Commissioner of Taxation v Warner (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 28 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Warner (No 2) [2015] FCA 1281

Citation: Commissioner of Taxation v Warner (No 2) [2015] FCA 1281
Parties: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v ANTHONY WARNER, STEVEN KUGEL, TJT (NO 1) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 121 745 711, TJT (NO 2) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 002 710 910, TJT (NO 3) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 112 054 841, TJT (NO 4) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 099 721 203, TJT (NO 5) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 100 014 346, TJT (NO 7) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 120 124 781, TJT (NO 8) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 101 457 970, TJT (NO 9) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 101 458 539 and TJT (NO 13) PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 058 455 600
File number: NSD 573 of 2014
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 20 November 2015
Catchwords: COSTS – where Commissioner issued notice to produce documents under s 264 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and s 353-10 of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) to liquidators appointed in creditors’ voluntary liquidations – where liquidators took stance that s 264 is in conflict with s 486 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and would not comply with s 264 notice absent Court order – where Commissioner had no real option but to initiate proceedings – where respondents filed submitting appearance and amicus curiae arranged by Commissioner to make submissions as a contradictor – whether Court ought to exercise discretion depriving Commissioner of prima facie entitlement to costs where submitting appearance has been filed – where submitting appearance did not immunise liquidators against an adverse costs order – where liquidators ordered to pay costs of Commissioner and amicus curiae – whether Court ought to exercise discretion to award costs against the liquidators personally – where position of liquidators was more akin to that of liquidators who had instituted proceedings and therefore they should assume the risk – where interests of justice, including interests of creditors, best served by awarding costs against liquidators personally
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 486, 511
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 12.01
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 264
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 353-10 of Sch 1
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.1
Cases cited: Blackwood Foodland Pty Ltd v Milne and The Superintendent of Licensed Premises [1971] SASR 403
Commissioner of Taxation v Warner [2015] FCA 659
Develtor Property Group Pty Ltd v Newcastle City Council [2001] NSWLEC 47
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCAFC 37; (2011) 191 FCR 400
Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc.) (1986) ATPR 40-748
Kisimul Holdings Pty Ltd v Clear Position Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 317; (2014) 86 NSWLR 645
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
Re Wilson Lovatt & Sons Limited [1977] 1…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Commissioner of Taxation v Warner (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1281
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Taxation v Warner (No 2), the dispute involved the liquidators of respondent companies who refused to comply with a notice issued by the Commissioner of Taxation under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and the Taxation Administration Act 1953. The liquidators argued that these Acts were in conflict with the Corporations Act 2001 and that they would not comply with the notice unless a court order was obtained. The Commissioner had no choice but to initiate proceedings. The liquidators filed a submitting appearance except as to costs, reserving their right to argue on the matter of costs. The court had to decide whether to exercise its discretion to deprive the Commissioner of his prima facie entitlement to costs and whether to award costs against the liquidators personally.

The court examined the legal principles governing the award of costs, noting that the general rule is that a successful party is entitled to its costs. The court considered the unusual circumstances of the case, where the liquidators filed a submitting appearance but did not immunise themselves against an adverse costs order. The court also noted that the liquidators' position was more akin to that of liquidators who had instituted proceedings, and thus they should assume the risk. The court concluded that the interests of justice, including the interests of creditors, were best served by awarding costs against the liquidators personally. Consequently, the court ordered the liquidators to pay the Commissioner's costs and the costs incurred by the Commissioner in arranging for counsel to appear as amicus curiae.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first and second respondents are to pay the costs of the applicant as agreed or assessed.

