong’s notice to Mr Fordyce of 12 April 2016 (through his solicitor) was not sent in response to an application for review, which in any event was not made until 19 April 2016.
It is important to note that at the time of the issuing of the bankruptcy notice on 19 April 2016, on the material before the Court, Mr Wong did not know that Mr Fordyce had lodged, or was about to lodge his application for review.
On the material before the Court, it was not until 27 April 2016, that Mr Wong learned of the application for review, lodged out of time on 19 April 2016. Further, Mr Wong’s solicitor’s email of 29 April 2016 to the Manager Costs Assessment and Mr Fordyce, states that they had not seen Mr Fordyce’s letter dated 15 April 2016 until the previous day (see the affidavit of Mark Webeck, sworn 27 May 2016, at pages 1 of annexure “B”).
I also note that given that the letter from Mr Fordyce dated 15 April 2016 which was said to have accompanied the application for review, it is difficult to see how it can be said, as asserted in Mr Fordyce’s written submissions, that that application was lodged on 12 April 2016.
In these circumstances it was reasonable of Mr Wong to issue the bankruptcy notice on 19 April 2016. Further, given Mr Fordyce’s failure to act in a timely fashion, it was also reasonable to serve the bankruptcy notice on 28 April 2016 even though they had notice, albeit of a few hours, of the application for leave to make an application for review of the costs assessment. I note that the parties generally agree that the bankruptcy notice was served on 28 April 2016, albeit the email was sent late in the evening on 27 April 2016.
I agree with Mr Fordyce that given the strict and prescriptive bankruptcy regime applicable here, and the serious consequences that flow from the issuing and serving of a bankruptcy notice, Mr Fordyce was left with little, if no option, but to make his application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. However, it may also be that the grounds of that application, as stated, lacked merit, and is therefore a factor that, on balance, weighs against Mr Fordyce.
But that was a consequence of his own inaction. Had he acted to make his application for review at the time he originally said he would, and even had he acted to have made it by 8 April 2016, Mr Wong’s issuing of the bankruptcy notice would have been seen in a different light.
Further, had Mr Fordyce responded to Mr Wong’s notice of 12 April 2016, again this may have cast Mr Wong’s subsequent conduct in a different light. In my view, by 28 April 2016 when the bankruptcy notice was served on him, the time had well and truly passed by which Mr Fordyce could say that Mr Wong acted precipitously. Ultimately Mr Fordyce must now bear the consequences of his own tardiness.
Further, and in reinforcement of what is set out above, I cannot see that Mr Fordyce acted with sufficient expedition to avoid the costs incurred by Mr Wong by his legal representatives attending Court on that day (6 July 2016). There is no satisfactory explanation from Mr Fordyce as to why the amount was not paid prior to attendance at Court, and not paid in such a fashion as to avoid attendance at Court.
In all therefore, Mr Fordyce should pay Mr Wong’s costs including those thrown away for the Court attendance on 6 July 2016. I will make that order.
I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Date: 25 January 2017
Corrections
Matter number on coversheet and first page of reasons changed from “SYD 1184 of 2016” to “SYG 1184 of 2016”
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