2. The first and second respondents are to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in arranging for counsel to appear as amicus curiae as on a party-party basis.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In addition to the evidence at trial, the Commissioner relied also on the affidavit, affirmed on 27 July 2015, of the solicitor with conduct of the matter on behalf of the Commissioner which annexed additional correspondence between the parties.3. BACKGROUND Following initial discussions and correspondence between the ATO and the liquidators as to the ATO’s authority to require inspection of the respondent companies’ books and records, the solicitors for the liquidators wrote to the ATO on 11 November 2013 advising of their position, namely that:(1)the Deputy Commissioner was a creditor of the respondent companies;(2)section 486 of the Corporations Act requires a creditor of a company to obtain an order from the Court should it wish to inspect the companies’ records as held by its liquidator;(3)it appears that ss 263 and 264 of the ITAA 1936, on the one hand, and s 486 of the Corporations Act, on the other hand, “are in contradiction to each other. In such a situation, the section that is more specific to the factual situation should prevail. The general law of interpretation is that the general should be read down to the specific. Therefore we believe that the Corporations Act is most applicable in this situation and the DCT should obtain a Court order to inspect the books and records held by our client.” The letter concluded that:Our clients do not wish to be difficult. They are happy to cooperate with you but MUST comply with the law. If your view of the law is different or you can point us to a law which overrides the Corporations Act, please let us know. (Emphasis in the original.) On 10 January 2014 the Deputy Commissioner issued a notice pursuant to s 264 of the ITAA 1936 and s 353–10 of Sch 1 to the TAA requiring the liquidators to produce documents and furnish information to the ATO. The solicitors for the liquidators responded by email on 20 January 2014 advising that unless the notice was withdrawn by 24 January 2014, the liquidators may apply to the Court for directions and injunctive relief, together with costs against the Commissioner. In its response on 21 January 2014, the ATO confirmed that:… the Commissioners [sic] notices were issued for a different purpose than that covered by section 486 of the Corporations Act and… there is no conflict of law. The notices were issued for purposes concerning the income or assessment of entities in the TJT Group and for the purposes of the administration or operation of the New Tax System (The Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999. The Commissioners [sic] intent in issuing the notices was NOT to inspect the books of the company as a creditor as dealt with by section 486 of the Corporations Act.Please note that as the Commissioner considers there is no conflict of law the notices will continue to operate and should be complied with by 11th February 2014. In responding by letter dated 11 February 2014, the solicitors for the liquidators reiterated their position including that, unless the notice was withdrawn, their clients will either seek directions from the Court pursuant to s 511 of the Corporations Act in order to resolve the conflict between the legislation or seek orders pursuant to s 486. The letter further stated that: Arguably of course the Commissioner should make that application. It may be preferable for the position to be resolved by the Court so that the conflict is determined once and for all and our client would be quite content to run the matter as a test case if the Commissioner would provide funding.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While the Commissioner was wholly successful, the question as to how costs should be dealt with in the exercise of the Court’s discretion is complicated by a number of factors, as I explain below. In the unusual circumstances of this case, I consider that the liquidators should be liable for the Commissioner’s costs and for the costs occasioned by the Commissioner in arranging for amicus curiae to act as a contradictor.2. EVIDENCE In addition to the evidence at trial, the Commissioner relied also on the affidavit, affirmed on 27 July 2015, of the solicitor with conduct of the matter on behalf of the Commissioner which annexed additional correspondence between the parties.3. BACKGROUND Following initial discussions and correspondence between the ATO and the liquidators as to the ATO’s authority to require inspection of the respondent companies’ books and records, the solicitors for the liquidators wrote to the ATO on 11 November 2013 advising of their position, namely that:(1)the Deputy Commissioner was a creditor of the respondent companies;(2)section 486 of the Corporations Act requires a creditor of a company to obtain an order from the Court should it wish to inspect the companies’ records as held by its liquidator;(3)it appears that ss 263 and 264 of the ITAA 1936, on the one hand, and s 486 of the Corporations Act, on the other hand, “are in contradiction to each other. In such a situation, the section that is more specific to the factual situation should prevail. The general law of interpretation is that the general should be read down to the specific. Therefore we believe that the Corporations Act is most applicable in this situation and the DCT should obtain a Court order to inspect the books and records held by our client.” The letter concluded that:Our clients do not wish to be difficult. They are happy to cooperate with you but MUST comply with the law. If your view of the law is different or you can point us to a law which overrides the Corporations Act, please let us know. (Emphasis in the original.) On 10 January 2014 the Deputy Commissioner issued a notice pursuant to s 264 of the ITAA 1936 and s 353–10 of Sch 1 to the TAA requiring the liquidators to produce documents and furnish information to the ATO. The solicitors for the liquidators responded by email on 20 January 2014 advising that unless the notice was withdrawn by 24 January 2014, the liquidators may apply to the Court for directions and injunctive relief, together with costs against the Commissioner. In its response on 21 January 2014, the ATO confirmed that:… the Commissioners [sic] notices were issued for a different purpose than that covered by section 486 of the Corporations Act and… there is no conflict of law. The notices were issued for purposes concerning the income or assessment of entities in the TJT Group and for the purposes of the administration or operation of the New Tax System (The Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999. The Commissioners [sic] intent in issuing the notices was NOT to inspect the books of the company as a creditor as dealt with by section 486 of the Corporations Act.Please note that as the Commissioner considers there is no conflict of law the notices will continue to operate and should be complied with by 11th February 2014.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the unusual circumstances of this case, therefore, I have reached the view that the course which best serves the interests of justice, bearing in mind the interests of the creditors, is to award costs against the liquidators personally. It will then be for the liquidators to establish the reasonableness of their conduct in all of the circumstances in due course, should they ultimately seek indemnity against these costs out of the companies’ assets. 5. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, I consider that an order should be made that the liquidators personally pay the costs of the Commissioner in the proceedings and the costs incurred by the Commissioner in arranging for counsel to appear as amicus curiae.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In mid-August 2014, the Commissioner arranged for Mr Michael O’Meara of counsel to appear as amicus curiae to make submissions as a contradictor in the proceedings. 4. CONSIDERATION4.1 General principles The Court has power to award costs in all proceedings under s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act). While the question of costs is a matter for the Court’s discretion, the general rule is that a successful party is entitled to its costs: Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) [2001] FCA 1865; (2001) 115 FCR 229 at 234-235 [11] (Black CJ and French J); Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security (No 2) [2000] FCA 1450 at [2] (Beaumont and French JJ). In Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc.) (1986) ATPR 40-748 at 48,136, Toohey J observed that the discretion must be exercised judicially and identified three principles as to the exercise of the discretion evident from the authorities: 1. Ordinarily, costs follow the event and a successful litigant receives his costs in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order. Ritter v. Godfrey (1920) 2 K.B. 47.2. Where a litigant has succeeded only upon a portion of his claim, the circumstances may make it reasonable that he bear the expense of litigating that portion upon which he has failed. Forster v. Farquhar (1893) 1 Q.B. 564.3. A successful party who has failed on certain issues may not only be deprived of the costs of those issues but may be ordered as well to pay the other party’s costs of them. In this sense, “issue” does not mean a precise issue in the technical pleading sense but any disputed question of fact or of law. Cretazzo v. Lombardi (1975) 13 S.A.S.R. 4 at p. 12. In this case, the liquidators filed a submitting appearance save as to costs, as permitted by r 12.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Federal Court Rules). By doing so, the liquidators indicated that they did not intend to put any argument to the Court on the substantive issues, but reserved their right to argue the matter of costs. As is the case under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), no rule of court or other provision deals with the cost consequences of the filing of a submitting appearance. However under the UCPR, while the making of some other order lies within the court’s discretion, the prima facie rule that costs follow the event is contained in r 42.1 of the UCPR. While the Federal Court Rules do not expressly contain the prima facie rule as to costs, the difference is not a material one given that the same general principle is applied by this Court in any event. The issue is whether, in the principled exercise of the discretion conferred by s 43 of the Federal Court Act, the Court should make an order depriving the Commissioner of his prima facie entitlement to costs: see by analogy Kisimul Holdings Pty Ltd v Clear Position Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] NSWCA 317; (2014) 86 NSWLR 645 (Kisimul Holdings) at 647 [12] (the Court). As to the proper approach where a submitting appearance has been filed, the Court of Appeal held in KisimulHoldings that: 13. In approaching that issue, one immediately encounters what has been said to be another prima facie expectation. In China Shipping (Australia) Agency CoPty Ltd v D V Kelly Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 1557 at [8], Rein J noted that “a defendant who files a submitting appearance except as to costs is prima facie only liable for costs up to the time of service of the submitting appearance and not thereafter”. His Honour referred, in that connection, to Develtor Property Group Pty Ltd v Newcastle City Council [2001] NSWLEC 47 where Bignold J (at [42]) extracted the following proposition from decided cases:“In my judgment, the effect of the Respondent’s submitting appearance in the present case, where that appearance has not been challenged or impugned, is that the submitting party is generally to be regarded as immune from any liability for costs incurred in the proceedings after the filing of the submitting appearance save as to costs (although conformably to principle and case law, the submitting party will be liable for costs incurred by the plaintiff up to the date of the filing of the submitting appearance).”14. The true position is that the question should be approached not by reference to prima facie expectations but according to an appraisal of the circumstances of the case. In particular, attention must be paid to the context in which the submitting appearance was filed. Pertinent, in that connection, are the following observations of Beazley JA (as she then was) in Nyman v Valmas [1997] NSWCA 235:“In my opinion, the filing of a submitting appearance does not denote consent to the orders sought. A submitting appearance (both at first instance and in this Court) may be filed for a variety of reasons. The typical situation is where a party has no vested interest in the outcome of proceedings. This typically occurs in statutory appeals where a necessary respondent is the Court or Tribunal from which the appeal is brought. Another is where a party holds funds as a stakeholder or on trust. However, the occasions where a submitting appearance is filed are by no means limited to such obvious circumstances. A party might submit where the costs of appeal outweigh the amount in dispute so that it was too prohibitive or simply not worth the while of a party to contest the matter. The procedure provided by the submitting appearance is a means of facilitating notice to the Court that the party does not propose to put any argument to the court.”